15 Ala. 423 | Ala. | 1849
A court of law is fully competent to control the acts of their officers, and to set aside sales made by
The first ground relied on, to show that the sale in this case oughtoto be set aside, is, that the land was sold by a deputy of the bank agent. It is contended, that although the agents of the bank, are clothed with the same powers in the execution of process in favor of the bank, that sheriffs possess by law, yet they are not authorized to appoint deputies, or to perform the duties required of them by another. We cannot give so limited a construction to the act, authorizing the State Bank, and its branches, to appoint agents to execute process. The act declares, that the agents shall have the same powers, shall be entitled to the same fees, and shall observe the same regulations, as the existing laws prescribe to sheriffs. We think that this statute intends to invest the agents of the bank, with all the powers, rights, and authority, in reference to the execution of process in favor of the bank, that sheriffs possess, either by common law, or by our statutes. In other words, the agent, is the sheriff for the bank, invested fully with all his authority, and may perform the duties of his office by deputy.
In the case of the Mobile Cotton Press v. Moore & Magee, 9 Ala., 682, it is said, that inadequacy of price, within itself, is not a sufficient ground to set aside a sale of land. See also, Hart v. Blight, 3 Monroe, 273; 1 Lit. Select Cases, 256. But coupled with other circumstances, it may be. I will not lay down the rule so. broad, that mere inadequacy of price may not afford, within itself, such evidences as would super-induce the belief of fraud ; or such gross neglect, in the execution of the process as would require the court to interfere, and set aside the sale. But I do not think, that the price at which the land was sold, in this case, can afford any ground, that will justify a court, in setting it aside. Nor can" we perceive that there are any circumstances connected with the sale, which, in conjunction with the price at which it was sold, will warrant us in setting it aside. The land had been levied on for two months previous to the sale ; no steps were taken to pay the debts, or to stop the executions. The offer to pay one execution, if the agent would postpone the sale, created no legal obligation on him to do it, and indeed he might have subjected himself to legal liability had he complied.
But, it is contended, that the offer of Henderson to pay up ihe judgment against him, is a fact, or circumstance that ought to set the sale aside. If it had been shown, that the land was not legally liable to all the judgments, we should be disposed, indeed compelled, to hold this sufficient ; but it is not stated, that the land was not liable for the payment of all the judgments. Indeed, we are led to the conclusion, from reading the affidavits, that all the judgments were liens on the land, and if Henderson was the owner, at the time of the sale, he held in subordination to those liens.
The affidavits on which the rule was granted, state, that
The judgment of the county court must be reversed.