Drake University v. Des Moines Area Community College FoundationDrake University v. Des Moines Area Community College Foundation
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Des Moines Area Community College Foundation (the “Foundation“). [ECF No. 20]. The Foundation is named as a Defendant alongside Des Moines Area Community College (“DMACC“) (collectively, “Defendants“) in this lawsuit filed by Plaintiff Drake University (“Drake“). The Foundation moves to dismiss the claims brought against it on the basis that it does not engage in any conduct related to the mark at issue in the case.
I. BACKGROUND
In this case, Drake alleges trademark infringement and unfair competition against Defendants arising from DMACC‘s rebranding campaign beginning last year. Specifically, Drake claims that DMACC‘s new school logo and colors violate its intellectual property rights. Defendants deny the substance of the allegations. The Foundation contends that it is not a proper party in this lawsuit because it does not own or exercise control over the allegedly infringing mark, nor does it provide any of the services or goods identified by Drake in the pleadings. The Foundation maintains that Drake does not understand the distinction between the entities, leading
The Foundation seeks dismissal from the case on this basis. It also maintains that the Amended Complaint constitutes a “shotgun” pleading that does not allow it to properly respond to the allegations. Drake resists the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Amended Complaint sufficiently states a claim against the Foundation and it is not an impermissible shotgun pleading. Drake also insists that the Foundation is a required party under
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to
B. Analysis
The Foundation argues that Drake “misidentified” its target because the Foundation is not a proper party. It maintains that the Foundation is “merely the fundraising arm of DMACC whose sole purpose is to raise money.” [ECF No. 20-1 at 4]. Therefore, Drake cannot obtain relief from the Foundation because it does not engage in the conduct alleged in the pleadings. By making no effort to differentiate between its conduct and the conduct of DMACC, the Foundation claims that Drake has no legal theory under which the Foundation can be held liable for the claims brought in the Amended Complaint.
The Foundation also contends that the Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 because it constitutes an impermissible “shotgun” pleading. It argues that Drake does not sufficiently allege which entity is responsible for the specified conduct, leaving the Foundation “to guess as to which allegations in the Amended Complaint” pertain to it. [ECF No. 47 at 2].
1. “Shotgun” Pleading
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Rule 12(e) allows a party to “move for a more definite statement of a pleading” when the subject pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
However, district courts in the Eighth Circuit have occasionally dismissed claims when they are pled against every defendant where the alleged conduct of the specific defendants is meaningfully distinct. See Qwest Commc‘ns Co., LLC v. Free Conferencing, 990 F. Supp. 2d 953, 969 (D. Minn. 2014) (noting that claims brought against “all defendants” are dismissed when “those defendants appeared to be responsible for discrete actions alleged in the complaint, but the complaint did not identify which defendant took which action“); see also Tatone v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 821, 831-40 (D. Minn. 2012) (dismissing complaint where the elements of a cause of action were “cut and paste[d]” and one claim alleged “border[ed] on frivolous” which appeared to be an effort to see which claims “would stick“).
The Amended Complaint contains none of these flaws. Although it is lengthy, there is no basis to support the Foundation‘s contention that it must “guess why it is being sued.” [ECF No. 20-1 at 7]. The Foundation relies on case law that does not support its position. Contrary to the Foundation‘s assertions in the Motion to Dismiss, a complaint does not lack specificity merely because the allegations refer to a group of defendants without differentiating them. Engel v. Buchan, 710 F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2013). In Engel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that factual allegations must be read “sensibly and as a whole” to assess whether there is “genuine uncertainty” about which defendant is responsible for which alleged legal violation. Id.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to seek clarification if a pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”
2. State a Claim for Relief
The Foundation also faults the Amended Complaint for “contain[ing] no legal theory under which” it could be held liable. [ECF No. 20-1 at 4]. According to the Motion to Dismiss, the Foundation does not own or exercise control over the disputed marks or provide any services or goods which allegedly infringe on the mark. Therefore, the Foundation contends that Drake is not able to state a claim for trademark infringement or any of the other claims pled against it. The Foundation argues that in the original complaint, Drake was “clearly attempting” to bring claims against the College, rather than the Foundation. It insists that Drake had an obligation to fix its “mistake” in the original complaint, which means adopting Defendants’ factual assertions that the Foundation is merely conflated with the College. By not substituting parties pursuant to Defendants’ demand, they argue that dismissal is required.
However, the Foundation‘s position runs counter to the standard on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which requires a court to take “all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and mak[e] reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); cf. Wright & Miller § 1356 (“The purpose of a motion under
However, it does not submit or identify any materials properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion which support this assertion. Its factual assertions also contradict the pleadings which, at this stage, are entitled to a presumption of veracity. The only additional documentation filed with the Motion to Dismiss is a copy of email communications between counsel for both parties and a record of a Drake trademark filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. [ECF No. 20-3]. In the exchange, defense counsel advises that the Foundation “does not sell anything or provide any educational services.” Id. at 3. Counsel requested that Drake “refile” the complaint against DMACC rather than the Foundation. Id. An amended pleading would not be resisted by DMACC, according to the email, if Drake agreed to “reset all currently pending deadlines” and also allow a response of up to 50 pages. Id. Counsel‘s representations in email communications with opposing counsel is not “fairly embraced” by the pleadings, nor do they establish that the Amended Complaint does not state a claim for relief against the Foundation at the pleading stage. Taking the factual allegations set forth therein as true, the Amended Complaint states a claim for relief.
Based on the discussion above, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. [ECF No. 20].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 10th day of September, 2024.
STEPHANIE M. ROSE, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT