History
  • No items yet
midpage
Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
797 F.3d 859
11th Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 mеaning within the “under indictment” WOLLSCHLAEGER, Dr. Bernd Dr. Ju to some points He also of that statute.7 Schaechter, Tommy dith Dr. Schecht legisla- of federal firearms other sections man, Academy American of Pedia reading a narrow of “under tion to advance trics, Chapter, Florida American indictment.” Academy Family Physicians, of Flori as informa But none of these sections is Phy Chapter, College da American of of express statutory definition tive as sicians, Inc., Chapter, Florida Roland indictment”: term ‘indict “[t]he “under Gutierrez, Stanley Sack, Shannon an indictment or informa ment’ includes Fox-Levine, Plaintiffs-Appellees, a crime tion in court under which v. a term by imprisonment for punishable GOVERNOR of the State OF FLORI exceeding year may prosecuted.” one DA, Secretary, Florida, State of Sur 921(a)(14). § look We must 18 U.S.C. geon Florida, General of State Of law to determine whether Saiz’s cir state Secretary, Health Care Administra satisfied that broad definition. cumstances Florida, tion of the of Division State Hill, 883; also 210 F.3d see United Director, Department Florida of (5th 66, 67-68 Chapman, 7 F.3d States Health, Quality Division of Medical Cir.1993) (“The firearms statute federal Assurance, George Thomas, Jason defers to state law on the definition Rosenberg, Zachariah, Zachariah P. law, ... ‘conviction.’.... Under Texas Tucker, Espinola, Elisabeth Trina remained ‘under indictment’ [Defendant] Stringer, Orr, Gary Merle James Win conviction.”). For during appeal his Sanadi, Nuss, chester, Nabil El Robert above, it clear that the reasons discussed Bearison, Lage, Fred Donald Onelia defendants who are New Mexico considers Mullins, Brigette Goersch, Rivera discharge to conditional to remain Levine, Bradley Defendants-Appel expires. until probation under indictment lants.

III. Conclusion Association, County Medical Broward Society, County Pediatric Broward reasons, AFFIRM foregoing For the we County Society, Palm Beach Medical sixty-month imposed by sentence Association, Florida Public Health court. district University Miami of Law School Clinic, Children’s Health

and Youth Inc., Early Legal Duty, A care is Foundation, Initiative Childhood Pediatrics, Academy American Academy Ado of Child and American Psychiatry, American Acade lescent Family Physicians, my American sug- predicates only posses- argument, there were factual Although Saiz was convicted sion, 922(n) had gesting received a firearm that argue inap- § he had also he does not foreign com- transported in interstate or but been plicable because he was under indictment suggest person who that a possessing merce. We do not barred from a firearm was not Rather, merely possesses a consistently indictment and he is under under the statute. meaning prohibited firearm is within argues that he not under indictment. was because, 922(n). § at oral This is as Saiz conceded *2 Academy Orthopaedic Surgeons, College Surgeons, Ameri

American Medicine, College

can of Preventive College

American of Obstetricians Gynecologist, Congress American

And Gynecologists, And

of Obstetricians Psychiatric Association,

American Jurispru

Center for Constitutional

dence, Responsible Doctors for Gun

Ownership, National Rifle Association America, American Medical Associ

ation, Florida, Aclu Foundation County Society,

Alachua Medical Association,

American Public Health Suicidology,

American Association of Awareness Edu

Suicide Voices of

cation, Law Center to Prevent Gun

Violence, Amicus Curiae.

No. 12-14009. Appeals,

United States Court of

Eleventh Circuit.

July

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Bruce S. Manheim, Jr., Augustine Ripa, Julia Lew- is, LLP, Vice, Ropes Gray, & Daniel R. DC, Kainen, Washington, Dennis G. Weis- Mark, PL, Lucas, berg Kainen Hal M. Hal Lucas, P.A., Mullins, M. Edward M. Asti- Davis, Miami, FL, garraga for Plaintiff- Appellee. Vail, Winsor, Bondi,

Jason Allen C. Pam Osterhaus, Timothy David Attorney Gen- Office, Tallahassee, FL, eral’s for Defen- dant-Appellant. WILSON,

Before TJOFLAT and Circuit Judges, COOGLER,* District Judge. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING TJOFLAT, Judge: Circuit sponte We sua vacate and reconsider original opinion matter, our report- ed at 760 F.3d 1195. We substitute in its place following opinion. Florida,

The Governor of the State of officials, other Florida and members of the Board of Medicine of Depart- the Florida “State”), ment (collectively, of Health appeal from the grant District Court’s summary judgment injunction and an favor of a group physicians physi- cian advocacy groups (collectively, “Plain- tiffs”) enjoining enforcement of Florida’s (the “Act”) Privacy Firearm Owners Act1 on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.

Society traditionally physi has accorded high cians a degree of deference due to * (codified Coogler, Honorable L. Scott United States 1. 2011 Fla. Laws 112 at Fla. Stat. Judge 381.026, District for the 456.072, 790.338). Northern District of §§ Alabama, sitting by designation. *10 Act, knowledge, cy. understanding Given this of the superior their such as factors education, conquer role as in “symbolic light longstanding authority Berg, Paula and death.” good ors of disease of States to define the boundaries of Theory Amendment is, Toward A First practice, medical we that the Act hold Right and the Discourse face, Doctor-Patient a permissible on its restriction of Advice, 74 B.U. Medical Receive Unbiased speech. Plaintiffs remain free— physician (1994). 201, 226 This deference L.Rev. always have been—to assert their apex in the examination room. reaches its rights First Amendment as an affirmative physician’s exami patient enters When in any brought against defense actions room, position is in a patient nation not, by striking them. But we will down must powerlessness. The relative Act, effectively hand Plaintiffs a decla- physician’s her trust place his or ration that such a defense will be success- au physician’s to the guidance and submit ful. thority. we reverse the District Accordingly, authority responsibility. comes With summary grant judgment Court’s society long has im- protect patients, To Plaintiffs, injunc- favor of and vacate the physicians certain duties and posed upon against tion enforcement of the Act. operate to define the restrictions keep- care. In good medical boundaries I. tradition, passed with this the State ing the Act. On June Florida Governor Rick protect patient privacy Act seeks to

The signed the Act into law. The Act Scott by-restricting inquiry irrelevant and rec- 790.338, § created Fla. Stat. entitled ord-keeping by physicians the sensitive firearms; concerning privacy “Medical ownership. The Act does issue of firearm prohibitions; penalties; exceptions,” and speaking from with prevent physicians Bill amended the Florida Patient’s generally. firearms Nor patients about Responsibilities, Fla. Stat. Rights and prohibit specific inquiry it or record- does 381.026, § to include several of the same patient’s about a firearm-owner- keeping amended Fla. provisions. The also ship physician status when the determines 456.072, § entitled “Grounds for dis- Stat. faith, on the circumstances good based enforcement,” pro- cipline; penalties; case, that such informa- patient’s of that measures for violation disciplinary vide for patient’s medical tion is relevant passed legislature of the Act. The Florida safety, or the of others. care or response complaints the Act in personnel that medical were constituents Rather, the Act codifies the common- questions regarding asking unwelcome good conclusion that medical care sense ownership, and that constituents record-keeping or require inquiry does not or discrimination on ac- faced harassment unnecessary to a regarding firearms when ques- refusal to answer such count of their patient’s especially not when care— simply or due to their status as fire- record-keeping constitutes such tions inquiry arm owners.2 upon patient priva- a substantial intrusion privacy, example, widely publicized her the mother refused in a incident an invasion of 2. For Ocala, pediatrician place pediatrician, then terminated took dur- to answer. visit, relationship mother patient’s their and advised the a routine asked a mother thirty days to a new doctor. Fla. kept any her home. she had find whether she firearms in ' Servs., question H.R. Comm. on Health & Human she felt that the constituted Because *11 firearms, provides, part, The Act relevant owns practitioner unless the or practitioners licensed health care and facil- facility in good believes faith that the “in- (i) “may intentionally ities enter” infor- formation is patient’s relevant to the medi- concerning patient’s ownership mation a of safety, others,” cal care or or safety of patient’s firearms into the medical record (iii) 790.338(2); § “may not discriminate” practitioner that the knows is “not relevant against patient a on the basis of firearm patient’s safety, medical care or or 790.338(5); (iv) § ownership, and “should others,” (ii) safety 790.338(1); § of unnecessarily refrain from harassing pa- a respect a patient’s right privacy “shall tient about firearm ownership,” refrain” inquiring and should from as to 790.338(6).3 § patient a family whether or his or her (2011) Analysis (Apr. cerning ownership H.B. 155 Staff 2 patient’s firearm into the 2011). Hiers, Family pedi- practitioner See also Fred medical and record if the knows that tangle gun question, atrician such pa- over Ocala Star- information is not relevant to the Banner, July safety, tient’s medical http://www.ocala.com/ safety care or or the others. article/20100724/articles/7241001. (2) practitioner A health care licensed un- incident, physicians In another refused to chapter der facility 456 or a health care li- provide nine-year-old medical care to a "be- chapter respect pa- censed under 395 shall a cause wanted to know if [the child's right privacy tient’s and should refrain family] had a firearm in their home.” Audio making inquiry asking a ques- written or Regular CD: Session Senate Floor Debate on concerning ownership tions of a firearm by (Apr. HB held the Florida Senate 27- by patient or ammunition by family a 28, 2011) (remarks Evers) (on at 26:32 of Sen. patient, member of the presence or the of a file with Florida Senate Office of the Secre- private firearm in a home or other domicile of tary). example, legislator In another a stated patient family or a patient. member of the that, during appointment daugh- an with his Notwithstanding provision, a health care ter, pediatrician legislator a asked that the practitioner facility or health care gun remove his from his home. Audio CD: good faith believes that this information is Regular Session House Floor Debate on HB patient’s relevant to the medical care or safe- by Representa- held the Florida House of others, ty, may or the make such a 26, 2011) (remarks (Apr. tives Rep. at 26:20 inquiry.... verbal or written Artiles) (on Repre- file with Florida House of (5) practitioner A health care licensed un- Clerk). legis- sentatives Office of the Another chapter der facility 456 or a health care li- reported complaint lator a from a constituent chapter may censed under not discrimi- provider that a health falsely care told him against solely upon nate a based disclosing awas Med- patient's right exercise of the constitutional (remarks requirement. icaid Id. at 13:40 possess own and firearms or ammunition. Brodeur). Rep. legislator relayed That also (6) practitioner A health care licensed un- complaint separated about a mother who was chapter der facility 456 or a health care li- from her children while medical staff asked chapter respect pa- under 395 shall censed the children whether the mother owned fire- legal right possess tient’s to own or a firearm arms. Id. unnecessarily and should refrain from harass- Further incidents are recounted in a Joint ing patient ownership during about firearm Undisputed Statement Facts filed an examination.... parties in the District Court below. Wollsch § Fla. Stat. 790.338. Farmer, laeger v. No. 1:11-CV-22026 provisions The Act also contains related (S.D.Fla. 11, 2011), Nov. Doc. 87. concerning emergency personnel medical and challenged text provisions The full of the companies, insurance affirming right as follows: patients physician ques- to decline to answer (1) tions, practitioner A health care affirming licensed un- that the Act does not alter chapter der [of the Florida existing regarding or a physician’s Statutes] law authori- facility health care chapter 790.338(3), (4), licensed under patients. § zation to choose (7). [of Statutes] Florida not inten- appear challenge Plaintiffs do not tionally and, any enter provisions, disclosed information con- these as the District Court teenth Amendments of the provisions of the of the United States Violation Constitution, declaratory ac- grounds disciplinary seeking for Act constitutes 456.072(2). § Fla. Stat. injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contended that tion under 456.072(l)(nn). Furthermore, unconstitutional, imposes § “[viola- an con- (1)- of subsections provisions speech, tions tent-based restriction on is over- (4) ac- grounds disciplinary broad, unconstitutionally constitute vague. and is *12 456.072(2) and §§] under Stat. [Fla. tion 14, 2011, September finding that On 790.338(8). Thus, § Fla. Stat. 395.1055.” likely were to succeed on the Plaintiffs Medicine of the Florida if the Board of merits, en preliminarily the District Court (the “Board”) finds of Health Department joined inquiry, enforcement of the record- Act, the has violated the physician that a discrimination, keeping, and harassment measures in- disciplinary faces physician Act, together of the with the provisions fines, practice, return cluding restriction discipline physi for provisions providing fees, suspension or revo- probation, Wollschlaeger Act. cians who violate the license. Fla. of his or her medical cation Farmer, F.Supp.2d 814 1384 456.072(2). investigation An culmi- § Stat. (S.D.Fla.2011). initi- may action be nating disciplinary 2, 2012, per On June the District Court Depart- the physician by a against ated enjoined the in manently enforcement of triggered by ment of Health or discrimination, and quiry, record-keeping, § complaint. Fla. Stat. 456.073. citizen’s togeth provisions harassment of the Act— 2, 2011, meeting of minutes of a June disciplinary provi er the related with Rules/Legislative Committee holding, on motions for sum cross sions— prepared Board is Board indicate mary provisions that all four judgment, against disciplinary proceedings to initiate Amendment, the First facially violated Act, stating who violates physician inquiry, record-keeping, “the determined [has] Committee provisions of the Act were void harassment under falls [the Act] violation [that] Farmer, Wollschlaeger v. vagueness. for legal obligation with a comply failure to (S.D.Fla. 1251, 1267-69 F.Supp.2d disciplinary guidelines current and the 2012). apply.” Fla. Bd. of this violation would Comm., Meet- Rules/Legislative Medicine found that Plaintiffs The District Court (Jun. 2011), available at ing Report, Plaintiffs standing to sue because had http://wwlO.doh.state.fl.us/pub/medicine/ to avoid engaging self-censorship were

AgendaMnfo/Public_Information/Public_ action, consti- disciplinary which potential Minutes/2011/Committees/R-L/060211_ injury-in-fact that was cognizable tuted Minutes.pdf. to the Act and redressable fairly traceable at 1258-59. The Dis- by injunction.. Id. days four after Gover- On June claims law, also held that Plaintiffs’ Plaintiffs trict Court signed the Act into nor Scott finding delayed review ripe, § the were against 1983 action filed a U.S.C. Plaintiffs, who hardship “cause to District Court would State in the United States Florida, engage to in self-censor- alleg- would continue for the Southern District development factual and that further record-keeping, ship,” dis- inquiry, that the unnecessary. Id. at was crimination, of of the issues provisions and harassment and Four- 1259. facially violate the First standing chal- held, lack apply physicians, Plaintiffs provisions do not because these lenge regulate any them. physicians do not conduct or merits, Turning to the the District Court harassment provisions of the Act could not found that Act imposed pass a content- constitutional muster. Id. at 1265-67. physicians’ speech based restriction on on The District Court found that the State of firearms. Id. at 1261: The had failed provide any evidence that the rejected District Court argu- confidentiality State’s regarding information ment that the Act permis- patients’ risk, “constitute^] firearm ownership was at regulation professional sible or noting that a may simply decline to occupational conduct that imposed provide information, a mere such and that state speech.” incidental burden on Id. at 1262. and federal pertaining laws to the confi- that, The District Court noted unlike dentiality of medical records provide ade- Act, provisions of the regulations quate protection “[s]uch patients. Id. govern the access or practice of a profes- regard With regulation of profes- sion; they do not burden prohibit sions, truth- the District Court found that the Act *13 ful, non-misleading speech scope within the lacked “narrow specificity,” id. profession.” Id. (quotation omitted), marks because the Act directly targets speech merely rather than The District Court then assessed the imposing an incidental speech. burden on State’s asserted passing interests in the Id. at reasons, 1266-67. For similar Act. The District Court acknowledged that District Court further found that the Act is the State has an in interest protecting its not the least restrictive means of achieving citizens’ Second Amendment right keep Thus, State’s interests. Id. at 1267. arms, and bear but found that right such a the District Court held that the “balance of is “irrelevant” to the Act and therefore is tip interests significantly in favor of safe- legitimate not “a or compelling interest for guarding practitioners’ ability speak it.” 'Id. at 1264. The District Court found freely patients.” to their Id. that, because the State acted on the basis purely anecdotal information pro- and The District Court also held that vided no evidence that discrimination inquiry, record-keeping, and harassment harassment based on firearm ownership provisions of the Act were unconstitution- pervasive, the State does not legiti- ally have a vague. Id. at 1267-69. regard With compelling mate or interest in protecting to the inquiry and record-keeping provi- sions, its citizens “from receipt barriers the District Court found that medical care arising from [such] discrimi- “relevance provide standard” failed to suf- nation or harassment.” (quotation Id. guidance ficient as to what conduct the Act omitted). However, marks prohibits. District Id. at regard 1268. With Court found that legitimate— Florida has provision, harassment the District Court perhaps but compelling “in noted that the term “harass” has an ordi- —interests protecting patients’ privacy regarding nary meaning clear, id., that is readily but their or use” and in the “[w]hat constitutes ‘unnecessary harass- regulation professions. Id. at 1265. ment’ anyone’s is left to guess,” id. at 1269. The District Court noted that it did not Balancing physicians’ free speech rights need to address argument Plaintiffs’ against legitimate the State’s interests the Act is overbroad because doing so protecting patient privacy regulating and would not change the outcome. Id. at professions, the District Court held 1270 n. 7. regardless of scrutiny whether strict that — or some lesser Thus, standard in- applied the District finding the —the Court— quiry, record-keeping, discrimination, remaining provisions and of the Act severa- however, for we an independent Plaintiffs’ motion sum- conduct' ex granted ble— record, granted part subjecting and and amination of the whole mary judgment, findings motion for sum- the District Court’s of ‘constitu part the State’s denied According- at 1270. tional facts’—those facts “that mary judgment.4 Id. involve the ly, permanently [defendant] the District Court en- reasons took the chal enforcing lenged from the record- action”—to de novo joined the State review. ACLU Fla., harassment, Bd., Cty. and discrim- Inc. v. Miami-Dade keeping, inquiry, Sch. (11th Cir.2009). Act, 790.338(1), § 557 F.3d provisions ination We (2), (5), (6), enforcing questions concerning and also review de novo 790.338(8), provided jurisdiction, § to the extent that it our matter such as 790.338(1) (2) Basham, standing ripeness. § con- that violations of Elend (11th Cir.2006). action, 1199, 1204 disciplinary and 471 F.3d grounds stitute for 456.072(l)(nn), pro- § the extent that it 790.338(1), (2), §of

vided that violations III. (5) (6) grounds disciplin- constitute begin by taking up We the issue of ary action. Id. justiciability. The District Court found July timely ap-

On State standing Plaintiffs had to sue because judgment. pealed the District Court’s We engaging self-censorship, were jurisdiction pursuant have to 28 U.S.C. cognizable injury-in- which constituted a §§ *14 and 1291. 1331 fairly fact traceable to the Act and re- by injunction.

dressable 880 F.Supp.2d 1258-59. The State contends that this II. was error, because the Act prohibit does not grant We review a district court’s physicians asking patients from about fire- summary judgment de novo. Thomas arm ownership, providing firearm Inc., 1361, Cooper Lighting, v. 506 F.3d counseling, or recording information con- (11th Cir.2007). “Summary judg 1363 cerning patients’ ownership. appropriate gen ment is when ‘there is no argues physicians may that engage State uine issue of material fact and ... in such conduct when it is relevant to moving party entitled to a a judgment is as care, relevant, patients’ and even not when ” (alteration original) matter of law.’ Id. merely suggests physicians the Act that 56(c)). A (quoting genuine Fed.R.Civ.P. inquiring “should refrain” from as to fire- issue of material fact exists “if the evi 790.338(2). § ownership. arm Fla. Stat. jury dence is such that a reasonable could hortatory language, argues, Such the State nonmoving party.” return a verdict for the physi- a that does not constitute mandate v. Four United States Parcels Real Thus, inquire. cians must not the State Cir.1991) (11th 1428, Prop., 941 F.2d 1437 Act in fact argues, because the does not omitted). (quotation marks actually prohibit the conduct Plaintiffs in, a legal engage standing We review district court’s wish to Plaintiffs lack ordinarily they Act not challenge determinations de novo and re to because have Moreover, findings injury-in-fact. view its factual for clear error. demonstrated Amendment, argues, obligation In the context of the First the State we have an 790.338(3), (4), (7), finding § granted physicians, that 4. The District Court the State’s mo summary judgment standing challenge respect tion for with Plaintiffs lacked these Farmer, provisions provisions. Wollschlaeger apply of the Act that neither 1251, (S.D.Fla.2012). practitioners regulate any by F.Supp.2d nor conduct Indeed, leaving a mere recommendation the Constitution. aside read the Act as Act, in- physician facing malpractice refrain irrelevant lia- physicians firearms, about quiry record-keeping bility professional for a wide swath of ac- valid. to construe the tivity involving speech theoretically order could raise a First Amendment defense. that the District Court We find mounting challenge In a facial Plaintiffs’ claims are properly held that Act, however, sought Plaintiffs a First justiciable. standing, In to have “a order brought Amendment defense to action injury an present claimant must against physician based on tar- concrete, and actual or im particularized, geted by the Act. The State contends that minent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s only proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ First behavior; likely to be re challenged proceeding Amendment defense is a live ruling.” dressed a favorable Davis v. words, brought under the Act. In other FEC, 724, 733; 2759, (2008). arguing challenge facial Plaintiffs’ However, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 justiciable, saying the State is “[standing dispensed gross. is not Plaintiffs must wait until have been Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate subjected discipline pursuant to the Act. standing press for each claim he seeks to sought.” for each form of relief that is resolving standing Crucial to (citations Id. at 128 S.Ct. at 2769 question is the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. omitted) omitted). (quotation marks law, controlling apply “Under case we outset, At the we note that Plaintiffs’ injury-in-fact requirement loosely most challenge First Amendment to the Act rights where First Amendment in are equivalent viewed as the functional volved, lest free be chilled even argument of a First Amendment raised as before the law or regulation is enforced.” hypothetical an affirmative defense in a Bar, Harrell v. The Fla. 608 F.3d brought against physician case for asking (11th Cir.2010) (citing Hallandale *15 questions irrelevant firearms about con- Fighters 'l Fire City Local 2238 v. Prof trary good to A practice. physi- medical Hallandale, (11th 922 F.2d Cir. cian could raise such a in a defense disci- 1991)). plinary proceeding brought under the Act alleged injury Plaintiffs’ sole is self- conduct, or, matter, for such for that in a censorship, may a cognizable which in malpractice brought action in court for jury-in-fact for standing purposes. See id. example, patient such conduct. For a (“[I]t is well-established ‘an actual could file a alleging physi- lawsuit that a injury plaintiff can exist when the is chilled malpractice by cian committed unnecessar- from exercising right expres her to free

ily harassing patient about firearm forgoes sion or in expression order to ownership just patient poten- as a could — ” avoid enforcement consequences.’ (quot tially file a alleging physi- lawsuit that a Cole, ing Pittman v. 267 F.3d malpractice by cian committed unnecessar- (11th Cir.2001))). ily harassing about other topic. physician could choose admit To a cognizable establish self- purportedly harassing speech to the censorship injury and purposes for the of a plead claim, the First Amendment as an affirma- plaintiff First Amendment “must defense, that, tive contending effect that the show as a result of his desired ex (1) rejection court’s of the affirmative defense pression, prose he was threatened with (2) (3) cution; would constitute state action in violation of prosecution likely; or battery questions prosecution.” counseling a credible threat of and re- there is (internal quotation marks omit- Id. at 1260 garding safety health and risks (including, ted). proceeds under plaintiff If a example, poisonous chemicals eredible-threat-of-prosecution prong, he home, alcohol, tobacco, swimming and “[FJirst, that he seri- must demonstrate: Act, pools). After passage of the Plaintiffs engage expression ously wishes have practice curtailed or eliminated this arguably by perti- is at least forbidden facing discipline.5 for fear of second, law, nent and that there is at least minimal the chal- probability

some Plaintiffs have established that if lenged rules will be enforced violated.” they engage wish to in conduct that is at omitted) (citations omitted) Id. (emphasis arguably least forbidden the Act. In omitted). (quotation marks “If a chal- practice medicine, their preventative enacted, recently lenged law or rule was or questions Plaintiffs wish to ask and record enforcing authority defending if the regarding information firearms as mat court, challenged law or rule an intent ter of making particu routine —without Id. may to enforce the rule be inferred.” larized determination of relevance —which at 1257. implies inquiry some such and recor- will that, dation not be relevant explain part as health

Plaintiffs care, patients or others and thus practice preventative physi- some routinely prohibited by would be the Act. The Act patients they cians ask whether recently was verbally enacted, firearms —either or via a and the State is own it, defending screening questionnaire provide fire- so we infer that there is —and safety counseling, part larger probability arm of a at least some that the Act will Complaint lays specifics out the firearm Plaintiffs' and entered related in- physicians’ practices regarding They individual formation into their medical records. inquiries safety counseling. firearm For practice pas- have even after continued Act, example, prior passage of the Dr. sage they good of the Act because believe in Wollschlaeger patients complete asked his questions faith that such and information are questionnaire questions However, that included re- patients’ relevant to their care. garding ownership, routinely they asking follow-up ques- now refrain from orally patients they asked whether owned fire- patients parents tions when or their seem present when, arms if other risk factors were upset by screening question, the initial —such home, patients as when had children in the Act, prior passage would not addiction, suffering depression, were Similarly, have refrained. Dr. Gutierrez con- ideation, family an suicidal had unstable envi- patient questionnaire tinues to use a that in- *16 ronment, were involved in a domestic- question ownership, cludes a about firearm provide violence situation —to firearm asking any but has resolved to refrain from counseling patient’s to the tailored circum- follow-up questions patient initially should a Act, passage stances. After of the Dr. appear topic. disinclined to discuss the Dr. Wollschlaeger has removed the firearms-relat- previous practice of be- Sack has ended his questions questionnaire his ed from and no ginning safety counseling by his firearm ask- longer orally questions regarding asks firearm ing patients they a firearm in whether have ownership part or discusses firearms as of his However, he continued to the house. has preventative counseling. standard framing provide safety counseling, it firearm pa- hypothetical terms not tailored to his physicians party The other who are to this individual Dr. Fox-Le- tients’ circumstances. practice asking suit have limited their Act, has, passage removed vine since questions providing counseling and about questions regarding safety, firearm varying but still do to de- so questionnaire, intake but continues to ad- grees. example, prior passage her For to Act, patients safety, vise some about firearm fram- Dr. Schaechter and Dr. Schechtman rou- tinely patients questions regard- hypothetical asked their her advice in terms. Thus, objectionable. predictably deem Without Plaintiffs if violated.6 be enforced stage, at this the ultimate cognizable determining, self-censor- a have established accept Amendment argument, their First Plaintiffs’ we injury for merits of ship to is at language point Plaintiffs claims.7 that the Thus, vague. Plaintiffs arguably least cogni a Similarly, to establish self-censor- cognizable have established pur injury for the self-censorship zable claim. injury vagueness their ship for claim, plaintiff must vagueness poses of “(1) seriously wishes that: he show they that curtailed their Plaintiffs claim (2) [speech] arguably would [speak]; such inquiry counseling practices and firearms rules, the rules are by the but be affected Act, they that would re- and due vague they apply as arguably at least Thus, the Act. practices those but for sume (3) him; a minimal there is least and fairly self-censorship injury is Plaintiffs’ enforced, will that the rules be probability Act, and re- passage traceable (empha at 1254 they if are violated.” Id. Accordingly, by injunction. dressable omitted) (citations omitted) (footnote sis standing. have Plaintiffs omitted). existence, Notably, “it is the not require standardless imposition, argues The that Plaintiffs State (alter injury.” Id. ments that causes [the] regard inquiry standing lack with original) (quoting Legal CAMP ation provision provision of the because Atlanta, Fund, City Inc. v. Def. Thus, nothing at all. prohibits in fact Cir.2006)). (11th 1257, 1275 F.3d claims, will Plaintiffs’ fear State objectively reason discipline face is not above, discussed For the reasons Ga., Bar able. See Wilson State third have met the first and Plaintiffs Cir.1998) (“A (11th party’s F.3d regard prong, to the second prongs. With may subjective prosecuted fear that she be it unclear whether argue Plaintiffs expressive activity will not engaging for re inquiries record-keeping routine and standing injury to constitute an for be held firearms, part of the garding made as objectively that fear is purposes unless preventative medicine and practice reasonable.”). proposed the State’s Under patients’ particularized circum based on construction, merely the Act recommends stances, qualify as “relevant” to health refrain” from ask physicians “should safety,-and that the law does not define rele ing questions about firearms unless “unnecessarily harassing” or “dis terms vant, hortatory language and that such criminate,” leaving physicians without speech. does not constitute bar guidance pro to what conduct the Act the Executive Di points State out physicians may hibits and when in a letter— may un- rector of the Board stated discipline patients for conduct acknowledge provide 7. We that the harassment 6. We note that the Act does not for partic- provisions of the Act in discrimination only disciplinary penalties, ac criminal but ular, 790.338(5) (6), prohibit § conduct Nevertheless, standing tion the Board. speech. to no Never- that theless, involve little purposes, disciplinary action the threat of self-censorship claim as a Plaintiffs *17 Bar, may be sufficient. See Harrell v. The Fla. challenged provisions of the result of all four 1241, 1248, (11th Cir.2010) 608 F.3d 1260 regulate challenged provisions Act. As all four standing challenge (finding attorney an had speech, arguably involves this is conduct that attorney advertising the state bar’s rules when standing purposes. We need sufficient for not, consequence noncompliance was dis for course, evaluate the merits of these action, disbarment). ciplinary as such standing stage. at the claims

877 (2013) shortly (holding attorneys Board’s after 264 posted to the website and var- labor, rights, legal, the Board does ious human Plaintiffs filed suit—that and media provision organizations as a cannot interpret inquiry “manufacture stand- ing” challenge provision but rather as a recommenda- of the prohibition, For- (contradicting eign Intelligence a letter the Executive Surveillance Act tion of 1978 previously “by choosing mailed to Florida expenditures Director had make based stating the Accord- on physicians opposite). hypothetical plain- future where .harm” contends, ingly, merely speculate government the State there is no credi- tiffs that the communications, regard target threat of enforcement with to will their ble and so inquiry provision. they the costs incurred were product surveillance). generalized their fear of disagree. Laws—such as the We Moreover, we note that the Board has disciplinary for action provide Act—that position not been consistent in its that the generally in should not be ease of violation inquiry provision hortatory, as indicated interpreted hortatory. Compare as Liese by the Executive Director’s letter first Sec’y Affairs, v. Veterans 312 gang stating contrary. The State is also (“In (Fed.Cir.2002) 1368, 1377 F.3d interpretation inconsistent in its any consequences absence of for noncom refrain” in language “should its briefs. plianсe, timing provisions are at [a law’s] instance, For it repeatedly characterizes precatory mandatory.”), best rather than in language provi identical the harassment Kornstein, 531, Kittay v. 230 F.3d with mandatory prohibition sion of the Act as a (2d Cir.2000) (noting n. 3 that attor against unnecessary harassment. State’s ney disciplinary mandatory rules “are 1, 6, 18, 27, 8, Br. at n. It also mini they character” because “state the inquiry provision describes itself as mum level of conduct below which no law ... “proscribing] inquiries,” id. at yer being subject can fall without to disci conduct,” “prohibiting] id. at 39. Wil Cf. omitted)), (quotation action” plinary marks son, (holding at 1428-29 F.3d Born, Inc., and Edwards 792 F.2d attorneys standing disbarred lacked (3d Cir.1986) (noting attorney 391-92 challenge State Bar rules that limit the disciplinary mandatory” rules “are be ways attorneys rep which disbarred can attorneys discipline cause are to the public resent themselves or have them). Thus, violating despite for contact with clients where “the State Bar position Board’s as the Executive —insofar repeatedly consistently taken ha[d] represent Director’s letters it—that position [challenged thé rules] inquiry provision constitutes a recommen application types no of scenar ha[d] mandate, dation rather than a the fact attorneys posed”). ios the have disbarred provides disciplinary that the Act for ac that, against controlling tion Plaintiffs case of a violation Neither is it as the contends, provides Supreme evidence that Plaintiffs’ fear that State the Florida they may discipline objectively face rea term interpreted Court “should” standing purposes. Notably, hortatory reviewing Florida’s sonable Code generalized disciplin this is not a fear of Judicial Conduct. See In re Code Judi (Fla. action, Conduct, ary specific apprehen but rather a cial 643 So.2d 1994). specific group physicians— interpretation sion is irrelevant to Such — legis targets. determining whose conduct the Act But what effect the Florida cf. Amnesty give language in the Clapper v. Int'l lature intended to USA -, Thus, 185 L.Ed.2d Act. Plaintiffs’ fear that *18 discrimination, and harass- inquiry provision ing, inquiry, discipline under

face impermissi- provisions ment objectively reasonable.8 is Act10— bly upon rights trench their under the that Plain argues also State view, Act First Amendment. In their standing regard to the rec tiffs lack with is a content-based restriction of the Act because it ord-keeping provision such, and as is to—and fails—strict entry of firearm infor only proscribes the scrutiny. Plaintiffs also assert that to medical care mation that is not relevant is, overbroad; they Act is that claim that injury safety, and Plaintiffs claim no or is regulation even if the Act’s from a wish to record irrelevant arising constitutional a limited number situa- However, claim an information. Plaintiffs tions, proscribes it nonetheless a substan- preventative injury practice to their speech, and must legitimate tial amount of arising being from not free to medicine Second, argue fall. Plaintiffs that the Act every the firearm information of record rights under the Due Process violates their patient as a matter of course. Some— Amendment, in Clause of the Fourteenth majority these records perhaps —of they vague that the Act’s terms are so be irrelevant to the care and will therefore put person ordinary intelligence fail to Thus, patients and others. prohibits. the Act on notice as what argument unavailing: Plaintiffs State’s injury arising, part, claim an from a begin with the latter contention We will desire to record irrelevant information. and then move to the First Amendment Brooks, challenges. Borgner See Accordingly, we find that the District (11th Cir.2002) (“Before F.3d properly Court held that Plaintiffs have un analyzing challenged state [the statute] standing to the Act. also challenge We find [appropriate der the level of First Amend properly that the District held that Court scrutiny], ment we must first determine adjudication.9 ripe Plaintiffs’ claims are statute, whole, whether the taken as a IV. required clear as far as what is and what is prohibited.”). Now for the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ facial attacks on the arise A. separate provisions

under two of the Con- First, void-for-vague Under “[t]he stitution. contend (6) 790.338(1),(2), (5), doctrine[,] record-keep- § ... ‘a statute which either ness —the accept argument 8.We do not Plaintiffs’ withdraw this recommendation should the in- construing inquiry provision’s given "should re quiry relevant in a case. Neverthe- language hortatory less, frain” as would render inquiry we find that the clause is not a meaningless portion provision al recommendation, rejection mere and our physicians lowing to nevertheless make fire argument Plaintiffs' does not alter the result inquiries doing when rele arm so would be standing inquiry. of our safety. Corley vant to care and See v. United States, appeal 9. The State does not renew on its (2009) ("[A] 173 L.Ed.2d 443 statute argument ripe. that Plaintiffs’ claims are not given should be so that effect is construed Thus, we will not the issue in detail. address provisions, part all its so that no will be insignifi inoperative superfluous, void or challenge 10. Plaintiffs' is limited to these four omitted)). (quotation cant.” marks Even if provisions. Accordingly, context de- unless inquiry provision we were to construe otherwise, to the Act mands future references physicians mere recommendation that refrain only should be understood to refer to these firearms, inquiring perfectly about it is provisions. legislature may reasonable wish

879 doing challenged provisions, of an act after requires forbids or which we ad common vague [persons] so specific terms Plaintiffs’ dress contentions. See necessarily guess at its intelligence must Oklahoma, 601, Broadrick v. 413 U.S. 617 meaning application, and differ as to its 16, 2908, 2919, n. 93 S.Ct. 37 L.Ed.2d 830 process the first essential of due violates (1973) (“[A] federal court must determine ” Foods, Specialty v. law.’ Harris Mexican what a state statute means before it can Cir.2009) (11th Inc., 1301, F.3d 1310 564 judge its facial constitutionality.”). We do (third in original) (quoting alteration Rob light so in of the familiar principle that 609, 629, Jaycees, 104 erts v. U.S. 468 U.S. “readily susceptible where a statute is to a (1984)). 3244, 3256, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 S.Ct. narrowing construction that avoids consti Thus, unconstitutionally vague a statute is infirmities,” tutional uphold we must it. public if “it leaves the uncertain as to the Lamar, Life, Right See Fla. Inc. v. 273 prohibits judges conduct it or leaves (11th Cir.2001). 1318, 1326 F.3d decide, legally jurors any free to without standards, prohibited fixed what particular in each case.”

what is not Giac 399, 402-03, Pennsylvania, 382 cio v. U.S. record-keeping provision pro The 518, 520-21, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 86 S.Ct. physicians “intentionally hibits en (1966). tering] any disclosed information concern ownership patient’s firearm into the Supreme explained has Court [physician] medical record if the knows permissible statutory that “standards of that such information is not relevant to the in the area of free vagueness are strict Button, patient’s safety, medical care or or the v. 371 expression.” NAACP U.S. 790.338(1). 337, 415, 432, safety § 83 S.Ct. 9 L.Ed.2d 405 of others.” Fla. Stat. (1963). Nonetheless, “perfect clarity and points regard We note three salient with guidance required precise First, have never been provision. the substantive regulations expressive even of that restrict prohibition contained in the first clause— Racism, activity.” Against Ward v. Rock “intentionally that a physician 781, 794, 2746, 2755, 105 491 U.S. concerning enter disclosed information (citation (1989) omitted); L.Ed.2d 661 see ownership,” firearm id.—is conditioned on Grayned City Rockford, also 408 U.S. relevancy requirement in the second 104, 110, 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d- S.Ct. American Dictio clause. See New Oxford (1972) (“Condemned to the use of (3d ed.2010), nary http:// available words, expect we can never mathematical www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ such, certainty language.”). our As “if,” in american_english/if (defining vagueness in “speculation possible about sense, conjunction “intro- first which hypothetical situations not before the clause”). a conditional The sub duc[es] support will not a facial attack on a Court prohibition applies only when the stantive surely it statute when valid the vast met—i.e., in the second clause is condition majority applications.” of its intended that information physician when a knows Colorado, Hill v. 120 concerning firearm is not rele (2000) 147 L.Ed.2d 597 or safe patient’s vant to the medical care omitted) (citation (quotation marks omit ty, safety Logically, or the of others. ted). not know that infor physician when does ownership is concerning mation begin by setting We forth our un patient’s medical care or derstanding meaning of each of the irrelevant to the others, statutory prohibi- apply plain meaning safety, or *20 language ambiguous.”). unless it is “Rele- apply. tion does not vant” means to the matter at. “[r]elated is Second, relatedly, the statute hand; point; pertinent.” American to the degree of certain- require high a written to Lan- Heritage Dictionary English of the part on the of the ty as to non-relevance 1969). (William ed., Morris guage 1098 prohibition takes ef- physician before agree relevancy require- that the Act’s We terms, provision only pro- By fect. its ment, neat, a does not have one-size-fits-all entering informa- physicians hibits definition; rather, necessarily relevancy is ownership concerning firearm when tion case-by-case determined on a basis. That knowledge of irrele- physician has is, whether information is related to the Any regarding mental state irrele- vance. entirely depends matter at hand on the to the of that does not rise level vance specifics reading of the matter at hand. A trigger the knowledge prohibi- would not ownership about firearm that information tion. would, indeed, every in is relevant case course, if Finally, prohibition ap- record-keeping provision super- render the fluous, problem easily is avoided physician a knows the but this plies only when by adhering plain-meaning to a construc- irrelevant, then the criti- to be information relevancy as an ad hoc determina- tion of meaning relevancy of the cal issue is the tion, a or requiring physician to base his argue that requirement. Plaintiffs relevancy as to the of a her calculation pro- it vague is because does not provision firearms-ownership par- status on patient’s notice as to when vide them with sufficient patient. ticularized information about the record-keeping regarding firearms is rele- relevancy, By employing a flexible stan- safety. vant to medical care or Plaintiffs dard, provides with the physicians the Act specify whether note that the does regarding to record information freedom particularized must make a physician ownership doing firearm whenever so patient of relevance for each or finding practice good of the medi- part would be physician’s general whether a belief cine. always firearms are relevant will suffice. points together, three we Taking these They argue that the Act does not also record-keeping provision think the stands specify physician if a must believe simple proposition physician for that a information is relevant at the time may patient’s not record a firearm-owner- record-keeping, good- or if a inquiry ship physician status unless the believes faith that the information later belief particularized of some infor- that —because (such practice become relevant as in the patient, mation about the individual medicine) preventative satisfies the re- example, patient that the is suicidal or has Act. Plaintiffs contend quirements of the patient’s firearm- violent tendencies —the that, reading information because pertains patient’s ownership status always about firearms is relevant would safety, medical care or or the meaningless, physicians render the Act record-keeping provision others. The reasonably requires fear that the Act some sufficiently person that a of common clear higher, level of relevance. unspecified intelligence guess need not as to what it plain meaning find that recourse to We prohibits.

resolves the issue. See Johnson Gover (11th Fla., nor 405 F.3d Cir.2005) (en banc) (“The step first stat inquiry provision phrased differently, but we think it is sub- utory interpretation requires slightly that courts context, record-keeping requirement simply stantially similar means practical its effect. physician terms of that a should provision base his or her physicians directs provision This ‍‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‍calculation relevancy pa- of a particular- tient’s of firearms on making inquiry a written or refrain from Thus, concerning patient. ized information about the asking questions the owner- by physician may a firearm or ammunition make ship inquiries as to the family member firearms-ownership status of or all patient, presence or the of a firearm a patients, long so as he or she does so with *21 home or other domicile of the private good-faith the specif- belief—based on the family pa- member of the patient or a patient’s ics of the inquiry case—that the provision, Notwithstanding tient. this a patient’s is relevant to the medical care or in [physician] good ... faith be- safety, safety If, or the of others. that this information is relevant to lieves example, physician the seeks firearm infor- safety, care or patient’s the medical personal agenda mation to suit a unrelated others, safety may make such a the safety, to medical care or he or she would inquiry. or written verbal making “good-faith” not be a inquiry, and 790.338(2). plainly § Fla. so Stat. the directs him refrain inquiring. again, prohibition Here the substantive qualified by relevancy requirement, is Accordingly, we conclude that inqui- effectively providing physicians ry provision sufficiently clear that a inquire good whenever faith believe person intelligence of common need not ownership that firearm information is rele- guess prohibits. as to what it safety. Again, vant to medical care or provision high sets a bar as to the mental necessary trigger prohibition: state Finally,11 the provi harassment any good-faith lack physician must belief sion also contains the same basic elements relevancy as to the of the information. provisions, as the first two albeit with a provision require physicians The does not provi few modifications. The harassment knowledge to have of relevance before physicians sion directs to “refrain from only a speaking, good-faith but as to belief unnecessarily harassing a patient about Although phrased relevance. this is differ- ownership during аn examination.” ently record-keeping provision’s than the 790.338(6). § Fla. Stat. Like record- relevancy requirement, we think the two keeping inquiry provisions, the harass provisions form two sides of the same coin. provision impose ment does not a flat ban prohibitions apply physician when a issue, qualifies on the but rather the information to be knows irrelevant here, necessity require its with a ban— apply physician good- do not if the has a statute, ment. Under the terms of the faith the information is rele- belief physicians only prohibited from ha are vant. rassing patients about firearm And, record-keeping provi- as with the unnecessary. harassmeht is when such sion, relevancy key clause is also here. again way Plaintiffs that the term “rele- One which the harassment assert above, vague, provision previous vant” is but as we observed differs from the two result, cross-appealed 11. Plaintiffs have not Dis- ness. As a we need not address their .the holding argument trict Court’s that the discrimination that what constitutes "discrimina- 790.338(5), provision, vague- provision § is not void for tion” is unclear. under of the medical ex- however, regard purpose to related to the is with provisions, Second, relevancy require- triggers amination. standard the mental-state record-keeping present of ments both the Instead prohibition. the substantive inquiry provisions illuminate the prohibiting high bar before imposing necessity requirement meaning irre- of the knowledge of speech requiring — require- provision. the harassment These good-faith levance or the absence manifestly particularized ments turn on a pro- harassment of relevance —the belief formula, physician as to the a rela- determination imposing this flips vision care relevancy of the to the medical permitting before tively high bar safety or the patient, firearm own- or speech. Harassment about explic- link necessary. others. While that is not made only permitted when ership is inversion, necessity require- it in connection with the by this are not troubled We ment, however, implication, given pat- we dis- the clear although, because tern, necessity below, imagine requirement scenarios in is that the cuss we can *22 warranted, object: directed to the same the medical might which “harassment” be advisable, safety patient, safety in ma- care or of or the we think that the the even cases, Imposing of it will not be. of others. jority permit- standard before rigorous a more express Plaintiffs concern that the rele ting record-keeping inquiry might or solely a vancy hinge determination will on question, a .but we present more difficult particular patient’s subjective understand inappropriate pre- think it as a do not “unnecessary of what constitutes requisite permitting “harassing.” to harassment,” result, and that as a necessity may subjected liability discipline re be to or Finally, we think that the arbitrary in an record-keeping like the and basis. Were this indeed quirement, ease, provision likely in the context the the would be quiry provisions, when read whole, Walters, provision and the Act as a invalid. See Conant v. 309 F.3d of the (9th Cir.2002) 629, requiring particu (holding also has the effect of a a statute physician providing against larized determination the for administrative action in Young Progressive physicians engage to relevance. See v. who that “the (Fla.2000) Co., to patient Se. Ins. 753 So.2d believes be recommendation (“[A]ll marijuana” read narrow parts requisite of a statute must be lacks the Amendment); specificity together in order to achieve consistent under the First “ Collins, whole,” courts possible, see also Thomas ‘[w]here (1945) statutory provisions 89 L.Ed. 430 give must effect to all statutory provisions (striking grounds on First Amendment and construe related ”), harmony criminalizing in one another’ cited with statute solicitation of mem with approval Borgner, bership 284 F.3d 1208. certain unions without state license because the statute did not distin points inform this conclusion. Two advocacy, guish between solicitation and First, contains provision the harassment wholly ... “put[ speaker so the ] an ’limitation: unneces- explicit temporal mercy understanding the the varied sary prohibited “during an harassment consequently his hearers and of whatever 790.338(6). § examination.” Fla. Stat. to inference be drawn as his intent of a medical examination purpose Since meaning”). care, of medical it seems provision is the logical Again, plain meaning harassment is we find the assume if context, dispel it must be term sufficient to these fears. “Ha- permissible within that persis- only means disturb or irritate safety “[t]o rass” firearm advice which is rele- Heritage Dictionary American tently.” necessary, vant and he or she need not (William English Language Morris discipline fear at the hands the Board or ed.1969). When read the context of the monеy judgment a court of law. whole, provision Act as a the harassment physicians

communicates that should not disparage firearm-owning patients, and summarize, To we read the Act persist speak attempting should prohibit record-keeping about firearm about firearm ownership only when physician knows is not relevant to when medical such information to be irrelevant to the safety. Like provisions care or the other of patient’s safety, medical care or' or the Act, provision targets the harassment safety others; inquiry about firearm physicians pursue agenda who wish to an ownership only when physician lacks a safety. unrelated to medical care or good-faith belief that the information is relevant patient’s to the medical care or Although the District Court found the safety, safety others; or the and harass “unnecessarily” modifier problematic, ment about ownership only when disagree. we The modifier in fact allows physician does not it necessary believe physicians the freedom to challenge -i.e.,— patient’s medical safety, care or patients regarding firearms “harass” — of others. when, particularized under circum- case, of the patient’s doing stances so is Having determined that the record- *23 reasons, necessary for health safety or keeping, inquiry, and provi- harassment patient if the might physi- even find the clarity sions are of sufficient to conform to example, cian’s advice unwelcome. For if the requirements process, of due we hold suicidal, a patient physician may is wish that the District Court erred in finding attempt persuadé to patient the to re- vagueness. them void for home, patient’s move firearms from the B. patient initially objects.

even if the So if physi- even the considers the turn now to the first of We Plaintiffs’ cian’s health and advice related to challenges. First Amendment We need harassing, firearms to be the inclusion only proceed apply First Amendment “unnecessarily” the modifier leaves room scrutiny regulates activity to the Act if it physicians deliver such advice when the falls within ambit of the First necessary safety, to medical care or consis- Therefore, protections. Amendment’s we with the provisions. tent Act’s other analysis by begin resolving our a neces- provision sufficiently harassment is clear sary preliminary any issue: whether of the person intelligence that a of common need challenged' provisions implicate signifi- guess prohibits. as to what it “speech” cant as that term amount is in the context of understood First Amend- point, patients by As a final we note that ment law. subject physicians themselves cannot

discipline. complaint Patients file a triggers investigation by

which an the Board, they may bring malpractice or the and Four Under First action, Amendments, long physician operat- prohibited but so as a is teenth States are good “mak[ing] [any] abridging faith within the law ... boundaries speech.” good practice, providing medical and is the freedom of U.S. Const. GOGO support for this The State finds Amendment literal I.12“The First

amend. Shore, in Locke v. 634 F.3d proposition abridgment only ‘speech,’ ly the forbids (11th Cir.2011). case, In that we said 1185 recognized pro that its long have but we practice governs statute spoken “[a] not end at tection does Johnson, is not unconstitutional as occupation 491 of an Texas v. written word.” 2533, 2539, right speech, of the to free abridgement 105 an 109 S.Ct. U.S. (1989). any right of that long so as inhibition may also be 342 Conduct L.Ed.2d observing incidental effect of merely com with elements of “sufficiently imbued regulation.” Id. at legitimate an otherwise scope munication to fall within v. (quoting Accountant’s Soc. Va. Amendments.” 1191 Fourteenth First (4th Cir.1988)). 602, 409, Bowman, 405, F.2d 604 Washington, v. 418 U.S. Spence 2730, goes, so far as it but 842 That is true L.Ed.2d 94 S.Ct. begs the (1974). interpretation particular proffered State’s To determine whether An inhibi we must answer here. protections question conduct implicates freedom of Amendment, professionals’ it tion of we look to whether First the First Amendment “so does not violate convey particularized “inten[ded] ” whether, “merely the incidental effect long the circum it is message,” and under regulation.” stances, legitimate ... an otherwise likely “that the mes highly it is added). analysis The State’s (emphasis Id. sage understood [observers].” would be Johnson, high generality at at such a level of proceeds 109 S.Ct. 491 U.S. 410-11, of a regulating practice that all laws 418 U.S. at (quoting Spence, 2730). necessarily impose only profession would 94 S.Ct. speech, and so would incidental burdens under this definition— It would seem always pass muster under the First indeed, almost measure —that under the case. Amendment. This cannot be an- asking questions writing down con The State also cites Justice White’s protected expression constitute un-. swers SEC, However, curring opinion Lowe der the First Amendment. 211-36, 2557, 2573-86, escapes First argues that State *24 (1985), do not find scrutiny it is directed L.Ed.2d 130 but we Amendment because anything opinion in that that would counte practice of medicine. toward conduct—the (as must) category that of conceding it nance the idea the entire seemingly While only professional regulation touches on asking questions writing that down conduct, beyond the of Amendment and thus lies reach answers would receive First Indeed, strangers if the First Amendment. Justice protection it occurred between a corner, recognized point, some “[a]t on a street the State asserts White a activity by phy- longer regulation conducted a measure is no a because the a or of practice profession regulation speech of the medical but part sician as beyond that the statute pro- press; point, the medical profession, and because scrutiny demand regu- to close must survive the level long fession has been 230, State, Id. at by by the fact that the law ed the First Amendment.” lation 2583; Holder v. Hu communication is 105 S.Ct. at see also restricts oral and written 1, 28, Project, 561 U.S. consequence of no whatever. manitarian Law 150, 146, (1939); ap see also prohibition is S.Ct. 84 L.Ed. 155 12. The First Amendment's through Connecticut, 296, 303, plied against the Four the States Cantwell v. 310 U.S. 60 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. teenth 900, 903, (1940). 84 L.Ed. 1213 S.Ct. 147, 160, Jersey, 60 Schneider v. New 308 U.S.

885 2705, 2724, such, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 and as must survive some level of 130 S.Ct. (2010) scrutiny. First Amendment (explaining that when “the conduct coverage under statute con triggering [a] inquiry Act, The provision of the communicating message a ... we sists of 790.338(2), § requires physicians to “re demanding a more standard” [apply] must making frain from a inquiry written scrutiny regulations than that applied asking questions concerning the ownership (second mod of noncommunicative conduct face, of a firearm....” On its this provi Stuart, in original)); ification Miller v. 117 sion also inhibits protected speech—inquir (11th Cir.1997) (holding F.3d 1382 ing about firearm ownership. It too must regulation a a state insulate survive some level of First Amendment of commercial from First Amend scrutiny. simply by classifying ment review The provision discrimination part profession of accoun Act, 790.338(5), § if not a horse of a tancy); King of N.J., 767 F.3d Governor color, different is at least a different shade (3d Cir.2014) (rejecting the 228-29 provision steed. This prohibits “discrimi- argument verbal communications be against solely nat[ion] based come “conduct” when are used to upon patient’s exercise of the constitu services), professional deliver cert. denied right possess tional to own and firearms or U.S. -, 135 191 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d ammunition.” Id. pro Unlike the first two (2015). considered, pro visions the discrimination task, then, facially vision does not implicate Our is to determine whether substan tial amount of any provision protected speech. of the Act crosses the bound- Of course, it ary regulating professional possible between a law to discriminate via speech, by hanging sign with an on the examina conduct incidental effect speech, proclaiming tion room wall regulating protected law “Gun Owners Here,” speech, example. which “must the level Not Welcome for But survive scrutiny demanded the First this does not transform antidiscrimination Amend- Lowe, 230,105 speech. ment.” laws into restrictions on See U.S. (White, J., concurring). v. Forum Acad. & Inst’l Rumsfeld for Inc., 47, 62, Rights, (“Con (2006) record-keeping provision of 164 L.Ed.2d 156 Act, 790.338(1), § prohibits physicians gress, example, prohibit employers cán “intentionally entering] discriminating hiring dis from on the basis concerning require closed information firearm of race. The fact that this will an patient’s employer sign reading into the medical rec to take down a *25 Only’ hardly ord” under certain circumstances. This Applicants ‘White means clearly provision targets activity—making analyzed regulat the law should be as one entry employer’s an in a medical record—that is in than con speech rather duct.”); Mitchell, convey particular message— tended to a accord Wisconsin v. 508 476, 487-88, 2194, ownership. 2201, information about firearm 124 U.S. 113 S.Ct. aside) (1993) And, (legibility (compiling up we think that under L.Ed.2d 436 cases highly likely holding the circumstances it is state and federal antidiscrimi- chal expressive against content contained these nation laws First Amendment lenge). provision single entries would be understood those does not out Therefore, a viewing speech, target speech them. we hold that the that carries point of record-keeping provision regulates speech, specific message; rather “the focal 886 reading provi A natural discriminating the act of prohibition [is]

its pri that it sion would seem to indicate is provision against individuals harassment, with verbal marily concerned proscribed on the treatment] [medical un since it defines a about which Hurley Gay, v. Irish-Am. ground[ See ].” It is necessary prohibited. harassment Bos., Grp. 515 U.S. Lesbian & Bisexual physi imagine how one would difficult 2338, 2347, 557, 572, 132 L.Ed.2d 115 S.Ct. cally patient a about firearm ] (1995). facial “harass! light of the Especially 487 790.338(6) § ownership.” See Fla. Stat. challenge hold nature of Plaintiffs’ —we added). However, even assum (emphasis regu- a provision is that the discrimination ing that there are some situations which only with an incidental lation of conduct provision applied could be without in such, it does not speech. effect on As balance, that on volving speech, we think offend, alone the First implicate, let provision substantially regulates Amendment. must survive some level of speech and so scrutiny.13 First Amendment provision of The harassment Act, 790.338(6), § requires physicians sum, In that while the dis- we conclude unnecessarily harassing a to “refrain provision regulation crimination ” ownership.... merely about an inci- professional conduct with point us to Saxe v. State Coll. thus does not speech, Plaintiffs dental effect on Dist., Amendment, prop which stands for the First the rec- implicate Area Sch. categorical ord-keeping, inquiry, pro- is no and harassment “[t]here osition that exception’ regulate significant to the First visions do amount of ‘harassment protected speech. Accordingly, we must speech free clause.” 240 Amendment’s (3d Cir.2001) J.) (Alito, 200, proceed to determine what level of scruti- F.3d 204 Of ny of these the First Amendment demands course, “non-expressive, physically harass Lowe, 230, provisions. See 472 U.S. 105 entirely ing conduct is outside the ambit of (White, J., concurring). S.Ct. at 2583 clause,” but the First the free “protects variety Amendment also wide may deep that listeners consider see, 206;

ly e.g., Sny question, offensive....” Id. at Before we answer that howev- 443, 1207, er, helpful survey think it Phelps, der v. 562 U.S. 131 S.Ct. we (2011); Brandenburg landscape professional speech. 179 v. Two L.Ed.2d 172 Ohio, 444, 1827, concepts profession 23 orient our discussion: 89 S.Ct. (1969). only relationship. physician L.Ed.2d A is not 430 bring types judged plainly legit- 13. We note that Plaintiffs two in relation to the statute’s Stevens, sweep.” challenges imate United pro States facial First Amendment 473, U.S. challenge, vision: a traditional facial which (2010) (quotation L.Ed.2d 435 marks omit- only can succeed if "no set of circumstances ted). valid,” exists under which the would be State, Cty. Emps. & Mun. Am. Fed'n Coun plainly legitimate applica- there are some If Cir.2013) Scott, (11th cil 79 v. 717 F.3d provision, tions of the harassment such as to - denied, -, U.S. rt. harassment, physical that would seem to ce (2014) (quoting 188 L.Ed.2d 912 United doom the first of Plaintiffs' facial First *26 Salerno, 745, 739, States v. 481 U.S. 107 S.Ct. challenges. This is not necessar- Amendment 2095, (1987)), however, L.Ed.2d and an over- 95 697 ily dispositive, a because substantial challenge, "whereby a applications may breadth law be of its still be found number invalidated as overbroad if a substantial num be in an overbreadth anal- unconstitutional unconstitutional, ysis. applications ber its are of

887 profession; any the medical he or reasonable definition professional member of of (defin- fiduciary speech. King, also a member of various See she is 767 F.3d at 232 See, e.g., physician-patient relationships. ing professional speech speech as that “is Surgeons, and Physicians, 61 Am.Jur.2d provide personalized used to services to a (2012); Mangoni § 141 v. Healers Other client based on professional’s expert the (Fla.Dist.Ct. Temkin, 1286, 679 1288 So.2d knowledge judgment”); Moore-King By exploring the distinct in App.1996). Va., Cty. Chesterfield, 560, v. 708 F.3d government (4th terests that drive and restrain Cir.2013) 569 (finding “the relevant areas, a regulation both we can derive inquiry to apply determine whether to the by regu laws framework which evaluate professional speech doctrine” to be lating professional speech. “whether speaker providing person- the in private setting alized advice a to a pay- We start with common client”); Post, see also Robert In- is a differ sense observation “[t]here Consent A Abortion: First formed ence, purposes, for First Amendment be Analysis Compelled Physi- Amendment professionals’ speech tween ... Speech, 939, cian 2007 U. Ill. L.Rev. 949 direct, public large person at versus their (“[W]hen a physician speaks patient to a Locke, with 634 speech alized clients.” treatment, the course of medical opin- his 1191; see also Fla. Bar v. F.3d Went ”). normally regulable].... ions are It, Inc., For (1995) 2371, 2381, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 At the spec other end of the (“Speech by professionals obviously has trum, speech by professional uttered a dimensions.”). many a professional While practice is irrelative to the or his her may speak variety topics on a in a profession particular and outside a profes contexts, variety only some of this relationship likely sional-client beyond falls under speech category “profes falls purview of professional speech.14 See speech.” hypothetical sional Consider two Lowe, 232, 472 U.S. at first, physician scenarios. In the a meets (“Where (White, J., concurring) per with a in an examination room and professional sonal nexus between explains particular surgical risks of a exist, speaker client does not and a does procedure. easily This conversation is not purport exercising judgment to be professional speech. classified as In the any particular behalf of individual with scenario, second physician same whose circumstances he is ac directly speaks rally, extolling to a crowd at a quainted, government regulation ... be particular political merits of candidate. regulation speaking publishing comes equally It seems clear that while this such, subject to the First Amendment’s speech by professional, also uttered it ‘Congress command that shall make no law “professional speech.” is not ... abridging speech, the freedom of or of press.’”); Sedivy principles, Phrased in terms of v. State ex rel. we cf. say speech Stenberg, Neb.App. think it is safe to uttered 567 N.W.2d (1997) professional (suggesting in furtherance of his or 793 in dicta that profession her and within the confines of a First Amendment would bar the State professional-client relationship within revoking falls from veterinarian’s license sole- government regulation speech does- This not mean that the cannot of such would is, regulated, generally be but rather that such to a conventional First Brown, purposes, indistinguishable analysis. Pickup for most Amendment See Therefore, (9th Cir.2014). speech by average citizen. 1227-28 F.3d *27 illustrate, physician’s speech in disagreement with To expressed ly because he above, patient first scenario to a about policies). government tax surgery, would fall risks the first difference between The category: speech that furthers the second posed above turns on second scenarios profession and practice physician’s of the professional effectivity of factors: the two physician- confines of a occurs within the physician speech relationship. physician’s —whether practice of the in furtherance speaking speech political to the crowd about a candi- not, and the relational context medicine category: date would fall the fourth physician speech of the speech practice that is unrelated to the —whether fiduciary relationship or within a speaking physician’s profession and occurs these factors ac together, any special relationship. Taken not. the absence by universe of uttered for the count these two extremes can Speech between dividing catego it into four professional, a be located as well. Promotional or adver First, may to the physician speak a ries. tising physician public a to the practice in furtherance of the public, category: speech fall within the first would Second, may speak a physician medicine. furthering public purpose to the for the client, practice a in furtherance physician’s practice. Giving general Third, physician may speak a medicine. public health advice to the on a television client, prac matter irrelative to the on a in newspaper talk show or column would Finally, physician may See, tice of medicine. category. e.g., Bailey also be in this Ctr., Inc., a matter irrelative speak public, Huggins Diagnostic to the & Rehab. (disal- (Colo.App.1997) 952 P.2d practice of medicine.15 helpful four 15. It to think about these grid, categories like in the form of so: *28 interest, grounds profession. professional’s a The

lowing First Amendment on against conversely, claim misrepresentation strongest speaks is when he negligent suggesting that mer- publicly profession a for matters unrelated to his dentist fillings are harmful and in cury amalgam speaks weakest when he furtherance of removed). profession. should be his by a Conversely, physician conversation regulations speech by When of uttered a their mutual love of patient with a about professional analyzed are in terms of the category: fall in the third golf would speech audience —whether the occurs with- of medi speech practice unrelated to the in relationship the confines of a of trust physician- the confines of a cine but within and confidence or'not —the relevant inter- A patient relationship. more sinister ex slightly ests are different. a fidu- Within category within this is ample speech of ciary quasi-fiduciary relationship, or the by a harassing intimidating speech phy government has a in strong polic- interest See, patient. e.g., Suspen sician to a In re ing the relationship boundaries of the Singh, sion or Revocation License protect party exploita- of of the weaker from A-2181-06T2, at *1 No. WL solely tion. This interest does not derive 2007) (af (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. June general from some principle gov- that the physician’s of a license firming revocation ernment obligated protect the weak repeatedly pressuring elderly in for part rather, predation by strong; the the patient physician’s attempt to conceal the government’s ensuring interest is in her). to solicit a loan from societally the beneficial function of these attorney- relationships agent-principal, utility The of this two-dimensional model — client, physician-patient, not nulli- etc.—is professional speech of comes to the fore exploitation by fiduciary. fied due to identify attempt when we the various relationships, Outside the confines of such societal, governmental, and individual in- government’s protecting interest shape regulations speech by terests that of wanes, listener and instead the interest of professionals. The combination Of salient physician’s obtaining audience infor- present physician speaks interests when a mation reaches its zenith. profession of his furtherance is related to, from, play but distinct the interests at interplay Once two-dimensional physician speaks fiduciary. when a as a forth, interests is set our intuitive conclu- government regulation speech sions about whether certain kinds of

When professional analyzed speech by profession- uttered constitute physicians latitude through professional speech, proportionate the lens of the effec- al and the such tivity regulate of the it furthers or with which a state —whether physician practice profes- speech, is unrelated to .the of a make sense. When gov- speaks patient relevant interests are to a in furtherance of the sion—the medicine, one, two regulating pro- practice ernment’s interest but sub- implicated: reg- protection public fession for the stantial state interests are protection professional’s speaking profession interest in free- ulation of the regulation of the rela- ly. vary depending public, Both interests on of practice tionship protection whether the effects the for the Conversely, society. and the profession. government’s The interest is benefit speaks public on a strongest professional speaks physician when a in when a of medi- profession practice furtherance of his and weakest matter irrelative to the cine, with neither state interest adheres professional speaks when a irrelative to his addressed, force; instead, Supreme the countervail- Court has also any special category speech by in in another passing, interest physician’s interests —the *29 regulation compelling phy in society’s professional interest freely and speaking —a to the fore. sicians to discuss certain information with freely listening —come about the risks of abortion patients their of our two-dimensional Another benefit Parenthood and childbirth. Planned of and illumi aligns that it with framework is 833, 884, 112 Casey, Pa. v. 505 Se. U.S. Supreme the guidance the limited nates (1992) 2791, 2824, 120 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 674 subject pro the of provided has Court framework, (joint opinion). Under our Take, example, pro speech. fessional type regulation of falls at the intersec this Under speech by professionals. motional governmental tion of inter two substantial type of of analysis, regulations our regulation profession ests: of the for the category, in where the speech fall the first of protection public, regulation of the and primary play two interests at are the fiduciary relationship protec the for the by protecting public interest in the state’s tion of the and the benefit of soci society’s in regulating profession, the of ety. When one understands both of information. No terest in the free flow primary play at in this cate the interests precisely the interests the tably, these are gory government regulation, cut in favor of Supreme has found relevant to ana Court Supreme Court’s succinct conclusion lyzing regulations professional of advertis regulation implicated physi- that the “the Bd. Pharm. v. ing. See Va. State Va. of rights” First Amendment but sur eian[s’] Council, Inc., 425 Citizens Consumer U.S. scrutiny regulation a vived “reasonable” 766-68, 1827, 748, 764, 1817, 96 S.Ct. 1828- practice of medicine makes more (1976) 29, (characterizing 48 L.Ed.2d 346 sense. Id. countervailing society’s interests as in “strong interest the free flow of com brief treatment Ca- While Court’s information,” sey provide insight mercial and the state’s does not much into how public analyze professional “strong protecting regulations interest” by maintaining “high professional speech, why at sur- stan statute issue dards”); scrutiny,16 v. Bar accord Bates State vived First Amendment Ariz., 350, 364-79, 2691, 97 insofar as it consistent holding helpful 433 U.S. S.Ct. is is 2699-707, (1977); by pro- speech 53 L.Ed.2d 810 Ohralik with our conclusion Ass’n, 447, by evaluating v. Bar 436 454- fessional is understood Ohio State U.S. best 460, 1912, 1918-20, 444 it it ut- along 98 S.Ct. 56 L.Ed.2d two dimensions—whether (1978). profession tered in furtheranсe noted, narrowly 16. As at least one commentator has because it was not tailored 705, Wooley Maynard, v. 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. “sufficiently compelling'' government in- 1428, (1977), 51 L.Ed.2d 752 716-717, Whalen terest. See 430 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. Roe, 589, 869, 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct 51 L.Ed.2d hand, passage 1436. On the other cited (1977), 64 the two cases the Court cited as authority suggests from Whalen that States' support holding, point opposite for its di regulate practice of medicine is appropriate rections on the issue of the level only process due See to basic considerations. Halberstam, scrutiny. Daniel Commercial 603, 429 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at 878. “To fuse Speech, Speech, and the Constitu Professional two in a formulation these models shorthand Institutions, tional Status Social 147 U. Pa. provides little indication of how to resolve 771, (1999). L.Rev. 773-74 The reference to professional’s First Amendment claim other Wooley height would seem to indicate that Casey." precise Hal- than the one issue scrutiny appropriate, given ened berstam, supra, at 774. Wooley regulation Court in struck down a FCC, 642, professional- Sys, 622, it occurs within a Inc. v. whether U.S. relationship. (1994), client L.Ed.2d 497 typically rigor while others receive a less today need not mark out We review, Ward, e.g., ous level of 491 U.S. professional full metes and bounds of (content-neutral 109 S.Ct. 2746 regu It is sufficient to observe that speech. time, place, lations of the or manner of physician is uttered in speech); Corp. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. practice furtherance of the of medicine and N.Y., v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n fiduciary within the confines of a relation (1980) 65 L.Ed.2d 341 ship squarely category. falls within this *30 (regulations speech); of commercial Unit regulate, As this is what the Act to seeks O’Brien, 367, v. ed States 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. regulation pro we conclude that it is a of (1968) 1673, 20 (regulations L.Ed.2d 672 of speech.17 fessional conduct). noncommunicative mind, these in we principles With are a. to prepared

now address the issue of the appropriate level of First Amendment noted, As the Supreme Court has scrutiny with which to evaluate the Act. yet clarify to precise scrutiny level of with which to government review restric professional tions of speech. bridge To regulations

All speech gap, proceed of are this we must via inference equal eyes not created in the of the First from the known to the unknown. first regulating speech piece Amendment. Laws “re of information we have is the level of judicial scrutiny scrutiny government ceive different levels of due regulations of depending on the type regulation speech by professional of and on a matter irre- justifications purposes underlying and practice profession lative to the of his Camnitz, (in 238, it.” v. 774 244 any particular relationship Stuart F.3d outside (4th above). Cir.2014), denied, U.S. -, cert. category every 576 fourth In almost — - (2015). 2838, instance, 135 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d when a professional speaks context, statutory speech-most professional Some restraints on his status as a speech entirely laws that restrict based on its con incidental to his speech. When true, viewpoint, example-receive government generally may tent or this is scrutiny,” exacting professional speakers differently “most Turner Broad. not treat argument speak patients 17. There can be no that Plaintiffs to their within the examination inquiries view about firearm aas practice room on matters irrelative to the of i.e., preventative matter So, of in further- care — medicine. because we find that the Act practice they ance of the of medicine—or that inquiry permit was tailored so as to about patients— wish to raise these issues with their all in which the firearms in circumstances i.e., fiduciary within the context of a relation- good physician faith that believes such Indeed, ship. See Plaintiffs’ Br. 3-4. health information is relevant to the essentials, stripped theory to its Plaintiffs’ of individual, IV.A.2, supra part we of see appears prohibits the case to be that the Act indeed, need we cannot —address not— speaking patients them from their fur- propriety applying prohibit phy- of the Act to medicine, practice therance of the but that discussing matters irrelative to sicians objective passing the State’s the Act was to patients’ safety. health or Because their prohibit speaking them from a matter irre- regulates Plaintiffs concede that the Act medicine, practice lative to the and that it practice speech uttered in furtherance punish doing will seek to them for so. medicine, proceed analyze we it such. argue We do not understand Plaintiffs to right have a First Amendment 892 traditionally sub “occurs in an area See Pick speakers. nonprofessional

than (9th regulation,” and has 1208, ject government Brown, F.3d 1227-28 up 740 v. that it a low therefore concluded warrants Cir.2014) (“[OJutside re doctor-patient the First protection under er level constitutionally lationship, doсtors are 456, Ohralik, 436 Amendment. U.S. pam soapbox orators equivalent the Court Correspondingly, at 1918. S.Ct. receives robust and their phleteers, to measure a lower bar which has set Amendment.”); under the First protection regulation speech—interme of such State Madison, Sch. Dist. City also Joint see diate, scrutiny. than strict Fla. rather Comm’n, Relations Emp’t No. 8 Wis. Bar, 623, 115 at 2375. To 515 U.S. at S.Ct. 426, 167, 176, 97 S.Ct. 429 U.S. review, the this level of State survive (1976) (“[The government] L.Ed.2d in sup interest “must assert substantial speak ... discriminate between may not demonstrate regulation” of its port employ their ers on the basis “directly and material that the restriction ment....”); Ed. Pickering v. Bd. of sweep ly advances” that interest without County, Twp. High Sch. Dist. Will necessary. widely more than Id. 1731, 1734, Ill, (citing at 2376 Cent. Hud *31 (1968) (“[T]eachers may 20 L.Ed.2d 811 2351). 566, son, 447 at 100 S.Ct.at U.S. constitutionally compelled to relin [not] in holdings The this area follow Court’s rights they quish the First Amendment seeks to a clear trend. When the State enjoy as citizens to com would otherwise on impose content-based restrictions interest....”). public of ment on matters its regulatory in a context which in im Because the State’s interest diminished, such as when a interests are posing content-based restrictions on in a non- professional speaks public to the professional at ebb when a speech is low capacity, apply courts the professional prac to the speaks public irrelative scrutiny. the exacting most When State required profession, tice of his the State regulate speech by professionals to seeks by demon justify any regulation to such the interest in in a context which State’s strating that it is “the least restrictive public the regulating protection for the of govern advancing compelling means of a rooted, level deeply is more a lesser of Solantic, City ment interest.” LLC v. scrutiny applies. (11th Beach, Neptune 410 F.3d 1258 think that the restriction at We Cir.2005). This test is known as strict cleanly here fits within the latter issue So, a scrutiny. example, Id. for law category, because both of the State inter prohibited physicians discussing the by deep regu Act have implicated ests the public gener of firearms the with First, latory long have rec roots. Courts assuredly as a con ally would be classified authority—duty, ognized the even—of subject to speech, tent-based restriction on regulate practice profes the States to showing that the scrutiny. strict Absent a public against to the “shield[] sions necessary compelling law was to further incompetent, or the ir untrustworthy, interest, government it would fall. Thomas, responsible.” 323 U.S. parcel cognita Another of terra J., See, (Jackson, concurring). at 329 S.Ct. scrutiny to evaluate Bar, the level of with which v. State 421 U.S. e.g., Va. Goldfarb 792, regulations professional 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d (“We (1975) public promotion pro of his or her that the recognize States (in above). category compelling practice fession the first interest have boundaries, and professions within their Supreme type Court has noted that this Moreover, protect authority their part power that as of the State to health, safety, regulate relationships and other valid inter- of a public fiduciary char is, to establish acter via the power ests have broad common law if anything, a licensing practitioners proposition for and more venerable prin standards than the professions.”); regulating practice ciple possesses the State regulatory Maryland, authority See, 218 U.S. over professions. Watson e.g., (1910) (“It 644, 646, 54 L.Ed. 987 is Twin-Lick Oil v. Marburg, Co. 587, 588-89, (1875) (“That require too well settled discussion 23 L.Ed. 328 day police power joint-stock that the of the states director of a corporation occu regulation pies fiduciary extends to the of certain trades one of those relations where callings, particularly dealings and those which his ... beneficiary with the health.”).18 closely public party concern the whose interest is confided to his authority, sponsible physicians "by profes- 18. Pursuant to that States com name and monly touching profes enact what laws on sional title” and that include sufficient infor- Florida, may say. example, "justify has mation to sionals the course of treatment of regulations implicating speech by quite patient”; “failing provide a few and pa- ... See, (re physicians. e.g., § Fla. Stat. 381.026 tients with information about their quiring physicians rights patient‘complaint”); to communicate various and how to file a patients request, including: (requiring information to Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B8-9.007 “name, function, qualifi physician’s surgeons "verbally patient’s and confirm the cations”; identification, concerning pa procedure information the intended "diagnosis, planned surgical/procedure tient’s course of treat the correct site” before alternatives, ment, risks, prognosis”; operating, and to document such confirma- information; records); patient’s financial and a various written tion in the medical id. R. patient rights responsibili (proscribing "statement of 64B8-9.008 all "verbal behav- *32 ties”); (requiring physicians physician patient § id. 381.986 ior” between a and a prescribe provide “reasonably interpreted who low-THC cannabis to could as romantic patients potential patient”); to about the [the] information involvement with id. R. of, to, (mandating risks and side effects alternatives and 64B8-9.013 detailed information treatment, physicians prior during well as effectiveness as im must record to and posing recording reporting prescribing various and re the course of controlled sub- quirements); (requiring physi patient; requiring physicians § id. 456.41 stances for a offering complementary plan” specific cians or alternative use a "written treatment with content; requiring physicians care health treatments to communicate to the to "discuss the nature, patient, orally writing, "the or ben risks and benefits of the use of controlled efits, treatment,” patient”); and risks of the well as substances with the id. R. 64B8- education, practitioner's experience, (prohibiting physicians "pro- "the and 9.0141 from field,” viding] credentials in the and to indicate the treatment ... via recommendations provision patient’s physi- of such information in the electronic or other means” unless the records); (requiring completes § patient medical id. 458.324 cian evalu- “documented ation,” physicians treating patients diagnosed options with discusses "treatment and high provide pa- at a or risk for breast cancer to risks and benefits of treatment” with the tient, contemporane- various information about treatment alterna ... “[m]aint[ains] records”); provi tives document ous medical id. R. 64B8-11.001 patient's (imposing physician sion of such information in the various restrictions on records); (requiring advertising); (prohibiting § medical id. 458.325 id. R. 64B8-11.002 physicians, prior administering physicians representing electrocon- licensed from psychosurgical procedures pa promotional they vulsive or tient, to a their communications that AIDS,” regarding negative to disclose information “are HIV or free from or procedure); (listing implying stating any § id. 458.331 various or "that other licensee action, grounds disciplinary including may greater patients is or be a risk to due to fraud, intimidation, provide "the use of undue influ a failure or refusal to similar adver- ence, notice”); (re- overreaching tising or a form of or vexatious or id. R. 64B8-11.003 identify patients; "failing keep quiring physicians them- conduct” to solicit licensed legible identify patients). ... medical re- to their records” selves as such courts, scrutiny speech with which to evaluate care, jealousy by viewed with is slight grounds, on restriction when the result was the same be set aside on the soundest morali- possible founded under either of the two stan- doctrine dards). received the clearest ty, and which has others.”); in this court and

recognition Story, Joseph Commentaries b. see also § Jurisprudence 235-36 Equity scrutiny Plaintiffs contend strict 1886) (“In (13th ... cases which [in ed. First, required they for several reasons. fiduciary between the there is a relation satisfy argue that the Act must strict scru law, prevent in order to undue parties,] tiny because it is a content-based restric confidence, advantage from the unlimited physicians it speech i.e., tion on restricts — affection, duty the rela- or sense of which their speaking topic: about a certain creates, naturally requires the utmost tion status as firearm owners. See patients’ faith ... in all degree good transactions Paul, City R.A.V. v. St. If there is mis- parties. between 382, 112 S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d 305 any. or concealment of a representation, (1992) (“Content-based regulations are fact, any just suspicion of arti- material invalid.”) presumptively readily agree We influence, Equity fice or undue Courts of regulates speech that the Act on the basis ”); Tamar interpose.... generally will see speak of its content—“Plaintiffs want to (2011) Law, Frankel, Fiduciary ‍‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‍79-99 patients], they may and whether do [their (tracing government regula- the roots of depends [the so under on what Act] fiduciary relations back to Hammu- tion of Holder, 27, 130 say.” See 561 U.S. at rabi). at 2723-24. But this does not seal the Indeed, one could make the case that Act’s fate. enacting governing type when laws R.A.V., explained As the Con

quintessential professional with stitution suffers content-based restrictions here, we are concerned which State categories within certain limited regulatory leeway even more than has society has determined do not merit regulating promotional speech by when full protection. First Amendment See 505 professionals, given fiduciary context *33 382-83, at 112 at U.S. 377 S.Ct. 2542-43. However, within which the former occurs. regulations “may made [not] Such be conclusively we not determine wheth need vehicles for content discrimination unrelat scrutiny applies er lesser form of ever conduct,” distinctly [regulable] ed to their regulations professional speech, of because 383-84, 2543, 112 id. at S.Ct. at but intra- in this case the outcome is the same category permis content discrimination is a heightened whether intermediate scruti very when the basis for it is the ny judicial sible standard or some lesser level of scrutiny category speech reason the entire of at applied. Sorrell v. IMS Cf. —, Inc., U.S. -, -, protection issue receives un Health 131 less-than-full S.Ct. (2011) 2653, 2667, Amendment, 388, der the id. at (finding 180 L.Ed.2d 544 First see unnecessary it 112 at precise might “[a] decide the level S.Ct. 2545.19 Thus State Paul, 377, 382-84, City fighting 19. In R.A.V.v. St. 505 U.S. words. See id. at 112 of 382, why 112 S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d 305 S.Ct. at 2543. We can think of no reason (1992), Supreme explicitly reasoning ad the Court’s in R.A.V. should not Court extend, only categories speech perforce, beyond wholly proscribable dressed those that categories they may complete categories have to those so little value defamation, which, ly although they may proscribed, obscenity, not be of so little such as

895 tion, only obscenity prohibit speaker-based presumptively choose to un —is Supreme constitutional. The patently is the most offensive in its Court has which never analysis way framed its in this prohibit ... it ... when prurience [b]ut scrutinizing regulations speech by pro only obscenity which includes offen- See, e.g., fessionals. Thompson v. W. 388, messages.” Id. at 112 political sive Ctr., 357, 366-68, States Med. 535 U.S. 122 at S.Ct. 1497, 1503-04, S.Ct. 152 L.Ed.2d 563 This is the case with the Act. The State (2002) (reviewing restricting law speech by made the commonsense determination that pharmacists physicians); licensed Fla. inquiry ownership, topic about Bar, 622-24, U.S. 115 S.Ct. at 2375- many highly pri- which of its citizens find (reviewing law restricting speech by vate, good falls outside the bounds of med- Fane, lawyers); 761, Edenfield physician ical care to the extent the knows 765-67, 1792, 1797-98, 113 S.Ct. inquiry entirely such to be irrelevant (1993) (reviewing L.Ed.2d 543 law restrict the medical care or of a or accountants); ing speech by Casey, 505 any person. neatly This accords with the 884, 112 U.S. at S.Ct. at 2824 (reviewing affording protec- rationale for diminished compelling speech by (joint law physicians) category professional tion to entire opinion); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. speech i.e., regulat- the State’s interest — 8-14, 887, 893-98, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 profession to ensure that its citi- (1979) (reviewing restricting speech by law zens receive safe and effective care.20 optometrists). suggest Plaintiffs also that the Act why The reason on speech restrictions trigger scrutiny should strict because it is by professionals generally do not offend speaker-based regulation speech. To despite the Constitution the fact that seriously the extent that Plaintiffs contend discriminate on the basis speaker’s independent ground this is an identity essentially the same reason that scrutiny, betray strict Plaintiffs a funda restrictions on the basis of the content of misunderstanding mental of the doctrine of permissible are in this area. professional speech. simply R.A.V., It is not the See 505 U.S. at every regulation case that speech by 2543. The basis for such restrictions is are, professionals very of which by defini- reason that the entire class of —all bans, particular viewpoint. value as to warrant flat have traditional- on the basis of a In- ly stead, been deemed to merit a diminished level of physicians affords wide latitude protection, First Amendment such as com- speak inquire, about firearms —to to rec- speech, professional speech. King mercial or ord, even, instances, right in some to harass — N.J., (3d v. Governor 767 F.3d 236-37 knows, up point physician where the Cir.2014). Indeed, the Court indicated as faith, longer good no believes in that such much when it used several commercial *34 anyone’s speech is relevant to medical care or speech cases to illustrate how the doctrine safety. supra part by See IV.A. We think that R.A.V., practice. worked in See 505 U.S. at defining permissible speech boundaries of the 388-89, pro- 112 S.Ct. at 2546. We therefore necessity, of medical State terms the understanding. ceed with this scrupulous evinced heed of the distinction impermissible regulation between an of may It be contended that the basis for the 20. speech on basis of content unrelated to the political State’s restriction is rather than med- falls, category appro- the in which it and an nature, result, ical in and that as a the Act priate regulation speech of on a basis that is exception. does not fall within R.A.V.'s This catego- argument might legs the the entire have if the Act had sim- consistent with reasons prohibited ply by ry may regulated. all discussion of firearms be physicians, speech or if it had restricted such 896 strongly suggested that some interme First Amendment or

speech gets diminished effectively appropriate cannot when diate level of review was protection. The State regulating profes- оf pursue assessing regulations professional its interest (4th by Stuart, laws reference may if not draw sions it 774 F.3d at 248 speech. See Cir.2014) status.21 professional scrutiny to (applying intermediate regulation physicians’ to strike down sprinkle Plaintiffs Finally, although (3rd King, 767 F.3d at 235 Cir. speech); viewpoint discrimina fleeting references to 2014) (concluding that intermediate scruti brief, we do not take throughout their tion by which ny appropriate standard was Act contend that seriously them professional to evaluate restrictions by taken particular ... views “targets 1227-28, 740 at speech); Pickup, F.3d Rosenberger v. subject,” speakers on a (9th Cir.2014) by (situating speech Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. Rector & Visitors of con professionals that occurs within the 2510, 2516, 132 L.Ed.2d at the professional relationship of a (1995), The Act fines good reason. and speech on a continuum between midpoint distinction between plainly makes no favoring ownership by public, firearm which re speech professional disfavoring ownership. firearm speech protection “robust under the First ceives target Amendment,” of the Act’s restriction speech by professional on the speech any viewpoint “merely incidental” to the conduct which physician “subject ration profession, only of a completely irrelevant review”). knows al basis and welfare of the health person.

other 4. conducting an interme When c. scrutiny analysis, diate we.look first to the Accordingly, proceed we will un substantiality of the State’s interest. See scrutiny. of intermediate der the rubric Bar, at at Fla. S.Ct. standard, uphold we must Under this propose hypothetical 2376. We if “directly it advances” “substantial” interests, as in a rational governmental interest, not more extensive State and “is analysis; rather we must look to “the basis necessary than is to serve that interest.” put, forward precise interests Hudson, Cent 447 U.S. at See omitted). (quotation marks State....” Id. Here, so, the State asserts good In doing we find ourselves interests, Act serves several substantial company. Three of our sister circuits scrutiny including safeguarding privacy pa- applied have either intermediate R.A.V., Supreme vided its rationale was consistent with “the 21. As the Court noted in however, give very category this does not the State free rein reason entire protection regulations professional speech less than full under to turn into issue” receives Amendment, not, it "vehicles for content discrimination unrelated the First could consistent Amendment, impose distinctly [regulable] with the First a restric- to their content.” 505 383-84, physicians U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 2543. We think tion on the of all who are Democrats, registered requirement because such a restric- there exists nexus area speaker-based analogous entirely inter- restrictions tion would be unrelated to the justifying greater regulatory leeway present in the area re- est in this of content-based *35 Thus, profes- ensuring strictions. while a State would be free area—that of that medical provide physicians, safe and effective medical to restrict the of all or even sionals 388, sub-categories physicians, pro- certain care. See id. at 112 S.Ct. at 2545. of of

897 families, facilitating practice professions protec their access the for the tients and care, preventing substantial, discrimina public merely to medical tion of the not and harassment.22 These interests tion “compelling.” Goldfarb, but 421 at U.S. “obviously “para into” the State’s factor[ ] 792, Furthermore, 95 at 2016. S.Ct. the Bar, objective,” 515 at mount ... Fla. U.S. Supreme has also Court held that “the 2376, 624, 115 the area of protection potential privacy clients’ is a regulation preserving its cit professional Bar, substantial state interest.” Fla. 515 — profes harmful ineffective izens from or 625, (quoting U.S. at 115 S.Ct. at 2376 456.003(2) § practices, sional see Fla. Stat. 769, Edenfield, 507 U.S. 113 S.Ct. at legislature’s the belief that (stating Florida 1799). Although presumably the Act was health, preservation safety, “the of the primarily by privacy motivated the con public” only permissi of the is the welfare physicians’ existing cerns of patients, as objective regulations ble of the health opposed potential patients, we see no “social, Citing political, the professions). substantiality material difference in the controversy” surrounding and moral fire privacy the interests at issue. We con circles, ownership arm in some the State protecting by clude that public regulat about the argues inquiry profession the medical so as to safe by perceived many highly to be intrusive. guard patient privacy is a substantial state Br. (quoting Bryco State’s Johnson v. Ga., Falanga interest. v. State Bar Cf. (E.D.N.Y. Arms, 536, 224 F.R.D. (11th Cir.1998) (“Un 150 F.3d 2004)). In response expressed to concerns questionably, the interests the State constituents, asserts, by leg the State substantial, namely, ... are pro asserted patient islature enacted the Act to shield tеcting the public from vexatious conduct by privacy limiting the solicitation of infor [by attorneys] preventing ... inva [and] mation about firearm whenever privacy....”). sions of unnecessary anyone’s it is medical care safety.23 or Id. step to the second We move above, scrutiny analysis: Supreme

As noted the intermediate wheth Court has directly deemed er regulating State’s interest advances State’s ultimately speculate We need to the reasons Because we conclude that the proffered patient privacy State’s interest in patients might disclosing be uncomfortable substantial, we find further discussion of firearm-ownership physi- to their their status unnecessary. State's alternative interests See cians, patient might but we note that wish It, Inc., Fla. Bar Went For keep any subjects private number of when 624 n. 132 L.Ed.2d subjects discussion of those is not relevant to (1995) (noting that the State need not example, care. For his or her medical "point support to more than one interest in patient may not wish to disclose his or her restriction; single ... its substantial interest affiliations, religious political pref- sexual satisfy is sufficient to Central Hudson's first erences, physi- to a or bank account balance prong”). merely the un- cian. The Act circumscribes patient necessary information on collection of complaints 23. Some of received many subjects. one of sensitive It does so as legislature prior passage Florida protecting patient's ability a means of Act reflect constituents’ concerns that their status, receive effective medical treatment without firearm-ownership once entered into record, privacy compromising patient's with re- their medical be disclosed to parties. gard third Plaintiffs contend that this is medical to matters unrelated to their fear, existing pro- an irrational law safety, of others. care or or the privacy. safeguards vides sufficient IV.A.4, part See infra at 72. *36 898 State); carry presented by Falanga, To its burden the 150

substantial interest. here, must establish that the (noting State F.3d at 1340 anecdotal evidence of prevent that Act to “are harms seeks public). complaints real, merely conjectural, not and however, importantly, given More what regulation will in fact alleviate these harms actually prohibits record-keeping — material, Turner, way.” in a and direct only about firearm when the 664,114 at 2470 (plurality 512 U.S. at S.Ct. physician knows such information to be opinion). may rely the State not on While irrelevant, IV.A.1, supra part inquiry see conjecture,” speculation “mere or Eden- ownership only about firearm when the 770, 1800, field, at 113 at it 507 U.S. S.Ct. physician good-faith lacks a belief that the required present ‘empirical is not “to data relevant, supra part information is see IV. accompanied by ... a surfeit of back A.2, and harassment about firearm owner- ” ground justify information’ its restric ship only physician when the does Falanga, (quoting tion. 150 F.3d at 1340 necessary, supra part believe it see IV. Bar, 628, at Fla. 515 U.S. 115 S.Ct. at think “simple A.3—we common sense” 2378). “Rather, may ... case State[’s] ample support legisla- furnishes for the consensus, ‘solely history, rest and sim ” point ture’s decision. The State need not (second common ple Id. altera sense[.]’ peer-reviewed studies or conduct exten- Bar, in original) (quoting tion Fla. 515 surveys sive that proscribing establish 2378). 628, Further, at at U.S. S.Ct. highly physicians intrusive quantum empirical evidence need “[t]he do not themselves believe be relevant satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny ed to necessary directly advances the in- State’s legislative judgments vary up will or down in protecting terest its citizens from harm- novelty plausibility with the and of the ful or professional practices ineffective and justification raised.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. safeguarding privacy. partic- their This is PAC, 391, 377, Gov’t ularly given plausibility true the facial (2000). 906, 145 897, L.Ed.2d 886 Nixon, legislature’s conclusion. See conclude that the State has met its We 391,120 at U.S. S.Ct. proof step burden of under this dispute Plaintiffs this commonsense con- matter, analysis. As an initial the record by arguing existing clusion federal contains a number of anecdotes and refer- sufficiently protect patient state laws ences to complaints regarding constituent matter, privacy.24As an initial we note that questioning unwelcome about firearm own- protect these laws information it has ership physicians. supra See note 2. after physicians; they been disclosed to do noth- Supreme Both the Court and this Court protect information from initial dis- have noted that anecdotal evidence physicians closure to support a conclusion that and their staff. More challenged regulation directly materially point, physician to the if the has no serves need place, State’s substantial interest. See Fla. the informаtion the first then Bar, 515 U.S. at whether that kept information will be (describing principal extensive anecdotal record confidence is irrelevant. The regulations promulgated pursuant § 24. Under entities. 45 C.F.R. law 164.502. Florida Portability provides patient's federal Health Insurance that a also medical records Accountability kept Act of Pub.L. No. must be confidential and enumerates 104-191, only 110 Stat. covered health care limited circumstances in which a health providers may patient provider may not disclose health in- care share records with 456.057(7)(a). except party. § formation to an enumerated list of a third Fla. Stat. *37 targeted protect patient harm is the collection privacy by shielding pa- regarding, and of harassment tients from and all discussion information about about, ownership firearm when that infor- firearms with physicians; their the Act unnecessary mation is irrelevant to or for merely requires physicians to refrain from provision of medical care. broaching a concededly topic sensitive when lack any good-faith belief that Plaintiffs further contend that because such information is heavily regulated, relevant to the medical and individuals who wish to own a firearm care or of patients their or others. provide must personal considerable infor- Pointing to circumstances allegedly State, mation to the see Fla. Stat. patients’ diminish privacy per se is off- § (requiring prospective 790.065 firearm base.

