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Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
760 F.3d 1195
11th Cir.
2014
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 (D.Mass.2013) (find- 304, F.Supp.2d 323-24 United States court for violations of in- displaced was ing presumption that by ternational law committed United the defendant was a resident of because States citizens while on United States soil. provided assistance United States Certainly, these extraterritorial claims campaign persecution to an overseas “touch and territory concern the of the States); Laden, v. from the United Mwani United great By States” with force. fail- (D.D.C.2013) 1, F.Supp.2d (holding ing to enforce the ATS under these cir- (1) plotted that a terrorist attack that was cumstances, I fear we disarm innocents (2) States, in part within the United against American corporations engage at a Embassy was directed United States rights in human violations abroad. I un- employees displaced presump- and its derstand the ATS to have been deliberate- tion); Rajaratnam, Krishanti v. 2014 WL ly crafted regrettable to avoid this result. (D.N.J. 2014) 1669873, 28, at *10 Apr. reasons, For I respectfully these dissent. (“The Rajaratnam Defendants focus on the fact all of the harm to Plaintiffs oc- argument

curred in Sri Lanka. This weight

would hold if the Plaintiffs were

suing the LTTE for the actions it took in However,

Sri Lanka. Plaintiffs are in- suing Rajaratnam

stead Defendants alleged

for their actions that occurred States.”);

within the United see also Du Inc., Sys.,

Daobin v. 2 F.Supp.3d Cisco (D.Md. 717, 728, 2014 WL at *9 WOLLSCHLAEGER, Dr. Bernd Dr. Ju 2014) (observing Feb. Kiobel Schaechter, Tommy dith Dr. Schecht (1) distinguishable because “Cisco is an man, Academy American of Pedia (2) company”; plaintiffs American al- trics, Chapter, Florida American leged that place pre- Cisco’s actions “took Academy Family Physicians, Flori dominantly, entirely, if not within the Unit- Chapter, College Phy da American States”). courts, ed I Like these conclude sicians, Inc., Chapter, Florida Roland plaintiffs’ sufficiently claims here Gutierrez, Stanley Sack, Shannon “touch and concern” the territory of the Fox-Levine, Plaintiffs-Appellees, they allege United States because Chiquita violated international law from v. by offering within United States sub- GOVERNOR OF State FLORI campaign stantial assistance to a of vio- DA, Secretary, Florida, State of Sur lence abroad.

geon Florida, General State III. Secretary, Health Care Administra Florida, sum, In tion of the State Division I do not read Kiobel to be an Director, Department Florida impediment remedy to providing a to civil- Health, Quality Division of Medical decades-long campaign ians harmed Assurance, George Thomas, they plainly allege of terror to have been Jason Rosenberg, Zachariah, sponsored by an Zachariah P. corporation. American Tucker, Espinola, Again, plaintiffs these do not Trina seek relief Elisabeth Orr, Gary foreign for the offenses of a defendant on Merle Stringer, James Win Sanadi, Nuss, foreign plaintiffs soil. These seek relief in chester, Nabil El Robert *2 Bearison, Lage, Donald Fred Onelia Goersch,

Mullins, Brigette Rivera Levine, Defendants-Appel-

Bradley

lants. County Association, Medical

Broward Society, County Pediatric

Broward Society, County Medical

Palm Beach Association, Health

Florida Public

University Miami of Law of School Clinic, Health- Children’s

and Youth Duty, Inc., Early Legal

care is Foundation, Initiative

Childhood Pediatrics, Academy

American Academy and Ado-

American of Child Psychiatry, American Acade-

lescent

my Family Physicians, American Surgeons,

Academy Orthopaedic Surgeons, College Ameri-

American Medicine, College

can of Preventive College

American of Obstetricians Gynecologist, Congress American Gynecologists,

of Obstetricians Association, Psychiatric

American Jurispru-

Center for Constitutional

dence, Responsible Gun Doctors

Ownership, Rifle National Association America, American Medical Associ- Florida,

ation, Aclu Foundation County Society,

Alachua Medical Association,

American Public Health Suicidology,

American Association of of Edu-

Suicide Awareness Voices

cation, Law Center to Prevent Gun

Violence, Amicus Curiae.

No. 12-14009. Appeals,

United States Court

Eleventh Circuit.

July *7 Hallward-Driemeier, Bruce S.

Douglas Manheim, Jr., Lewis, Augustine Julia LLP, Gray E. Ripa, Ropes & Jonathan Vice, DC, Lowy, Washington, Daniel R. Kainen, Mark, Kainen Weisberg Dennis G. Lucas, P.A., PL, Lucas, Hal M. Hal M. Davis, Mullins, Astigarraga M. Edward Miami, FL, Plaintiffs-Appellees. Winsor, Bondi, Vail, Pam Jason Allen C. Osterhaus, Timothy David Office of the General, Tallahassee, FL, Attorney for De- fendants-Appellants. Caso,

Anthony T. Univ. School Chapman Law, CA, Orange, Bryan H. Heckenlive- Olsen, LLP, ly, San Munger Tolies & Francisco, CA, Levenstein, Harry Richard PA, Stuart, Sopko Kramer & Levenstein FL, Patterson, A. Cooper, Charles J. Peter Kirk, Thompson, Cooper David H. & Julin, DC, Washington, Thomas Richard Isani, Williams, Zysk & Jamie Hunton LLP, Greenberg, Edward Gelber Gerald *8 PA, Greenberg, & Gordon Schachter Mead, Jr., Stearns Miller McRae Weaver Sitterson, PA, Miami, Alhadeff & Weissler FL, Marshall, Randall American Civil C. Union, AL, Montgomery, for Liberties Amicus Curiae. simply good

The Act codifies that medical require care does not inquiry or record- keeping regarding firearms when unneces- sary patient’s to a care. It is uncontrover- WILSON, may police Before TJOFLAT and Circuit sial that a state the boundaries COOGLER,* Judges, Judge. good practice by and District of routinely sub- jecting physicians malpractice liability TJOFLAT, Judge: Circuit discipline administrative for all manner Florida, activity of of that the state deems The Governor State bad medi- cine, officials, necessarily much of which other Florida and members of the involves physicians speaking to Depart- patients. Although Board of Medicine of the Florida “State”), the Act (collectively, singles particular ment of Health out a subset of grant physician activity trigger from District of as a for appeal Court’s disci- summary injunction pline, an this does little to alter judgment analysis. and Any group physicians physi- places physician favor of a of and burden speech is advocacy groups (collectively, entirely cian “Plain- thus incidental. Plain- tiffs”) enjoining physicians always enforcement of Florida’s tiffs remain free—as (the “Act”) Privacy Firearm Act1 have been—to assert their First Owners Amend- rights on First and Fourteenth Amendment ment as an affirmative defense brought against actions grounds. them. But we not, by striking will down the effec- protect patients’ priva- The Act seeks to tively hand Plaintiffs a declaration that cy by restricting inquiry irrelevant such defense will be successful. Fur- record-keeping by physicians regarding thermore, when the Act properly under- recognizes firearms. The Act that when a regulation of physician stood as conduct patient physician’s enters a examination to protect patient privacy intended room, patient position is in a of rela- physician-patient curtail abuses of the rela- powerlessness. tive must tionship, readily it becomes apparent place physician’s his or her trust in the language type of the Act the of con- guidance, physician’s and submit to the prohibits. Accordingly, duct the Act we In authority. protect patients, order to grant reverse the District Court’s of sum- subject physicians have for millennia been Plaintiffs, mary judgment favor practice to codes conduct define the injunction against enforcement vacate the good responsi- medicine and affirm the of Act. bility physicians keeping bear. In these traditional codes conduct—which I. universally respect pa-

almost mandate privacy simply tient acknowl- —the 2, 2011, Florida Rick On June Governor edges that practice good medicine Act into The Act signed Scott law. require interrogation does not about irrel- 790.338, § Fla. created Stat. entitled evant, private matters. firearms; concerning privacy “Medical such, legiti- prohibitions; penalties; exceptions,” As we find that the Act is Bill professional mate conduct. amended the Florida Patient’s * April Coogler, L. United 1. Act of 2011 Fla. Laws 112 Honorable Scott States 381.026, 456.072, (codified Judge §§ District for the Northern District of at Fla. Stat. Alabama, 790.338). sitting by designation. *9 concerning ownership a patient’s mation Responsibilities, Fla. Stat.

Rights patient’s the same into the medical record 381.026, several of firearms § to include amended Fla. “not relevant practitioner The Act also that the knows is provisions. 456.072, “Grounds for dis- safety, § entitled medical care or or patient’s Stat. enforcement,” (ii) others,” 790.338(1); penalties; § cipline; safety measures for violation disciplinary privacy vide respect patient’s right a “shall legislature passed Florida of the Act. The inquiring from as to and should refrain” complaints from response family patient a or his or her whether personnel that medical were constituents firearms, practitioner unless the or owns regarding asking questions unwelcome “in- good faith that facility believes and that constituents ownership, firearm patient’s is relevant to the medi- formation on ac- or discrimination faced harassment others,” safety of safety, cal care or or the ques- to answer such count of their refusal (iii) 790.338(2); “may § not discriminate” fire- to their status as simply tions or due of firearm against patient a on the basis arm owners.2 (iv) 790.338(5); § “should ownership, unnecessarily harassing pa- a refrain from part, relevant provides,

The ownership,” tient firearm and facil- practitioners care licensed health 790.338(6).3 (i) § intentionally enter” infor- “may not ities challenged provisions leading up passage 3. The full text of the During the debates Act, legislators cited several incidents. as follows: widely publicized incident example, For in a (1) practitioner A health care licensed un- Ocala, pediatrician, place in a dur- that took chapter or a [of Statutes] der Florida visit, patient’s ing a mother a asked routine facility chapter health licensed under care any kept firearms in her home. whether she may the Florida not inten- [of Statutes] question constituted Because she felt that tionally enter disclosed information con- privacy, the mother refused an invasion of her cerning ownership patient’s firearm into pediatrician then terminated to answer. practitioner medical record if the knows that relationship the mother that and advised pa- relevant to the such information thirty days had to find a new doctor. she safety, safety medical care or or the tient’s incident, separat- a mother was In another others. while medical staff ed from her children (2) practitioner A health care licensed un- the mother asked the children whether owned chapter facility der 456 or a health care li- another, physicians refused to firearms. In chapter respect pa- censed under 395 shall a provide nine-year-old "be- care to medical right privacy refrain tient’s and should [the wanted to know if child's cause making inquiry asking ques- from a written or family] Doc. had a firearm in their home.” concerning ownership a firearm tions example, legislator a at 3. In another by patient by family or ammunition a that, during appointment an with his stated patient, presence member of the or the of a legis- daughter, pediatrician asked that the private in a home or other domicile of gun his home. lator remove his patient. patient family or a member of reported complaint legislator Another Notwithstanding provision, a health care provider that a health care from a constituent facility practitioner or health care disclosing falsely firearm owner- told him that good faith believes that this information is requirement. ship At a was a Medicaid patient’s care 8, 2011, relevant to the or safe- hearing held the Florida March others, ty, safety Subcommittee, or the make such a Mar- House Criminal Justice inquiry.... verbal or written the National Rifle Association ion Hammer of (5) incidents, practitioner A health care licensed un- including reported several similar chapter facility der 456 or a health care li- family falsely involving a that had been one chapter may not censed under discrimi- by pediatrician’s office that Medic- advised against solely upon family based pay did not nate aid would not claims if patient’s questions regarding exercise of the constitutional answer firearm owner- possess ship. firearms or ammunition. own and

1205 provisions of the of the teenth Amendments of the United Violation States Constitution, for ac- grounds disciplinary Act constitutes seeking declaratory and and 456.072(2). 456.072(l)(nn). § § tion under injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contended that Furthermore, provi- of the “[violations the Act imposes unconstitutional, an con- (l)-(4) sions of subsections constitute tent-based restriction on speech, is over- disciplinary for action under grounds [Fla. broad, and unconstitutionally vague. 456.072(2) §§ Stat. and 395.1055.” ] September 14, 2011, On finding that 790.338(8). Thus, § if the Board of Medi- Plaintiffs likely were to succeed on the Department cine of the Florida of Health merits, the District preliminarily Court en (the “Board”) a practitioner finds that has joined enforcement inquiry, of the record- Act, practitioner violated the faces dis- discrimination, keeping, and harassment fines, including measures ciplinary restric- provisions Act, together of the with the fees, practice, probation, tion of return of provisions providing for discipline prac suspension and or revocation of his or her titioners who violate the Act. Wollschlae 456.072(2). § medical license. An investi- Farmer, ger 1367, v. F.Supp.2d gation culminating disciplinary action (S.D.Fla.2011) 456.072(1)(nn), §§ (citing may against practitioner by be initiated a (8)). (2), 790.338(1),(2), (5), (6), Department trig- of Health or 2, 2012, On June per District Court gered by complaint. § a citizen’s 456.073. manently enjoined enforcement of in 2, 2011, The minutes of a meeting June quiry, record-keeping, discrimination, and Rules/Legislative Committee of the provisions harassment togeth of the Board indicate that the Board is Act— prepared er disciplinary with the related provi to initiate disciplinary proceedings against holding, on cross motions for sum practitioner stating a who violates the sions— mary judgment, that all four provisions that “the Committee [has] determined Amendment, facially violated the First violation of [that] [the Act] falls under inquiry, record-keeping, comply legal obligation failure to with a provisions harassment were void disciplinary guidelines and the current for Farmer, vagueness. Wollschlaeger v. this violation apply.” would Doc. at 5. (S.D.Fla. F.Supp.2d 1267-69 6, 2011, days On June four after Gover- 2012) 456.072(1)(nn), (2), §§ (citing law, signed nor Scott the Act into Plaintiffs (8)). 790.338(1), (2), (5), (6), § filed a 42 against U.S.C. 1983 action The District found that State the United States District Court Plaintiffs Court Florida, standing for the had alleg- Southern District of sue because Plaintiffs ing inquiry, engaging that the were record-keeping, self-censorship dis- to avoid crimination, action, provisions potential disciplinary and harassment which consti- facially cognizable injury-in-fact violate the First and Four- tuted a that was (6) practitioner A care physician ques- health licensed un- decline answer chapter facility tions, der 456 or health care li- affirming that the-Act does not alter chapter respect pa- censed under 395 shall existing regarding physician’s law authori- legal right possess

tient’s to own or a firearm 790.338(3), (4), patients. § zation to choose unnecessarily and should refrain from harass- (7). appear challenge Plaintiffs do not ing patient ownership during about firearm and, provisions, these as the District Court an examination.... held, provisions apply because these do not § Fla. Stat. 790.338. practitioners regulate any or do not conduct provisions The Act also contains related by practitioners, standing Plaintiffs lack concerning emergency personnel challenge them. companies, affirming insurance ownership or vacy regarding their firearm Act and redressable

fairly traceable professions. and in the The Dis- use” Id. at 1258-59. by injunction. *11 claims Id. at 1265. held that Plaintiffs’ trict also Court delayed finding that review ripe, were Balancing physicians’ speech rights free Plaintiffs, who hardship would “cause interests in against legitimate the State’s engage self-censor- continue to would patient privacy regulating and protecting development factual that further ship,” and the District Court held professions, unnecessary. Id. at was of the issues scrutiny strict regardless of whether that — 1259. in- applied or some lesser standard —the discrimination, merits, record-keeping, quiry, the District Court Turning to the of the Act could not imposed provisions a content- harassment the Act found muster. Id. at 1265-67. speech pass constitutional practitioners’ based restriction found that the State Id. at 1261. The District Court subject of firearms. on the provide any evidence that the rejected the State’s had failed The District Court regarding per- confidentiality of information that the Act argument “constitute^] risk, ownership was at professional speech patients’ regulation missible imposed noting patient may simply that a decline to occupational conduct or information, provide at such and that state speech.” burden on Id. mere incidental that, pertaining un- federal laws to the confi- District Court noted 1262. The regu- dentiality provide of medical records ade- of the provisions “[s]uch like the quate protection patients. Id. at 1267 govern practice the access or lations Portability (citing Health Insurance profession; they prohibit do not burden or truthful, Accountability No. non-misleading speech within the Act of Pub.L. 104-191, (providing, among Id. 110 Stat.1936 scope profession.” things, confidentiality other of medical rec- then assessed the The District Court (same)). ords); § Fla. Stat. 456.057 With passing interests in State’s asserted regard professions, to the acknowledged that Act. The District Court District found that the Act lacked Court its protecting has an interest the State (internal specificity,” “narrow id. at right keep citizens’ Second Amendment omitted), marks the Act quotation because arms, found that such a and bear but directly targets speech merely rather than to the Act and therefore is is “irrelevant” imposing speech. an incidental burden on legitimate compelling not “a or interest for reasons, the Id. at 1266-67. For similar it.” Id. at 1264. District Court that the Act is District Court further found that, the State acted on the found because achieving not least restrictive means of anecdotal information and purely basis Thus, the State’s interests. Id. at 1267. provided no evidence that discrimination the District Court held that “balance ownership or harassment based on firearm tip significantly interests favor of safe- pervasive, the State does not have le- guarding practitioners’ ability speak gitimate compelling protect- interest freely patients.” to their Id. ing its citizens “from barriers to the re- The District also held that ceipt arising of medical care from Court [such] (inter- inquiry, record-keeping, and harassment discrimination or harassment.” Id. omitted). However, quotation provisions nal of the Act were unconstitution- marks regard ally vague. the District found that Florida has Id. at 1267-69. With Court inquiry record-keeping provi- to the legitimate “perhaps” compel- —but sions, District Court found that ling protecting patients’ pri- “in —interests relevant, suf- even when not provide merely standard” failed “relevance suggests physicians to what conduct the Act “should refrain” guidance ficient regard inquiring at 1268. With as to firearm prohibits. ownership. Id. 790.338(2). § provision, hortatory language, the District Court Such harassment argues, that the term “harass” has an ordi- the State does not constitute a noted clear, id., readily nary meaning physicians inquire. that is but mandate that must not ‘unnecessary argues, constitutes State because the Act “[w]hat anyone’s guess,” actually prohibit is left to id. does not in fact con- harassment’ in, that it engage at 1269. The District Court noted duct Plaintiffs wish to Plaintiffs *12 argu- standing challenge to address Plaintiffs’ lack did not need the Act because injury-in-faet. ment that the Act is overbroad because have not demonstrated Moreover, doing change argues, would not the outcome. an so State we have obligation at 1270 n. 7. Id. read as a mere rec- ommendation that physicians refrain from Thus, finding the District Court— inquiry record-keeping irrelevant and remaining provisions of the Act severa- firearms, in order to construe the granted Plaintiffs motion for sum- ble— Act as valid. mary judgment, granted part and in and part argues motion for sum- The denied State’s State also the District mary According- Id. at 1270. judgment.4 holding impos- Court erred that the Act ly, permanently facially en- District Court es unconstitutional content-based restriction, joined enforcing from the State the record- because the Act is a harassment, keeping, inquiry, professional and discrim- conduct that im- act, 790.838(1), § provisions poses ination speech, incidental burdens on (2), (5), (6), enforcing and from and because the discrimination and harass- 790.338(8), § provided provisions regulate to the extent that it ment conduct and can- 790.338(1) (2) § challenged that violations of and con- not be speech grounds. free action, ground disciplinary imposes stitute for and Even if the Act than an more 456.072(l)(nn), § speech, to the extent that it incidental burden on ar- State (2), 790.338(1), § gues, upheld vided that violations of the Act should be as a valid (5) (6) grounds disciplin- and constitute for restriction on commercial because ary narrowly action. Id. the Act is to further tailored governmental pa- substantial interests in 30, 2012, July appealed On the State privacy, protecting tient Second Amend- judgment. District Court’s The State con- rights, preventing ment barriers for fire- tends that the District erred in hold- Court care, arm owners to receive medical and ing justiciable, Plaintiffs’ claims because preventing harassment and discrimination prohibit physicians the Act does not from firearm-owning patients. asking patients ownership, about firearm providing safety counseling, firearm or re- The further contends that the Dis- State cording concerning patients’ holding inquiry, information trict Court erred ownership. argues record-keeping, provisions and harassment State physicians may engage unconstitutionally vague in such conduct of the Act be- care, patients’ plain meaning reading when it is relevant to and cause a of the Act’s 790.338(3), (4), (7), finding § granted practitioners, 4. The District Court the State’s mo- standing challenge summary judgment respect lacked tion for with that Plaintiffs’ provisions apply provisions. Wollschlaeger, of the Act that neither these practitioners regulate any F.Supp.2d nor conduct at 1258. accomplishing the means of what con- restrictive reasonably clear terms makes objectives. argue Plaintiffs also State’s ar- Finally, the State prohibited. duct is unconstitutionally vague Act is because Act is not overbroad gues that the does not define “rele- because the statute record-keeping provisions and inquiry record-keeping inquiry vant” in unconstitutionally prohibit do not not define “unneces- provisions, and does and harass- discrimination and the speech, Fi- or “discrimination.” sarily harassing” indistinguishable ment provisions the Act is overbroad nally, argue, Plaintiffs such statutes antidiscrimination legitimate physi- a wide because it affects swath Rights Act of of the Civil as Title VII patients, daily cians’ interactions (1976), and §§ 2000e-2000e-17 42 U.S.C. in- even consented-to appears preclude Act of with Disabilities the Americans of information re- recordation quiries and (1994). §§ 12101-12213 42 U.S.C. Thus, Plaintiffs con- garding firearms. contends, the District the State tend, affirm the District Court’s we should summary judg- granting erred Court judgment Plaintiffs grant summary the en- enjoining for Plaintiffs ment injunction against en- of an issuance of the Act. forcement of the Act. forcement *13 the District Court argue Plaintiffs that justiciable. held Plaintiffs’ claims properly II. self-censorship that their contend Plaintiffs a court’s review district We injury-in-fact be- cognizable a constitutes summary judgment de novo. grant in that is they engage cause wish Inc., 506 F.3d Cooper Lighting, Thomas v. by the forbidden the arguably at least (11th Cir.2007). 1361, “Summary 1363 arguably provisions are least challenged no judgment appropriate when ‘there is probabil- is some minimal vague, and there ... of material fact and genuine issue if will enforced ity provisions that a is entitled to a moving judgment party ” Plaintiffs violated. contend (quoting matter of law.’ Id. Fed.R.Civ.P. in- language of Act’s “should refrain” 56(c)). fact genuine issue of material A may interpreted not be quiry provision is such that a rea exists “if the evidence physicians discipline hortatory when face could return a for the jury sonable verdict violation, provision and when the nonmoving party.” United States v. Four its 1428, Prop., that would be Real 941 F.2d 1437 a safe-harbor clause Parcels contains Cir.1991). (11th making “In determi if were read as provision irrelevant nation, record, drawing all review Thus, we argue Plaintiffs hortatory. light in most inferences reasonable standing. have nonmoving party.” Da favorable merits, argue Plaintiffs On the Fla., Fleming Supermarkets v. mon regula- as a properly Act is not understood Cir.1999). (11th 1354, Inc., F.3d 1358 196 conduct, be- professional tion of questions review de novo concern We also challenged provisions were cause all four subject jurisdiction, matter such as ing our to—and were intended response in enacted Basham, v. standing ripeness. Elend regarding prohibit —communications (11th Cir.2006). 1199, 1204 471 F.3d contend, safety. Plaintiffs impermissible viewpoint-dis- an the Act is III. subject criminatory speech, restriction A. justified scrutiny, which cannot be to strict interests, by proffered find that the District Court any of the State’s We that Plaintiffs’ are properly least held claims any case is not the which In justiciable. standing, mounting order to have “a In a facial challenge to the Act, however, present injury claimant must an sought Plaintiffs a First concrete, particularized, actual im- Amendment defense to action brought minent; fairly against physician traceable the defendant’s based on speech tar- behavior; challenged likely geted by to be re- the Act. The State contends that ruling.” dressed a favorable Davis v. proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ First Comm’n, 724, 733, Fed. Election 554 U.S. Amendment defense is a live proceeding 2759, 2768, brought words, L.Ed.2d 737 under In the Act. other (2008). However, “[sjtanding arguing is not dis- that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge is Rather, pensed gross. plaintiff justiciable, must the State is saying standing demonstrate for each claim he Plaintiffs must wait until they have been seeks press subjected and for each form of relief to discipline pursuant to the Act. sought.” that is Id. at 128 S.Ct. at resolving Crucial to standing (citations omitted) (internal quotation question is the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. omitted). marks controlling law, “Under apply case we outset, injury-in-fact At requirement loosely we note that most Plaintiffs’ where First challenge rights First Amendment to the Act in volved, lest free equivalent be viewed as the functional be chilled even of a before the law or argument First Amendment raised as is enforced.” Bar, an affirmative Harrell v. The Fla. hypothetical defense 608 F.3d (11th Cir.2010) brought against physician (citing case for asking Hallandale 'l questions Fighters irrelevant Fire Local 2238 v. City about firearms con- Prof *14 Hallandale, (11th trary good practice. to A 922 F.2d physi- Cir. 1991)). cian could raise such a in defense a disci- plinary proceeding brought under the Act Plaintiffs’ alleged injury sole self- conduct, or, matter,

for such for that in a censorship, may cognizable a which be in malpractice brought action court for jury-in-fact standing for purposes. See id. such example, conduct. For a patient (“[I]t is well-establishéd that ‘an actual could file a alleging physi- lawsuit that a injury can exist plaintiff when the is chilled malpractice cian committed by unnecessar- exercising her to free expres ily harassing patient about firearm forgoes sion or expression order to ownership just patient as a could poten- — ” consequences.’ (quot avoid enforcement tially file a lawsuit alleging physi- that a Cole, ing Pittman v. 267 F.3d cian malpractice by committed unnecessar- (11th Cir.2001))). ily harassing other topic. The physician could choose to admit For their First Amendment claims, to purportedly harassing speech cognizable and to establish a self-cen plead the First Amendment an sorship injury, that, as affirma- Plaintiffs “must show defense, (1) tive' contending effect that the as a result of expression, desired [their] rejection court’s of the [they affirmative defense prosecution; were] threatened with (2) (3) would constitute state action in violation of prosecution likely; or is a there Indeed, leaving Constitution. aside prosecution.” credible threat of Id. at Act, (internal omitted). a physician facing malpractice lia- quotation marks bility professional for a wide swath of ac- To establish that there is a threat credible tivity involving speech theoretically prosecution, could Plaintiffs must demon raise a First “first, [they] Amendment defense. strate: that seriously wish[ ] alcohol, tobacco, home, swimming and is ‘at least expression engage Act, Plaintiffs passage After of the law,’ pools). by pertinent

arguably forbidden practice or eliminated this have curtailed second, is at least some there and facing discipline.5 for fear of challenged probability minimal if Id. violated.” will be enforced rules Plaintiffs have established omitted). (citations law challenged “If a that is at they engage in conduct wish enacted, if the recently or rule was Act. In by forbidden arguably least defending the chal- authority is enforcing medicine, preventative practice court, an intent rule in lenged law or and record questions to ask Plaintiffs wish inferred.” Id. at may be enforce the rule information as a mat regarding firearms 1257. particu making ter of routine —without that, part explain Plaintiffs determination of relevance —which larized care, physi- some practice preventative inquiry and recor- implies that some such they whether routinely patients ask cians the health will not be relevant dation verbally or via own firearms —either safety patients or others and thus and provide fire- questionnaire screening The Act prohibited by the Act. would —and larger of a safety counseling, part enacted, recently arm was and the State is counseling it, re- battery questions defending so we infer that there is safety (including, probability risks that the Act will garding least some health if violated.6 Plaintiffs chemicals in the be enforced example, poisonous pas- practice even after Complaint lays specifics of have continued this out the Plaintiffs’ regarding sage they good physicians’ practices of the Act because believe in individual inquiries safety counseling. questions For that such and information are firearm faith Act, However, example, prior passage of the Dr. patients' care. relevant to their complete Wollschlaeger patients to follow-up ques- asked his they asking now refrain from questions questionnaire included re- patients parents when or their seem tions routinely garding ownership, when, screening question, upset the initial orally they fire- whether owned asked prior passage of the would not present factors were arms if other risk Similarly, Dr. Gutierrez con- have refrained. —such home, patients had children in the as when patient questionnaire that in- tinues to use *15 addiction, depression, suffering were from ownership, question cludes a about firearm ideation, family envi- had an unstable suicidal asking any but has resolved to refrain from ronment, in a domestic- or were involved initially follow-up questions should safety provide firearm violence situation —to topic. appear discuss the Dr. disinclined to patient’s counseling to the circum- tailored previous practice of be- has ended his Sack Act, passage After of the Dr. stances. safety counseling by ginning his firearm ask- Wollschlaeger has removed the firearms-relat- ing patients they whether have a firearm in questionnaire questions and no ed from his However, the house. he has continued to longer orally questions regarding asks firearm counseling, framing provide safety firearm ownership part firearms as of or discusses his hypothetical pa- in terms not tailored his preventative counseling. standard circumstances. Dr. Fox-Le- tients’ individual has, Act, passage removed physicians party who to this vine since The other asking ownership practice questions regarding have limited their firearm suit providing counseling questions questionnaire, to ad- her intake but continues varying safety, do so to de- safety, firearm but still fram- patients vise some about firearm example, prior passage grees. For ing hypothetical her terms. advice Act, and Dr. Schectman rou- Dr. Schaechter provide 6. We note that the Act does not for tinely patients questions regard- asked their only disciplinary ac- penalties, but ing ownership entered in- criminal related Nevertheless, standing They by Board. for records. tion formation into their medical

1211 a cognizable discipline have established self-censor- for conduct may un- ship injury predictably for their First objectionable. deem Without determining, stage, claims.7 at this the ultimate

merits of argument, Plaintiffs’ we accept For Plaintiffs’ vagueness language point Plaintiffs to is at claim, establishing the test for a cognizable arguably vague. Thus, least Plaintiffs self-censorship injury is similar. have established a cognizable “[Plain self-censor- (1) ship injury for [they] vagueness must establish that: claim. tiffs] seri (2) ously [engage speech], wish[] Plaintiffs claim they curtailed their [speech] arguably such would be affected inquiry firearms counseling practices rules, by the but the rules are at least Act, due to the they and that would re- [them], arguably vague they apply practices sume those Thus, but for the Act. (3) there is at least a minimal proba Plaintiffs’ self-censorship injury fairly bility enforced, the rules will be if traceable to passage of the and re- (citations they are violated.” Id. dressable injunction. Accordingly, omitted). existence, Notably, “it is the standing. Plaintiffs have imposition, require standardless (alter injury.” ments that causes [the] Id. The argues State that Plaintiffs original) (quoting ation in Legal CAMP lack standing with regard inquiry Fund, Atlanta, City Inc. v. Def. provision of the Act because provision (11th Cir.2006)). 1257, 1275 F.3d prohibits fact nothing at all. claims, State Plaintiffs’ fear that will above, For the reasons discussed discipline face is not objectively reason Plaintiffs have met the first and third Ga., able. See v. Wilson State Bar prongs. regard to prong, With the second (11th Cir.1998) (“A F.3d party’s Plaintiffs argue it is unclear whether subjective fear that prosecuted she be inquiries routine and record-keeping re engaging expressive activity for will not firearms, garding made part injury be held to constitute an standing practice preventative medicine and not purposes unless that fear objectively based patients’ particularized circum reasonable.”). Under proposed the State’s stances, qualify as “relevant” to health and construction, merely recommends safety, and that the law does not define the that physicians “should refrain” from ask “unnecessarily terms harassing” or “dis ing questions about firearms unless rele criminate,” leaving practitioners vant, without hortatory and that such language guidance as to what pro conduct the Act does not speech. constitute bar on physicians may subject hibits and when points State out that Di- Executive *16 purpose, disciplinary may speech. the threat of action that involve little to no Never- Harrell, 1248, theless, be sufficient. See 608 F.3d at self-censorship Plaintiffs claim as a (finding attorney standing 1260 an had challenged provisions result of all four of the challenge attorney advertising the state bar’s challenged provisions regulate Act. As all four rules, consequence noncompli- when the for arguably speech, conduct that could involve action, disciplinary ance was such as disbar- only incidentally, even if this is sufficient for ment). not, course, standing purposes. We need evaluate the merits of these claims at the acknowledge 7. We that the harassment and standing stage. provisions partic- discrimination of the Act in ular, 790.338(5) (6), § prohibit conduct v. targets. Clapper But in a duct the Board stated letter— of the rector cf. — -, U.S. Amnesty Int’l shortly website after the Board’s posted to USA (2013) 1138, 1143, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 S.Ct. the Board does filed suit—that Plaintiffs human (holding attorneys and various inquiry provision as a interpret not labor, legal, organiza and media rights, rather as a recommenda- but prohibition, standing” to cannot “manufacture tions the Executive (contradicting a letter tion Foreign Intel challenge provision mailed to Florida previously Director had “by Act of 1978 choos ligence Surveillance Accord- stating opposite). physicians hypo expenditures make based on ing to contends, there is no credi- ingly, the State plaintiffs thetical future harm” where regard with of enforcement ble threat government that the will merely speculate inquiry provision. communications, and so target product of their they costs incurred were Laws—such as the disagree. We surveillance). fear of generalized action in provide disciplinary Act—that for not be generally should case of violation Moreover, note that Board has we hortatory. Compare Liese interpreted position in its been consistent Affairs, 312 F.3d Sec’y v. Veterans gang hortatory, as indicated inquiry provision (“In (Fed.Cir.2002) 1368, the absence first letter by the Executive Director’s consequences noncompliance, for [a contrary. is also stating the The State at timing provisions preca- are best law’s] interpretation inconsistent in its mandatory.”), Kittay tory rather than briefs, language refrain” in its re- “should (2d Kornstein, 531, 538 n. 3 v. 230 F.3d characterizing language peatedly identical Cir.2000) (noting attorney disciplinary provision in the harassment of the Act as a mandatory unnecessary prohibition against mandatory in character” be rules “are harassment, 1, 6, 18, 27, Br. at State’s the minimum level of cause “state 39, n.8, inquiry provi- describing lawyer no can fall conduct below which “proscribing] inquiries,” ... sion itself as subject ac being disciplinary without “prohibiting] conduct: id. (internal omitted)), quotation marks tion” providers interrogate care must not health Born, Inc., v. 792 F.2d and Edwards ... if it is not patients about firearms Cir.1986) (3d (noting attorney 391-92 patient’s to a medical care or relevant mandatory” because disciplinary rules “are others,” safety, safety id. at 39 attorneys subject discipline for vio added). Wilson, 132 (emphasis But cf. them). Thus, the Board’s lating despite (holding attor- F.3d at 1428-29 disbarred Di position as the Executive —insofar challenge neys standing lacked State in represent it—that the rector’s letters ways Bar rules that limit the which quiry provision constitutes recommenda attorneys represent disbarred can them- mandate, fact that tion rather than a to the or have contact with public selves action provides disciplinary for where “the State Bar re- ha[d] clients Plaintiffs in case of a violation against consistently posi- taken the peatedly evidence that Plaintiffs’ fear provides [challenged no rules] ha[d] tion that objectively rea they may discipline face application types of scenarios standing purposes. Notably, sonable attorneys posed”). have disbarred disciplinary generalized this is not a fear of *17 action, specific apprehension controlling it that —as the but rather Neither is Supreme contends—the Florida by specific group physicians-whose con- State — interpreted Accordingly, the term “should” as we find that Court District properly of Court hortatory reviewing Florida’s Code held that Plaintiffs’ have standing challenge See In re Code Judi the Act. Judicial Conduct. We also find (Fla. Conduct, 1037, 1041 that the properly cial 643 So.2d District Court held that 1994). interpretation ripe adjudication.9 is irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims are for Such legis effect the Florida determining what in the give language lature intended to B. Thus, they may

Act. Plaintiffs’ fear that inquiry provision under the discipline face Before addressing the State’s other ar- however, objectively guments, reasonable.8 we must evaluate the

Act in order to assess the interests at argues also that Plain State stake. The simple: essence the Act is standing regard lack to the rec tiffs with medical practitioners should not record in- Act ord-keeping provision of the because formation inquire or about fire- patients’ only proscribes entry of firearm infor arm-ownership doing status when so is not mation that is not relevant to medical care necessary providing safety, injury or and Plaintiffs claim no good medical care. The Act’s harassment arising from a wish to record irrelevant provisions and discrimination serve to rein- However, Plaintiffs claim an information. prohibitions. force these injury preventative to their practice arising being suggested by

medicine from not free to As complaints every legislature prior record the firearm information of the Florida received patient as a matter of course. Some— passage patients are aware that perhaps majority these records physicians’ inquiries answers to will —of record, will therefore be irrelevant to the care and entered into their be medical Thus, safety and others. fear their record will be shared argument unavailing: parties, including, example, State’s Plaintiffs with third injury arising, part, claim an from a government bureaucrats.10 need not We speculate desire to record irrelevant information. a patient may the reasons recommendation, accept argument rejection 8.We do not the State’s mere and our construing inquiry provision’s argument "should re- the State's does not alter the result language hortatory standing inquiry. frain” would of our render meaningless portion provision al- lowing physicians to nevertheless make fire- appeal 9. The State not renew does its inquiries doing argument ripe. arm when so would be rele- that Plaintiffs’ claims safety. Corley vant to care and See v. United we will not address the issue in detail. States, 1558, 1566, 556 U.S. (2009) ("[A] 173 L.Ed.2d 443 statute should argue existing 10. Plaintiffs federal and given construed so effect is to all its sufficiently protects state law the confidential- provisions, part inoperative so that no will be ity regulations of medical records. Under (inter- superfluous, insignificant.” void or promulgated pursuant Health federal omitted)). quotation nal mark we Portability Accountability Even if Insurance 104-191, Stat.1936, inquiry provision were to construe the aas Pub.L. No. physicians providers may mere recommendation that refrain covered health care not dis- firearms, inquiring perfectly except it is close health to an enumer- information legislature may § reasonable that the wish to ated list of entities. 45 C.F.R. 164.502. patients’ provides withdraw this the in- recommendation should Florida law quiry given kept be relevant in a case. Neverthe- records must be confidential and enu- less, inquiry we find that the in which clause not a merates limited circumstances *18 1214 relationship pa- and the of patients, or their sharing of his objecting

have trust and de- status, physician is one of but we note tient firearm-ownership her consigns patient in which the pendence, concerned about might be patient a care, physician’s him—or herself to the information re- a disclosing physician physician to act with depends and private topics of when any number garding See integrity, fidelity, competence. and relevant to his or is not such information Ladd, Ethics: Who Knows For John Medical for similar reasons. care her medical (1980) 1127, Best?, The Lancet 1129 to disclose 316 may not wish example, patient a (“The awesome, affiliations, physician’s power is religious political or his or her Power, responsibility.... of power carries or bank account bal- preferences, sexual course, trust and confi- merely presupposes Act cir- physician. ance to a dence.”). unnecessary collection of cumscribes many poten- on one of

patient information course,” that “[o]f The Dissent states It does so as a means topics. tial sensitive their doc- patients are free not to answer ability to receive protecting patient’s of a if questions tors’ firearms without com- effective medical treatment In Dissenting op. not to. at 137. choose patient’s privacy with re- promising precedent hold- support, the Dissent cites matters unrelated to healthcare. gard to ing that residents who wish not to answer at their relationship, questions a from unwelcome visitors physician-patient In the “ protection’ from doorsteps ‘ample because there receive patient may protection need right to refuse to en- power patient ‘unquestioned of between [their] is an “imbalance ” —Inc., College Phy- gage.’ Sorrell v. IMS Health physician.” American (6th 2653, ed.2012), -, 2670, sicians, 180 Manual avail- U.S. 131 S.Ct. Ethics (2011) (quoting L.Ed.2d 544 Watchtower http://www.acponhne.org/running_ able at N.Y., Soc’y Bible & Tract Inc. v. Vill. praetice/ethics/manual/manual6th. Stratton, 168, 2080, a 536 122 S.Ct. htm#physician-patient. patient When U.S. (2002)). office, L.Ed.2d 205 But the de- physician’s enters reality knowledge assumption ignores and Dissent’s pends physician’s on the authority, patients examining that when physician’s submits to the some- rooms, they may feel vis-a-vis powerless on matters of life and death. It is times physicians in- patient may physicians. that a So when exaggeration no state firearms in essentially mercy quire presence at the about the some cases homes, such, may patients’ some feel physician. physi- of his or her As physicians that their demand an answer. great responsibility cians toward bear pass patient’s response. place our on the provider It is not health care share nor— n motivations, party. legislature’s Stat. records with a third Fla. wisdom contend, 456.057(7)(a). pa- § Plaintiffs stage the extent to which at this evaluate —to firearm-ownership that their sta- tients’ fears legislature’s the Act furthers the stated inter- parties are un- Dukes, tus will be shared with third City v. ests. See New Orleans unnecessary, founded and the Act is insofar as 2513, 2517, 297, 303, U.S. confidentiality purpose protect its (1976) ("[T]he judiciary may not L.Ed.2d 511 firearm-ownership patients’ status. superlegislature judge the sit as a wisdom desirability legislative policy Nevertheless, determina- legislature per- the Florida that neither affect funda- tions made in areas particular problem surrounding ceived a along suspect rights proceed ownership mental nor eliciting recording of firearm lines....”). by physicians, passed information *19 certainly free to Other modern ethical an individual models abound. While question posed by example, a an- For the American refuse to answer Medical Asso- (the “AMA”) ciation square, may physicians a invites public patient other pledge to a Declaration of ques- freedom when Professional not feel that same Responsibility, provides which that physi- her physician. tion comes from his or must, among cians things, other “[t]reat particularly This is true circum- injured competence the sick and with and patient in which a is especially stances compassion and prejudice” without and powerless physician. vis-a-vis his or her “[p]rotect privacy confidentiality in a rural example, patient may For area [they] those for whom care and breach only single physician. have access to confidence when keeping would option to seek treatment from Without seriously safety threaten their health and physician, a different and without the or that of others.” American Medical As- imposed by professional tections codes of sociation, Declaration of Professional Re- malpractice, conduct and the law of such a sponsibility: Medicine’s Social Contract patient phy- would have no recourse if the (2001), Humanity available http:// physician-pa- sician chooses to abuse the www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/ethics/ relationship way tient in some in- —for decofprofessionalpdf. by exploiting authority stance his or her Hippocratic As the Oath and the AMA’s personal for gain, over financial Declaration of Professional Responsibility advances, or, inappropriate to make sexual suggest, practice good medicine here, as we are concerned with to extract require should not inquiry private into information, reason, private for whatever inquiry necessary matters unless such patient’s unrelated to the medical care. practice for the of good medicine. What Thus, part protect at least in patients way protect patients’ privacy better physicians from position who abuse their inquire unnecessarily than to not about power, physicians long have been sub- private merely matters? The Act reaf- ject In to codes of conduct. Classical surrounding firms the boundaries what Greece, Hippocratic Oath—as it comes good practice by medical constitutes codi- today required physicians down to us — fying into proposi- law common-sense responsibilities by swearing affirm their tion, important purpose and serves the they uphold will a number of profes- protecting privacy rights standards, sional ethical including questions who do not wish to answer keep patients’ private will information private matters. irrelevant [patients] in confidence and “keep Edelstein, injustice.” Ludwig

harm and gener Insofar as Plaintiffs claim a Text, Translation, Hippocratic The Oath: in being speak freely alized interest able to (1943), Interpretation available at (if patients, to their such conversation not care) http://guides.hbrary.jhu.edu/content.php? relevant to medical is outside the pid=23699&sid=190555. Today, most physician-patient boundaries of the rela graduating medical students swear to a tionship. insofar as Plaintiffs wish Tyson, modernized form of the Oath. Peter keep inquiries to make records re (Mar. Hippocratic Today, Oath garding ownership PBS firearm as a matter of 27, 2001), routine, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/ to an even when relevant indi case, body/hippoeratic-oath-today.html. places vidual such patient’s subject discipline or she good bounds of conduct outside liability making exposed malpractice that routine recognizing practice, leading bioethicists poor decision. As regarding record-keeping inquiries and recognize, prov- not within the ownership are rather, perhaps, medicine but are ince of profession into the of med- [b]y entering issues.11 law enforcement *20 icine, accept responsibility a physicians to their specific the standards to observe concern, then, ultimate must Plaintiffs’ If their conduct falls below profession. may where it be in the close case: lie standards, negligent- act these is rel- inquiry whether a firearm debatable [However,] line between due ly.... [t]he care. At one given patient’s to a evant (that care which inadequate care and extreme, firearm-ownership if a patient’s due) is often difficult falls below what patient’s irrelevant to a plainly status is to draw. care, Act bars it will be clear that Childress, extreme, Beauchamp F. good if Tom. L. & James inquiry. At the other Biomedical Ethics 154-55 Principals of clearly requires inquiry medical care —for ed.2009). (6th a physician’s Whether patient in of a suicidal example, case —the unnecessary inqui- concerns transgression relevant inquiry will know that physician ry record-keeping regarding private thus not barred. The close case lies anything else the State chooses matters or middle, physi- in where a somewhere discipline, the law grounds to define as for may be forced to act without definitive cian statutory disci- malpractice or her —and as to whether or not his guidance measures the Board is authorized plinary good falls the bounds of conduct within impose specific profes- for violations of medical care. standards —remain the same. Like- sional however, problem, unique is not This Act, wise, challenge physi- a under regarding pro- decision physician’s a treating patient in a remains the cian faces firearm under the Act. priety inquiries professional he or she must use same: continually make deci- physician A must judgment to determine what constitutes regarding appropri- what constitutes sions particular pa- care for that good medical tient, professional accordingly. ate care under the relevant The Act proceed standards, merely privacy one re- running while the risk that he delineates factor — policies may physician inquiries We observe that these 11. Plaintiffs contend that ownership comply profes- the AMA'sDeclaration of Profes- firearm with conflict with which, noted, standards, Responsibility, man- even in situations sional sional medical respect patient privacy. In (presented by practice preventative dates for case, care) may inquiries may initially ap- well-established that Florida where it is such safety. regulate professional standards of medical pear to medical care or irrelevant regardless including of what care within its Several medical borders— associations — See, AMA, party medical associations recommend. and those associations that are Barsky Regents, policies physi- e.g., v. Bd. 347 U.S. that endorse this suit—have 650, 654, (1954) L.Ed. 829 practice asking questions and cians’ See, ("It power counseling regarding that a state has broad viding firearms. is elemental Association, of conduct to establish and enforce standards e.g., Brief for American Medical al., relative to the health of Supporting Amici Curiae Plain- within its borders et everyone (citing there.... The state’s discretion tiffs/Appellees at 21-22 American Med- H-145.990, naturally Policy that field extends Prevention ical Association health.’’). Children). professions of all concerned with of Firearm Accidents garding ownership physi- might malpractice face liability giving for —in instructions, patient improper failing cian’s calculation. or for provide proper instruc- analysis It little to alter the does scenarios, tions. In all of these a court out a singles single factor as might hold a doctor liable for actions which trigger discipline, for nor that this factor and, given action, involve such state legislature involves what the considers ap- presumably infringe the doctor’s First propriate physicians to ask or record mind, rights. With this we patients. leaving about their Even aside proceed to evaluate the Act’s constitution- statutory disciplinary measures such as ality. physician may liability face malpractice state courts under or tort law C. professional activity, for a wide swath *21 necessarily much of which physi- involves We find that the Act is a valid Indeed, speaking failing cians or to speak. regulation professional of conduct that has routinely giving “doctors are held liable for only an physicians’ incidental effect on negligent to patients, medical advice their speech. such, As the Act not facially does suggestion without serious that the First violate the First Amendment.12 To define protects right give Amendment to good the standards of medical practice and advice that is not consistent ac- with the provide for administrative enforcement of cepted of care.” Pickup standard v. those standards is within well the State’s Brown, (9th Cir.2014). 1208, long-established 740 authority regulate F.3d 1228 to professions. generally Barsky See v. Bd. For example, may doctor not coun- “[a] 442, 449, Regents, 650, 347 74 U.S. S.Ct. of rely sel a to quack on medicine. (1954) 654, (holding 98 L.Ed. 829 The First Amendment not prohibit would may regulate professions states “all con doing the doctor’s loss of license for so.” health”); cerned Oregon with Semler v. (internal omitted). quotation Id. marks Exam’rs, 608, Bd. State Dental 294 U.S. of banned, drug is ... a “When doctor who 611, (1935) 570, 571, 55 S.Ct. 79 L.Ed. 1086 drug treats with that does not (“That may the state regulate [profes have a First right speak may ... and to that end ... sions] estab necessary provide the words or adminis- lish an supervision administrative drug.” ter the banned A Id. at 1229. board, not open dispute.”). might

doctor face malpractice liability for communicating diagnosis an inaccurate Moreover, above, as discussed patient, failing timely or for communi- as Justice White observed Lowe v. S.E.C., diagnosis. cate an accurate A doctor power government reg- of “[t]he that, 12. We note stantially person may insofar as individual Plain- affected seek a declara- particular prac- tiffs are concerned that their tory regarding agency’s opinion statement an asking questions tice of about firearm owner- applicability statutory provision, as to the a of ship providing individualized firearm any agency, or of rule or order as it (in safety counseling they the manner that did applies petitioner’s particular to the set of prior passage) Act’s constitutes “close 120.565(1). § circumstances.” Fla. Stat. case,” they advisory opinion seek an not, however, challenge Plaintiffs do from the Board to determine whether conduct, applied specific here as to their but discipline engaging prac- will face in that argue rather that the Act is invalid on its face. provides "[a]ny tice. Florida law sub- 1218 the con- is incidental to sional’s is not lost whenever professions

ulate the profession.... Where speech.” entails duct profession of a practice 2557, 2582, professional and 181, 228, personal 86 nexus between 105 S.Ct. 472 U.S. (1985) (White, J., exist, speaker does concurring does not client L.Ed.2d 130 result). Rather, exercising judgment purport statute not to be “[a] in the occupation any particular of an individual practice on behalf of governs abridgement of directly as an he is unconstitutional with whose circumstances long so speech, regulation to free ceas- right acquainted, government merely the inci- legitimate regulation inhibition es to function as an otherwise observing effect of practice dental incidental professional Shore, v. regulation.” Locke legitimate impact speech; becomes (11th Cir.2011) 1185, (quot- 1191 such, F.3d speaking publishing sub- Bowman, Soc’y. Va. v. Accountant’s ing ject to the First Amendment’s command Cir.1988) (4th (relying on F.2d ... “Congress shall make no law reasoning up- in Lowe to White’s Justice speech, or of abridging the freedom of restricting statute use hold a state press.” product per- terms the work certain Lowe, at 2584 472 U.S. at ac- public licensed as certified sons not (foot- result) (White, J., in the concurring countants)). Locke, omitted); F.3d at note see also *22 (“There difference, for First 1191 matter, course, general As a of purposes, regulating between Amendment immune by professionals is speech speech public large to the at professionals’ of the First Amend protections from the direct, personalized speech versus See, It, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For ment. Lowe, 232, (citing 472 U.S. at with clients.” Inc., 634-35, 2371, 618, 515 U.S. (White, J., in concurring 105 S.Ct. at 2584 (1995). 2381, pro These 132 L.Ed.2d 541 result))). profes at their when a apex tections are on matters of speaks public sional to the key to distinguishing “[t]he nadir, concern; they approach a public occupational regulation and between however, professional speaks pri when the abridgment [A]mendment of liber [FJirst exercising in the course of his or vately, finding personal in ‘a nexus between ties is judgment, person to a re professional her ” client,’ Bowman, professional and 860 professional’s services. As ceiving the Lowe, 232, (quoting F.2d at 605 472 U.S. at in the context of a explained Justice White (White, J., concurring in 105 S.Ct. at 2584 professional scheme for invest licensing result)), professional where the is “ex advisors, ment ercising] judgment on behalf of the client of a client in individual needs light One who takes the affairs of the client’s Lowe, circumstances,” 232, to exer- 472 at personally purports hand and U.S. (White, J., of the client in judgment concurring cise on behalf 105 at 2584 S.Ct. result). light of the client’s individual needs properly circumstances is viewed as we afford Accordingly, profession. engaging practice of public “by attorneys public to the issues acceptance Just as offer and are commu- legal representation the and matters of regulable nications incidental contract, our has strongest protection Constitution profes- transaction called a

1219 It, Inc., For 515 at judgment to offer.” Went U.S. on behalf of the in light client of (citing circumstances, 115 S.Ct. at 2381 Gentile v. specific client’s Flori- of Nev., 501 da’s is properly State Bar U.S. S.Ct. law viewed as a legitimate (1991)). 2720, 115 regulation oppo professional practice.” L.Ed.2d 888 At the Id. at (Black, J., concurring). Therefore, spectrum, site end there is no “con held, we requirement “the license infirmity” governs stitutional where conduct, occupational and not a rights physicians “implicated, but substantial protected amount of medicine, speech, part practice [and so] implicate does not constitutionally protect- subject licensing regula to reasonable activity ed under the First Amendment.” tion the State.” Planned Parenthood (internal (majority Id. at 1191 opinion) 833, 884, Casey, Pa. v. Se. 505 U.S. omitted). quotation marks (1992) 2791, 2824, S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d 674 O’Connor, (plurality opinion of Kennedy, inquiry provision Insofar as the JJ.) (citations omitted) (hold Souter, 790.338(2), § regulates physician

ing provision Pennsylvania that a of a stat speech, it does so where the “personal ute requiring providers health care to in professional nexus between and client” is availability form of the of certain perhaps significant: at its most within the regarding information abortion and child physician’s confines of the examination prior obtaining birth an abortion awas room, physician where the exercises his or valid practice of medicine judgment her professional to deliver treat physicians’ and so did not violate First particular ment and advice to a patient, speak).13 not to patient’s tailored to that personal circum example, applied For in Locke we Jus- stances, Lowe, private. See U.S. tice White’s framework in Lowe in uphold- 232, (White, J., 105 S.Ct. at 2584 concur ing requirement professional interi- result). Thus, ring in the although the Act designers practice. obtain a license to physicians’ ability ques restricts to ask *23 Locke, 634 F.3d at 1191-92. noted We ownership tions about firearm when doing that, although practice the of interior de- patients’ so would be irrelevant to sign speech, require- involves the license care, only it does so in the service of regulates only “professionals’ ment ... di- medicine, defining practice good of in rect, personalized speech with clients.” very private, physician- context of the Lowe, 232, Id. at (citing 1191 472 U.S. at patient relationship. inquiry provi The 2584) (White, J., 105 at concurring S.Ct. in places phy sion no burdens whatsoever on result). ‘personal “Because of this ability speak sicians’ outside the physi nexus’ designer between the and the client cian-patient relationship.14 simply The Act designer exercising physicians inquiring and because the is informs about a White, Scalia, joined by 13. The section of Planned Parenthood Justices and Thom- of Pennsylvania Casey upholding Southeastern v. joined by as—and Justice Chief Jus- Scalia— Pennsylvania statute's informed consent Rehnquist tice and Justices White and Thom- provision, required physicians which separately upholding as—wrote to concur in prior vide with certain information 967, 981, provision. Id. at 112 S.Ct. at abortion, obtaining plurali- an is found in the 2867, 2875. O’Connor, ty opinion by written Justices Ken- 833, 881-85, nedy, and Souter. 505 U.S. example, physician 14. For a would not face 2791, 2822-25, (1992). S.Ct. 120 L.Ed.2d 674 lecture, discipline giving under the Act for a However, Rehnquist— both Chief Justice creation and dissemi- care held that “the to medical is Court matter irrelevant private medicine, within the nation of information are good practice part of the not Amendment”, 131 meaning of the First that, physician face always, and 2667, medicine. and that individual’s good “[a]n S.Ct. at practicing for not discipline Therefore, implicated of the Act when informa- inquiry provision speak subjected to possesses conduct that professional tion he or she is a speech only part “as in the infor- physicians’ way on the which implicates ‘restraints medicine, disseminated,” subject to rea or practice might mation be used’ licensing regulation,” does v. Times Co. (quoting sonable at 2665 Seattle id. 32, 2199, Amendment. See Ca Rhinehart, offend the First not 467 U.S. (1984)). at 2824 at S.Ct. sey, 505 U.S. Court 81 L.Ed.2d opinion). (plurality that restrict- that a statute found Vermont sale, disclosure, and use for market-

ed the provi record-keeping Act’s records that ing purposes pharmacy sion, 790.338(1), similarly regu § a valid practices of individual prescribing reveal too, conduct. Here professional lation of regula- imposed a content-based doctors regulates aspect making Act one and, expression, applying protected tion on physi confines of the of records within the scrutiny, the stat- heightened struck down relationship. A medical rec cian-patient ute. Id. at 2672. merely writing ord is a reduction Sorrell, note, however, that in We of his course of treatment physician’s manner question restricted the statute profession his or her patient, her based on pharmacies in which could disseminate patient’s tailored to the judgment, al or use parties records third business Thus, to the ex personal circumstances. way involved communicat- them a which im record-keeping provision that the tent parties. their contents to third In ing speech, non-public, personal it is plicates contrast, clearly prohibit Act does physician made ized information. Plain- the dissemination of using professional his or her course infor- entering characterize the act of tiffs particular patient. judgment to care for patient’s mation in a record as “communi- Accordingly, making as the of med insofar cating writing patient’s current speech aspect, ical records has a also Br. care-providers.” future Plaintiffs’ where the nexus between “personal occurs However, whatever communicative sig is at its most professional and client” is, records serve with function medical nificant, may regulate *24 and so the within the exception, limited contained of the Amend running without afoul First not, of profession physicians do 232, Lowe, 472 at 105 ment. See U.S. — course, public make medical records (White, J., concurring in at 2584 S.Ct. Moreover, health care consumption. what result). is, providers may do medical records See, course, regulated. already highly acknowledge that a business’s We Portability and Ac- e.g., Health Insurance categori are not record-keeping activities 1996, Pub.L. No. 104- countability Act of cally protections excluded from the Stat.1936; Thus, 191, § out, 456.057. point First Amendment. As Plaintiffs Inc., The reasoning inapposite. of Sorrell Supreme Health in Sorrell v. IMS safety. per- not a about firearm pamphlet, speaking to a son who is publishing merely recognizes good provisions private, medical Act’s other personal — speech physician ized between a require keeping pa does not practice tient, involving physician’s professional Any burden the rec- irrelevant records. judgments patient’s and tailored to the may place physi- on ord-keeping provision course, individual circumstances. Of ha ability to create information in the cians’ rassing speech may in pro some cases be form of medical records or to communicate by Amendment, tected the First such as such information to other health care speech when such in public place is made regulation viders is incidental the Act’s regarding public a matter of concern. See practice of the of medicine. — Snyder U.S. -, Phelps, v. (2011) 1207, 1219, 179L.Ed.2d 172 (holding provision, The Act’s discrimination that picketers military at funerals who 790.338(5), regulates professional § also signs held communicating their belief that the physician-patient conduct within rela God hates the United States for its toler Although physician tionship. discrimina homosexuality ance of were shielded potentially tion could involve speech, the First Amendment liability from tort balance discrimination involves conduct. activity because this constituted in speech pro To extent the discrimination public place “a on a public matter of con prohibit involving phy vision does conduct cern”). Although accept we that firearm analysis the same speech, applies sician as safety may concern, public be matter of place private physician- to its within the reasoning Snyder inapposite patient relationship, “personal where the of a regulation professional context professional nexus between and client” is provides privacy conduct that that the aof Lowe, strongest. its at See U.S. physician’s ap examination room is not an 232, (White, J., 105 S.Ct. at 2584 concur propriate forum for unrestricted debate on result). Thus, ring the discrimina such matters. pro harassment provision regulation tion also a valid regulation profes vision is also a valid professional only conduct that incidental only sional incidentally conduct affects ly physician at all—affects speech. —if speech. provision, The Act’s harassment argue Plaintiffs that the cases establish- 790.338(6), § similarly targets professional ing professional regulations may inci- conduct physician-patient within the rela dentally speech offending burden without tionship. speech, Harassment can involve licensing the First Amendment concern any speech but that the provi harassment supervision requirements.15 pur- The sion reaches is—like that pose requirements, involved of these Plaintiffs ex- ers, reasoning 15. Dissent would have the and the burden on is content- why may regulate professional’s a state neutral. personalized, one-to-one with a client reasoning We do not find the set forth in part profession of its Justice White’s Lowe concurrence and —as set forth in Justice White’s concurrence in Locke valid in such a narrow context. As S.E.C., III.B, Lowe v. *25 explained, U.S. 105 S.Ct. supra we have see section it (1985), 86 L.Ed.2d may impose 130 and cited in our deci- is uncontroversial that a state Shore, (11th discipline professionals sion in Locke v. 634 F.3d 1185 on for all manner of Cir.2011) apply only activity professional speak- where the law at issue that involves the — licensing regulating entry ing ais scheme into the with a client. Justice White’s concur- profession, impact speech merely helps explain why the incidental rence in Lowe this unlicensed, only by practition- Casey may directly felt would-be is so. affirms that states 1222 beyond licensing.” initial extends against the duct public the “shield[ ] is to

plain, 451, ir- or the at at 655. incompetent, Barsky, the 347 U.S. S.Ct. untrustworthy, repre- unauthorized against although responsible, Casey, Supreme the In Court — Collins, v. Thomas agency.” of sentation nexus” invoking “personal without 315, 329, 516, 545, 65 S.Ct. 323 U.S. in set forth Justice White’s framework (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). L.Ed. 430 by this applied Lowe concurrence contend, the Act di- contrast, Plaintiffs In statutory provi upheld in Court Locke — targets physicians’ rectly directly regulated physicians’ sion restriction can- any speech and so firearms patients regu as a valid conversations with merely incidental. not be Casey, practice of the of medicine. lation 884, 112 (plurality at 2824 505 U.S. at S.Ct. However, is well-established that a are not convinced opinion).16 We for main legitimate concern “that a state’s requirement is the form of licensing con- professional of taining high standards practice ship part of the of medicine” say their "as regulate physicians what Amendment, violating First see id. without practice part of medicine.” “as 884, (plurality opinion) at 2824 at 112 S.Ct. 884, opin- (plurality at 2824 112 S.Ct. —(cid:127) U.S. here, own, despite applies stands on its ion). in more Finally, as we will discuss inquiries prohibits the fact that the Act detail, already drawn a Circuit has the Ninth information, record-keeping about irrelevant reasoning White’s in Lowe to line from Justice requires discussion of relevant rather than provision Supreme the informed consent Pennsylvania information. That the statute's Casey, upheld and invoked this rea- Court in provision required dis- consent informed direct- soning upholding a state statute that truthful, non-misleading informa- closure of physicians may say ly regulates what physicians’ tion and did not interfere Brown, 1208, patients. Pickup v. 740 F.3d See not, suggest, judgment Plaintiffs was Cir.2014). (9th 1227-29 Court’s determination that the basis for the provision did not violate the First Amend- course, upheld Supreme Court 16. Of Rather, considered these fac- ment. the Court provision Pennsylva- informed consent respectively, determining, that the stat- tors in Casey on several other nia statute at issue impose ute did not an undue burden with grounds, including the information the abortion, regard obtaining and did not an requires physicians provide re- provision pri- constitutional with a "interfere[] garding and childbirth is truthful abortion vacy pregnant woman and her between non-misleading, provision fur- that the physician.” Id. at 112 S.Ct. at 2823-24 protecting important thers an interest opinion). (plurality unborn, provision did and that the life of suggests in Ca- The Dissent that the Court physician prevent the from exercis- so, not "not doing sey, explaining that it was without judgment,” ing which the his or her medical scrutiny reviewing the applied intermediate harbor, However, safe provision. Court attributed to the statute's informed consent provide support physician language need not under which a the Dissent cites is, above, reading Casey di- doing adversely as discussed so would affect information if (not and is set forth in the rected at other issues unlike the safe the health of the opinion before the Court turned to its discus- inquiry provision, under harbor of the Act's Amendment, noting that the sion of the First may inquire physicians as to firearms which was that is left "[a]ll First Amendment issue doing relevant to medical care or when so is argument” dispatch- petitioners’ and then 881-87, Casey, safety). See 505 U.S. at argument paragraph ing in a short (plurality opinion). S.Ct. at 2822-26 in- explaining that there is “no constitutional imply that the instant We do not mean to physi- firmity” provision reaches because the However, analogous. the Court’s First case is regu- speech only part a reasonable cian analysis consent of the informed practice medicine. Id. at lation of the Casey provision in the State (plurality opinion). at 2823-24 —that that, Casey suggests regulate physician within even if some extent The Dissent also something than intermediate applied less physician-patient relation- the confines of the

1223 may validly at issue professional place there took “with- professional speech. on touch in the professional confines of a relation- ship.” Citing Id. at 1228. reasoning Brown, Pickup In v. the Ninth Circuit concurrence, of Justice White’s Lowe Casey together invoked with Justice Ninth Circuit noted that: in rejecting Lowe concurrence a White’s Outside the professional challenge relationship, First Amendment to a statute directly regulated requirement what a healthcare such a would almost cer- may say patient. to a provider Pickup, tainly be impermissible considered com- Pickup, plain- 740 F.3d at 1227-29. In pelled speech.... [However,] the First practitioners, advocacy organiza- Amendment tolerates substantial tiffs — tions, patients, patients’ parents— amount of speech regulation within the challenged prohib- a California statute that professional-client relationship providers ited state-licensed mental health would not tolerate outside of it. And engaging therapy with a minor in that toleration sense: makes When change an effort the minor’s sexual fessionals, by means of their state-issued orientation. Id. at 1222-24. The Ninth licenses, clients, relationships form with upheld regu- Circuit the statute as a valid purpose relationships of those is to professional lation of conduct that has clients, advance the welfare of the rath- speech.” “incidental effect on Id. at 1229. er than to public contribute to debate. holding, In so recog- Ninth Circuit Lowe, Id. at 1228-29 (citing 472 U.S. at along nized a “continuum” which “the First (White, J., 105 at S.Ct. concur- rights professionals, such ring)). The Ninth proceeded Circuit as doctors and mental health providers” therapy prohibited by locate the the Cali- may be evaluated. at 1227. Id. The Ninth fornia statute even lower on the continuum professional Circuit noted that “where a is of First Amendment protections than the engaged public dialogue,” repre- activity at in Casey, describing issue it as a continuum, high sents “the end of the conduct, “regulation professional where where First Amendment protection is power great, though the state’s even Lowe, greatest.” (citing Id. 472 U.S. at regulation may such have an incidental (White, J., at S.Ct. concur- speech.” effect on Id. ring)). The Ninth placed Circuit the re- However, the Ninth Circuit reached a quirement that providers health care com- different in an conclusion earlier case with municate certain information challenged regard policy that was to a federal that threatened Casey “[a]t continuum,” midpoint of noting physicians discipline— administrative scrutiny, Casey compelled speech “reasonably involved related to the State’s interest” prohibition standard). However, whereas the Act involves a we do not find this dis- speech, exacting and so a more test is re- compelling. reg- tinction Zauderer involved a quired here. See Zauderer v. Disci- attorney advertising public Office of ulation of Ohio, plinary Sup. Counsel Ct. 471 U.S. of, here, professional’s and not one-on- 626, 651, 2265, 2282, 85 L.Ed.2d one interaction with his her client. More- (1985) (subjecting provision of disci- over, regulating prac- a state’s interest in plinary prohibiting subject rules certain mat- important tice of medicine is no less when a attorney advertising ter in to intermediate prohibits physician activity state than when it scrutiny provision compelling and a inclusion compels physician activity. subject demanding of certain matter to a less *27 patient a attempt an to convince li- terize physician’s of a

including revocation his or her treat- smoking part as cease patient that a recommending cense—for patient. ment of that holding marijuana, use medical protected expression interfered policy Thus, the Ninth Circuit chose although v. Conant Wal- Amendment. by the First the recom bright a line between to drawn Cir.2002). (9th ters, 309 F.3d the ther at in Conant and mendation issue Pickup, in we do not find such apy at issue Ninth Circuit distin- Pickup, In physician’s inquiry A about a line here. Conant, in by noting that guished Conant patient’s in a presence of firearms physicians recom- against policy it was the opening salvo may be viewed as home the First marijuana that offended mending by raised attempt in an to treat issues Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1226. Amendment. a of those firearms. When presence physicians pre- policy prohibiting owner patient’s a firearm physician enters marijuana un- distributing was scribing or patient’s medical rec ship status into the Thus, “the demarcation challenged. Id. patient’s the rest of the along with ords— in and Conant between conduct part par course of treatment —this against merely policy [T]he was clear.... treatment of the physician’s cel with the marijuana was both ‘recommending’ [a] Moreover, physi under the patient. viewpoint-based” restriction content—and largely up point cians remain free — In 740 F.3d at 1226. speech. Pickup, unnecessarily harassing a however, held the Ninth Circuit Pickup, ownership of firearms —to patient’s targeted by the therapy that the California safety, make recommenda discuss firearm treatment, itself and so the statute was safety, regard tions with It a form “regulates conduct. bans statute firearms. Pick express opinions about Cf. minors; nothing treatment for does (“[T]he law allows up, 740 F.3d at 1229 therapists from discuss- prevent licensed treatment, recommenda discussions about orientation ing pros [sexual and cons of treatment, expressions tions to obtain change patients.” with their Id. efforts] opinions about orientation [sexual homosexuality.”). The change efforts] regu- Plaintiffs characterize the Act as and record- simply targets inquiry treatment, in lating Pickup, not but keeping, along with related harassment However, se, speech per Conant. and discrimination.

the line treatment and communi- between Furthermore, unlike the state statute at necessarily cation about treatment (and upheld Pickup), the one issue here cases, In medical treat- so clear. some policy pur- a federal Conant involved when, may occur for exam- ment —such as conduct, and ported regulate physicians’ attempts help patient a ple, physician against upholding injunction an enforce- begin inquiry with an smoking may cease — the Ninth Circuit took policy, ment of the (“do smoke?”), you followed recom- primary that “states [are] into account counseling amount of mendation and some conduct.” Co- regulators professional (“you smoking smok- quit should because nant, 309 F.3d at 639. cancer”). In ing has been shown to cause cases, may go reasoning efforts find that the many physician’s we do not Nevertheless, a different result no this. of Conant mandates further than we find analysis of the Act. Nor do certainly charac- our physician would almost Pickup inapposite because of the Ninth harassment prohibited by Indeed, the Act. Circuit’s characterization of the therapy physician need not find out whether his *28 prohibited in Pickup pure as conduct de- patient owns a firearm in to provide order serving of even less First Amendment pro- information to any possible on than compelled tection disclosure at health consequences that might go along issue in Casey. Pickup is instructive as a with firearm ownership. physician A example recent a court of applying Justice might offer such counseling by providing White’s reasoning in Lowe in conjunction literature on firearm safety that does not Casey with uphold regulation make inquiries of patients by or briefly fessional with conduct incidental effect on advising patients of safe firearms storing speech, outside of the context of a license practices without demanding answers from requirement. patients as to whether they own firearms at home. Counseling, without inquiring, The Act as a “governs whole occupation- long as as it harass, does not maintains conduct, al and not a substantial amount of patients’ right to privacy regarding fire- protected speech.” Locke, See 634 F.3d at arms and at the same time physi- enables (internal 1191 quotation omitted). marks cians to patients advise on practices. safe Any burden the Act places speech on such, As actually Act neither infringes thus incidental legitimate to its physicians’ on rights to speak topic on a practice of medicine.17 choosing

their nor infringes on rights patients those who would welcome infor- Moreover, the Dissent’s assertion mation on safety. firearm that the Act violates the First Amendment because it targets prohibits physicians’ For the reasons, same we re

speech on the topic is actually firearms ject argument Plaintiffs’ the Act is plain belied language of the Act overbroad. “In the noted, itself. First As Amendment long so physicians as do context, ... a not ask law be questions irrelevant invalidated as overbroad if ownership, their ‘a substantial number of Act nowhere its prohibits physicians applications unconstitutional, are discussing judged fire in safety arm patients, relation except in plainly statute’s legitimate ” case where such sweep.’ firearms counseling Stevens, United States v. 559 might rise to the level of unnecessary 460, 473, U.S. 1577, 1587, 176 conclusion, reaching not, 17. In this we as as a law barring doctors from —such claims, the Dissent declaring "a category new discussing the Affordable Care Medi- immune from First Amendment re- care/Medicaid, laws, malpractice Dissenting view.” op. at 1237. As discussed any topic other avoid First Amendment —will above, III.B, supra see section holding our scrutiny long so as the law applies within the simply recognizes may -just that a state as it — confines of a professional one-on-one rela- routinely does state court malpractice and tionship. We note that the does not ban discipline tort impose physician a on actions — any topic, discussion of but irrelevant for activities the state bad deems medi- inquiry, record-keeping, and related harass- cine even when those activities involve the case, ment and any discrimination. In we physician speaking, and that when a state must decide case does so the based First Amendment facts be- generally does us, provide physician indeed, doing fore with a so we shield. need not— we, Neither are we speculate as the must suggests, Dissent to the constitution- not— creating whereby rule burdening ality law hypothetical laws. 1226 (White, J., concur 232, 105 at 2584 S.Ct. State (2010) Wash. (quoting 435

L.Ed.2d result). in the Party, ring Republican State v. Wash. Grange 1184, 170 6, 449, 128 442, n. S.Ct. 552 U.S. conclusion, note we reaching this In (2008)). “The overbreadth 151 L.Ed.2d First curtailing Plaintiffs’ are not we generally ‘strong medicine’ doctrine remain free Plaintiffs rights. re- a last ‘only as administered should an affir- First Amendment to assert (quoting Locke, at 1192 F.3d sort.’” brought any proceeding mative defense Williams, U.S. v. States United made upon speech based them against 1830, 1838, 170 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. *29 that fell outside of treatment the course (2008)). re- By care. good the bounds challenge facial jecting Plaintiffs’ is over- that Act that argue Plaintiffs refusing provide simply are we every practi- regulates it broad because such a that a declaration firearms, Plaintiffs subject of the speech on tioner’s be successful. defense will even consented-to preclude and appears fire- record-keeping regarding or inquiries Court the District Thus, hold that we discussed, However, the Act as arms. facially Act vio- finding that erred inquiries and relevant prohibit does not the First Amendment. lates may legiti- the State record-keeping, medicine to practice of regulate the mately D. record- inquiries and irrelevant

exclude profession- Act “is Because keeping. is not that the Act also find We ef- merely incidental awith regulation al “[t]he Under unconstitutionally vague. say cannot we speech, protected fect on doctrine[,] ... ‘a stat void-for-vagueness are sub- applications impermissible that its requires either forbids ute which legitimate plainly its relative to stantial vague so act in terms doing an not over- the Act is sweep.” Id. must nec intelligence of common [persons] broad.18 meaning and differ at its essarily guess essen the first application, violates to its claims we find Plaintiffs’ Accordingly, ” Harris v. law.’ process of tial of due facially First violates Act Inc., Foods, F.3d 564 Specialty Mexican The State merit. without Cir.2009) (third (11th alteration 1301, 1310 of medi practice validly regulate may Jay v. U.S. (quoting Roberts original) Any privacy. protect patients’ cine to 3244, 629, 609, 104 cees, S.Ct. U.S. 468 place takes reaches (1984)). Thus, a 3256, L.Ed.2d 462 82 physi confines within the entirely if “it unconstitutionally vague statute is “per relationship, where cian-patient the con as to public uncertain leaves the professional and nexus between sonal ju judges and or leaves it prohibits duct entirely inciden so is strong, and client” is decide, any legally without rors free physicians’ Act’s tal to the standards, prohibited Lowe, what fixed 472 U.S. See conduct. professional as Title regulations such holding, antidiscrimination we it not alter our would Because 1964, 42 U.S.C. Rights ofAct VII of Civil argument the State's not address need (1976), Ameri- and the §§ provisions 2000e-2000e-17 and harassment the discrimination 1990, 42 U.S.C. Act of Disabilities cans with these Act are not overbroad because (1994). §§ 12101-12213 indistinguishable from valid provisions are 1227 what is particular each case.” Giac lief that the information later become cio v. Pennsylvania, 402-03, (such 382 U.S. relevant practice of preven- 518, 520-21, medicine) S.Ct. tative L.Ed.2d 447 satisfies the requirements (1966). of the Act. Plaintiffs that, contend because

a reading that information about firearms matter, As an initial we always note relevant would render the Act that the provides only for penal civil meaningless, physicians reasonably fear ties in the form of disciplinary action that the Act requires higher, some unspec- the Board&emdash;physicians do not ified face criminal level of Davis, relevance. See In re penalties (11th Cir.2009) (“We Act’s F.3d violation. “The Su preme cannot Court has warned read against statutory language me in way chanical renders application wholly vagueness doctrine, meaningless or non- sensical.”). emphasizing that ... should there ‘greater tolerance of enactments with civil We find plain recourse to meaning re- rather than penalties criminal because the solves the issue. “Relevant” means “[r]e- consequences of imprecision qualita *30 lated to the hand; matter at to the point; ” tively Harris, less severe.’ 564 F.3d at pertinent.” American Heritage Dictionary 1310 (quoting Vill. Estates v. of Hoffman English (William the Language 1098

Flipside, Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. Hoffman Morris, ed., 1969). An ordinary person of 489, 498-99, 1186, 102 1193, S.Ct. 71 common intelligence need guess not toas (1982)).19 L.Ed.2d 362 the meaning of the term. It is apparent that the Act’s relevancy standard only argue

Plaintiffs that the record- vague insofar as “relevancy” is necessarily keeping and inquiry provisions basis&emdash;that determined on case-by-case a 790.338(1), § (2), vague because the is, whether information is related the Act provide does not sufficient notice as to matter hand depends entirely on the when record-keeping or inquiry regarding specifics of the matter at hand. A reading firearms “relevant” to medical care or that firearms information is relevant safety. Plaintiffs note that the Act does every would, case indeed, inqui- render the not specify physician a whether must make ry record-keeping provisions superflu- particularized a finding of relevance for ous, problem this easily but avoided patient each or whether a physician’s gen adhering to a plain-meaning construction eral belief that firearms are always rele of relevancy determination, as an ad hoc suffice, vant will and does specify not if a requiring a physician to base his or her physician must believe that firearm infor calculation as the relevancy pa- of a mation is relevant at the time of inquiry tient’s firearms ownership partic- status on and record-keeping, good or if a faith be- ularized information about patient. By point Supreme Plaintiffs out apply.” Court Vill. v. Flipside, Estates Hoffman has that "a regulation held Estates, Inc., 489, content-based 499, 455 U.S. Hoffman speech ... special 1186, raises 1193-94, First (1982). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d However, concerns because its chilling obvious effect the Act because is not a content- speech." on free v. Reno Am. Civil Liberties based regu- but rather a Union, 844, 871-72, 521 U.S. professional lation of only conduct that inci- Thus, (1997). 138 L.Ed.2d 874 if dentally impacts a speech, we need apply not a "law interferes with the of free stringent vagueness more version our anal- ..., a vagueness stringent more ysis. test should define Act does not standard, vague because “relevancy” flexible a

employing that, out point Plaintiffs the free- “discrimination.” physicians Act provides passage,20 informa- record of the Act’s inquiries given context to make dom doing so prohibit whenever provision firearms regarding might expect tion one medi- good practice part of his or her terminating would be physician a cine. patient’s based on patient care of a about questions to answer refusal record-keeping under the example, For another, unchallenged ownership, but recordation of prohibits provision, explicit makes it of the Act provision physician if the firearm information rule that a alter the not does rele- is not the information “knows” that ser- providing cease is free to physician 790.338(1). simply means This § vant. any reason. See a for vices to patient’s record may not physician 790.338(4) (“A not to patient’s § decision physi- firearm-ownership status unless relating presence question answer of some knowledge that —because has cian alter does not of a firearm ownership or the indi- information particularized au- regarding physician’s existing law pa- example, that patient, vidual patients.”). his or her to choose tendencies-— thorization has violent tient is suicidal contend, per- are left firearm-ownership physicians status Plaintiffs patient’s safe- care or prohibited patient’s activity tains to the would guess what Therefore, the safety of others. ty, or the provision. discrimination by the vague. record-keeping provision is the District Court agree with We rele- inquiry provision’s key ordinary an has the term “discriminate” *31 be- a must physician is that vancy clause readily persons to that is clear meaning that firearm owner- faith” “good lieve context, “dis- In intelligence. this common to medical is ship relevant information the basis of act “[t]o criminate” means on 790.338(2). Thus, phy- a § safety. care or Dictionary Heritage American prejudice.” inquiries firearms may make sician at supra, 376. English Language, of the or she does long as he so patients, or all so the dis- reading, plain-meaning Under on the faith belief—based good with the simply of the provision crimination case—that the patient’s the specifics a may provide not physicians means patient’s is inquiry relevant basis of care the level medical on lower If, safety of others. safety, or or the care Al- firearm-ownership status. patient’s a seeks firearm physician the example, for may vary physi- though particulars the —a unrelated to agenda to suit an information against firearm- cian could discriminate safety, he she would not or or medical care making by, example, owning patients “good inquiry, faith” so making a time for an excessively long wait an them refrain from directs him to plainly equal them by refusing or appointment, Thus, provision inquiry the is inquiring. specialists— for referrals opportunities vague. not sufficiently provision is the discrimination they may physicians that apprising clear in the discrimi argue that Plaintiffs with firearm-owning patients 790.338(5), Act, provide § is provision of the nation pa- the patient a because care of terminated point out that the particular, In Plaintiffs pediatri- refused to answer response tient's mother large part passed in Act was in ownership. regarding questions cian's pediatrician in Ocala which incident less medical than care would other to attempt tion speak to the patient patients, in any circumstances. about firearm ownership when not rele- provision discrimination of the Act is not vant medical safety. care or Like the n vague. provisions Act, other the harass- provision

ment targets physicians who Plaintiffs Finally, argue to pursue wish an agenda unrelated to harassment provision medical care or safety. 709.338(6), § vague because the Act does Although the District Court found that not define “unnecessarily harassing.” the modifier “unnecessarily” rendered the Plaintiffs that patients may contend hold harassment provision vague, disagree. we diverse views as to what constitutes unnec The modifier in fact allows physicians the essary harassment. argue Plaintiffs freedom to challenge i.e., pa- — “harass” — what prohibited conduct is thus depends tients regarding firearms when doing so particular what a patient understands it necessary for health safety reasons, be, and that the resulting uncertainty as if the patient even might find physi- to what the Act prohibits permissi “is not cians’ advice unwelcome. For example, if ble under the First Amendment.” See patient suicidal, physician Conant, 309 F.3d at (holding a statute wish to attempt persuade the patient providing for against administrative action to remove firearms from patient’s

physicians engage who in speech that “the home, if even patient initially objects. to be a believes recommendation of if Even the patient considers the physi- marijuana” requisite lacks the narrow cian’s health and safety advice related to specificity Amendment) under the First firearms harassing, inclusion Collins, (citing 323 U.S. at 65 S.Ct. at modifier “unnecessary” leaves room for 325 (striking on First grounds deliver, physicians to such advice when a statute criminalizing solicitation of mem necessary, consistent Act’s other bership for certain unions without state provisions. license because the statute did not distin Plaintiffs’ physicians fears that may face guish between solicitation and. advocacy, discipline for offending patient’s subjec- “put[ and so speaker ] ... *32 wholly tive sensibilities are therefore unfounded. the mercy of the varied understanding of Leaving aside that Conant and Collins did his hearers consequently and of whatever vagueness not turn on challenges, we note may inference be drawn as to his intent patients by that themselves subject cannot meaning”)). and physicians to discipline. Patients file However, term “harass” an has ordi- complaint triggers investigation which an nary meaning readily that is per- clear to Board, they may bring or a mal- sons of intelligence: common “harass” action, practice so long physician but as a means “[t]o or disturb persistent- irritate operating good in faith within the ly.” American Heritage Dictionary of the good boundaries of practice, medical and is English Language, supra, at 600. When providing only safety advice which read in the whole, context of the Act as a relevant necessary, and he she or need provision harassment communicates discipline not fear at the hands of the that health providers care should not dis- money Board or a judgment in a court of parage firearm-owning patients, and Thus, law. the harassment provision of should not continue over a patient’s objec- Act is not vague. doctors, including of Florida a number need intelligence” “common of

Persons advice. the AMA’s followed meaning plaintiffs, of to the guess about with routinely spoke patients the Act. See They challenged provisions four were hold if firearms firearms, patients we Harris, asking F.3d finding the specifically erred Court in order to District in the home that the present harassment and inquiry, record-keeping, There safety information. follow-up tailor vagueness. void provisions genuinely many doctors is no doubt that help can conversations

believe these public. In- and the patients their protect IV. conver- these deed, believed some doctors the District Accordingly, we REVERSE they were important so to be sations summary judgment grant Court’s patients who to lose the business willing in- Plaintiffs, and VACATE favor to engage. refused Act. against enforcement junction by patients complaints response In SO ORDERED. and coun- questioning found doctors’ who to be subject of firearms seling on dissenting: WILSON, Judge, Circuit offensive, overly political, irritating, Priva- Firearm Owners’ passed the Florida includ- organizations, Numerous gag (Act). Act is Simply put, the Act cy Association Medical the American ing even ask- doctors from prevents order deaths (AMA), related view firearm conversation question the first ing problem health public a serious injuries as sig- prohibits The Act firearms. on chil- effects pernicious particularly with expressing nificantly chills doctors believe organizations dren. These information providing can alleviat- views and problem health their public this topic chil- one topic and particularly about one people, by providing ed information parents, only, firearms. dren Accordingly, the safety.1 about firearm agree with of whether we Regardless adopted things, has, among other AMA pa- conveyed by message doctors to inquire encouraging “members policy firearms, perfectly I think tients about as a firearms presence household a First Amend- have that doctors clear home.” Preven- childproofing part message. This convey that right to ment Children, Accidents tion of Firearm right, infringes upon significantly the AMA’s From Policy H-145.990. AMA very at the subject, it is therefore more not be inquiry could this perspective, Subject least, scrutiny. to intermediate de- specifically vital, policies as the pass cannot scrutiny, the Act level of firearm mor- pediatric to “reduce signed *33 muster. constitutional mortality.” Id. bidity and protect- in interests State’s asserted how about with their beliefs Consistent owners, including firearm rights problem, ing health public this to address best community firearm related to reduce Ap- Moyer, Health "Public S. 1. See Christine methods that by preventive care injuries using Vio- Physicians to Prevent Gun proach: Aim News, 10, lence,” Sept. public health address other Medical been used to American have accidents, 2012, http://www.amednews.com. motor vehicle problems available such by published Medical News spread American smoking, of diseases. and the in the Moyer’s efforts article AMA. describes privacy rights, rights their their to free significantly be limit ability speak doctors’ to from harassment discrimination, and to patients their ways that they believe ability care, their to access medical are protect will public and save lives. The incredibly important. Were the Act neces- poor fit between what actually sary protect to rights, I those believe the does and the it purportedly interests Act might survive an scrutiny intermediate serves belies Florida’s purpose true challenge. But the State has no offered passing this Act: silencing doctors’ disfa- evidence to show rights those are vored message about safety. This, firearm threat, under nor is there evidence in the the State cannot do. suggesting record that the Act will either The district court properly invalidated directly or materially advances those inter- content-, as a speaker-, and view- ests. point-based restriction practi1 that “chills Further, those interests must speech tioners’ in way impairs weighed against rights doctors’ to convey provision of medical care may ulti- their chosen message about safety firearm mately patient.” harm the Wollschlaeger play and to their in addressing chosen role Farmer, v. 1251, 880 F.Supp.2d what they view to public be a health crisis. (S.D.Fla.2012). In an unprecedented deci- If there is disagreement in the medical sion, Majority reverses and holds that community plaintiffs’ with the view that this law is immune from First Amendment providing patients with information about scrutiny. This is so because the State safety good public health, it labeled quell wished to “con- is certainly presented in the record duct” and the speakers it wished to silence Indeed, before us.2 the record and com- “professionals,” and profes- because these mon sense lead inexorably to the conclu- prohibited sionals were from speaking sion that children will suffer fewer firearm patients. privately firmly Precedent es- injuries related if they par- their —and tablishes that the speech proscribed or ents —know more firearm safety. about by chilled ranges Act— But they now will know less. As a result of from potentially lifesaving medical infor- there is no doubt that many doc- mation conveyed from patient, doctor to tors in curtail, Florida will significantly if political discussions private between citi- cease, not altogether pa- discussions with zens, to conversations people between who tients safety. firearms and firearm enjoy speaking freely with each other Thus, while the Act does not about a advance host of topics irrelevant —is interests, the State’s asserted the Act does tected the First Amendment. meeting At its August annual [plreventive care through safety counseling (ABA) American Bar adopted Association Res- medicine, pillar is a of modern vitally and is olution important pa- to the health and welfare of opposing] governmental poli- actions and It is legal tients. also the ethical re- rights cies that limit physicians sponsibility physicians. Failure to fulfill other health care providers inquire these objec- duties results in a breach of the patients they possess their guns whether tive standard patients.... of care owed and how secured home Firearms in the home are another known patients counsel their dangers about the risk factor doctors choose to dis- guns practices in the home and safe cuss with parents or the *34 dangers. avoid those patients. young above, Citing quoted the AMApolicy ABA specifically recognized that care for to firearms; refused physician a order, court’s district affirm

I would he wanted boy because nine-year-old a respectfully dissent. and I therefore home; in the firearms know about to Medicaid falsely told that were citizens I. firearm them to disclose required they if pay not ownership and would at issue provisions four contains The Act to answer; refused a doctor refused (1) keeping “record The appeal. in this re- the mother when a child examine cannot rec- that doctors states provision” questions; answer firearms fused to in medical information ord firearm-related not delivered services facility billed for a “relevant.” not to be “know” files that ques- to answer family refused after a 790.338(1).(2) “inquiry § Fla. Stat. their firearms. tions about re- “shall doctors states provision” right privacy patient’s spect a Leg- show experiences These about patients asking from refrain” should Act over- passing action islature’s doctor be- unless the ownership, firearm concerns on real whelmingly was based that the information faith good privacy lieves in constituent protecting about Stat. Fla. medically relevant. harass- discrimination preventing 790.338(2).(3) The “discrimination § visits. during doctor’s ment “may practitioners states vision” simi- was experience own A Legislator’s the basis on against patients discriminate” answering pediatrician’s a lar: “After Fla. Stat. ownership. firearm pedia- ownership, gun about question 790.338(5).(4) “harassment Finally, the § remove Legislator] that [the trician asked “shall practitioners states that provision” [Legisla- To the from his home. gun to own or legal right patient’s a respect po- ‘a constituted tor, doctor’s conduct refrain from should firearm and a possess the constitutional attack on litical ... about harassing” unnecessarily ” Rifle A National a ... firearm.’ to own Fla. Stat. ownership. firearm complained also representative Association 790.338(6). § owner- gun patients about questioning needs to agenda satisfy political a “to ship response to con- passed Act was This these asserts that The State stop.” the manner and complaints stituent designed Act was of what the examples discussing were doctors to which extent stop. Specifi- patients. ownership with explains: the State cally, as appeal attempts on Tellingly, the State though it by experienced scope of the discrimination [AJctual narrow Act— event, the In directly inconsistently. motivated in Florida does so gun owners a law Among explained the Act. pass Court has Legislature Supreme uncon that: be rendered Legislature restricting speech heard things, the other effect find “the inevitable based on days stitutional given was a woman [or its] its face ... to an- statute she refused physician [the] after new Health v. IMS Sorrell her purposes.” firearms stated questions about swer — U.S. -, S.Ct. Inc., physi- home; asked was (2011) (internal quotation home; L.Ed.2d 544 his remove firearms cian to omitted). Therefore, assessing marks from her a mother facility separated cannot we constitutionality interrogating them about while children *35 ignore that Act will inevitably this silence mend providing counseling guidance doctors on topic the of on a .variety firearms in all of injury-prevention but topics including firearm safety. the rarest of circumstances. Doctors Doctors thus risk quite legitimately insist that asking losing their fire- they licenses if found arm-related questions as a matter of Act, have violated they the so cannot safe- course and recording the information in ly assume that the only State will advance good files is for patients’ the narrow reading of the it suggests Act health and for public’s the safety. here. As the incidents discussed the legisla- In a revealing portion brief, of its the history tive suggest, however, the Act was State asserts that the “Act proscribes only apparently designed to prohibit doctors inquiries the doctor-patient within relation- from routinely asking about firearm own- ship and record-keeping firearms ership on prescreening, informational that is not relevant medical and safety Appellees forms. rightly suspect, despite concerns.”3 At point, difficulties arise present the State’s assurance to the con- because Appellees and the State have dif- trary, that the standard of relevance con- ferent definitions of “relevant.” Many templated by the Act is higher than the doctors and medical organizations assert Appellees’ own standard. Consequently, it is always relevant to ask about— purposes for of assessing the Act’s consti- thus, tutionality, I firearm-ownership in- many doctors, assume that record — discussed, particularized formation. absent some AMA, As the fact or circum- stance indicating well as that firearm the American Academy ownership is of Pedia- particularly relevant, trics, will stop asking its Florida chapter, the American about and recording this information.4 Academy of Family Physicians, its Florida chapter, the American College Physi- The Act prohibits also “discrimination” cians, and its chapter Florida all recom- on the basis of gun ownership. might One 3. Here is one of the State’s contradictions. not revert back to its interpretation. broader Elsewhere briefing, in its Further, the State asserts interprets the State the same word not, inquiry provision that the just (“should”) mandatory to be in the context of stated, proscription but merely is instead interpreting provision— the harassment advisory. perspective, From doctor’s how- though the State vacillates interpreta- on this ever, the Act mandatory. must treated as tion, as well. Indeed, the Executive body Director of the appears It responsible enforcing determines as a the Board matter of State law that ownership Medicine Department Florida medically (Board), preven- Health relevant in all mailed cases for physicians a letter to tive stating purposes. medicine inquiry provision that the Elsewhere in its was manda- however, course, briefing, tory. change emphasized But in the State Board posted specifically shortly to its allows Appellees website after doctors ask that, fact, filed suit about firearms provision they whenever only believe "in was advisory. good argument faith” The State’s that the information relevant only one, vision is advisory to record is not a bad such be- information unless provisions this, cause unlike "know” other it to which be irrelevant. use the From clearly "shall,” mandatory State Legislature word concludes that inquiry "the enabled provision ambiguous physicians uses the inquiries these word "should.” make ” But it extremely risky would be all for doctors to if the doctor holds different rely interpretation, given on this that the view of tim- medical relevance than State. ing change course, suggests Board's interpretation, course This would allow that it part have been inquiries of the State’s legislative history; detailed in the litigation strategy. There are precisely no assurances inquiries previ- same the State that, ends, litigation once this ously the Board will stated designed Act was *36 under for discrimination punishment fear on the incidents based

reasonably expect, did in as the doctors speaking the Act for that the this passage prompted that Accordingly, incidents. declining to the above-cited from doctors bars provision the rec- like provision, discrimination to answer the refuses who treat will ownership. inquiry provisions, keeping firearm ord regarding questions or make the con- about doctors ask affords doctors to explicitly cause The Act pa- such firearm own- to regarding refuse treat to recommendations tinued 790.338(4), initially § however, Fla. Stat. are tients, patients particularly see if ership, intended to apparently topic.5 this Legislature on so to information the resistant of discrimination forms other prevent chills doctors’ provision The harassment asserts Act. The State the passed when explains further. State even experienced discrimination that “actual to physicians enabled Legislature that “the directly motivat- in Florida owners by gun ownership] inquiries make [firearm Act.” This pass to Legislature ed the so with they do provided patients, all inci- by the list of followed statement to inquiry is relevant that the the belief history. legislative in the contained dents then, if a Logically care. patient’s above, explained the State also As noted to information seeks firearms physician response passed Act was unrelated agenda political suit and fol- ownership gun about questioning may be well-being, ... he patient’s such to make recommendations low-up harassing patient....” his unnecessarily safer, including recommenda- ownership explains, brief consistent Appellees’ As en- home from the guns to remove tions believe many doctors policy, with AMA discussions, con- which some tirely. These ownership is asking about firearm to be a perceive Legislators stituents well-being in all patient’s related to attack, as discrim- be viewed could political about fire- cases, why questions which own- gun as on their status inatory. Based many doc- by ownership were asked arm uncom- subjected ers, patients some As the of this Act. passage tors before firearms, conversations fortable however, clear, history makes legislative the State are not. Because others while follow-up and the inquiries these routine legislative acknowledges that the explicitly were deemed they prompted conversations of what consti- examples history provides part Legislators to be discrimination, reasonably by constituents doctors tutes primary discrimi- form of plicitly allows uncertainty, doctors who Given prevent. this is, doctors ownership actually in all occurred—that nation that to ask about wish significant they if taking a risk to answer turning away patients who refused would cases to do so. the notion continued questions about firearms —belies IV, point in Part provision this meant more is on A bit said discrimination my infra, brief discussion experienced in relation address actual discrimination vagueness. prohibit some may indeed It firearm owners. the State discriminatory conduct that purpose of Act and the the overall Given occur, not cre- might and it would speculates light of history legislative Act’s —considered is all it if that problem ate a constitutional legislative his- that that the State’s assertions however, context, difficult to it is did. In constitutes "dis- tory of what is illustrative anything provision as discrimination see the harassment must view the crimination” —we provi- of the other other reinforcement than designed provisions discrimination saying and prohibiting doctors sions keeping pro- inquiry and record reinforce things. writing Moreover, certain fact ex- visions. of an political anti-firearm agenda which arms. Doctors cannot ask ques- routine the State defines in its briefing as unneces- tions about firearm ownership all incom- sary ing harassment. they before, did despite the fact that a host of medical associations Most of the incidents discussed in the suggest should. Doctors cannot *37 legislative history appear to involve noth- record information about patients’ their ing more than disagreement between the in ownership highly-confidential doctor, perceived who gun-related the in- files, even though the information formation to relevant patient’s be prove later essential to the doctor in a well-being, patient, and the perceived who medical malpractice suit or to part information be of an unwelcome in an emergency situation. Doctors also political attack. The provision harassment provide cannot firearm safety information of the Act suggests that the State has and advice without running the risk of patients’ taken the side in disagree- this facing discipline if their medical efforts are ment. There is nothing suggest that construed part to be of political agenda. the doctors’ inquiries or messages regard- Though the State offers reasons to believe ing firearms not genuinely were believed that the Act might not interpreted be patients’ be best medical interest prohibit all of these things, at various given. when But there is evidence in the points its briefing, the State accepts legislative history to suggest that that these of speech forms are the intend- provision harassment is designed pre- targets ed Act. this Under a reasonable vent these conversations from taking place interpretation Act, then, doctors are in the future. That certainly the result potentially subject to discipline for talking it will achieve. Doctors largely will cease about firearms with patients in all inquiring into and counselling topic on the abut few narrow circumstances. firearms, they lest of cross- accused One final observation is in regard- order ing the line providing between life-saving ing the interpretation. Act’s The State preventive medical information and deemed the district court’s decision to moting an anti-firearm political agenda.6 the inquiry treat provi- harassment then,

Under this one group of sions as mandatory advisory rather than speakers, medical professionals, prohib- an intentional “effort to render the Act ited ator least chilled from engaging in a unconstitutional.” however, The Majority, great deal speech topic, about one fire- accepts the district court’s interpretation brief, (most, In its initial the State asserted unnecessarily ... harass about fire- though time) not all of the arms, word suggesting while ... they “should” inquiry provision in the rendered broach these If the State areas.” cannot even provision purely advisory. Regarding the decide from one brief to the next whether the provision, harassment which included the ex- prohibits merely Act against advises unnec- word, "should,” act same the State asserted essarily harassing patients, certainly doctors provision “prohibits] facilities and rely cannot on the self-contradictory State’s practitioners ... unnecessarily harass- punish assurances that will not seek ing patients guns.” own who The same word doctors under provision the harassment used in the provi- same statute one rendered speaking ways that some constituents deem advisory sion mandatory. but other In an political. Judge Tjoflat to be recognized As contradiction, effort to correct the State argument, oral simply these rules will cause Reply asserted in its Legisla- Brief that "the doctors to clear.” "steer provided ture physicians with the freedom to id. See namely,” doctors. speakers, provisions harassment inquiry

that the disfa- face burdens law on its “[t]he Thus, despite accepting mandatory. speakers, [and] by disfavored vored even the Act interpretation an judicial scruti- heightened follows [i]t un- “render would suggests State Indeed, Id. at 2663-64. ny is warranted.” strikingly Majority constitutional,” the height- requires First “[t]he not even and is is valid that the holds government scrutiny whenever ened scrutiny. In First Amendment subject to because creates a further gone has words, Majority other message it con- with the disagreement than State rights limiting speech added) (in- (emphasis at 2664 veys.” Id. could. it should or argued omitted). The marks quotation ternal excep- not invite does “whenever” word *38 II. any- creates one tions, Majority but com- Notwithstanding the Court’s way. speech about one proscribes The Act no First mand, Majority concludes speakers (firearms) group by one topic a when scrutiny applies even Amendment this, Despite (medical professionals). disagree- on regulated based message is entirely Majority concludes content, the mes- long as so with its ment scrutiny because First Amendment evades a doctor in private sage delivered and within the private occurs speech patient. to her relationship. doctor-patient aof confínes this conclusion. undermines Precedent scrutiny applica Modifying the level consistently sub- authority Court Supreme in this restrictions content-based ble to viewpoint- content-, speaker-, jects dangerous,” “startling and manner is least intermediate to at restrictions based “free-floating adopt courts are scrutiny. I believe we First coverage” First Amendment test[s] on this based case decide this should expansive the substantial light of authority. straightforward by content- speech posed free threats to v. Ste United States

based restrictions. 460, 470, vens, 130 S.Ct. U.S. 559 A. (2010); see also 1585, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 — -, Alvarez, Sorrell, invalidat- the Court v. U.S. Recently, United States marketing, 2537, 2544, L.Ed.2d 574 183 disfavors [that] ed a “statute 132 S.Ct. Indeed, “con (2012) opinion). a content. is, particular speech (plurality with have spe- speech on that, restrictions statute disfavors than tent-based More matter, only general as namely pharmaceutical permitted, a been speakers, cific Here, and tra few historic at when confined manufacturers.” long fa expression categories firearm related ditional directly prohibits Alvarez, S.Ct. 132 the bar.” as miliar to keeping, well inquiries and record omitted). (internal marks quotation topic,7 “that persistent discussions pa doctors speech between Private content. More is, particular with a speech re- this list-a list not make tients does specific that, disfavors than statute firearms. their doctors with sions "[t]o Majority "to harass" defines 7. The per- patients by Many fire- their persistently.” "harass” doctors or irritate disturb legislative by the evidenced discussing owners—as arm firearms. sistently virtually all discus- history irritated —are things obscenity, served for like defama- And even if we assume only speech tion, violence, inciting speech integral to which the State defines as medically irrele- conduct, criminal child pornography, and vant proscribed, will be Justice White’s fraud. See id. S.E.C., concurrence in Lowe v. upon which the Majority relies, heavily explains that Precedent also creating forbids excep while “the prohibit [SJtate the pursuit tions to First Amendment review out of medicine as an occupation without its whole cloth: “the First Amendment stands license, ... I do not think it could make it against any ‘freewheeling authority to de publicly crime privately to speak urg- categories clare new outside the ing persons reject to follow or any school scope Stevens, of the First Amendment.’ thought.” 181, 231, 472 U.S. [472], S.Ct., 559 U.S. at at 1586.” Al 2557, 2584, (1985) S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d 130 varez, 132 S.Ct. at 2547. creating But (White, J., added) concurring) (emphasis category new of speech immune from First (internal omitted). quotation marks Un- exactly Amendment review is what der the run doctors the serious risk of Majority has done here. “Before exempt being disciplined for harassing patients by ing category from the normal pushing “political agenda” if they speak prohibition on content-based restrictions (too forcefully or persistently) to pa- ... presented Court must be *39 tients about schools of thought medical ‘persuasive evidence that a novel restric which deem firearm ownership relevant. (if tion on content long is of a part hereto Based on Majority’s the holding, doctors fore unrecognized) tradition of proscrip could prohibited in the future from tion,’ Brown v. Entertainment Merchants speaking their patients any par- about Assn., U.S. -, -, 564 2729, 131 S.Ct. ticular topic, including the any virtues 2734, (2011).” Alvarez, 180 708 L.Ed.2d school of medical thought, because such 132 at S.Ct. are, conversations strictly speaking, irrele- anything, If speech the restricted here is vant to a patient’s care. part of a of exceptional tradition protec More disturbingly, under the rule an- tion, certainly and it is not within an area by Majority, nounced the any law burden- traditionally subject to “proscription.” ing or eliminating speech will avoid First The Court explicitly has recognized the scrutiny long Amendment so as the law importance of a free flow of information only applies within the confines of a one- between patient, doctor and which this Act on-one professional Then, relationship. explicitly directly and limits. phy “[T]he according Majority, speech the sician must know all that a can merely professional entirely conduct articulate in identify order to and to treat disease; unprotected. States are left barriers full free to elimi- disclosure would nate all impair speech irrelevant diagnosis from a doctor’s and treatment.” Tram States, office, v. 40, 51, speech mel United all 445 U.S. relevant from a 100 doctor’s 906, 913, (1980). office, just speech S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d or Re- which conflicts latedly, a with “consumer’s concern for the State’s preferred viewpoints. free the of ... speech flow ... great Majority’s has Under exception relevance the new in the fields of public health, restrictions, medicine content-based if the State be- where can information save lives.” Sor lieves that doctors are complaining to their rell, (internal 131 S.Ct. at 2664 quotation patients that the Act public itself is for bad omitted). marks safety, State could pass banning a law Further, un- anti-gun politicking. rassing, Act to about speaking from doctors holding, speech about Majority’s der long as State asserts patients —so entirely from could be eliminated the latter medical are irrelevant to complaints these relationship.8 doctor-patient subject to would not be Such law care. scrutiny. Nor would still, express purpose law’s Amendment “the First Further to an act diminish scrutiny apply are to effect practical First safety messages pa- talking to their effectiveness” doctors barring Sorrell, Act, 131 S.Ct. by doctors. Affordable Care delivered tients effect that “the inevitable (explaining Medicaid, malpractice or Medicare “a statute’s on its face” of a statute laws, topic whatsoever. other may be considered purposes” stated why a second reason suggests This (in- constitutionality evaluating purposes here deserves being silenced speech omitted)). marks Doctors quotation ternal hier- First Amendment in the higher place firearms order patients about asked are afforded archy. protections Greater thus more specifically tailored —and give con- public matters of dealing with In- information. safety effective—firearm “any politi- matter of cern, which include the State’s deed, supporting curiae amicus commu- cal, social, concern or other the Act is neces- explain that legislation — -, Phelps, v. U.S. nity.” Snyder in- questions can a “doctor’s sary because L.Ed.2d 172 exercise of patients’ terfere omitted). (internal marks (2011) quotation patients by putting arms] bear [to public con- safety qualifies Firearm question where position hesitant So, too, does that standard. under of physi- cern because ownership firearms care. stag- health Under regulation of That statement disapproval.” state cian to their perceived Florida doctors suggests that gering. It truthful, almost the former is non-mis- regarding with doctors’ problem *40 safety the firearm regarding speech leading message and about entirely prohibited, itself, message the working, so that it was latter, was as it relates viewpoint classic That com- was silenced. lest a doctor’s chilled significantly ha- discrimination. as perceived the Act be about plaint to Second Amend- those well-attuned even Snyder explains that also "whether 8. debates, advice could requires political us to a doctor’s private public or concern ment content, form, new, and perhaps previously the context unconsidered examine offer (internal at speech.” S.Ct. 1216 change public 131 views may perspective that well omitted). The content quotation marks practices. was personal The State as well as by certainly con- prohibited great influence aware of the doctors’ no doubt by speech prohibited public, as the cerns might sharing knowledge and information recognized the AMAto Act has been debate, be- public on the firearm have public health address a part of an effort disagreed with the the State doctors' cause perhaps cut problem. and context The form message, them. powerful it silenced direction, necessarily. opposite but not in the health, concerning public doc- topics pa- speaks private her On When a doctor safety during ability one-on- topic like firearm inform tients about tors' examination, message legislation consequences the course an about the one —an impact fairly significant holding Majority's have a speech that the area guns doctors patients’ views because First be restricted without allow to would trusted, knowledgeable, presumably clearly even more review—seems Amendment conse- genuinely health interested concern, though public even matter of abe political rather than quences of firearms private. conveyed in speech is listeners, many To consequences them.

1239 Despite the State’s contention that Planned Parenthood Southeastern gun topic just doctors are silenced on the Pennsylvania Casey, 833, v. 505 U.S. 112 doctors, surely anti-gun as as 2791, Act’s S.Ct. (1992), L.Ed.2d 674 legislative history erases doubt as to Brown, (9th Pickup v. 740 F.3d 1208 Cir. viewpoint sought which the State 2013), si- directly contradict the Majority’s discussed, legislative lence. As history conclusion. purpose

confirms of the Act was firearm-safety messages to silence perceived “political

were attacks” and Majority’s analysis begins with Jus part of a “political agenda” against Lowe, tice White’s concurrence 472 U.S. ownership. prac- “[i]n its 228, 105 at (White, J., S.Ct. concur operation, tical goes law even [Florida’s] Shore, ring), and Locke 1185, v. 634 F.3d beyond discrimination, mere content to ac- (11th Cir.2011). shown, As will be (inter- viewpoint tual discrimination.” Id. these cases stand proposition for the omitted). that a quotation nal marks “It follows law regulating professional conduct that heightened judicial scrutiny is war- speech may burdens evade First ranted.” Amend Id. at 2664. (1) scrutiny only ment when: the law is a The Supreme recognized Court has licensing scheme regulating entry into a is rare that a restricting “[i]t (2) (an profession; impact on speech speech because of its content will ever be impact only by unlicensed, felt would-be permissible.” Playboy United States v. practitioners) is incidental to a broader Inc., Grp., 803, 818, Entm’t 529 U.S. goal State (ensuring the quality of the 1878, 1889, (2000). S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (3) State’s professionals); the burden on statutes, therefore, Content-based “are content-neutral; (4) speech is pro presumptively invalid.” R.A. v. City V. of hibition on unlicensed individuals’ speech Paul, 377, 382, St. 505 U.S. beyond does not extend the confines of a (1992). 120 L.Ed.2d 305 Based on professional-client one-on-one relationship. the foregoing, choice I believe we Only the fourth present condition is here. have to make is one between strict and Thus these readily distinguish cases are intermediate First scrutiny. able. shows, As Part III below the Act is uncon *41 Majority stitutional The is under either correct that some laws standard so decid ing burdening speech between the evade unnecessary. two is First Amendment

scrutiny where the burdens occur within a professional Locke, setting. See 634 F.3d B. (“ at 1191 ‘If government the gener- enacts ally applicable Against great licensing provisions limiting the weight of this authori the ty, persons the class of who Majority disagrees practice and the sug instead gests content-, profession, it these cannot be said to speaker-, and have enact- viewpoint-based regulations ed a limitation on impli do not ... freedom of ” cate the subject First Amendment. to First Accordingly, scrutiny.’ Amendment (alteration added) Majority applies the in original) (emphasis rational-basis review. Lowe, Most of the Majority, (quoting 232, cases cited the 472 U.S. at however, (White, do not reg J., involve content-based at concurring))). Where ulations, do, and the cases cited that applies, this rule subject only the law is of a practice in the engaging as Lowe, at viewed 472 U.S. review. basis

rational at 2584. at Id. S.Ct. profession.” only that (requiring at 2582 228, 105 S.Ct. hand, the other On rational connection “have a regulation capacity or fitness applicant’s with pro- personal nexus between [w]here (internal quotation profession” practice exist, a and not and client does fessional omitted)). marks to be exercis- purport not does speaker any particular of judgment on behalf ing Majority’s con- disagree IBut he circumstances with whose individual because, here, applies rule that this clusion regu- acquainted, government directly is similarity between one is while there legitimate to function ceases lation and the those cases at issue in regulations practice with professional regulation of differ- critical here, are several there it be- speech; on impact only incidental ences. publish- speaking of comes Amend- such, to the First Lowe, Locke, subject ing similarity is that The (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) occurs speech that all consider this case ment! J profes- of a one-on-one confines within because concluded that White Id. Justice Lowe, In defen- relationship. sional latter fell into the the defendant’s activities providing investment of accused dant was applied. Amendment the First category, license, of in violation a advice without person a if Majority reasons at S.Ct. Id. federal law. within the confines operating is not who the First Amend- considered White Justice First relationship has professional a that the in- the fact implications ment person then protections, Amendment broadly, published was “advice” vestment within the confines operating who might not be that Lowe suggesting Amend- has no First relationship such ad- of investment practice in the engaged faulty. logic This protections. ment Ultimately, Justice White at all. Id. vising only that the existence established Lowe Amendment the First concluded necessary relationship is a professional convey invest- tected Lowe’s is to burdening speech if a condition law profit, for a even information ment-related scrutiny. Noth- First Amendment evade 233, 105 S.Ct. Id. at no license. if he had a condition implied such ing in Lowe First discussing In at 2584-85. this conclusion.9 support was sufficient licensing implications condi- fact, three more Lowe suggests In conclud- White generally, Justice schemes present tions, have been all of which the af- who “takes professional ed that rule, applying subsequent Lowe’s cases hand personally client fairs aof present here.10 none of which judgment behalf to exercise purports condition, Lowe above the client’s individ- In addition light client would contemplated also properly circumstances ual needs *42 state- from Justice White's only not follow recognized does "[t]he White 9. Justice regulate profes- in Lowe. power government ment practice of a is not lost whenever sions 228, at 105 speech.” Id. profession entails Cir- exception Ninth one from the 10. There is Majority reads this the 2582. From S.Ct. at cuit, readily distinguishable from which is of the principle that broader far case, be discussed below. as will instant is speak he professional is lost whenever profession. This practicing his conclusion 1241 without burdened First Amendment topic scru- of investment advising, but within tiny only field, if the burden was a consequence it did not differentiate. It was not as if professional licensing of a unlicensed scheme. Id. at advisers were left free 229, recommend 105 at investment (discussing products S.Ct. 2583 “the government preferred govern- principle government may that the restrict —such ment bonds—but restricted from recom- entry professions into and vocations ” mending anything else. Similarly, through licensing schemes (emphasis Locke, unlicensed designers were not added)). left condition, And there ais third free to design recommend techniques the recognizes which the government’s government might prefer energy ability to burden speech through a —such licens- saving, “green” designs restricted ing scheme —but without implicating the First from recommending anything else. In this Amendment “has never been extended to way, least, at speech burden on encompass licensing of speech per se cases like Lowe is content-neutral. 229-30, or press.” at Id. 105 S.Ct. Further, at First 2583. This Amendment reasoning scrutiny has is developed not eliminated simply because “any into a rule that burdened inhibition [must be] speech occurs in the course of merely conducting the incidental of observing effect one’s business as professional. a Even in an legitimate otherwise regulation.” cases involving speech spoken that is only Locke, added) 634 F.3d at (emphasis 1191 in pursuit of profession, one’s the Court (internal omitted). quotation marks In applied has intermediate First Amendment (and contemplated cases by Lowe subse- Sorrell, scrutiny. See 131 at S.Ct. 2667-71 quently, Locke), regulation the State’s was (applying intermediate First Amendment speech not directed at but instead im- scrutiny ato law prohibiting pharmacies proving the overall quality profession, of a selling from records of doctors’ prescribing broadly speaking, by ensuring patterns pharmaceutical salespeople); qualified practice individuals profes- It, Inc., Fla. Bar 618, v. Went For 515 U.S. See, e.g., (relying sion. id. Lowe 620, 623-24, 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 115 S.Ct. a uphold restricting statute practice (1995) 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (subjecting regu- design interior professionals); to licensed prohibiting lation lawyers from engaging Bowman, Soc’y Accountant’s v.Va. in certain forms of direct advertising to 602, (4th Cir.1988) F.2d (relying on First scrutiny); intermediate Amendment Justice White’s reasoning up- Lowe to v. Holder Project, Humanitarian Law cf. restricting hold statute the use of certain 1, 28, 561 U.S. terms in product the work of unlicensed (2010) L.Ed.2d (recognizing that when accountants). triggering “conduct coverage under the statute of communicating consists a mes- fourth A and final condition that im- sage,” First scrutiny ap- Amendment still plicit in the rule contemplated in Lowe plies).11 content-neutrality least to a far great- —at er extent than is present Locke, here. To be In all four conditions were satis- sure, prohibition the SEC’s applied only to fied. challenged provision was a con- Majority’s 11. The approach protect converts scrutiny. immune First To speech unprotected sure, ed into freely. conduct too be "it abridg has never been deemed an speech may fairly if Even conduct, press characterized as ment of freedom of to make or targets which illegal merely conduct course conduct because the entirely initiated, that consists evidenced, almost part conduct was in *43 1242 inap- and Lowe scheme, rendering Locke licensing scheme professional

tent-neutral stop not do and the differences posite, that inci- designers to interior applicable regu- is not to purpose Act’s there. The of unlicensed the dentally burdened a medicine as whole of profession late giving them from by designers prohibiting one, aspect narrow regulate to at but rather F.3d advice. 634 design one-on-one Further, speech. professional of from were Lowe conditions 1191. The four speech as a incidentally burden does not scrutiny was met, Amendment and First of im- pursuit of the State’s Lowe, consequence at U.S. also applied. See not profes- quality of the overall (White, J., proving concur- 228, at 2582 Instead, directly Act a sion as whole. that First Amendment (recognizing ring) by profes- licensed per se targets speech “[rjegulations apply not scrutiny does incidental sionals, just speech not (emphasis profession” a entry into on unli- by the profession practice of added)). distinguishable readily one With rec- inquiries, prohibits The Act censed.12 by the Ma- only cases cited exception, harassing unnecessarily keeping, ord applied involve Lowe is jority in which may discriminatory expression circumstances where same, of narrow set —which more than recommenda- nothing consist challenging is individual an unlicensed safely more or firearms tions to store ability her on his or restriction some with children if from homes them See profession. remove regulated in a engage to be are taken Ga., 1422, recommendations those 132 F.3d Bar v. Wilson State topic, firearm Cir.1998) attacks” —on one “political (11th (restricting dis- 1429-30 ren- safety. of course law); ownership and This attorneys practicing from barred than rather Act content-based ders the Bowman, (restricting F.2d at 604 case content-neutral, distinguishing this product the work terms in of certain use accountants). Locke. even further unlicensed only two reasons Majority offers all distinguishable from The is The Act here beyond the narrow extending Lowe licensing for not a cases. It of these Lowe, Majority prohibits. The re- inquiry provision language....” means of by carried out J„ (White, State’s ban that the S.Ct. at 2582 lies on Lowe to conclude 472 U.S. at added) (internal quota concurring) (emphasis inquiries implicates no irrelevant on such omitted). primarily concerns, conduct If directly tion marks but Lowe First however, language, it becomes carried out inquiries speech, not are that such states regulation of that claim that difficult to speaker does ... a conduct: "Where fessional merely burden an incidental conduct creates exercising judgment on be- purport to be to fall speech. The then seems on individual,” would any particular as half of speech, sub of commercial under the rubric asking a doctor is obviously the case when See, scrutiny. e.g., Sor ject to intermediate he firearm because if he owns a patient his rell, 2667-68. at S.Ct. hunting trip, "government arrange wants legitimate regulation ceases to function Indeed, considering exactly what the in- 12. practice with professional purports how far quiry provision to do shows reg- impact speech; it becomes incidental contem- removed the is from scenario such, publishing speaking prohib- ulation inquiry provision plated in Lowe. 472 U.S. subject Amendment].” the First questions asking irrelevant its doctors from direct- example, Lowe if a doctor 105 S.Ct. at For about firearms. gotten prohibited by each other patient inquiries to know ly his that the have states patient years, profes- the doctor ask legitimate regulations over Act are not to see if in order whether he owns regula- direct conduct but instead sional hunting. might go That like to speech. tions patient’s inquiry plainly irrelevant care, example of what so it is an obvious

1243 in context which it has been previously into expression. free recognized It First, applied. explains very it that a that a State’s narrow category speech— speech concern for maintaining standards professionals unlicensed engag- ing in goes beyond fessional conduct practice initial li- one-on-one of profes- sion for censing. true, which unqualified This is of course but in are it —could incidentally way justifies no burdened Majority’s as a position consequence of licensing an entire profession. that no First The scrutiny Amendment applies holding of Lowe and purpose of Justice to laws directly like the Act that burden White’s concurrence was to narrow that speech in pursuit of maintaining those category, and thus expand the free Instead, standards. regulations of this even rights. profes- unlicensed subjected kind are to intermediate scruti- By saying sionals. that profes- unlicensed It, ny. Inc., See Went For 515 U.S. sionals’ rights free expanded, Lowe 623, 115 S.Ct. at (applying 2375-76 inter- implying was not profession- licensed scrutiny mediate to a limiting als’ free speech rights narrowed. The Su- direct-mail by lawyers solicitations vic- preme explicitly Court has against warned tims the wake of accidents which was reading First Amendment case law this justified as “an protect effort to flag- way: “A designed rule to tolerate certain ging reputations of lawyers by Florida speech ought not blossom to become a preventing them engaging in conduct rationale for a restricting rule it.” Alva- ... universally regarded as de- rez, 132 S.Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion). plorable and beneath common decency” (internal quotation omitted)); Lowe’s marks rationale Gen- further undermines the Nev., Majority’s tile holding v. State 1030, profession- Bar 501 U.S. licensed als do not 1074, enjoy First 2720, 2744, 111 Amendment rights S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d whenever (1991) they are speaking 888 within the “a (applying less demanding professional confines aof relationship. standard” of scrutiny First Amendment Justice White explained that regulations limiting lawyers from speaking cases). press pending a State can require high standards of Majority’s reason for extending second qualification, good such as moral charac- Lowe is based misreading on a Casey, law, ter or proficiency its before it which will be great addressed detail admits applicant an to the bar.... now,

below. For enough point out the Majority explicitly recognizes ... Clients trust in investment advis- that Casey apply does not the Lowe ers, if protection not for the of life and that, framework contrary Ma- liberty, at least for the safekeeping and jority’s holding, Casey explicitly states property. accumulation of Bad invest- that “First rights ... im- ment advice ... lead to ruinous plicated” when the State profes- burdens losses for the client. To inves- protect speech. sional U.S. at S.Ct. tors, Government ... may require at 2824. Majority with left advisers, investment lawyers, like no basis for extending beyond Lowe li- qualities evince truth-speaking, censing context. honor, discretion, fiduciary responsi- bility.

Lowe’s rationale has wisely not been extended —until now. Lowe articulated 472 U.S. at at 2582-83 S.Ct. reasons for limiting government (internal (White, J., intrusion concurring) quotation outweighed ownership omitted). professionals Licensed

marks *45 recently re- very The has Court benefits. in position venerated a occupied thus for rationale appropriate as an jected this func- perform Lowe, these professionals as the State finds speech: “That silencing to cannot be trusted society that in tions permit not persuasive does too expression only it was because anyone. And just its to speech or burden quiet the it to unquali- that the rationale compelling Sorrell, at 2671. messengers.” Majori- at all. The silenced could be fied distinguish- is that Lowe thus clear It is deep in in this case is Lowe ty’s reliance on its ratio- factually based able both and from ven- Far rationale. with that tension compel- aside a not set nale. We should deliver what who erating professionals consistently case law that body of ling advice, the critical to be recognized Lowe con- scrutiny to Amendment First applies profes- licensed prohibits Act here an exten- based on restrictions tent-based exercising judgment, their from sionals of cases. line inapplicable an sion of the kind engaging in making inquiries, believe counseling persistent pa- of their well-being improve will 2.

tients. analogy, a much closer Casey presents that licensed recognizing Instead of that interme only to but serves reaffirm valuable, particularly speech is fessionals’ here. The appropriate is scrutiny diate certain to silence the State’s decision to compelled doctors Casey in regulation Majority pre- by the approved speech is about var seeking abortions women advise quali- so speakers are cisely because and alternatives. consequences ious health rely on the could not The State fied. 884, 112 (plurality at 2824 at S.Ct. 505 U.S. to, si- example, Majority’s rationale nexus between personal opinion). unquali- who are non-professionals, lence here and and client that exists professional advice, safety from give firearm fied in present also in Locke was that existed about inquiries private making however, Locke, in Casey Unlike Casey. type though silencing even ownership, targeted regulation a volved In- Lowe envisioned. is speaker what the medical topic within specific allow rationale stead, Majority’s would general rather than profession profession- and all the State silence entry profession restricting give advice qualified to such analogous als who are more Casey thus whole. in a spoken when speech, identifying because their helpful this case setting is converted scrutiny, though it private, professional applicable level unpro- speech to First private the relevant protected noting worth turns conduct. This consisted professional tected discussion Amendment opinion in a three-member its head. sentences Lowe on three Court.13 speak for the that did favoring seemed As amicus sup- Casey Majority cites Though admit, silenced because doctors were rule that of Lowe’s of its extension question port causing patients speech was implicated is not Amendment the First safety concerns associated whether V-B, and Justice falls Part discussion opinion constituted 13. Justice O'Connor’s III, only by I, II, joined Justices Kenne- was V- O’Connor as to Parts judgment of Court Part. dy in this A, V-C, Souter only. The First Amendment and VI here, actually (5th Cir.2012) Casey (“The stated the exact oppo- 575 plurality response “First rights site: ... to the compelled speech claim clearly implicated.” 505 U.S. at S.Ct. at not a strict scrutiny analysis.”). The Majority’s conclusion that Fourth Circuit was specific, more applies Lowe and that First Amendment Casey characterized applying “interme- rights implicated are not inside the con- scrutiny.” diate See Greater Balt. Ctr. for fines of one-on-one professional Concerns, relation- Pregnancy Mayor Inc. v. & *46 ship is simply incorrect. The Majority Balt., City Council 539, 683 F.3d 554 (4th apparently Cir.2012), drew its conclusion from reh’g vacated on en banc on Locke—-where we licensing held that the grounds, (4th other 721 Cir.2013); F.3d 264 requirement at implicate issue “does not see also Pickup, 740 at (placing F.3d 1228 Amendment,” ... the First 634 F.3d at Casey at midpoint the on the continuum of added) (emphasis 1191 mistakenly First protections). Amendment Other —and Casey conflated with even though, again, Circuits have not definitively answered the case opposite.14 said the question. Locke, it is clear that unlike the Although Casey did explicitly not state regulation in Casey subjected was to some that scrutiny intermediate applied, I be- level of First scrutiny. Amendment Given lieve the Fourth and Ninth Circuits are brevity Casey’s the First Amendment correct. Immediately before addressing discussion, identifying what level of scruti issue, the First Amendment the in Court ny applied was is difficult. Casey noted Casey recognized that the State had “a that, only although the First Amendment government substantial interest justifying applied, “subject the was to reason requirement that a apprised woman be licensing regulation” able and because it of the health risks of abortion and child- “part of the practice was of medicine.” birth.” 505 882, U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 2823 884, 112 at U.S. at (plurality 505 S.Ct. 2824 opinion). (plurality requirement The also opinion). It is clear from this advanced the “legitimate goal” statement of ensuring See, that strict scrutiny was not applied. that women do not unwittingly suffer “dev- e.g., Tex. Med. Performing astating Providers psychological consequences” of Lakey, 570, Abortion Servs. v. 667 F.3d less-than-fully-informed making decision Majority As the recognizes, “Casey, in why the cable. That is White Justice in Lowe and Supreme although invoking Casey without Justice opposite O’Connor in reached Court— ‘personal the conclusions about the nexus’ whether First Amend- framework set forth in implicated, ment was why that is and the two applied Justice White’s Lowe concurrence and opinions cannot be they applied treated as if by upheld this Court in statutory Locke— the same scrutiny. level of provision directly regulated physicians' regula- conversations with as a valid Majority case cited the practice tion of the Maj. Op. of medicine.” at context, beyond licensing extends Lowe the true, 1222. That is of course but the fact that explic- the Ninth Circuit's Pickup, in decision Casey upheld provision the does not mean itly recognized that laws like the one at issue provision subject that the was not First Casey midpoint here and in belong on "the scrutiny. That Justice O’Con- protec- continuum” of First Amendment opinion Casey apply nor's did not Justice Majority tions. 740 F.3d at 1228. The sim- insig- White's framework from Lowe is not an ply Casey placed regulation acts as if there nificant detail that Casey can be cast aside. continuum, at the low end of the but it did apply did not Justice White’s framework be- place not. We should not the Act at the low end, cause inappli- Justice White’s framework was either. though review, wording, similar—in ment of the unborn.” life “protecting applied in form—to the one necessarily not To 884, at 2823-24. 882, 112 S.Ct. Id. at 651, at Id. at S.Ct. Casey. “leg- found goals, Court these advance First Amend although (holding that a decision that ensuring at islation aimed com implicated, ment was constitution- informed” to mature information in of certain disclosure pelling (emphasis at 2824 at al. Id. long constitutional was advertisements added). Further, discussed the Court “reasonably to the State’s it was related was requirement ways in which interest”). explained Zauderer to “truth- it was limited narrowly drawn: there was applied standard reasonableness information, misleading” ful not scrutiny, than intermediate rigorous less physician prevent [did] “the statute 14, 105 at 2282 n. n. S.Ct. see id. judg- his or exercising her highlights a distinction but case information provide not to ment” here, scrutiny applies intermediate proves 882, 884, 112 Id. at situations. certain Casey. Zauderer if it did not even *47 at 2823-24. S.Ct. on advertis that a restriction recognized First subject to intermediate ing would be an intermediate analysis mirrors This ap the test scrutiny under Amendment the law in scrutiny analysis shows Id. Hudson. and Central Sorrell plied muster un- constitutional question passes vances termediate at least that terest termediate N.Y., achieve that at 2667-68 der that standard. Gas & L.Ed.2d 341 Casey applied 447 and [3] Elec. [2] U.S. First a substantial scrutiny, “the State (explaining Corp. v. Pub. Serv. interest” (1980))). I that the measure the statute 557, Amendment 566, something akin See (citing Cent. Hudson that to survive in- 100 Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. governmental therefore [1] S.Ct. scrutiny. directly ad- is drawn Comm’n must 2343, believe show in- in- 65 to when vision Id. at ratcheted but ness” at tion on scrutiny compelled, should speech, while Casey involved 644, did not scrutiny applied speech is at 651, speech, so even if 105 was issue ratcheted up S.Ct. prohibit reasonableness-scrutiny applied compelled a prohibited case involves at 2278. “Reasonable intermediate up to provision compelling speech at 2281-82. Casey, scrutiny truthful where reasonableness intermediate rather a any way. scrutiny. prohibi speech than pro something Casey applied less again Even if This a here.15 confirms level scrutiny, Zauderer the Act here v. restriction like than intermediate content-based intermediate always the Su- receive least Disciplinary Counsel will Office Ohio, 626, scrutiny. 471 U.S. preme Court of (1985),confirms 2265, L.Ed.2d 652 S.Ct. 3. scrutiny applies here. intermediate sup- from the Ninth Circuit case, a Two “reason- cases applied In that the Court v. In Conant as well. port this conclusion First standard Amend- able relation” Majority's ap- Though challenge. under the compelling speech as significance 15. Major- certainly restricting would because proach, it can be observed in opposed to imagine that a apply difficult to Casey says It is Amendment does not ity itself. First providing from prohibiting a doctor statute doctors and regulations on between truthful, non-misleading information con- unpro- than of which is no more patients, all abortion al- cerning risks of abortion conduct. professional tected survive First ternatives would Walters, form, the court invalidated federal verbal indistinguishable was from regulation prohibiting prescribing doctors from recom- a drug or performing a sur- mending marijuana gery. words, the use of medical af- In other the burdened ter applying heightened First Amendment speech was exclusively the functional (9th Cir.2002). scrutiny. 629, 309 F.3d equivalent of the treatment itself. There- Despite taking place fore, within the confínes of banning SOCE therapy was no differ- doctor-patient relationship, regula- ent than outlawing certain drugs, and the analyzed content-, tion was (i.e., classic burden on the ban on speaking speaker-, viewpoint-based restriction. words that constitute therapy) SOCE was contrast, Id. at By 639. in Pickup v. incidental necessary to the ban on the Brown, the court held that a (i.e., California law disfavored medical conduct perform- prohibiting mental professionals health ing therapy). Id. at Pickup 1230. offering sexual change recognized orientation ef- that the law at issue went no (SOCE) therapy forts to minors was im- further in banning speech than necessary mune from First Amendment scrutiny, regulate proscribed medical conduct. though even therapy itself was carried Doctors’ “express views through out words. 740 F.3d at anyone, including minor and their parents, any subject, including Conant, Distinguishing the court drew SOCE,” was explicitly protected by the act lines between a professional’s public in question. Id. at 1230. speech, id. at a professional’s speech *48 “within the confínes of a professional rela- regulations here, The like regula- the tionship,” id. at (citing Casey Conant, an tions in Casey and speech burden example speech, of such noting fits, that least, that very the into the inter- the speech burdened in that case fell on category mediate where First Amendment midpoint the of the continuum protections where First apply. To avoid this conclu- protections Amendment sion, are diminished Majority lumps the all speech, long so eliminated), but not professional’s and a as it occurs within the profes- confines of a conduct which is carried through out relationship sional speech the is —whether speech, id. at 1229. regulation se, in speech per speech medically-re- about Conant, prohibited which doctors from topics, rec- lated or equivalent the functional of ommending marijuana, medical one, burdened procedure medical unprotect- —into speech entitled, least, that very was at the category. ed to intermediate protec- First Amendment contrast, By when Ninth the Circuit ex- time, tions. Id. at 1226-27. At the same panded Lowe’s in reasoning Pickup, it was Conant recognized that speech bur- very narrowly careful to the circumscribe dened as a result of the law’s ban on category of speech that was left unprotect- prescribing marijuana medical fell into the Only speech ed. that is the functional third, unprotected category, id. at equivalent performing a surgery pre- or because the ban targets professional con- scribing a drug can be burdened without (i.e., duct giving patients drugs) only scrutiny under Pickup. It is well worth incidentally (i.e., speech burdens writing noting speech that the in Casey burdened drug the name of a prescription on a pad). received scrutiny intermediate even

Similarly, the court in Pickup though concluded speech exclusively the was intend- therapy, that SOCE though carried out in fully ed to inform patients about a medical then, Majority treats the Ultimately, is if that speech even procedure. medical con- nothing like that speech treat- of medical equivalent functional the narrow exceedingly the in duct—either scrutiny, without regulated be ment can Pickup or the by contemplated sense to medical directly related that speech by contemplated sense somewhat broader category within not fit does treatment conduct. unprotected Casey—as Pickup. under as narrow as holding Majority’s the Were where Pickup objections, contrast Here, in stark have I would fewer Pickup’s, below, I func- was the reasons discussed speech though for the burdened all of it incorrect. find probably none drug, still providing would equivalent tional as narrow as Majority’s holding the fits in Were by the Act burdened speech because I find incorrect Casey, would Asking category. narrow exceedingly scrutiny a lower level Majority uses the firearm owner- about questions irrelevant to- Casey, but did the Court did than answers, harassing a recording ship, objectionable be less day’s decision would ownership by based patient — however, Here, only error. its if were discussing irritatingly persistently holding not decreases Majority’s giving nothing like subject—is regulations scrutiny applied level therapy. Fur- SOCE performing drug or Casey, expands it also the one like all, of the by no means some, though ther, that can be burdened speech category Act is similar by the burdened speech review. without by the burdened speech a broad such burdens Because the Act bur- extent Casey. To topic speech on physician swath of to inform designed speech dens defini- including speech firearms — speech firearms or dangers medical treat- nothing to do tion has ways patients of safer inform designed to Conant, heightened applied which ment — like firearms, is much speech to own Doctors directly applicable. scrutiny, Accordingly, such Casey. ask a First have intermediate given should to discuss— firearms questions about *49 speech tections, Majority gives the the but cons pros and persistently even —the that, all, a line as blurring at protection no just patients their ownership with Supreme the recognized, Circuit the Ninth the to discuss they have surely still, while required. Worse itself Court marijuana. of medical pros and cons the exclusively concerned Casey the law be labelled un- cannot communication Such fully inform necessary patients to speech it takes simply because conduct protected the here procedure, about a medical professional a confines of place within the to is unrelated speech that also burdens to nothing un- Pickup does relationship. bans irrelevant The Act purpose. this reaffirms fact principle this dermine on irritating politicking I make questioning no it, though 740 F.3d at by ownership, correctly which subject of firearm Pickup the was on whether comment to do whatsoever nothing has definition decided.16 proce- or a medical treatment with medical inform designed to way no and is in dure is irrelevant speech rele- that By subjecting of medical anything

