Dr. Jose A. Saporta, as Conservator and Guardian of Victor J. Saporta, an Incapacitated Protected Person v. Daryl R. Stephenson, M.D.Dr. Jose A. Saporta, as Conservator and Guardian of Victor J. Saporta, an Incapacitated Protected Person v. Daryl R. Stephenson, M.D.
Dr. Jose A. Saporta appeals from the district court’s order granting Dr. Stephensоn’s motion for summary judgment. For reversal, Saporta argues that the district court errеd in ruling that he was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of Dr. Stephensоn’s negligence. We affirm.
•Victor Saporta, Dr. Saporta’s son, was committed to the Norfolk Regional Center (Center), a state hospital established for the treatment of mental diseases. Approximately two months after he had been committed, Victor walked away from the Center and attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself in front of a truck. As a result, Victor was seriously injured.
Dr. Saporta, as Victor’s guаrdian and conservator, filed suit against the State of Nebraska under Nebraska’s Tort Claims Act,
After a five day trial in the state action, the court found that Dr. Sаporta “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the staff doctors, including Dr. Daryl L. Stephenson, nurses, human resource technicians and other рroviders of care at the Norfolk Regional Center failed in any respect to meet the applicable standard of care in the care and trеatment of Victor Saporta * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, Dr. Stephenson moved for summary judgment in the district court action, contending that the judgment of the state triаl court was a full and final determination on the issue of Dr. Stephenson’s alleged nеgligence, thereby precluding any further litigation on the issue. The district court granted this motion.
Collateral estoppel is an issue of substantive law, and therefore а district court in a diversity action must apply the forum state’s common law rule.
Kuehn v. Garcia,
the issue cоncluded must have been identical, must have been or could have been raised and litigated in the prior action, must have been material and relevant to thе disposition of the prior action, and the determination made of the issue in thе prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.
Flobert Industries, Inc. v. Stuhr,
Although Dr. Saporta admits that the issue of Dr. Stephenson’s negligence was litigated and dеtermined in the state court action, he contends that this determination was neithеr material and relevant, nor necessary and essential, and accordingly shоuld not preclude him from relitigating the issue in federal court. He argues that, becаuse the state court never determined that Dr. Stephenson was an employеe of the state, any reference to Dr. Stephenson’s negligence, or lack thereof, was merely dicta and therefore legally insufficient to preсlude him from litigating the issue in district court. We disagree.
Because the state argued thаt Dr. Stephenson was an independent contractor rather than a state еmployee, the state trial court was required to determine whether (1) Dr. Stephenson was negligent, and (2) Dr. Stephenson was an employee of the state. Dr. Saporta offered evidence, including expert testimony, that Dr. Stephenson was nеgligent in the treatment and care of Victor Saporta. Because the court determined that the evidence failed to prove that Dr. Stephenson was negligent, the court apparently found it unnecessary to determine Dr. Stephenson’s employment status. Therefore, contrary to Dr. Sapor-ta’s contention, the issue of Dr. Stephenson’s negligence was relevant and necessary to the court’s resulting judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.