buyers to range personal submit wide of highly disparate Given the power bal- undergo information and a background ance of the physician-patient relationship,26 check), patients qualms should have no we find it to be clear that extracting pri- revealing about their status as firearm vate patient, information from a knowing physicians, owners to and thus the Act such information to be irrelevant patient privacy. does not further Again, provision care, of medical is a real harm. argument we find inapposite. to be circumstances, In these it is a matter of may possess The fact that the State infor- common sense that restricting unnecessary mation about resident firearm owners is inquiry eliciting such utterly directly immaterial to information physi- whether or not advances the cians State’s substantial should have access to such informa- interest .in Moreover, regulating tion.25 again, profession here medical to pre- Plaintiffs working mistake the actual vent harmful the Act. The or ineffective medical care Act, purpose it, of the as we read is not to safeguard patient privacy. and Amendment, 25. Unlike in the legitimizes Fourth there is interaction that in itself "third-party exposure” exception no physician expressions. mitigates pro- somehow the State’s interest in dominance, patients In the face of this sus- tecting privacy of its citizens. Smith v. pend phy- Cf. their critical faculties and defer to 735, 743-44, Maryland, 442 U.S. opinions. disempowered sicians' Patients’ 2577, (1979) (explain- 61 L.Ed.2d 220 factors, position stems from a number of in- purposes for the of the Fourth cluding knowledge, lack of medical the anxi- Amendment, person legitimate "a has no ex- illness, ety accompanies and the need to pectation privacy in information he volun- physicians power believe that have the and tarily parties”). turns over to third competence needed to cure them. power One scholar has summarized the inequities These structural also counteract dynamics physician-patient relationship patients' ability question physicians and thusly: conversation, redirect the course of even if purpose [R]esearch shows [that] and patients acquire have an acute desire to infor- doctor-patient relationship structure of the Moreover, mation. socio-economic differ- physicians authority vest with immense power patient, eyes patients. Physicians’ particular- in the ences between doctor and race, class, authority superior ly gender, age, derives from their knowl- differences education, edge prestigious their social impede further communication. status, and economic and the “charismatic Berg, Paula Toward A First Amendment authority” symbolic that derives from their Theory Doctor-Patient and the Discourse conquerors role as disease death.... Advice, Right to Receive Unbiased Medical The confluence of these factors leads to an (1994) (footnotes B.U. L.Rev. 225-28 physicians’ “profession- institutionalization of omitted). al dominance” within the structure of doctor- the First Amendment. The Act step final of violates third and Under scrutiny per- as a analysis, we intermediate scrutiny withstands the intermediate professional speech. more the Act is missible restrictiоn whether determine must in necessary to serve this extensive than *38 nar “must demonstrate terest. The State challenged regulation of tailoring Finally,

row we address the second fit that is not interest —‘a challenges: to the asserted Amendment of Plaintiffs’ First reasonable; that necessarily but if perfect, A is overbreadth. statute “overbroad necessarily single best not represents applications number of its are substantial scope pro is in unconstitutional, whose but one disposition judged relation to ” served.’ Greater the interest portion legitimate sweep.” to plainly statute’s Unit Ass’n, Inc. v. United Stevens, 460, 473, Broad. New Orleans 130 v. 559 U.S. ed States 1923, 173, 188, (2010) States, 119 S.Ct. 1577, 1587, 435 176 L.Ed.2d (1999) 1932, (quoting omitted). Bd. 144 L.Ed.2d 161 marks “The over- (quotation Fox, N.Y. v. Trs. Univ. State that ‘strong doctrine is medicine’ breadth of 3028, 3035, 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. U.S. ‘only administered as a generally should be ” (1989)). Locke, L.Ed.2d 388 634 F.3d at 1192 last resort.’ Williams, 553 (quoting United States precisely to be Frankly, we read 293, 128 S.Ct. U.S. legitimate interests. the State’s tailored to (2008)). L.Ed.2d 650 sweeping made a ex has not The State all conversation judgment that ante reject for the challenge this We ownership is about firearm record-keeping rejected that Plaintiffs’ same reasons we The Act does not even inappropriate. challenge. speech facial free conventional conclusion that a legislative represent prohibit a substantial The Act does speech categorically physician subset because, protected speech even amount Instead, prohibi- the Act’s inappropriate. “regulates that the Act and re accepting entirely coupled to directly and tions are on the every practitioner’s speech stricts judgments good-faith own physicians’ firearms,” only it subject of burdens or record- inquiry such about whether that, by the judged physician medically in the keeping appropriate faith, lacks a nexus to the good sufficient particular patient’s circumstances of the particular pa or of a medical care If, as we have supra part case. See -IV.A. may validly legislate tient. As State concluded, in- has a substantial the State practice professions “the within ensure profession regulating the medical terest boundaries,” Goldfarb, 421 their U.S. care, in this prevent ineffective medical argues and as no one un- by patients from protecting instance concededly irrelevant lies with what nar- necessary privacy, breaches practice, we scope good in the .medical by this interest than way rower to advance that the Act is not overbroad. hold necessity physicians the impressing upon about any inquiry record-keeping C. genu- of a be the result Concluding, appropriate we think it ine, subjective determination based First, although we hold points. make two falter on medical need? The Act does not facially today that the Act does not conflict ground. this Constitution, requirements with not, as- holding, foreclose Accordingly, we hold that the District we do remain free applied challenges. Plaintiffs by concluding that the Act Court erred reason, scrutiny. the First Amendment as an affir- It does not. For I to assert proceeding brought mative defense continue to dissent. upon speech based made in

against them allegedly fell

the course of treatment I. good outside the bounds of medical care. By rejecting challenge Plaintiffs’ facial organizations, Numerous medical includ- Act, simply refusing provide we are ing the American Medical Association a declaration that such a Plaintiffs with (AMA), view firearm related deaths and defense will be successful. injuries as a public problem serious health particularly pernicious with chil- effects on Second, our decision should not be dren. These organizations believe that *39 -pronouncement read as the Act’s public problem this health can be alleviat- “wisdom, need, propriety.” [or] Griswold by providing people, particularly ed chil- Connecticut, parents, dren and their with information (1965). 1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 That is safety.1 about firearm Accordingly, the job. responsibility, simply not our Our has, among AMA things, adopted other supremely, agree and is “to decide cases policy encouraging inquire “members to ably to the Constitution and laws of the presence of household firearms as a United States.” Id. at part, of childproofing the home.” Preven- (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quotation Children, tion of Firearm Accidents in omitted). Having marks concluded that Policy AMA H-145.990. From the AMA’s the Act not offend either does the First or perspective, inquiry could not be more the Fourteenth Amendments of the Con vital, policies specifically as the are de- stitution, uphold we must it. signed pediatric to “reduce firearm mor- bidity mortality.” and Id.

V. Consistent with their beliefs about how Accordingly, we REVERSE the District public problem, best to address this health grant summary judgment Cоurt’s doctors, including number Florida Plaintiffs, in- favor and VACATE the plaintiffs, followed the AMA’s advice. junction against enforcement of the Act. They routinely spoke patients with about SO ORDERED. firearms, asking if patients firearms were present specifically in the home in order to WILSON, Judge, dissenting: Circuit follow-up safety tailor information. There Majority original many genuinely has vacated its is no doubt that doctors that, opinion replaced it with one un- help believe that these conversations can subjects original opinion, protect patients public. like the Florida’s their and the In- (Act) deed, Privacy Firearm Owners’ some doctors believed these conver- scrutiny. important they First Amendment this is sations to so were While be encouraging development, Majority an willing patients to lose the business of who engage. believes the Act survives intermediate refused to Moyer, Ap- community 1. See Christine S. "Public related Health medical to reduce firearm proach: Physicians Aim to Prevent Gun Vio- injuries by using preventive care methods that lence,” News, Sept. American Medical public have been used to other health address http://www.amednews.com. available at accidents, problems such as motor vehicle published by American Medical News is smoking, spread of diseases. Moyer’s AMA. article describes efforts in the materially those inter- by patients directly or advance complaints response In and coun- questioning who found doctors’ ests. of firearms seling on Further, must be those interests offensive, overly political, irritating, rights convey weighed against doctors’ Simply put, the passed-the Act. Florida safety message their chosen about firearm prevents doctors gag

Act is a order addressing chosen role in play and to their in a asking question the first from even they public to be a health crisis. what view pro- firearms. The Act conversation about disagreement If the medical there is doctors from significantly chills hibits view that community plaintiffs’ with the providing their views and infor- expressing with information about providing patients topic about one and one patients mation to health, it good public firearm only, topic firearms. certainly presented in the record agree with Regardless of whether we Indeed, and com- before us.2 the record message conveyed by pa- doctors to inexorably to the conclu- mon sense lead firearms, perfectly I think it is tients about that children will suffer fewer sion Amend- that doctors have a First clear injuries par- related if their —and message. This right convey ment safety. more about firearm ents—-know *40 infringes upon right, that significantly Act they But will know less. As a result of now subject, very it at the and is therefore Act, many no that doc- the there is doubt least, Subject scrutiny. intermediate to to curtail, if significantly tors in Florida will scrutiny, pass the Act cannot this level cease, altogether pa- discussions with constitutional muster. safety. firearms and firearm tients about in protect- asserted interests The State’s Thus, not advance while the Act does owners, including rights of firearm the interests, the Act does the State’s asserted rights their to be free privacy rights, their significantly ability speak limit doctors’ to discrimination, and from harassment and they in patients ways to their believe care, ability to access medical are their The protect public will the and save lives. Act incredibly important. Were the neces- actually the Act poor fit between what rights, I believe the sary protect those purportedly it does and the interests might scrutiny survive an intermediate in purpose serves belies Florida’s true challenge. But the State has offered no passing silencing this Act: doctors’ disfa- rights are evidence to show that those This, message safety. vored about firearm .threat, in the under nor is there evidence suggesting that the Act will either the State cannot do. record through safety counseling meeting August [preventive care 2. At its annual (ABA) medicine, adopted vitally American Bar Association Res- pillar a and is of modern olution pa- important and welfare of to the health opposing] governmental poli- legal actions and ethical and re- tients. It is also the rights physicians cies that limit the and sponsibility physicians. Failure to fulfill providers inquire other health care objec- these duties results in a breach they guns patients possess whether their patients.... tive standard of care owed to they and how are secured in the home or to are another known Firearms in home dangers patients their about the counsel may to dis- risk factor that doctors choose guns practices in the home and safe parents patients cuss with their dangers. avoid those young patients. above, Citing policy quoted the ABA the AMA specifically recognized that properly Legislature pass court invalidated Among The district Act. content-, things, Legislature other speaker-, Act as a and view- heard that: given a woman practi- days restriction that “chills was to find a point-based physician new way impairs tioners’ a after she refused to an- questions ulti- swer about provision of medical care and firearms in her home; a mately patient.” Wollschlaeger physi- harm the was asked a Farmer, home; cian F.Supp.2d to remove firearms from his (S.D.Fla.2012). facility Majority separated The reverses and a mother from her interrogating the Act survives children while holds them about intermediate firearms; scrutiny physician under First Amendment. Su- refused to care for nine-year-old boy preme prece- Court Eleventh Circuit because he wanted dent, however, home; to know supports the conclusion about firearms falsely that the Act cannot survive intermediate citizens were told that Medicaid scrutiny. required them to disclose their firearm pay they and would not if

II. answer; refused to a doctor refused to examine a child when the mother re- provisions The Act contains four issue questions; fused to answer firearms (1) appeal. keeping The “record a facility billed for services not delivered cannot provision” states doctors rec- family after a ques- refused to answer ord firearm-related information in medical tions their about firearms. files that “know” not to be “relevant.” experiences Leg- These show that the (2) 790.338(1), § “inquiry Fla. Stat. islature’s action in passing the Act over- provision” states that doctors “shall re- whelmingly was based on real concerns patient’s right spect privacy and protecting privacy about constituent asking patients should refrain” from about *41 preventing discrimination and harass- ownership, firearm unless the doctor be- during ment doctor’s visits. good in faith that the lieves information is medically relevant. Fla. Stat. A legislator’s experience Florida own (3) 790.338(2), § pro- The “discrimination similar: a answering pediatri- was “After practitioners “may vision” states that question gun ownership, cian’s about against patients discriminate” on the basis pediatrician legislator] asked that re- [the ownership. firearm Fla. Stat. gun move the from his home. To the (4) 790.338(5), § Finally, the “harassment legislator, the doctor’s conduct constituted provision” practitioners states that “shall political ‘a ... attack on the constitutional ” respect patient’s legal right to own or right to own a ... firearm.’ A National possess firearm and should refrain from representative Rifle Association also com- unnecessarily harassing” patients about plained questioning patients about ownership. firearm Fla. Stat. gun ownership satisfy political agen- “to 790.338(6). § stop.” da needs to State asserts examples these are of what the Act was passed response in This was to con- designed stop. complaints stituent about the manner and discussing extent to which doctors were attempts appeal on Tellingly, the State ownership patients. Specifi- firearm with though it scope to narrow the of the Act— cally, explains: as the State event, In inconsistently. does so

[Ajctual experienced by Supreme explained discrimination has that a law Court gun directly restricting in rendered uncon- owners Florida motivated tries, chapter, its Florida the American “the inevitable effect on stitutional based Academy Family Physicians, its Florida its face ... [or its] on [the] statute College Physi- American chapter, Health Sorrell IMS purposes.” stated — cians, U.S. -, chapter and its Florida all recom- Inc., (internal (2011) providing counseling guidance and quotation mend L.Ed.2d 544 omitted). Therefore, variety injury-prevention topics assessing on a marks Act, safety. Doctors thus including we cannot firearm constitutionality of asking insist that fire- inevitably quite legitimately silence that this Act will ignore questions as a matter of topic of firearms all but arm-related on the doctors recording the information Doctors risk course and the rarest of circumstances. they good patients’ if to medical files is for their licenses are found losing their Act, safety. public’s cannot safe health and for the so have violated only the State will advance ly assume that legisla- As the incidents discussed reading suggests of the Act it the narrow however, history suggest, the Act was tive here. apparently designed prohibit doctors brief, routinely firearm own- revealing portion asking of its about In a only ership prescreening, that the “Act informational proscribes State asserts rightly suspect, despite inquiries doctor-patient Appellees within the relation- forms. present firearms assurance to the con- ship recordkeeping about State’s con- trary, relevant to medical аnd that the standard of relevance that is not higher the Act is than the point, templated concerns.”3 At this difficulties arise Appellees Appellees’ Consequently, and -the State have dif- own standard. because Many purposes assessing the Act’s consti- ferent definitions “relevant.” doctors, organizations tutionality, many medical assert I assume that doctors always particularized fact or circum- that it is relevant to ask about— absent some thus, in- firearm-ownership indicating stance is record— discussed, AMA, relevant,4 particularly stop asking formation. As as will recording Academy well as the American of Pedia- about and this information.5 may only part 3.Here one of the State’s contradictions. that it have been of the State’s litigation strategy. briefing, in its There are no assurances Elsewhere the State asserts not, that, ends, inquiry provision it.just litigation that the once this the Board will stated, proscription merely interpretation. but is instead not revert back to its broader *42 Further, perspective, interprets advisory. From a doctor’s how- the State the same word ever, ("should”) mandatory mandatory. in the the Act must be treated as to be context of Indeed, body provision— interpreting Executive Director of the the harassment the Act, interpreta- responsible enforcing though the the State vacillates on this for Board tion, Department of Medicine of the Florida as well. (Board), physicians Health mailed a letter to inquiry provision physicians stating that the was manda- 4. And how will be able to make the course, tory. change inquiring? I But in a the Board relevance determination without coming posted shortly Appellees website after will return to this issue in the discus- to its that, fact, provision only filed suit was sion. argument pro- advisory.' The State's that the one, only advisory appears vision is is not a bad be- It that the Act determines as a ownership provisions other which matter State law that firearm cause unlike use "shall,” clearly mandatory inquiiy medically preven- relevant in word all cases provision ambiguous purposes. uses the word “should.” tive medicine Elsewhere in its however, briefing, emphasized extremely risky But it be the State would for doctors to rely specifically interpretation, given that the tim- the Act allows doctors to ask change suggests they "in of the Board’s in course about firearms whenever believe prohibits The Act also “discrimination” conversations about fire- uncomfortable gun ownership. might arms, on the basis of One while others are not. Because the reasonably based on expect, the incidents explicitly State acknowledges that the leg- Act, prompted passage that this history provides islative examples of what provision declining bars doctors from to discrimination, constitutes doctors reason- treat a who refuses to answer ably punishment fear for discrimination questions regarding ownership. under the Act for speaking as the doctors explicitly The Act affords doctors the con- did in the above-cited incidents. Accord- right pa- tinued to refuse to treat such ingly, provision, the discrimination like the tients, however, 790.338(4), § see Fla. Stat. keeping record and inquiry provisions, will Legislature apparently so the intended to cause doctors not to ask about or make prevent other forms of discrimination regarding recommendations firearm own- passed when it the Act. The State asserts ership, particularly if patients initially are that “actual discrimination experienced resistant to information topic.6 on this by gun directly owners in Florida motivat- provision harassment chills doctors’ Legislature pass ed the the Act.” This speech even further. The explains State statement is followed the list of inci- Legislature “the physicians enabled legislative history. dents contained make ownership] inquiries any [firearm above, As noted explained the State also or patients, provided all they do so with passed the Act was in response to inquiry the belief that the is relevant to questioning gun ownership about fol- patient’s Logically then, care. if a low-up recommendations to make such physician seeks firearms information safer, including recommenda- only suit a political agenda unrelated to guns tions to remove from the home en- patient’s discussions, well-being, ... tirely. he These which some con- unnecessarily harassing patient....” stituents and his legislators perceive to be a attack, political Appellees’ could As brief explains, be viewed as discrim- consistent inatory. policy, Based on their with AMA gun many status as doctors believe owners, patients subjected some are to that asking about firearm ownership is good faith” tory that the information is relevant is illustrative of what constitutes "dis- and tо record such information unless crimination” —we must view the harassment this, "know” it to be irrelevant. From provisions designed and discrimination Legislature State concludes that "the enabled inquiry keeping pro- reinforce and record physicians inquiries to make these Moreover, visions. the fact that the Act ex- " patients all if the doctor holds a different plicitly primary allows the form of discrimi- view of medical relevance than the State. is, actually nation that occurred—that doctors course, interpretation, This would allow turning away patients who refused to answer inquiries legislative history; detailed in the questions about firearms —belies the notion precisely inquiries previ- the same the State provision that the discrimination is meant to ously designed stated that the Act was experienced by address actual discrimination prevent. uncertainty, Given this doctors who *43 may prohibit firearm owners. It indeed some ownership wish to ask about firearm in all discriminatory of the conduct that the State' taking significant they cases would be risk if occur, speculates might and it would not cre- continued to do so. problem ate a constitutional if that is all it IV, point A bit more is said on this in Part context, however, did. In this it is difficult to infra, my in relation to brief discussion on provision anything see the discrimination as vagueness. provi- other than reinforcement of the other purpose 6. Given the overall the of Act and the prohibiting saying sions doctors from legislative history light Act's in —considered writing things. certain legislative the State’s that assertions that his- pro- information and medical well-being preventive in all patient’s to the

related agenda.7 political anti-firearm moting an fire- why questions about cases, which many doc- ownership were asked arm Act, then, one group Under this the Act. As passage the this tors before prohib- professionals, speakers, medical clear, however, history makes legislative in a engaging from or at least chilled ited follow-up the inquiries and routine these fire- topic, about one great deal they were deemed prompted conversations ask routine ques- Doctors cannot' arms. part to be legislators by constituents ownership of all incom- firearm tions about which agenda political anti-firearm of an before, despite the they did ing patients briefing in as unneces- its State defines the associations host of medical fact that a sary harassment. Doctors cannot they should. suggest that patients’ their record about information in the the incidents discussed Most of highly-confidential in firearm to involve noth- history appear legislative files, though the information even medical the disagreement between more than a ing to the doctor in a prove later essential in- doctor, gun-related perceived the who the malpractice suit or to medical patient’s to be relevant formation also Doctors emergency in an situation. perceived well-being, patient, and the who information provide cannot unwelcome part to be of an information the running the risk of without and advice provision The harassment attack. political if their medical are facing discipline efforts that State has suggests Act the of the political agenda. part construed to disagree- in side patients’ the taken offers reasons to believe Though State suggest that nothing There is to ment. to might interpreted not be that the Act messages regard- inquiries or doctors’ things, of these at various prohibit all believed genuinely were not firearms ing accepts briefing, the State points its interest patients’ in the best medical to be are the intend- that these forms evidence given. But there is when of this Act. Under reasonable targets ed history suggest that legislative Act, then, are interpretation doctors designed pre- provision is harassment discipline talking potentially place taking from these conversations vent patients in all with their about firearms certainly result That is in the future. a few narrow circumstances. but largely cease Doctors will it will achieve. regard- observation is order topic on the One final counselling into and inquiring interpretation. The firearms, ing the State they be of cross- Act’s lest accused district court’s decision life-saving deemed the providing between the line brief, (most, fire- unnecessarily patients harass about ... the State In its initial asserted arms, time) they though suggesting all of the that the word ... not while inquiry provision rendered "should” in the State cannot even broach areas.” If these advisory. Regarding provision purely next whether the decide one brief to the ex- provision, which included harassment against merely prohibits advises unnec- word, “should,” the State asserted same act certainly harassing patients, essarily doctors “prohibits] facilities and provision self-contradictory rely cannot on the State’s unnecessarily harass- from ... practitioners punish will not seek assurances guns.” same word ing patients who own provision for the harassment doctors under provi- one in the same statute rendered used speaking ways that some constituents deem mandatory. an advisory the other In but sion Judge Tjoflat recognized at political. to be As contradiction, the State to correct this effort simply argument, rules will cause oral these Legisla- Reply Brief "the in its asserted clear.” doctors to “steer *44 physicians with freedom to provided ture

907 inquiry provi- treat and harassment First Amendment requires height- “[t]he mandatory advisory as rather than scrutiny government sions ened whenever the an intentional “effort to render the Act regulation creates a speech because of however, Majority, unconstitutional.” The disagreement with message it con- accepts interpretation the district court’s added) (in- veys.” at (emphasis Id. provisions inquiry harassment omitted). quotation ternal marks Thus, mandatory. despite accepting are restricted here is part of a interpretation an of the Act that even the exceptional tradition of protection, and it would suggests State “render the Act un- certainly is not within an traditionally area constitutional,” Majority strikingly “proscription.” The Court has holds that the survives First Amend- explicitly recognized importance of a words, In scrutiny. Major- ment other free flow of information between doctor ity gone limiting speech has further patient, which explicitly this Act rights argued than the State it should or directly limits. physician “[T]he must could. know all that a can articulate in identify disease; order to and to treat bar

III. full riers to impair diag disclosure would proscribes speech The Act about one nosis and treatment.” Trammel United (firearms) ‍‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‍topic by group speakers one States, 40, 51, 906, 913, U.S. 100 S.Ct. (medical such, professionals). As the Act (1980). 63 L.Ed.2d 186 Relatedly, a “con subjected must be to at least intermediate sumer’s concern for the free flow of ... scrutiny, a standard it satisfy. fails to Ac- speech ... has great relevance in the cordingly, I conclude that the Act is uncon- health, fields of public medicine and where stitutional. Sorrell, information can save lives.” (internal at quotation S.Ct. marks A. omitted). Sorrell, Recently, in the Court invalidat- And if even we assume that only speech ed a “statute marketing, [that] disfavors which is, medically the State defines as irrele particular with a content. vant that, proscribed, will be Justice More than White’s spe- statute disfavors concurrence in speakers, namely explains cific Lowe v. S.E.C. pharmaceutical Here, that while “the prohibit [S]tate manufacturers.” 131 2663. directly prohibits pursuit the Act of medicine as an occupation firearm related with license, inquiries out its ... I keeping, and record as well as do not think it could persistent topic,8 publicly discussions on the “that make it a crime privately or is, speech a particular speak urging with content. More persons reject follow that, than the statute specific disfavors school of thought.” medical speakers, namely,” 2557, 2584, doctors. See id. 86 L.Ed.2d Thus, (1985) (White, J., law on its “[t]he face burdens disfa- 130 concurring) (empha added) (internal speech by speakers, vored disfavored quotation sis [and] marks omit ted). heightened judicial Act, follows that [i]t scruti- Under the doctors run the seri Indeed, ny is warranted.” Id. at being 2663-64. ous risk of disciplined harassing Majority ly 8. The defines "to harass" as all discussions with their "[t]o doctors about persistently.” Maj. Op. disturb or irritate Thus, pa- firearms. doctors "harass” their Many by firearm owners—as evidenced by persistently discussing tients firearms. legislative history irritated virtual- —are *45 908 Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at by doctors. agenda” if delivered “political by pushing

patients (too forcefully persistently) or that “the inevitable effect (explaining 2663 they speak of medical schools face” and “a statute’s patients about on its to their statute ownership deem firearm thought which may be considered purposes” stated (in- relevant. constitutionality evaluating purposes of omitted)). Doctors marks quotation ternal the why reason a second There exists in order to about firearms patients asked pro here deserves being silenced speech more tailored —and thus give specifically Amendment. the First under tection speech safety In- are afforded information. protections effective—firearm Greater concern, public matters of dealing deed, supporting with the State’s amicus curiae political, matter of so “any which include that the Act is neces- legislation explain community.” cial, concern to the or other questions can in- sary a “doctor’s because U.S. Snydеr Phelps, right patients’ with exercise terfere (2011) (inter 179 L.Ed.2d in a by putting patients arms] bear [to omitted). Firearm marks quotation nal they question their position where hesitant under public concern safety qualifies as physi- because of firearms So, too, regula does state standard. stag- That statement is disapproval.” cian Act, speech care. Under the tion of health suggests perceived It the gering. patients their re by Florida doctors truthful, non-mis- with doctors’ problem entirely pro the former is almost garding regarding firearm leading message latter, hibited, as it about the speech and message working, that was so the was .it itself, significantly Act is relates to the viewpoint That is classic was silenced. the complaint about chilled lest a doctor’s discrimination. anti-gun harassing, as perceived Act be Further, Majority’s the under politicking. pro- the contention that Despite State’s latter could be holding, about the speech just topic are on the gun doctors silenced doctor-patient entirely from eliminated doctors, the Act’s surely anti-gun as relationship.9 history any doubt as to legislative erases sought to si- viewpoint State which still, express purpose

Further “the law’s discussed, history legislative lence. As are to diminish practical effect of the Act was purpose that the safety messages confirms of firearm effectiveness” political quences rather than the of firearms Snyder explains that "whether also listeners, many consequences them. To requires public private us to concern form, Amend- content, those well-attuned to Second even and context of examine the debates, political a doctor’s advice could (internal ment speech.” 'S.Ct. at 1216 new, perhaps previously unconsidered offer omitted). quotation The content of the marks may change public perspective that well views certainly speech prohibited by Act con- personal practices. The State was as well as public, speech prohibited cerns the as the great doctors' aware of the influence no doubt recognized by AMA be has been sharing might knowledge and information public part address a health of an effort to debate, public be- have on perhaps cut problem. The form and context disagreed with the doctors’ cause the State direction, necessarily. opposite in the but not message, powerful it silenced them. private pa- speaks in to her When a doctor health, safety during topic concerning public topics tients about a like firearm doc- On examination, message patients ability inform their one-on- the course of an tors’ impact consequences legislation fairly significant on the have a one about clearly to be a matter of patients’ guns because doctors even more views about seems concern, trusted, though public even knowledgeable, presumably are private. conveyed in conse- genuinely interested in the health *46 firearm-safety messages by professionals that and assigns varying to silence levels scrutiny attacks” and perceived “political accordingly. were as To the extent “political agenda” against of a that framework part acknowledges profes that Moreover, ownership. the State’s sionals speaking outside the confines of protect professional that meant to argument relationship, the Act is on matters unre conjunc- rights profession the of firearm owners—in lated to the are entitled to the argument’s neglect tion with the of the same First protection Amendment as non are, rights professionals of non-owners—further evidences I agree with that conclu taking fight. the is in this which side State sion. There is no reason to think that the Thus, practical operation, authority regulate [Flori- its State’s a profession “[i]n goes beyond even mere content entirety professional’s da’s] law extends to the of a discrimination, addition, viewpoint to actual discrim- In Majority’s existence. con (internal quotation ination.” Id. marks that restricting speech by pro clusion laws omitted). heightened judi- “It follows that furthering profession fessionals outside scrutiny cial at 2664. a professional relationship, is warranted.” Id. including com speech, subjected mercial must be to First Supreme recognized that The Court has scrutiny Amendment is well-settled. See rare that a regulation restricting “[i]t Nev., 1030, Gentile v. State Bar 501 U.S. speech because of its content will ever be 2720, (1991); 111 S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d 888 permissible.” Playboy United States v. It, Inc., 618, Fla. Bar Went For 515 U.S. Inc., 803, 818, Grp., Entm’t 529 U.S. 620, 623-24, 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 115 S.Ct. 1878, (2000). 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995). 132 L.Ed.2d 541 statutes, therefore, Content-based “are presumptively City divide, invalid.” R.A.V. v. Majority goes The then on to Paul, direct, St. 505 U.S. within the context of a professional (1992). 2542, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 Basеd on relationship, speech furthering practice foregoing, only I choice believe we profession from that irrelative to the have to make is one between strict and profession; Majority concludes that scrutiny. intermediate First Amendment regulates category. the Act the. former shows, context, As Part IV below is uncon According Majority, stitutional under either standard so decid governmental regulatory interest unnecessary. between the two is peaks, giving while the citizen’s interest in receiving information reaches its na-

B. Thus, Majority dir. while the leaves the question open, catego- it declares that this Majority persuaded The is now the' ry speech may actually subject to a scrutiny Act is to some level of scrutiny more than in- level of deferential under the First Amendment. It is the scrutiny. termediate analysis ways, part follows where we Majority open possibility as the leaves signifi- This novel framework and the a more deferential approach restric- Majority cance that the attaches to it are speech tions of within the of a boundaries problematic. diminishes the First It professional relationship. protection profes- Amendment afforded to by permitting the to silence sionals State professionals topic the State whatever Majority’s analysis

The a two- fit. That is not what the Constitution creates sees dimensional, four-category precedent framework for commands. Our instructs assessing scrutiny apply, and we scrutiny applicable speech intermediate should here, on a cases and the Act there are several this standard for restrictions

relax only certain critical differences. where professional’s justify. characteristics so Lowe, Locke, similarity Lowe, concurrence Justice White’s all that occurs this case consider (White, 105 S.Ct. at 2582 profes- within the confines of a one-on-one *47 Shore, J., and Locke v. 634 concurring), Lowe, relationship. sional In the defen- (11th Cir.2011) 1185, 1191 stand for F.3d providing dant was accused of investment pro proposition regulating the law license, without a in violation of advice speech may fessional conduct burdens 227, law. at at 2582. federal Id. scrutiny only Amendment evade First Amend- Justice White considered the First (1) licensing the law a scheme when: in- implications ment of the fact that the (2) entry profession; the regulating into published broadly, vestment “advice” was (an only by felt impact speech impact on might that Lowe not be en- suggesting unlicensed, practitioners) is inci would-be in gaged practice the of investment advis- goal (ensuring a broader dental to State ing Ultimately, at all. Id. Justice White quality professionals); the State’s pro- concluded that the First Amendment (3) on is content-neu speech the burden convey right tected Lowe’s this invest- (4) tral; prohibition the on unlicensed profit, ment-related information for a even speech beyond does not extend individuals’ 233, if at 105 he had no license. Id. S.Ct. professional- of a one-on-one the confines discussing at In 2584-85. First relationship. Only the fourth condi client implications of licensing Amendment present tion is here. Thus these cases are generally, conclud- schemes Justice White distinguishable. readily professional ed that a who “takes the af- personally of a in fairs client hand and burdening speech Some laws evade First on purports judgment exercise behalf scrutiny Amendment where the burdens light the client of the client’s individ- professional setting. occur within a See properly ual needs and circumstances is (“ Locke, govern- 634 F.3d at 1191 ‘If the engaging practice viewed as of a generally applicable licensing ment enacts 232, profession.” Id. at 105 S.Ct. at 2584. provisions limiting persons the class of hand, On the other may practice profession, who it cannot [wjhere to have enacted a limitation on be said personal pro- nexus between subject ... exist, to First not fessional and client does freedom of ” (alteration in scrutiny.’ orig- Amendment speaker purport does be exercis- inal) added) Lowe, 472 (emphasis (quoting ing judgment any particular on behalf (White, J., at 2584 U.S. individual with whose circumstances he concurring))). applies, this rule Where directly acquainted, government regu- subject only law is to rational basis review. legitimate lation ceases to function as Lowe, 472 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 2582 regulation professional practice with (requiring only regulation that the “have a only impact speech; incidental on it be- applicant’s rational connection with the fit- regulation speaking publish- comes capacity practice profession” ness or such, to the First Amend- (internal omitted)). quotation marks ].... ment! here, apply

But this rule does not be- Id. White concluded that because Justice cause, similarity fell into the latter while there is one be- the defendant’s аctivities applied. regulations category, tween the issue those the First Amendment Thus, Locke), only quently, regulation Lowe established State’s was relationship is a professional existence of a not directed at but instead at im burdening if a law necessary condition proving quality profession, the overall of a to evade First Amendment scru- speech is broadly speaking, by ensuring that only tiny. Nothing implied in Lowe that such a qualified practice individuals the profes support condition was See, e.g., (relying sion. id. on Lowe to sufficient fact, suggests In three conclusion. Lowe uphold restricting a statute practice conditions, all of have been more which design professionals); interior to licensed subsequent applying cases present Bowman, Soc’y Accountant’s of Va. rule, present and none of which are Lowe’s (4th Cir.1988) (relying F.2d here.10 reasoning up Justice White’s in Lowe to condition, In addition to the above Lowe restricting hold a statute the use of certain *48 contemplated speech also that would be terms in the work product of unlicensed burdened without First Amendment scru accountants). if tiny only consequence the burden was a A fourth final condition that is im- professional licensing of a scheme. Id. at plicit in the in contemplated rule Lowe is 229, at (discussing 105 S.Ct. “the content-neutrality great- least to a far —at government may that the principle restrict present er extent than is here. To be entry professions into and vocations ” sure, prohibition applied only the SEC’s through licensing (emphasis schemes topic advising, of investment but within added)). condition, there is a And third field, that it did not differentiate. It was recognizes government’s

which that if not as unlicensed advisers were left free speech ability through to burden licens products to recommend investment implicating scheme without the First government preferred govern- as Amendment “has never extended to —such been ment bonds—but restricted from recom- encompass licensing speech per se mending anything Similarly, else. in 229-30, press.” or of the Id. at 105 S.Ct. Locke, designers unlicensed were not left reasoning developed at 2583. This has design techniques free to recommend “any into a be] rule inhibition [must government might prefer energy merely the of observing incidental —such effect saving, “green” designs restricted legitimate regulation.” an otherwise —but added) In Locke, recommending anything from else. at' 1191 (emphasis 634 F.3d (internal omitted). least, way, speech In at the burden on quotation marks (and contemplating cases Lowe subse- cases like Lowe is content-neutral.11 exception example, banning only obscenity 10. There is one from the Ninth Cir- excessive cuit, readily distinguishable which is from the prurience price advertising in its exclusive- case, instant as will be discussed below. fraud; ly industry especially prone in an prurience withholding and fraud are bases for assertion, Contrary Majority’s to the protection full First Amendment from obscen- principle R.A.V. content discrimination ity speech, respectively. and commercial See —that permissible where the basis for that dis- R.A.V., 388-89, at 505 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. 2545- speech crimination is a reason the receives hand, 46. On the other a state could not ban protection ... ... lesser "should extend be- obscenity speech only or commercial if it con- yond wholly proscribable categories speech political message. particular tained a See id. categories to those which ... have tradition- closely clearly relates more ally been deemed merit diminished level political speech ban. Besides obvious— protection, of First Amendment as ... such is, topic speech that it restricts on a at professional speech” inapposite. Maj. See —is substantially politically Op. principle contemplates, currently, n. at 894 19. That least designers that inci- scrutiny applicable to interior Further, Amendment First because burdened of unlicensed simply dentally eliminated burdened the not conducting course of occurs in the giving them from designers prohibiting Even professional. as a one’s business at design advice. 634 F.3d one-on-one spoken only involving speech that is cases four conditions from Lowe were 1191. The profession, the Court pursuit of one’s met, scrutiny Amendment was and First First Amendment applied has intermediate Lowe, also 472 U.S. at applied. See Sorrell, at 2667-71 scrutiny. 131 S.Ct. See (White, J., 228, concur- 105 S.Ct. at 2582 First Amendment (applying intermediate Amendment ring) (recognizing First scrutiny prohibiting pharmacies to a law “[rjegulations scrutiny apply does not selling prescribing records of doctors’ from (emphasis entry profession” into a salespeople); patterns pharmaceutical added)). It, 620, 623-24, For Went scheme, ren- licensing The Act is not a (subjecting regula 2375-76 inapрosite, Lowe and the dering Locke and lawyers engaging prohibiting tion stop do not there. The Act’s differences advertising forms of direct to inter certain regulate profession scrutiny); purpose is not to First Amendment mediate cf. Project, regulate Holder v. Humanitarian Law a whole but rather to medicine as 177 one, U.S. aspect professional speech. narrow (2010) (recognizing L.Ed.2d 355 when Further, incidentally bur- the Act does not *49 coverage under the triggering “conduct consequence a of the State’s speech den as communicating a mes statute consists quality of pursuit improving the overall scrutiny app First Amendment still sage,” Instead, profession as a whole. lies).12 by li- directly targets speech per se just speech not inci- professionals, censed Locke,

In all four conditions were satis- practice profession by of a dental to the challenged provision was a con- fied. The licensing prohibits inqui- the unlicensed.13 The Act professional tent-neutral scheme may fairly purported speech be characterized charged State's interests do 12. Even if —the conduct, any limiting regulation targets relate to reasons for First as a which con- not profes- entirely speech protection applicable to Amendment duct that consists almost First, nothing speech. scrutiny. about sional not immune from First Amendment sure, authority regulate professions has State’s deemed an To be “it has never been anything protecting Second abridgment press to do with of freedom of or rights, physicians Amendment are in no illegal merely make a course of conduct be- initiated, position rights better to violate those than part the conduct was in evi- cause denced, citizen, point robustly other I discuss more by lan- or carried out means of Second, privacy may Lowe, herein. while well be guage. ...” 472 U.S. at supports potential J., an interest that limitation (White, concurring) (emphasis at 2582 protection professional speech, added) omitted). afforded to (internal quotation marks If applies that would warrant restriction primarily by language, conduct is carried out range however, to a wide of matters about which doc- difficult to claim that a it becomes currently may freely inquire, not one that tors regulation merely an of that conduct creates applies ownership only. Finally, to firearm speech. incidental burden on The there is no evidence that firearm owners have to fall under the rubric of com- then seems receipt encountered barriers to the of health- speech, to intermediate scruti- mercial harassment, care, discrimination, See, Sorrell, another ny. e.g., S.Ct. at 2667-68. address; words, point I will in other restric- Indeed, exactly considering what the in- guns related to is unrelated to tion on content quiry provision purports regulation profession be- to do shows how far the State’s nothing suggest the Act the scenario contem- that it fur- removed is from cause there is inquiry provision prohib- plated in Lowe. The thers that interest. ries, unnecessarily and ha- 132 S.Ct. keeping, record L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion). discriminatory expression— and rassing nothing more than may which consist of Lowe’s rationale further supports the to store firearms more recommendations professionals conclusion that licensed en- safely or to remove them homes with joy First rights Amendment even when if are tak- children those recommendations they speaking are within the confines of a “political topic, en to be attacks” —on one professional relationship. Justice White safety. This of explained that renders the Act content-based rath- course require high a State can standards of content-neutral, distinguishing this er than qualification, good such as moral charac- case even further from Locke. law, proficiency ter or in its it before admits an applicant to the bar.... wisely has Lowe’s rationale been beyond parameters. these Lowe extended limiting govern- for

articulated reasons ... Clients trust investment advis- expression. into free It ers, ment intrusion protection if not for the of life and very catego- recognized only that a narrow liberty, at safekeeping least profes- ry speech speech unlicensed accumulation property. Bad invest- — practice in the one-on-one ment ... engaging sionals advice lead to ruinous losses for the client. To profession unquali- protect for which are inves- of a tors, may require the Government ... incidentally as a fied—could be burdened advisers, lawyers, investment like licensing profes- an entire consequence of evince qualities truth-speaking, holding pur- of Lowe and the sion. honor, discretion, fiduciary responsi- concurrence was to pose of Justice White’s bility. expand and thus to category, narrow that speech rights

the free even of unlicensed 472 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 2582-83 By saying that unlicensed professionals. (internal (White, J., concurring) quotation *50 speech rights expanded, free professionals’ omitted). marks professionals Licensed pro- that implying Lowe was not licensed occupied thus in position venerated speech rights Lowe, fessionals’ free narrowed. professionals perform as these func- Supreme explicitly The has warned Court society tions in that cannot be trusted to against reading First Amendment case law just anyone. only And it of was because way: designed in this “A rule to tolerate compelling unquali- this rationale that the speech ought certain not blossom to fied silenced at all. Far from could be be- restricting venerating professionals come a rationale for a rule it.” who deliver what — Alvarez, advice, -, recognized States v. U.S. Lowe to be critical United asking asking questions obviously irrelevant be the case when a doctor is its doctors from example, patient if a if he he about firearms. For doctor and his owns firearm because patient gotten arrange hunting trip, "government his have to know each other wants to years, regulation legitimate to over the the doctor ask the ceases function as regulation professional practice only whether he owns a firearm in order to see if with reg- patient might go hunting. impact speech; like to That incidental it becomes such, inquiry plainly patient’s speaking publishing is irrelevant to the ulation of care, example an the First 472 U.S. ]." so it is obvious of what the Amendment Thus, inquiry provision prohibits. directly at S.Ct. at 2584. Lowe direct- Lowe inquiries inquiries speech, pro- ly prohibited that that the states such are not states speaker legitimate regulations profes- conduct: “Where ... a does Act are not fessional regula- purport exercising judgment to be on be- sional conduct but are instead direct individual,” any particular speech. half of as would tions of compel- aside a profes- medical nale. We should not set licensed prohibits Act here consistently exercising judgment, ling body them of case law that from sionals scrutiny in the kind to con- engaging and First Amendment making inquiries, applies believe counseling based on an exten- tent-based restrictions persistent well-being pa- their improve inapplicable sion of an line cases. will tients. Majority precedent,

Despite level of scruti- some lesser maintains that Southeastern Planned Parenthood of by professionals speech ny may apply 833, 112 Pennsylvania Casey, professional of a rela- the confines within (1992), reaf 120 L.Ed.2d 674 li- recognizing tionship. Instead scrutiny appro that intermediate is firms particularly is professionals’ speech censed Casey in com priate regulation here. The valuable, decision to silence the State’s seeking to advise women pelled doctors by Majority approved certain various health conse abortions about qual- are so speakers because the precisely quences and alternatives. Id. rely could not on the ified. The State per (plurality opinion). S.Ct. at 2824 to, Majority’s example, rationale si- professional sonal nexus between unquali- who are non-professionals, lence in client that exists here and that existed advice, from give fied Casey. present Locke was also Unlike private about firearm making inquiries Locke, however, Casey regula involved a though silencing type ownership, even targeted specific about a tion In- is what Lowe envisioned. speaker topic profession within the medical rather would stead, Majority’s rationale allow general regulation restricting entry than a profession- all to silence the State Casey profession as a whole. qualified give such advice als who are analogous help thus more to this case spoken in a speech, their when because ful identifying applicable level of professional setting is converted private, scrutiny, though noting it is worth that the virtually protected private speech to relevant First Amendment discussion con professional conduct. This unprotected only sisted of three sentences a three- on its head. turns Lowe opinion speak member that did not for the Therefore, favoring Casey’s the Act seemed to statement— As amicus Court.14 ... admit, rights silenced because their that “First Amendment [were] doctors were implicated” causing patients question is sub speech was —instructs *51 ject scrutiny. to First whether concerns associated Amendment See 884, outweighed the 505 at 112 S.Ct. at 2824. The with firearm U.S. at very recently Cаsey upheld provision has re- fact- that benefits. The Court jected provi rationale for issue there does not mean that the appropriate this as an silencing speech: “That the State finds sion was not First Amend expression 'persuasive permit scrutiny. too does not ment That Justice O’Connor’s quiet speech opinion Casey apply it to or to burden its in did not Justice Sorrell, messengers.” 131 S.Ct. at 2671. White’s framework from Lowe is not an distinguish- insignificant It thus clear that Lowe is detail that can be cast aside. is factually Casey apply and based on its ratio- did not Justice frame- able both White’s V-B, opinion constituted the discussion falls in Part and Justice Justice O’Connor’s I, II, III, only by judgment joined V- Justices Kenne- of the Court as to Parts O’Connor was A, V-C, dy only. and VI Amendment and Souter in this Part. The First

915 framework the health Justice White’s risks abortion and child- work because 882, why at 112 inapplicable. That is Justice birth.” 505 U.S. S.Ct. at 2823 was (plurality opinion). requirement in Lowe and Justice O’Connor The also White Casey opposite “legitimate goal” reached conclusions about advanced the of ensuring impli- the First Amendment was that women do not unwittingly whether suffer “dev- cated, why opinions astating psychological and that is the two consequences” of if applied less-than-fully-informed making cannot be treated as decision scrutiny. “protecting same level of the life of the unborn.” 882, 884, Id. at 112 S.Ct. at 2823-24. To Thus, Locke, it is clear that unlike goals, “leg- advance these the Court found subjected regulation Casey was to some ensuring islation aimed at a decision that scrutiny. First Amendment Given level of is mature and informed” to be constitution- brevity Casey’s First Amendment 883, al. Id. at 112 at (emphasis 2824 discussion, identifying what level of scruti added). Further, the Court discussed the Casey is difficult. noted ny applied was ways speech requirement which the was that, only although the Amendment First narrowly drawn: it was limited to “truth- applied, “subject was to reason information, ful misleading” and not licensing regulation” it able because prevent “the statute physician [did] “part practice was of medicine.” from exercising judg- his or her medical 884,112 (plurality 505 S.Ct. at 2824 U.S. provide ment” not to information opinion). It is clear from this statement 882, 884, certain situations. Id. at 112 See, scrutiny applied. that strict was not S.Ct. at 2823-24. e.g., Performing Tex. Med. Providers 570, Lakey, analysis Abortion Servs. v. 667 F.3d This mirrors an intermediate (5th Cir.2012) (“The plurality response scrutiny analysis and shows that the law in compelled clearly claim question passes constitutional muster un Sorrell, scrutiny analysis.”). not a strict der standard. See 131 S.Ct. (explaining Fourth and Ninth Circuits have character at 2667-68 that to survive in Casey applying scrutiny, ized “intermediate scru termediate “the State must show tiny.” cy Concerns, See Greater Balt. Ctr. Inc. v. Mayor City & Pregnan Council vances least [2] substantial the statute governmental [1] directly ad in Balt., 683 F.3d (4th Cir.2012), terest and [3] that the measure drawn to reh’g grounds, (citing vacated on en banc on other achieve that interest” Cent. Hudson (4th Cir.2013); Corp. 721 F.3d 264 see also Pick & Elec. v. Pub. Comm’n Gas Serv. Brown, (9th N.Y., up v. 740 F.3d Cir.2014) (1980))). (placing Casey midpoint at the on L.Ed.2d 341 I therefore believe in protec Casey applied something the continuum First Amendment akin to tions). definitively scrutiny. Other Circuits have not termediate First Amendment question. answered the if Majority Even is correct that Ca Although Casey explicitly sey applied something did not state less than intermedi *52 scrutiny applied, scrutiny, that I intermediate be- ate Zauderer v. Disci Office of plinary Supreme lieve the Fourth and Ninth Circuits are Counsel the Court Ohio, 626, 2265, Immediately addressing 471 correct. before U.S. 85 issue, (1985), the First Amendment in L.Ed.2d 652 confirms that interme Court Zauderer, recognized scrutiny applies “a diate here. In Casey that the State had government justifying applied substantial interest the Court a “reasonable relation” review, a that of First Amendment sim- requirement apprised a woman be standard 916 anything demanding in less than necessarily gests not that wording, though

ilar—in Casey. scrutiny in Id. at applied applies the one intermediate here. form—to 651, (holding that al- at 2282 S.Ct. implicat-

though the First Amendmeht was 3. ed, regulation compelling disclosure sup from the Ninth Circuit Two cases in advertisements was certain information this conclusion as well. In Conant v. “reasonably port long constitutional as as it was interest”). Walters, Zauderer the court invalidated a federal related to the State’s that the reasonableness stan- explained regulation prohibiting doctors from recom rigorous there was less than applied dard marijuana af mending the use medical 14, scrutiny, see id. at 651 n. intermediate Amendment applying heightened ter First 14, high- case 105 S.Ct. at 2282 n. but the (9th Cir.2002). 629, scrutiny. F.3d proves a distinction that intermedi- lights Despite taking place within the confines here, if scrutiny applies even it did not ate doctor-patient relationship, regula Casey. recognized in Zauderer re- content-, analyzed tion as a classic was advertising would be striction speaker-, viewpoint-based restriction. scrutiny Amendment to intermediate First 637, contrast, By Pickup in Id. at 639. applied under the test Sorrell and Cen- Brown, the court held that a law California Id. at 105 S.Ct. at 2278. tral Hudson. prohibiting professionals mental health scrutiny only applied “Reasonableness” offering change ef sexual orientation provision compelled issue where (SOCE) therapy im forts to minors was speech prohibit speech truthful but did not scrutiny, mune from First Amendment any way. Id. at at 2281- though therapy carried even itself was Thus, speech prohibited when rath- 82. through 740 F.3d at 1225. out words. compelled, than reasonableness —scruti- er Conant, Distinguishing the court drew ny up is ratcheted to intermediate scruti- professional’s public lines between a ny. Casey provision compelling involved a speech, prohibi- speech, professional’s speech this case involves a id. at while speech, tion on so even if reasonableness professional “within the confines of a rela- scrutiny applied Casey, scrutiny was tionship,” (citing Casey id. at 1228 as an up ratcheted should be intermediate example speech, noting of such again level here.15 This confirms that a speech the burdened in that case fell on like content-based restriction here midpoint of the continuum where First always will receive at least intermediate protections Amendment are diminished scrutiny. eliminated), professional’s but not through conduct which is carried out

Thus, is, Casey Majority as the while speech, regulation id. at 1229. The notes, Majority’s “consistent with” the Conant, prohibited which doctors from rec- framework, Casey two-dimensional does ommending marijuana, medical burdened framework; necessarily support entitled, least, very that was at the imply correlation does not causation. On protec- to intermediate First Amendment contrary, weight binding prece- time, At same persuasive authority suggests dent and tions. Id. 1226-27. Casey sug- recognized any speech that neither nor other case Conant bur- truthful, significance compelling non-misleading information concern- opposed restricting it can be observed in the risks of abortion and abortion alterna- Casey imagine itself. It is difficult to that a tives would survive a First Amendment chal- prohibiting providing lenge. statute a doctor from *53 equivalent of the law’s on the functional as a resült ban medical treat- dened marijuana regulated fell into the ment can scrutiny, medical be without prescribing third, category, speech directly that unprotected 'id. is related to medical targets professional the ban con- treatment does not fit within that category because (i.e., giving patients drugs) only Pickup. and under duct (i.e., writing incidentally speech burdens Here, in stark contrast to Pickup where drug prescription pad). name of a on a the speech all of the burdened was the func- Similarly, Pickup equivalent court in concluded tional of providing drug, the a none therapy, though speech by carried out in of the that SOCE burdened the Act fits in form, indistinguishable category. Asking from that questions verbal was irrelevant drug performing ownership, a or a sur- about firearm prescribing recording the an- words, swers, harassing In or a gery. other burdened based on exclusively the functional speech ownership by persistently was and ir- — ritatingly There- equivalent discussing subject of the treatment itself. noth- —is fore, therapy ing no like a banning giving patient drug perform- SOCE was differ- a or Further, some, outlawing drugs, ing therapy. ent than certain and the SOCE (i.e., all, speech speaking though by speech burden on the ban on no means therapy) by that constitute SOCE was burdened the Act is words similar to the necessary speech by to the ban on the regulation incidental burdened Ca- (i.e., sey. perform- disfavored medical conduct To the extent that the Act burdens therapy). Pickup speech designed patients Id. at 1230. to inform about recognized dangers speech that the law at issue went no the of firearms or de- banning speech necessary signed patients ways further in than to inform of safer firearms, regulate proscribed speech medical conduct. own much like the right “express speech Casey. Accordingly, Doctors’ their views to such anyone, including patients speech given minor and their pro- should intermediate subject, parents, including Strengthening about tections. this conclusion is SOCE,” that, explicitly protected by Casey was the act the fact while the law exclu- in question. sively speech necessary fully Id. at 1230. concerned a patients procedure, inform about medical here, regulations regula- like the speech the Act also that is here burdens Conant, in Casey speech tions burden purpose. unrelated to this The Act bans fits, least, very into that the inter- irritating questioning poli- irrelevant category mediate First Amendment where ticking on the of firearm owner- prоtections apply. When the Ninth Cir- nothing ship, by which definition has what- reasoning in expanded Pickup, cuit Lowe’s soever to do with medical treatment or very narrowly circum- it was careful to way in no procedure medical and is de- category speech left scribe was patients anything about signed to inform unprotected. Only speech that is the func- of medical relevance. equivalent surgery tional performing a broad prescribing drug can be burdened Because the burdens such scrutiny physician speech topic It swath of on the Pickup. without under is well noting including speech defini- speech worth burdened firearms — medical treat- Casey scrutiny nothing received intermediate even tion has to do with Conant, heightened though exclusively applied intend- which was ment — fully scrutiny, directly applicable. Doctors patients ed inform about medical Thus, right to ask procedure. even if is have a First Amendment *54 discuss, Asking at and to Lowe’s rule. 740 F.3d 1225. about firearms questions they engage prac- of someone whether in a pros and cons persistently, even (“Do smoke?”) just you tice is far less like patients with their firearm discussing medical conduct than the dan- right have the to discuss surely as as marijuana. gers engaging practice (“Smoking in the of medical pros and cons cancer, you X, lung cannot be labelled un- causes so should use Such communication Y, Z It simply stop.”). because it takes or method to is even more protected conduct an irrelevant professional asking of a obvious than someone place the confines within (“Do so, you gun? If Pickup nothing question does to un- own we relationship. far like go hunting.”) and in fact reaffirms should is less medi- principle dermine this discussing I make cal conduct than it, though no 740 F.3d (‘You correctly your firearm am- Pickup was should store comment on whether separate, munition locked safes use decided.16 lock.”). trigger simply Thus it is inaccu- a regula- rate to characterize the as reg- tion on medical conduct rather than a patient obviously a doctor asks his When speech. ulation on questions, the doctor “does not irrelevant judgment on purport exercising to be be- The Act is unlike other State laws that individual,” half so Lowe particular only incidentally speech; burden it direct- regulation ceases to says “government that can it ly questioning. possibly bans How regulation profes- legitimate function as doctors, argued telling be that a law “Do only impact with incidental practice sional questions guns,” not ask irrelevant about regulation speak- ‍‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‍speech; on it becomes only incidentally right burdens the to ask such, ing ... to the First questions guns? irrelevant about The bur- ].” Amendment! By den could not be more direct. con- (White, J., concurring). at 2584 trast, a malpractice regime medical that Further, above, only holds a doctor liable when his as discussed unreason- beyond the licens- able treatment causes a harm has case extends Lowe context, limiting only speech. set a ing Pickup, also incidental burdens Under regime, liability principle. questioning prescrib- Irrelevant doc- attaches (for wrong directly of ar- purposes drug, burdening tors about firearms hunting going politi- giving patients on a bad harmful ranging trip practice rant) clearly drugs incidentally burdening cal the functional is care, equivalent providing right drug which was to write the name of the on a Liability only Pickup prescription pad. context which extended also attaches professional relationship 16. The Ninth Circuit's decision not to take the within the dissent, spirited case en banc drew a which related to medical conduct but is not itself “[b]y labeling stated that ... as 'con- conduct) (con unprotected category and the duct,' panel's opinion entirely exempt- has professional relationship duct within the regulation ed such from the Amend- First through speech) may prove carried out doing, panel ment. In so ... insulates erred, illusory. Pickup the court in it If scrutiny from First Amendment California’s by putting much into the did so too prohibition' guise professional of a —in unprotected category. Humanitarian Law Cf. regulation politically unpopular expres- —of Project, 561 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. at 2724 (O’Scannlain, J., sion.” 740 F.3d at 1215 (applying scrutiny First Amendment where dissenting rehearing from the denial en triggering coverage "conduct under the stat banc). I share the concern that the difference communicating message”). ute consists of category (speech between the intermediate *55 disease, law, a diagnose opening question a such then the in a failing properly to for failing safety counseling to session—a burdening practice the bad ses- as problem incidentally prohibited and sion bad medicine identify a health right hypothetical likely to remain silent about under this also burdening the —would case, In patient prohibited. or tell a he has be the ban on the problem a medical question might truly he does not. be incidental a clean bill of health when (what deems) justified on the same basis. overall ban on the State bad Pickup was analogous prescribing practice. expressed my medical I have therapy is SOCE Liability attach for doubts as to whether such a ban would drug. a harmful could scrutiny, the ther- evade First Amendment but that providing therapy SOCE because psy- likely harm minors ban would be more to do so than the apy had the chance to Act. chologically. contrast, recognized, By and Lowe howev- the Act allows firearm Pickup

As (or continue, er, counseling directly what the so it is not quack even if medicine medicine) regulating can quack declaring deems to be be medical conduct or State scrutiny, doctors cannot certain form of treatment bad medicine. prohibited without time, patients directly to their At the same the Act bans prohibited talking be asking questioning 472 at irrelevant about fire- quack about medicine. See U.S. (White, J., even, especially, ques- at concur- indeed those 105 S.Ct. arms — (“I having nothing think could tions to do with medical ring) State] do not [the directly targets ... conduct. The Act thus privately speak make it a crime reject any only urging persons questioning incidentally to follow or and advances (internal thought.” quota- might of medical whatever medical interests be school omitted)); eliminating tion marks 740 F.3d at 1228 served law irrelevant (holding only may questions doctor not firearms from the doctor’s “[a] about rely office. The burden on is direct. quack counsel a on medi- is, best, may that a The benefit to medical care at recognizing cine” but doctor quack Supreme such incidental and indirect. The patients talk to about medicine added) (internal explicitly recognized has that States (emphasis quo- as SOCE Court omitted)). way. I their interests tation marks believe that a cannot advance Sorrell, (recognizing at 2670 challenge doctor’s First Amendment would See 131 S.Ct. prohibits that the Amendment laws prevail liability speak- if a doctor faced First to achieve its performing inducing where State seeks “[t]he about but medicine, objectives through the indirect upon quack policy because reliance direct, speech by certain restraining would be means of such burden speakers”). certain goal pre- not incidental to the State’s care. venting bad medical IV. here, had the

Applying this rationale foregoing leads to the conclusion stating drafted a law that it is bad State than intermediate First patients nothing to counsel on firearm that less medicine that, scrutiny applies. For the Act may Amendment accordingly, doctors “First, survive, government must not, part practice preventive support interest medicine, assert a substantial patients counsel on firearm safe- second, government might regulation regulation; with a its ty, dealing we ... that the restriction the law in must demonstrate malpractice like laws and like in- Further, directly materially advances that drafted Pickup. had the State ends, terest; third, regulation though must be and its asserted the Act need It, For fit. clari- narrowly perfect drawn.” Went not be a Id. Sorrell also (internal quota at 2376 regulation burdening speech at 115 S.Ct. that if a fies Sorrell, omitted); under-inclusive, see also addressing tion marks one area but Hudson, 2667-68; at Central larger problem, this is evidence “[Interme justification U.S. be insufficient to sus- scrutiny] only standards ensure not diate scrutiny. tain the law under intermediate *56 proportional that interests are the State’s at 131 S.Ct. resulting placed burdens following The State asserts the inter- not seek to but also that the law does (1) securing improving ests: and health- Sorrell, message.” suppress disfavored (2) owners; care, particularly for firearm 131 S.Ct. at 2668. protecting privacy rights; firearm owners’ prong analysis, the first of this Under (3) rights; protecting Second Amendment may “supplant precise

we not interests (4) preventing against discrimination by put suppo- forward the State with other and harassment of firearm owners. I as- It, For 515 U.S. at 115 sitions.” Went of the sume each State’s asserted (internal quotation S.Ct. at 2376 marks ultimately interests is substantial but con- omitted). scrutiny’s Intermediate second provisions clude that all four relevant prong by speculation “is not satisfied mere the Act fail under the second and third rather, conjecture; governmental because, analysis prongs of this while the body seeking to sustain a restriction on substantial, interests are the interests are commercial must demonstrate that by pro- either not under threat activities the harms it recites are real and that its Act, by Act at scribed or the most in fact them to a restriction will alleviate indirectly marginally advances them. degree.” material Id. at at S.Ct. (internal оmitted). quotation marks A. clearly The Court has not established suggests The record that the Act will evidentiary requirements necessary worse, make healthcare Florida not bet- prong survive second intermediate my opinion. ter. That is not It is the scrutiny, explains but Went For It that if opinion many leading medical associa- studies,” presents the State “no and “the tions, including signif- the AMA. If there is record not disclose anecdotal [does] disagreement opinion icant with this ... evidence tended to con- [but instead] community, medical the State did not men- tradict, strengthen” rather than the State’s simply tion it. There is no evidence show- argument, then the evidence is insufficient. during inquires about firearms Id. Sorrell clarifies that “a few” anecdotal negatively medical examinations affected necessarily stories are not sufficient to es- well-being medical care or the health and posed tablish that the harm to the State’s patients. interest real. at 2669. See Finally, under the prong third inter- The available evidence does establish first, scrutiny, apply things: every- mediate we do not the healthcare of least two test, extreme, happy restrictive means at the one one who is to answer their doctors’ review, at inquiries or rational basis the other. about firearms suffer as It, Act; second, of the Went For result First narrowly rights everyone 2380. Instead we look for a tai- Amendment who wel- inquiries lored fit between the chosen means comes their doctors’ and informa- State!s infringed. partiality favoring As Governmental firearms have been firearm tion on community ownership predominates, messages point, the medical to the first against ownership drastically firearm are ought to be free to ask thinks doctors entirely limited if prevented provide patients in order to about firearms information, reaching people who want to hear them. life-saving but potentially with law, A they of this will not do so. because Considering only the healthcare of fire- imagination required is not to think vivid owners, arm there is no evidence that the innumerable adverse health conse- quality of their care diminished when doc- quences go along with unsafe guns. tors found out owned There is ownership, consequences but those health also no evidence their sta- likely people to befall who are now more tus improperly was disclosed. Indeed fire- inquiry would have doctor’s welcomed arm owners are the likely ones most ownership. into firearms benefit from the information provided subject, doctors on this and there is evi- point, protection As to the second “the *57 suggesting many dence firearm-own- the is to [by Amendment] afforded First ing patients appreciated the information. communication, to its the to its source and Sorrell, in As “The defect law is [the] recipients both.... [F]reedom by many made clear the fact that listeners right receive.” necessarily protects the to [the information] find instructive.” Id. at Pharmacy v. Citizens Va. State Bd. Va. Council, Inc., Consumer 756-57, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 S.Ct. only people arguably The who stand to omitted). (1976) (internal quotation marks medically from the Act are those benefit here, right The to receive is burdened and voluntarily who choose not to answer opening question by cutting off even questions their doctors’ about firearms. conversation, virtually Act, the firearm the Act Without the doctors are free to ask right altogether. eliminates that It questions, people firearm-related and who to the First to treat anathema Amendment questions may refuse to such answer truthful, non-misleading information the Act, denied care as a result. With way dangerous same we would treat a questions refuse to people who answer drug. care, “The First Amendment directs us Fla. may still be denied see Stat. especially skeptical regulations 790.338(4), § to be questions but firearm-related keep people to dark for seek very rarely, giving will be asked doctors government perceives to be their what the patients to find out that fewer occasions (in Sorrell, good.” own at 2671 non-cooperative would be and thus fewer omitted). quotation ternal marks deny occasions to care on this basis. benefit, potential That is a but it is a give patients This Act does not even Therefore, slight great one with costs. option question- to consent to the doctors’ the burden on does not meet the Sorrell, ing on firearms. In the Court proportionality standards of discussed “private decisionmaking can explained that Sorrell. governmental partiality and thus in- avoid no important from First It is to recall that there is privacy sulate measures suggesting at 2669. that firearm owners challenge.” Amendment Id. evidence Here, they fire- is no mechanism for were denied care because were because therе consent, decisionmaking only patients arm who were patients private owners. patients topic on the denied care were those who refused between doctors and thus, drastically questions, reduced. answer a doctor’s of firearms has been tion). options, are not bad and are not even know whether These doctor did options un- far than those available to a firearm owner. Doctors better patient was they jobs— grieving father whose son’s funeral cannot do their derstand malpractice liability harassing, protests. Sny- medical draws vile See and risk —if der, If inquire broadly. Patients who 131 S.Ct. at 1213. the First they fail jobs protects protests, more funeral inquiries make doctors’ Amendment resist and, “benign many say, doctors risks would beneficial” present difficult with inquiries not. Doctors and conversations about firearms compliant patients do by significant speaking interest in that are burdened the Act are “also thus have freely, making inquiries, recording pa- protection entitled to the of the First Sorrell, Amendment.” 131 S.Ct. at 2670. tients’ answers. course, answer, Further, patients if not to there is no evidence that Of wish Ordinarily, options by patients are free not to. those faced who refused to questions questions any to answer receive answer about firearms were who wish not “ample protection unques- options worse than the faced those who [their] Sorrell, right engage.” private, po- tioned to refuse to refused to answer other (internal tentially quotation question. 131 S.Ct. at 2670 marks irrelevant That omitted). patients may freely These right questions refuse answer about questioning garners special protection choose another doctor whose firearms belies sensibilities, comports patients’ preference preference with the the State’s —a designed patients and there is no evidence in the record to ensure that who wish *58 any suggesting non-compliant patients protect privacy that to their will have access to away designed pro- were turned could not find other medical care instead to who but pro-firearm message pre- doctors. tect a the State that a (explaining fers. See id. justify forcing relinquish To doctors to problem to a State’s failure address wider questions solely freedom to a their ask as through policy” addressing “coherent protect patients’ to means freedom not to problem as whole is evidence that the questions, answer the State would have to justify asserted interest cannot the burden patients show that faced a dilemma of (internal placed quotation marks that refusing sorts and to answer was not omitted)). Beyond failing sufficient solution. to patients offer evidence that Finally, favoring were unable to one amicus curiae doctors, suggests find other the State has offered no Act that improve will suggest patients to that by improving doctor-patient evidence would healthcare anything by answering relationship. argument, have sacrificed far I can The as tell, questions. goes previously, doctors’ There is no evidence as follows: firearm through unwilling that the information obtained owners were to share firearm- inquiries ownership these was misused. It has not information with their doctors disclosed, been and care did not diminish because feared —without evidence Thus, patients might for those who answered. to validate this fear —that doctors appear perfectly gathering from the record to face a be this information for nefarious free choice presented purposes. when with doctor’s Once doctors had the informa- tion, would, questions they may patients about firearms: find a feared doctors (which question principles new doctor or answer the violation of ethical and several and, laws, any- no if consequences pass government has adverse the information to thing, may lifesaving lead to a conversa- bureaucrats.

Now, however, told doctors are doubt this law will cause doctors to because less, more, questions patients’ irrelevant about fire- know not about their not to ask if arms, ownership can rest assured that patients firearm status. As the amicus relevant, firearms, it is suggests, poten- doctors ask about curiae this information is interest tially important patients’ know it is their best patients well-being. so course, question. Of there Much of that lost information to answer will include protections prohibiting initially questionable are no additional information of rele- information, that, disclosing late, only the doctor from vance after it is too will in full original prove peo- fear remains force. to be critical. That is so the bad also know that The far ple’s But firearm owners health. State falls short of answering of not are consequences showing directly health that the Act and material- now, because the probably ly anyone. more serious advances healthcare for At Thus, most, the cal- question poli- is more relevant. State seeks to achieve its “[t]he slightly: answering, objectives while changes cy through culus the indirect means of privacy rights, potentially restraining speech by detrimental certain certain Sorrell, doing not appealing speakers.” becomes more because 131 S.Ct. at 2670. likely more to be detrimental so is Such efforts do survive intermediate scrutiny. healthcare. argument accepts premise This B. conveying patient’s information about a next The State asserts an interest physician po- to her privacy promoting firearm owners. tentially patient’s beneficial to the health. It assumed that firearm owners argument accepts premise also keeping “have an interest in their [owner- that, potentially because this information is confidential ship But status] [the Act] healthcare, important it is

vital to effective not drawn serve interest.” Id. at that the of information between doc- flow Indeed, entirely unnecessary it is Thus, tor and be unobstructed. *59 serve that interest. reasons, im- the amicus curiae the Act it proves healthcare because removes argument premise This launches from a n potential suspicion fundamentally misunderstands one obstruction — privacy consequences disclosing firearm keeping medical primary purposes ownership outweighs the health benefits— way information confidential. The best to blocking that was the free flow of informa- information is not ensure that confidential patient on the tion between doctor is to divulged through our doctors avoid If Legis- of firearms. this was the sharing any information with doctors at all. goal, poorly view, lature’s its chosen means are But if we took that doctors would In order to remove an very suited to the task. The infor- obviously not be effective. information, the obstruction to the flow of to give potential mation them has the we altogether. lives, eliminated the flow This give freely, State our so should it save we simply does not withstand intermediate should ask for it without hesi- and doctors scrutiny. tation. information-sharing with our accept unlikely premise if Given

Even we medi- life-saving potential, has unwilling that firearm who were to doctors owners have built community cal and the State ownership information disclose rela- doctor-patient around the passed high before this Act was walls their doctors walls, now, that within those tionship is no to ensure willing will be to do so there Therefore, any informa- while the be used for the collection of are no secrets. there (A) ownership the lawful protecting relating interest in tion strong has a State (B) ammunition; records, confidentiality any possession of firearm or of medical ammunition; Act, of a firearm or directly burdens the lawful use claim that the which (C) a firearm or information-sharing, storage is or the lawful speech and limits § 300gg-17(c)(2). from ammunition.” 42 justified by suspect these concerns is U.S.C. disclosing very may Patients also refrain from the outset. The Act itself causes the status, which, confidentiality designed pre- ownership their firearm harm is above, proven has not to be det- limiting the flow of information discussed vent: ways in anyone’s except rimental to care patient. doctor to uncooperative patients, that befall all event, justify In for the State to just questions those who refuse to answer to further burdening speech order its about firearms. confidentiality, it interest must confidentiality directly materially that this Act Given that the of medical show closely guarded already, records is addresses a real concern. The concern status, privacy prevent if need to further ensure ownership that firearm recorded files, justify placed will not confiden- misuse cannot the burden medical remain by entirely speculative tial is and therefore doctors’ the Act: “The choice It, at infor- dangers suppressing insufficient. Went For between the mation, dangers and the of its misuse if it freely available is one that the First The record reflects no incidents of fire- Sorrell, Amendment makes for us.” arm-ownership information from medical (internal quotation S.Ct. at 2671 marks being parties, records disclosed to outside omitted). variety and there are a of measures that, suggests will also even if place to ensure such incidents State princi- kept never occur. In addition to ethical information is confidential from the world, confidentiality may incur ples, patients of medical records outside still ad- consequences privacy by is secured state and federal laws dis- verse loss Maj. n. if by Majority, Op. professionals cussed other medical are able suggested argument 24. It was also at oral determine firearm status from that, harm Again, as a result of the Affordable Care medical records. ad- records, digitization entirely speculative. and the of medical dressed here government bureaucrats somehow personnel Those doctors and are medical records, gain providing confidentiality access to medical bound the same restric- *60 just government the with information on fire- tions discussed. And there is no ev- ownership. arm To the extent such idence to validate the State’s fear already information not from re- patients is available whose firearm is sources, Act in other the Affordable Care corded their medical files will receive explicitly prohibits subsequent the information from worse care from doctors as being gathered through medical records: result of this information. Fear of this provided type purely speculative “None of the authorities to the and cannot sat- Secretary isfy the the intermedi- [Affordable Act] under Care State’s burden under It, ... may scrutiny.17 shall be construed to authorize or ate See Went For only speculating 17. Given that the State is files will cause them to receive worse care doctors, patients' subsequent equally that irrelevant in medical from it if notations seems 790.338(4). § the swer. See Fla. Stat. There- at 2377. As U.S. a con- “[p]rivacy is explained, fore, privacy Court has particular with this interest person integral cept too mind, plainly the Act is more extensive its to freedom to allow too essential right necessary patients’ than to serve interest ideas just those support to manipulation keeping the information from their doc- Sorrell, 131 prefers.” government the the prong tors and fails under third at 2672. scrutiny. intermediate patients’ Majority relies on Finally, the information, private in protecting interest C. owner, a firearm including status as Maj. Op. at 897 physicians. own See their way, if a physician In the same waits merely wants to If the State n. gun ownership until the risk of manifests right the to decide patients reserve for suicide, homicide, itself in a or accidental ownership, firearm whether to disclose shooting, physician will have missed not allow individ- poor Act is a fit. It does to an opportunity prevent such adverse to decide that their patients ual consequence gun ownership. potential of their doctors’ ownership status none precisely this is the situation the Act Instead, Yet patient never has business. the decision because upon just physicians the chance to make also forces but is unable to broach the sub-* the doctor will, patients, directly their who more would ject.18 provision A better tailored forcefully, consequences feel inquire simply re- physicians allow something happens” until bad Act’s “wait quire respect patients’ them to their deci- mandate. But Act sion to decline to answer. pro- next asserts that the Act State opposite. It allows doctors to

does rights. Amendment There is patients who decline to an- tects Second refuse see acquiesce goal burdening plausible subsequent in the State's not more to think that speech by speakers.”). disfavored disfavored provide care based on a doctors would worse history patient's of a recalci- documented (cid:127) signs, symptoms, or 18. In the absence of trance, tardiness, time, pay bills on failure condition, complaints of an illness or it is frequent follow-up Yet re- calls. doctors imagine physician how a would difficult main free to make these —and other-—(cid:127) particular ques- reach the conclusion that a patients’ medically rec- irrelevant notations questions would "relevant to the tion or be ords, though consequences even would safety, patient's care or or the medical just the concerns the seem to be as severe as cases, And in some it is vital to of others.” purportedly addresses. When statute is generally physi- patients the health under-inclusive, it belies the fact that the so regarding with- inquire certain matters cians purpose. statute has another As Court any particularized relevance determina- out Sorrell, explained “[pjerhaps the State tion, warning signs can that conditions and so confidentiality have addressed ... could developing caught into more seri- before through policy.... A a more coherent statute ous, example, life-threatening matters. For quite type present a different of that would course, a doctor ask as a matter presented than the one here. But the case diet and habits in about his exercise purpose did not enact a statute with that State patient's of heart risk order to assess *61 Instead, design.” 131 S.Ct. at 2668. disease, pa- any without indication that viewpoint-based State enacted a restriction on suffering heart disease. If a tient is from speech just invalidated in like the one Sorrell patient's poor heart waits until a doctor privacy example, with at incidental benefits. See most itself known—for health makes ("To privacy attack—it patient the limited suffers a heart id. at 2669 obtain when the Act, by patients] be too late. [provided are forced for] [the right keep clearly expressed and bear The State has not no doubt that in general preventing interest doctors by the Second Amend- guaranteed arms is “infringing patients’ rights” by that the has an interest ment and State giving rights advice not to exercise certain unclear, right. that It is how- protecting ways. certain The State has not ex- ever, pose to what threat Second doctors pressed general though interest even rights. Amendment Doctors do not have routinely range doctors ask about a ability patients’ weapons to seize nor is things other than firearms which are not any that ever there evidence have immediately relevant to our care and agents Doctors are also not tried to do so. may implicate rights. which our This is government, so to the extent that certainly ap- almost because the State message send a one-sided that doctors proves asking of doctors about these other ownership causes more harm than however, topics. guns, As for the State good, message convey gov- that does not disagrees questioning pa- with doctors that that disapproval might ernment raise Sec- tients firearms is relevant to medical about ond Amendment concerns. Like other care, disapproves persistent and it dis- citizens, group private doctors are free topic might passionate- cussion on the express their views on firearm owner- ly convey message. an anti-firearm So ship, ordinary expectation and the is that a State that message silenced and that mes- person’s rights to be free from unwanted alone, sage guise protecting under a speech amply protected by are the “un- rights. It is clear that inter- “[t]he State’s questioned right engage to refuse to in burdening est of [doctors] Sorrell, conversation.” 131 S.Ct.. at 2670. nothing turns on more than a difference of opinion:” Id. 2672. Such differences of it While is true within the confines opinion regulated cannot be out of exis- office, persuade of a doctors can doctor’s tence. things us to do we would not do for other right For the to bear arms be under citizens, private it is also true that as soon serious threat from doctors—a threat suf- leave, that power as we diminishes drasti- justify response ficient to State cally. If a doctor recommends that I re- intrudes on doctors’ rights speak —doc- home, my move a firearm from I per- am doing simply per- tors must be more than fectly him I ignore get free to when home. suading voluntarily firearm owners to re- advice, however, If I take his I cannot linquish They doing their arms. must be complain my right gun to own a was more than favoring what one amicus curiae infringed upon any more than a doing, claims doctors are which is quits smoking who after his doctor told n “question[ingJ [patients thereby] in- complain him to do so can that his doctor terfering] patients’ exercise of the with right his violated to smoke. The Second right by putting patients bear [to arms] right Amendment does include a to be position they question a hesitant where private persuasion. free from The State’s their ownership of firearms because argument Amendment Second is essential- physician disapproval.” Indeed much of ly “that the force of can [doctors’] good question patients what doctors do is justify government’s attempts to stifle thereby about certain behavior expressing it. Indeed the State defends the law disapproval (psychologists of the behavior insisting that strong in- [doctors] ha[ve] why say things people ask us we certain .... reasoning incompatible with;' fluence This we having are difficulties cardiolo- with the First Amendment.” Id. at if gists routinely unhealthy -2671. ask us we eat

927 enough private fice is no more and is entitled to no foods; get ask us if we internists Sorrell, enough greater protection.” much and not drink too soda sleep, (second omitted). in citation This state- water, engage unsafe and whether we regard rendered with to doctors causing ment was practices), (hopefully) sexual offices. If do not have a we should continue their own question whether us to from right behavior. No to be free unwelcomed visitors in that harmful engage to offices, right patients to their own who volun- anyone’s that it is disputes one tarily certainly activi- chose to visit doctors do any of the aforementioned еngage ties, greater protections ques- not have from absolutely no evidence and there by the doctors That is intruding tioning on firearm own- themselves. that doctors are when, already in- particularly than are true as ex- any more doctors rights ers’ plained, any question the answer to about on of the above-mentioned truding right to do some- firearms will not lead to adverse conse- rights. That we have quences. right not mean we have a be thing does right about that or questioning free from regard to the State’s asserted Sec- With suggestions people people from of other — justification, like its medi- ond Amendment on voluntarily went to see for advice

we justification, “[t]he cal State seeks may tell us healthy live lives—who how to objectives through the policy achieve its par- in a exercising particular right restraining certain indirect means way is a bad idea. ticular speakers.... certain But the speech by would make bad decisions compelling people more fear that potentially As for other use, relinquishing their if firearms] a doctor could as persuasion [such means of justify information cannot providing given truthful refusing such as treatment speech.” on Id. at give up content-based burdens patients treatment unless worse (internal arms, quotation marks omit- absolutely no evidence 2670-71 their there is ted). message fact that a doctor’s being means used. Such The that such are incompatible with justify firearm speculative fears are insufficient firearm own- protect the State’s desire to regulation that is to intermediate It, questioning or ers from uncomfortable scrutiny. For 515 U.S. Went im- safety does not counseling on firearm at 2377. 115 S.Ct. concerns and Second Amendment plicate noted Perhaps respond, one could to silence a simply the State’s desire belies above, asking preventing doctors disagrees. it message with which in most situa questions firearm-related put are people tions ensure fewer will D. being away turned position in a that the Act is finally asserts But the The State failing questions. to answer such and dis- prevent harassment right designed not include a right to bear arms does firearm owners. against crimination question about whether not to be asked provides very little evidence—no even State privacy arms. “Personal one bears support its a few anecdotes—to ‘ample protec more than own home receives one’s being patients are discrimi- contention unquestioned from the ‘resident’s tion’ harassed on the basis against nated engage in conversation right to refuse It doubtful whether ownership. Bi with unwelcome visitors.’ Watchtower establish that N.Y., is sufficient to Village such evidence Tract Inc. v. ble & Soc. in a “di- advance an interest Stratton, the Act will It, (2002). way.” For material Went A of- rect physician’s L.Ed.2d 205 *63 928 (internal at identical anecdotal evidence of harassment

U.S. omitted). A quotation “governmen- Sorrell, marks Supreme the Court stated: “[A] body seeking tal to sustain a restriction on reported they few have that felt coerced speech ... must demonstrate that the and harassed.... It is doubtful that con- harms it recites are real and that its re- physicians may cern for ‘a few’ who have striction will in fact alleviate them to a ... ‘felt coerced and harassed’ can sustain degree.” material Id. 115 S.Ct. at a broad content-based rule like” the Act. (internal omitted). quotation marks here, 131 S.Ct. at 2669. The same is true provision and the harassment cannot with-

Regarding particular, harassment in provision puts scrutiny chill that stand intermediate as a result. the harassment on Indeed, protected speech significant, “[m]any doctors’ are those who must en- provision and the benefit of the is minimal they like, speech dure do not but that is a given how innocuous the “harassment” necessary cost of freedom.” Id. allegedly place that takes seems to be. As provision presents The discrimination a I, simple discussed Part doctor’s rec- with, question. begin closer To unlike the ommendation to remove firearms from a inquiry, recording, provi- and harassment present home where children were was sions, directly targeted by is less prompted passage one of the incidents that A provision of the Act. doctor could presumably of this Act and that would inquire into and record information about if constitute “harassment.”19 Even doc- facing firearms with little fear of a discrim- might ultimately disciplined tors not be for charge simply doing ination those behavior, certainly this Act will such cause mean, however, things. That does not many engage of them not to in it. remained, if the provision discrimination Were evidence harassment no speech prohibited would be or chilled. against greater, firearm and had owners so, obviously While less doctor who legislative history explicitly stated presses patient on the issue of firearm that the Act was needed to prohibit doc- ownership, engages in tough questioning advising patients tors from relinquish subject, repeated- and recommends in pursuit political agenda— firearms of a ly that a patient remove firearms from his is, apparent were it not home discriminating could seen as goal unpopular State’s was to eliminate against patient. typically would speech rather We than harassment —the con- think of such behavior stitutionality provision more as harassment harassment discrimination, well be different. But that is not than as but the Act itself case nearly before us. Confronted with does not define either.20 A who is Again, Majority 19. patients' defines "to harass” as lieve is best for their health and well-being. persistently.” "[t]o disturb or irritate I am by certain that most are smokers "harassed” confronting In a case a somewhat similar smoking their doctors about under this defini- issue, Judge then Circuit Alito used the term apply persistence tion. If doctors same "discriminatory harassment” to describe fed including recommendations — prohibitions. eral Saxe v. State Coll. Area removing firearms from homes with chil- Dist., (3d Cir.2001). Sch. 240 F.3d they smoking dren—-as do to cessation recom- provision Even if the harassment ed, then, is invalidat mendations, are, according Major- it seems that the same which ity, harassing patients their and therefore might constitutes harassment constitute "dis discipline. One would think that criminatory pro harassment” and thus be ought persist encouraging doctors their provision. scribed the discrimination Fur patients genuinely to do what doctors be- ther, I, supra legislative as noted in Part (1995) added). But harsh, (emphasis this is tough-love 487 relatively subjected to easily be- anti-discrimination law or a typical could not a from doctor treatment *64 case, against be- being discriminated because unlike the statute typical lieve he is patients owns a firearm —other Hurley, cause he the Act here is before Court being are not firearms do not own way, who “unusual in obvious since it does an[ ] doctors, but by their lectured persistently ..., face, target speech ... on the on its being firearms are who do own patients basis of its content.” Id. 115 S.Ct. they own fire- precisely scolded because at 2347. me, That, could be it seems arms. almost no evidence of State offered Act. by the prohibited discrimination Indeed, conduct-based discrimination. Further, provi three if the other even only examples actual of adverse conduct down, doctors’ are struck sions by people cited the State befell who re- a result of the will be chilled as

inquiries status, people to disclose firearm not fused consti provision. Inquiries discrimination were known firearm owners. There who discriminatory mo strong tute evidence involving billing an for ser- was incident tive, see, Cnty., v. Madison e.g., Barbano rendered, allegedly not but that in- vices (2d Cir.1990), 141-46 922 F.2d away turned for volved a who was they if ask fear that rightly doctors will And other refusing questions. to answer subsequently patients about firearms and service, for which patients were declined any aspect of their treat complain about conduct, discriminatory not constitutes ment, inquiries initial will be the doctors’ they but were declined for service speech, against sup ammunition them used as because, again, they refused to answer standing claims. Even port discrimination they not because were known questions, alone, provision thus the discrimination Thus, there is evidence firearm owners. chills firearms significantly prohibits being are discriminated people that doctors, by though proba it related their doc- against refusing for to answer speech than the bly has a lesser effect on there is no evidence questions, tors’ but provisions. other Act’s being are discriminated patients that reject I asser Accordingly, State’s they because own firearms.21 against provision that the discrimination tion simply support cannot its as- The State scrutiny First Amendment as evades of prevent- that the Act is a means sertion conduct, discriminatory not regulation against fire- type of discrimination sure, Supreme To be Court speech. examples do not arm owners because those pro that anti-discrimination explained has against firearm discrimination constitute designed discriminatory visions to address did, if the Act matter, owners. And even not, vio general conduct “do as a away pa- to turn expressly allows doctors First or Fourteenth Amend late the see questions, who refuse to answer tients Gay, Lesbi Hurley ments.” v. Irish-Am. 790.338(4), Bos., § so it cannot be Fla. Stat. Grp. an & Bisexual that form 571-72, justified as an effort to eliminate 132 L.Ed.2d away refusing patients would turn history by the was said to contain doctors cited State Indeed, examples questions any topic. faced if of "actual discrimination” on to answer examples almost ex- owners. Those patients who re- to treat doctors continued speech. clusively involved would questions, doctors fused to answer significant malprac- séemingly exposed to way 21. There is no evidence in the record one liability as a result. tice point, suspect I the other on this but discrimination, Further, point-discriminatory either. the Act restrictions unnecessary to protect patients from speech.’ DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596-97.” rendered, (alterations billed for being services original)). surely exist to other remedies resolve Therefore, provision the discrimination As for the list of problem. State’s other scrutiny, is also to intermediate examples discriminatory conduct that the State has failed to show might occur on the basis of firearm owner- provision addresses a real harm or ad (denial referrals, times, ship longer wait direct, vances a State interest in a material appointments, and cancelled to name a *65 It, 626, way. See For 515 at Went U.S'. few), presented the State has no evidence 115 S.Ct. at 2377. The Act is instead that of these forms of discrimination silencing at directed doctors who advance against firearm owners have ever oc- an anti-firearm —not an anti-firearm own curred. viewpoint with which the State dis er— Thus, it speech while is clear that will be Sorrell, agrees. it This cannot do. See provision, burdened as a result of this it is (“[Intermediate at scrutiny 131 S.Ct. 2668 any discriminatory unclear that conduct only ensure not that the standards] State’s

will be eliminated. As Went For It ex interests are proportional resulting plains, statute cannot intermedi .survive placed burdens but also that the scrutiny assumption ate on the that it will law does not seek to suppress disfavored entirely speculative problem. solve an See message.”). at 115 at 515 U.S. 2377. This that, proves Hurley, also unlike in where V. provision discrimination was found not to Amendment, implicate the First here the I also believe the Act to be void for point prohibition “focal of [the] [is not] on vagueness. outset, At the because this discriminating against the act of individu right “law interferes with free provision publicly als available ..., stringent vagueness more ... services.” 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. test apply.” should Vill. Es of Hoffman added). (emphasis at legislative 2347 Estates, Inc., Flipside, tates v. Hoffman history makes clear that the Act was in 1186, 1193-94, 455 U.S. 102 S.Ct. primarily prohibit speech, tended (1982); 71 L.Ed.2d 362 see also Reno v. I though recognize may prohibit it ACLU, 844, 871-72, discriminatory some conduct if that type of (1997) (ex 2329, 2344, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 conduct ever occurs in the future. Given plaining “vagueness that the speech- [a facts, applies these the First Amendment regulation raises special related] First See, e.g., even anti-discrimination laws. Amendment concerns because of its obvi Saxe, (“ at pure F.3d 206-07 ‘Where ous chilling speech”). effect on free involved,’ expression is antidiscrimination standard, Under this based on the Ma- territory law ‘steers into the of the First Act, jority’s interpretation own of the DeAngelis Amendment.’ v. El Mun. Paso Ass’n, (5th vague Act is to one of the most common Police 51 F.3d Officers Cir.1995). because, practices actually firearms-related doctors especially This is true noted, engage namely, practice asking as the Fifth has Circuit when anti- in— patients ownership ques- discrimination about firearm ‘applied laws are to ... solely given harassment claims founded on ver tionnaires that are as a matter of insults, matter, pictorial literary bal course before the doctor and ever content-based, impose[ Many inqui- statutefs] ] view- meet. doctors claim that such confirming people further of common relevant and always potentially are ríes intelligence pro- do not what the Act part practice them is know making Consequently, Maj. doctors at n. Op. medicine. hibits. See 5. Some good they if can continue to ask making inquiries need to know doctors have continued as a mat- ownership about firearm patients about firearm as a matter of question- by using course intake they ter of course because believe the Act allows naires. stopped them to do so. Others have this believe, questioning though they —even inquiry provision is written Because policy, inqui- with AMA that the consistent com vague persons “in so terms good patients ries are necessarily guess intelligence mon must —because requires them to do so. believe the application, as to its meaning its and differ common intelli- possess Plaintiffs least pro violates the first essential of due [it] too, they, guessing. are left gence, and Specialty Harris v. Mexican cess of law.” (11th Foods, Inc., 1301, 1310 Cir. 564 F.3d Compounding problem, the State omitted). 2009) (internal quotation marks that doctors can and should con- suggests *66 that doctors ask might think when One patients safety. firearm tinuе to counsel ownership as a questions about firearm firearm good give patients So if it is course, they not “know” the matter of do instructions, safety possibly how can it be irrelevant, nor is the rec questions to be questions patients bad to ask order to record) (the a questionnaire itself is ord specifically tailor those instructions? a faith” belief kept “good in the absence of me, That, suggests asking it seems to might is relevant. Some that the record always about firearm is indeed from this that doctors are free to conclude Assuming mandatory, the Act is relevant. asking patients continue all about however, myself I am I must confess that the Act’s ownership as did before provision guessing inquiry left what the hand, legisla the passage. On the other prohibits. history question suggests

tive such in- Relatedly, prohibition on routine information, is ing, patient-specific absent quiry assuming prohibi- there is such a — the Act was exactly type hopeless in a bind. physicians tion—leaves designed prohibit. good If to reach the faith a doctor is highlighting vague- the Act’s Further that firearm is relevant conclusion ness, the State is not even clear on wheth- first in- particular patient, a he must provision advisory is or inquiry er the patient quire patient of that whether responsi- the Board mandatory. Initially, a firearm in the a'family keeps member enforcing the Act informed doctors ble for place pa- other where the home or some Then, mandatory. it the Board that was may it. But the doctor cannot tient access it was changed course and stated faith as to good that without his belief do Similarly, in Part advisory. as discussed an require can relevance. How II, characterization of the in- the State’s it- that the Act individualized assessment contradictory, internally is quiry provision may a impossible? If doctor self renders advisory it at times as describing subject, what then inquire on the Again, people of proscription. times as a a a to conclude that would allow doctor what intelligence guessing common are left A pa- relevant? firearms discussion was prohibits. the Act keeps gun a volunteering that he tient standard, likely meet have re- home would surprisingly, plaintiffs Not likely to be ways, though this strikes me variety Act in a sponded to this harassing no persists, rare occurrence. What else? Would doctor he is doubt is, however, patient’s wearing a T-shirt emblazoned patient. question The is logo with the National Rifle Association’s necessary? that harassment prohibition a circular be sufficient? Such course, Of the doctor does not know with ordinary intel “give person does not any great precision he cannot ask because opportunity to know ligence reasonable ownership, compounding about firearm certainly will “lead prohibited” what is problem per- further. intuition Medical citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful haps persistence tells the doctor is Grayned City Rockford, zone.” See necessary, but the doctor is left with no 108-09, 2298- U.S. guidance on whether this intuition is suffi- (1972). inquiry 33 L.Ed.2d The (i.e., persistence cient to render harass- then, provision, unconstitutionally vague. ment) necessary purposes of the Act. provision, The harassment which bans Legislative history suggest would that this harassment, unnecessary only also leaves exactly point at which doctors are people intelligence guessing of common supposed stop, simply but it is not clear may go about how far doctors in counsel- may pun- from the Act what doctors ing patients safety. Intuitively, on firearm doing. Majority’s sugges- ished for initially when doctors are met with resis- brief, may tion that engage gen- doctors patients medically tance from on a impor- good eralized discussions does no because subject, persist tant doctors should for the know, patient’s the doctor from the good patient. example, of the For if a reaction, that the initial discussion did no patient doctor knows smokes and advises good Majority’s whatsoever. The further so, him dangers doing *67 that, cases, suggestion in some a doctor may become irritated. the doctor While máy patient’s conclude based on a particu- approach should take a different perhaps lar that the persist circumstances need to counseling, certainly to his he should not clear, will be guid- also offers doctors no simply counseling the the cease. because proceed majori- ance oh to how the vast Indeed, patient irritated. is the doctor will cases, ty of persist where the need to will likely persistent have to be more irri- not be obvious.22 again, people Yet tating with this smoker than with the intelligence common guessing. are left responds favorably who smoker to the doc- initial counseling, signaling tor’s that the Again, uncertainty compounded by the is message doctor’s has been received. fact the that the State claims firearm safe- often, ty if counseling always, good is not might One think that the same is true of patients. for If that counseling good is firearm owners. If a initial doctor’s coun- patients, then it makes no sense limit to seling by patient, is well-received the the counseling that to the distribution of a doctor knows message that the has been received, pamphlet generic and a discussion is subject so he need not broach the Instead, likely impact. initial to have little to no again. But if a counseling doctor’s if resistance, counseling good, is common suggests is met with intuition sense patient may they ought persist that this be—like tells doctors that to the smoker counseling subject counseling, point resistant to past even —the counseling. anyone’s guess one most need of further irritation. It is whether Here, the Act uncertainty. creates If the doctors doing continue so after to- Normally, a doctor would able be to make whether he owns a firearm. Thanks to the simply by asking inquiry provision, longer option. the determination that is no an VI. instead holding, or whether will day’s practice medicine. licenses to their lose great speech Act deal of The silences speakers topic. on one group one con- forward these put who people subject directs us to Precedent therefore internally inconsis- times tradictory and at scrutiny, Act to at least intermediate possess of the Act interpretations tent under which fails. it If intelligence. common, exceptional if not designed prevent is not to This law irrel- Act about what the guessing left they are the doctor- speech harming evant the Act proves that all but prohibits, it allows patient relationship, because irrel- some of Sadly, suspect I vague. is to relationship within that speech evant have continued doctors practices Far from continue as it did before. much probably despite will engage speech in a doctor’s stopping irrelevant doctors to well-intentioned these office, virtually allows all Act instead them, simply like I do but discipline, stop- irrelevant to continue while know. virtually all ir- ping —relevant fire- single topic: relevant alike—about a pros- is the Exacerbating the situation improve designed arms. This law is not liability. If firearm pect malpractice because, as the healthcare as far medical counseling brief of ex- safety —-whether concerned, will community this law reducing pros- capable of tended —is This law is not make healthcare worse. injuries, accidental firearm related pect of protect privacy priva- because designed is, avoid it then to as the AMA believes already at issue is cy of information provide firearm liability, doctors should designed pro- law is not secured. This counseling If that is too counseling. rights Amendment because tect Second pediatri- generic or too brief —because authority have not doctors have no —and inquiry sought comply cian with private positions power used their —to it of the Act—but provisions harassment relinqúish compel firearm owners to their specif- persistent, can that more proven designed to law is instead weapons. This pre- ically counseling tailored would have it agenda, and stop perceived political load- *68 a child who found her father’s vented designed law difficult to conceive ed, accidentally firearm from unlocked withstand First purpose that could herself, may suspect I well shooting jury scrutiny. Amendment regardless find the doctor liable. And perhaps particularly Even if—doc- if— attaches, I liability malpractice whether actually waging political cam- tors were that doctor who will the death feel for have being perceived merely than paign rather conscience the rest of of a on her child fo.r so, Amendment would doing the First her life. like the Act. them from laws What protect enough jobs Doctors’ are hard when troubling that there is no evi- more ‍‌​​​​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​‌​‍is laws that force them does not enact State actually pursuing are dence that doctors asking questions and twice about think patients. Doctors agenda with political information save lives. providing patients from exercis- prohibiting are not is, arms; are, vague thinking per- this Act twice Given how to bear right so—or nearly enough for doctors not to do convincing patients will not be haps, precisely the protect safely. to do to their This is figure out what to do so more hand, the First Amendment comply type and to patients, on the one pro- the Act protect. Because Act, designed on the other. with the from even asking Mbits doctors the first conversation,

question in this the Act is Accordingly,

unconstitutional. the district affirmed,

court’s decision should be I respectfully

therefore dissent.

Ricky KNIGHT, Irvin, Franklin et

al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Adams, suing individually

Thomas Otter persons

and on behalf aof class of

similarly situated, Billy Two Feathers

Jones, suing individually and on be persons similarly

half of a class of

situated, al., Consol., et Plaintiffs-Ap

pellants, THOMPSON,

Leslie in his individual

capacity, Parker, al., Donald et

Defendants-Appellees, Stricker,

William S. Ellen Leon Ruth

ard, individually et al. and in their capacity, Consol.,

official Defendants-

Appellees.

No. 12-11926.

United States Court Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 2015. .

Case Details

Case Name: Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jul 28, 2015
Citation: 797 F.3d 859
Docket Number: 12-14009
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In