patients about without regulation to to medical conduct vance. dissent, spirited which en banc drew take the case not to Circuit’s decision 16. The Ninth scrutiny, First Amendment under the private speech All professionals from to conduct, is, guise regulating professional patients/clients today, subject after to regulation Majority speech scrutiny. the holds that without all between professionals patients/clients long —so Because Majority the holds that as it occurs within the confines of a one-on- regulation State’s direct of speech from professional relationship one be bur- —can doctor to particular about a topic by scrutiny. dened States without Despite review, then, draws rational basis re- clearly reaching this holding, Majority the gardless of whether State here has implications, those disputes so I must ex- all speech actually banned by doctors to plain my point further. I do not do so patients on topic firearms, today’s simply identify slope. In- slippery holding undoubtedly gives States license to stead, today’s this section shows that deci- do so in the future.17 why That is I assert brings sion us to the bottom of slope. that today’s holding authorizes States to ‘‘[b]ylabeling speech stated that ... as ‘con circumstances. And such discussions cannot duct,’ panel’s opinion entirely exempt has inquiry. involve escaping there is no regulation ed such from First Amend reality speech that even by if all doctors to doing, panel In so ment. ... insulates patients about prohibited, is not firearms scrutiny from First Amendment California’s great Despite deal of directly it is. targeting prohibition guise professional of a firearms, physician speech —in Majority politically unpopular expres specifically —of concludes does not (O’Scannlain, J., sion.” 740 F.3d at 1215 "infringef physicians’ rights ] on speak on a dissenting rehearing from the denial en topic choosing.” Maj. Op. at 1225. banc). I share the concern that the difference By holding that the directly State burden category between the intermediate (speech physician speech infringing without on First professional relationship within the rights, Majority Amendment has an- related to medical but is not conduct itself nounced a speech speech rule that all such — conduct) (con unprotected and the category professional patient/client within the professional relationship duct within the professional confines of a one-on-one rela- through speech) may prove carried out tionship unprotected conduct. —is illusory. Majority proves point be The by ability fact that doctors retain some explaining unprotected that the line between discuss firearms nothing does protected profes speech conduct in the significance limit the holding. To con- setting sional is not here clear and indeed otherwise, clude accept one have to would Shockingly, Majority cannot found. premise unbelievable if the State bans dividing turns the absence of a clear line speech topic, most infringed on a it has not veiy categories between these different all, rights First Amendment but that if it speech regulate into an invitation for States to topic, suddenly banned all on the First of it scrutiny. all without If the court rights erred, apply. That Pickup would would putting it did so too much create, essentially prerequisite as a unprotected to assert- category. into the Cf. *50 ing rights, First Project, showing by Amendment a Humanitarian Law the 561 U.S. at party regulation burdened (applying 130 S.Ct. at 2724 that the State’s First is Amendment scrutiny the triggering Any- even when most restrictive "conduct cov means available. less, erage thing under the statute of consists communi and this would lead view to the cating message”). a Majority The speech rights has multi conclusion infring- that are not plied many that error upon times over. clearly ed at all. That notion is incom- patible with the First Amendment. The Ma- jority’s rationale 17. is different: it holds that the While it is true that Florida doctors still subject Act here technically is not to First have the Amendment discuss firearm direct, 1225-26, safety scrutiny patients, Maj. Op. content-specific with because see even discussions, regulations speech, Act this ensures that on these to the such as the law in all, brief, tame, Act, they Casey extent occur at will be and the review evade because generic, patients’ particular regulations untailored to professional are on conduct. recog- limiting principle pa- eliminated discussing doctors prohibit itself. nized Lowe itself, Affordable Care tients Medicaid, mal- Medicare obviously patient his a doctor asks When topic. If the laws, any other or practice the doctor “does questions, irrelevant speech regulating passed an State judgment on be- exercising purport to be any about patients/clients professionals individual,” Lowe so any particular of half says Majority’s holding topics, those of regulation ceases “government that says is, though even regulation that such a profes- of regulation legitimate function as that is irrelevant speech directly targets impact only incidental practice with sional task, regulation pro- a professional’s speak- regulation speech; it becomes on from First immune conduct fessional such, subject to the First ... ing de- States can scrutiny. If Amendment 232, 105 S.Ct. 472 U.S. at Amendment[].” questioning clare, scrutiny, without (White, J., concurring). The Ma- at 2584 medicine, then is bad about firearms limitation, as the clearly rejects this jority declare, scrutiny, that without can States ques- provision primarily burdens inquiry topic are medi- about bad discussions being “irrele- by virtue tions that — the doc- be eliminated from cine that can usually be unrelated vant”—will relationship. tor-patient judgment on behalf doctor’s exercise principle patient. particular a previously protected how much To show category limit the articulated to Lowe un- Majority’s holding renders without First that can be burdened speech, Majority’s begin I with the protected, scrutiny has been eliminated Amendment inquiry provision. Under treatment of Majority. by the when ask- there are times provision, safety firearm is obvi- question a ing above, Further, only as discussed and thus to medical care ously irrelevant beyond Lowe the licens- case that extends by the Act. For exam- obviously prohibited context, limiting set a ing Pickup, also only asks about ple, if doctor Majority disregards.18 principle hunting go he ownership because wants by doctors about questioning Irrelevant he wants to patient or because with his (for arranging a purposes of firearms the Sec- on the evils of lecture his rant) political hunting trip going on Amendment, obviously question his ond clearly equivalent not the functional Majority The to medical care. irrelevant care, was the context viding which holds, rationale articulated based on the rule. 740 extended Lowe’s Pickup which Lowe, regulable questions such at 1225. F.3d receive no First conduct that professional Majority that the In And to the extent protections. applying Amendment general however, asserting that the Act is like here, Majority has Lowe II.B.2, Casey does not Casey, supra in Part Majority without discussed asserts rationale, apply rational basis review contem- discussing also mere citing Lowe or its did, Lowe, scrutiny Casey plated in and even if applied Lowe's rule that no First up Major- here both because surprisingly, would be ratcheted scrutiny applies. Not prohibition supporting proposition. here is ity cites no cases *51 Indeed, requirement speak and be- than a Pickup recognized opposite. See rather cause, Casey, the Act (placing unlike at 1228 the burdened 740 F.3d absolutely has some Casey midpoint the contin- here burdens speech in on the nothing care. to do with medical protections). As uum of First Amendment malpractice regime, medical its assertion is counsel a- patient to rely quack medi- flatly Majority incorrect. The errs in cine” but recognizing that a may doctor analogizing the Act to other State laws talk patients quack about medicine such only incidentally speech. burden added) (internal as SOCE (emphasis quo- directly questioning. bans How can it omitted)). tation believe, marks I appar- possibly argued be that a telling law doc- ently unlike the Majority, that a doctor’s tors, “Do not questions ask irrelevant First Amendment challenge prevail would guns,” only incidentally burdens the if a doctor faced liability for speaking right to ask irrelevant questions about about but not performing or inducing reli- guns? The burden could not be more upon medicine, ance quack because such a contrast, By direct. malpractice medical on speech direct, burden would be not regime that holds a doctor liable when his incidental to goal the State’s of preventing unreasonable treatment causes a bad medical care. only harm has incidental burdens on Applying here, this rationale had the speech. regime, Under that liability at- State drafted a law stating that it is bad taches for prescribing wrong drug, di- medicine to counsel patients on firearm rectly burdening practice the bad giving that, safety and accordingly, may doctors patients harmful drugs and incidentally not, part practice preventive

burdening to write the name of medicine, patients counsel on firearm safe- the drug prescription pad. on a Liability ty, might we dealing be with a regulation also failing attaches for to properly diag- like malpractice laws and like the law in disease, nose a burdening practice the bad Further, Pickup. had the State drafted of failing identify problem a health law, such a opening question then the in a incidentally burdening the right to remain safety counseling session—a ses- silent about a problem medical tell prohibited sion that as bad medicine patient he has a clean bill of health when under hypothetical likely also he does not. —-would Pickup justified was on the prohibited. case, be In that the ban on the same basis. therapy analogous SOCE question might truly be incidental to prescribing a harmful drug. Liability (what deems) overall ban on the State bad could attach for providing therapy SOCE practice. medical I expressed my have because the therapy had the chance to doubts as to whether such a ban would harm minors psychologically. evade First scrutiny, but that Pickup As recognized, Lowe howev- ban would be more likely to do so than the er, (or even if quack medicine what the Act. medicine) quack

State deems to be can be contrast, By the Act allows firearm prohibited scrutiny, without doctors cannot continue, counseling to directly so is not prohibited talking to their regulating medical declaring conduct or about quack medicine. See 472 U.S. certain form of treatment bad (White, J„ medicine. S.Ct. at 2584 concur- (“I time, At the same ring) directly bans do not think [the could State] asking questioning make it irrelevant a crime ... about fire- privately speak even, urging persons especially, ques- indeed those reject any follow or arms — (internal school of thought.” having nothing tions quota- do with medical omitted)); tion marks 740 F.3d at conduct. The Act directly targets thus (holding only that doctor questioning “[a] incidentally advances *52 mine-run, in the apply not but does cases might interests medical

whatever less from more case. Aside irrelevant obvious eliminating law by a served argument vagueness the Plaintiffs’ making from the doctor’s firearms about questions Majority’s them,19 that the proves this direct. for speech is on burden The office. is, best, inapposite. rationale is care medical to benefit The Supreme The indirect. incidental it can- that explains Majority the While States recognized that explicitly has Court it is Pickup, in the lines drawn find way. in this interests cannot advance wholly irrele- that a ban on unquestionable (recognizing Sorrell, at 2670 See provision inquiry like the questioning vant laws prohibits Amendment First that the that is speech a ban broader than is far its to achieve seeks State where “[t]he professional equivalent functional the the indirect through objectives policy case in the closer even And conduct. by speech restraining certain means of irrelevant, clearly is not questioning where speakers”). certain Majori- for the be said most that can the salvage its claim questioning attempt In some of the an is that ty’s opinion prohibits the provision like inquiry Act look by the Act’s the prohibited incidentally bur- only (i.e., directly conduct relat- speech fessional Casey in speech the Majority discusses dens burdened speech, The procedure). to a medical ed fire- questioning about where closer the bur- case looks like never questioning here in a discussion salvo opening (i.e., arms that is Pickup in dened cer- care. It is preventive Moreover, Act procedure). a medical cases, the question- in such tainly true Casey Pickup or either further than goes in the being “conduct” closer ing moves is neither burdening questioning Pickup. But in Lowe sense discussed nor procedure to a medical related the Ma- inapplicable how only proves this procedure. of such equivalent functional a First Amendment jority’s rationale First holding evades By As the inquiry provision. analysis of the hold- scrutiny, Majority’s Amendment viola- concede, clearest must Majority case than other is thus far broader ing ques- provision i.e., inquiry tions — rationale. applying Lowe’s arguably even obviously irrelevant most tioning that is accept Majority’s refusal The activity that looks prohibited care—is light in holding perplexing of its breadth conduct. So professional like the least Essential Casey. its treatment inqui- allowing the Majority’s rationale assumption holding is an Majority’s First Amendment to evade ry provision doctors Casey compelling the law inqui- when the applicable least scrutiny is was a ways about abortion certain speak theOn applicable. is most ry provision the ration- subject to of conduct regulation more becomes hand, questioning other by Lowe. contemplated review al (and basis less thus care to medical relevant First no Majority holds that Act), it be- obviously in violation applies none Casey so applied (and scrutiny conduct professional like comes more like the here because In scrutiny). regulable thus without more to medi- speech related Casey, burdens words, Majority’s rationale other counsel- (here, safety cal conduct closest, ambiguous most in the applies IV. infra, 19. See Part *53 abortion). there,

ing; Yet the Majority if Even we were to overlook Majori- the ty’s for some my explicit reason resists conclusion that rationale —that the discussion following question its the holding opens the door for would be States to conduct regulable thus we would still prohibit, without First be Amendment scruti- —then left with the indefensible proposition that a ny, all discussions about safety firearm question conduct, is unprotected while a under the exact same rationale. discussion following question the may be It is impossible envision what within protected speech. proposition That cannot Majority’s the holding would render its be Asking correct. someone whether rationale and holding inapplicable ain sit- (“Do engage smoke?”) in a practice you uation the where State banned all discus- far less like medical conduct than discuss- by sions patients doctors to on a topic ing dangers the of engaging in the practice such as firearms. Majority explicitly (“Smoking lung cancer, causes you so recognizes justifies that —and indeed its Y, should X, use or Z stop.”). method to holding because—the Act bans questions It is even more obvious that asking some- that may opening constitute the salvo a (“Do one an question you irrelevant own a medical discussion about firearm safety. gun? so, If go we should hunting.”) is far It is precisely question because that may less like medical conduct than discussing discussion, lead a (“You a discussion that it- safety firearm your should store conduct, self constitutes medical firearm and that the ammunition in separate, question locked lock.”). can be treated safes and use trigger if conduct. So Given that question Majority’s the regulated can be rationale as conduct for ex- tending Lowe is that the (i.e., questioning, because it precipitates conduct even a dis- irrelevant, conduct, when cussion discussion safety), about firearm then the itself is even clearly subject more regu- Majority necessarily has conclusively lation scrutiny without on the same basis. defined discussion about firearm safe- If Majority does not like the implica- ty as conduct that can regulated be with- tions of holding, its the Majority should out First scrutiny, Amendment as well. change holding rather than obfuscat- So, while it be true that the Act here ing it.20 does totally discussions, not ban such my

point is Majority’s holding Thus, neces- by reaching unprecedented sarily States to do so in allows future. holding Casey applied only rational becomes, 20. And Majority which the declares speech discussion the more like regulation to be a on conduct immune from the less like conduct becomes. If a doctor review, First stop sentences, does not limits to three he prob- himself has prohibiting questioning. prohibits ably It also strayed directly stating far from persistently discussing doctors from safety, firearm basics of but firearm if a doctor has discussion, safety patients. Persistent entered a extended a more discussion about reasons, Majority apparently just like the safety, likely he is far more to stumble discussion, opening regulable salvo in the topics onto politics like Second Amendment professional necessarily conduct. This nothing that have whatsoever to do with med- any argument course, regulation forecloses that a ical conduct. Of if a discussion be- by brief discussions doctors about long comes so intense and carries on for so might protected by others, firearms still be begins the First that it to harm the State's need A three Amendment. sentence recitation of to burden the would increase. generalized safety intense, protracted information be con- political cannot ban on discus- by verted from to conduct addition patients may with their sions doctors fourth, twentieth, of a likely or even sen- fiftieth more scrutiny, to survive intermediate illogical, tence. longer The notion is length as the but the of the discussion cannot some- scrutiny that more I little doubt sey, have subjected review, Majority has basis reviewing applied have been would that are related firearms discussions mentioned, and just like the one regulation without care preventive here, irrelevant burdens which like the *54 above, the Further, as discussed scrutiny. to medical that is unrelated questioning that rational basis held has also Majority care.21 Act the to laws like even applies review has no speech that doctors’ burden

that question- obviously irrelevant that Given conduct to medical whatsoever relation about diatribes lengthy political ing and ownership (i.e., about questioning nothing like are Amendment the Second trip). hunting a arranging of purposes for med- equivalent providing of the functional here, Majority is the Casey By applying all like the com- are not ical and at care the have come out Casey would that saying Casey, Majority in the disclosure pelled law had informed consent if even the same rationale. relying on a different must be in- provide irrelevant compelled doctors that suggesting implausibly Instead about, ques- to ask or irrelevant formation professional con- actually is speech such if the to, abortion. Consider tions related asserting that duct, Majority must be the here, had bur- Casey, like the law law is not itself “con- questioning irrelevant For exam- questioning. irrelevant dened pro- be it can nevertheless but that duct” all Ob- Pennsylvania compelled ple, had scrutiny First Amendment without scribed abortion, patients ask about Gyns to questioning that the basis irrelevant on (be- irrelevant was questioning if the even is, That practice of medicine. harms considering an not patient was cause the irritating questioning irrelevant while could not abortion, pregnant, not or was character- cannot be discussions political holding conceive), Majority’s (because even they are medicine” ized as “bad creat- all), burden Majority may would render be not medicine merely incidental by such a law is medi- claiming ed that such bad for view, And any question professional conduct. cine. Under ap- could be scrutiny might patient would ask a Amendment First doctor rationally assert about if the State Majority if is correct scribed can Even ply. is detrimental to asking question scrutiny applied Ca- was what level Roe, just as the protected or about evils abortion the discussion from how convert engaging unprotected prohibits conduct. Unless doctors speech to Majority willing to embrace distinc- is irritating, politically-motivated dis- lengthy, tion, option appears have no Majority Majority holds cussions about firearms. holding permit accept that its would but may regulate burden such States ban, scrutiny, discus- without brief States review, without Amendment discussions First surely just as States sions about firearms regulating guise medical con- under today’s holding prohibit allowed are long the discussions occur within duct—so questioning about persistent discussions relationship. professional It confines topic. the same nearly that such impossible to believe scrutinized, we but regulation would not be bur- Act does than fact more 21. The Majori- light now must believe that Casey, proves that as the inquiries further den lengthy, politically-charged ty’s holding that it, Imag- inapplicable. interprets Majority can between doctor discussions law Pennsylvania’s informed consent ine if scruti- regulated without First lengthy engage in compelled doctors to had ny. birth partial the details of discussions about “irrelevant”, professional conduct.22 holding obviously allows dis- cussions about the topic same to be banned rationale, Given this I fail to see how scrutiny. because, without That is if an today’s holding permit would ever a future question irrelevant profes- bad for the court to strike down on First Amendment sion, an irrelevant discussion—which will grounds that, stating law example, multiply the extent to which “irrelevant,” doctors cannot talk to their harmful topics injected profes- into the the Affordable Care Act. Certainly the sion—is sure to be as bad worse. State could rationally po- assert such litical discussions make patients uncom- Thus, today’s holding allows States to fortable and therefore should be eliminat- clearly ban irrelevant questioning under *55 spoken ed from patient when doctor to pretense the false that the questioning is within professional the confínes of a rela- conduct, or, alternative, in the on based This ban tionship. upheld would be under the un-scrutinized assertion that ques- the the Majority’s rationale as a regulation of tioning is bad for profession. the This medical conduct designed improve to medi- holding also allows States to ban arguably cal care. questioning irrelevant based on a theory questions might that be the opening salvo Perhaps Majority’s the holding only ain discussion might that constitute con- proposition stands for the that irrelevant duct, or, alternative, in the on a theory speech can purged be a profession from the or questioning follow-up discus- guise under the regulating conduct. sion might be bad profession. for the This But Majority since the holds that the holding also allows to States ban what the State’s assertion that question- irrelevant profession itself overwhelmingly deems to ing is for the profession bad will not be (so be relevant questioning long as the subject scrutiny, in future cases the State asserts that questioning is irrele- State’s assertion that the questioning is vant) under the same rationales. And if irrelevant and therefore harmful will be questioning can be accepted it banned without scruti- wholly unless is irrational. Further, ny on the basis Majority questioning holds that is we must (or accept conduct the State’s profession), view on detrimental to the relevance even if that view is discussions can contradicted evidence banned under the same rationale(s) the record.23 already discussed, And as if because discussions are more questioning “irrelevant” proscribed or, can be like conduct alternative, than — profession, because is bad for the just such a likely to be detrimental to the above, 22. Supreme As discussed prece- Court about firearms as a matter of course. See that, explicitly recognized dent has where this Policy AMA H-145.990. The State asserts the is the burdening speech, State’s rationale for contrary particularized view that some show- See, scrutiny applies. e.g., intermediate Went ing required of relevance ques- is to make the Inc., It, 620, 623-24, For 515 U.S. at tioning scrutiny ap- relevant. Because no is 2374, S.Ct. (subjecting regula- at 2375-76 plied by Majority to determine if the prohibiting lawyers tion engaging from in cer- questioning State’s assertion that routine tain advertising of direct forms to intermedi- irrelevant, actually States in the future can do ate scrutiny First Amendment where the law exactly reject what profes- Florida did here: designed improve was quality rep- opinions sional about relevance without evi- profession). utation questions per dence and deem certain se irrel- evant. Here, community the medical approves of—and inquiries thus deems “relevant” — second, government short, regulation; its In questioning. profession as— ... restriction must demonstrate to acknowl- willing Majority whether in- materially advances directly and not, hold- today’s implications edge the third, must be terest; regulation no a rule that announce indeed ing does It, For 515 U.S. narrowly drawn.” Went within professional speech (internal quota- at 2376 115 S.Ct. at relationship a one-on-one the confines Sorrell, omitted); also see tion marks protection. Amendment First entitled Hudson, 2667-68; at Central S.Ct. to obfuscate attempt Finally, in another “[Interme- at 2351. 100 S.Ct. U.S. that doc- Majority asserts holding, the its not ensure scrutiny] standards diate may this Act under discipline facing tors proportional interests that the State’s challenge. a First still assert on resulting placed burdens holding, that today’s true, after but That is not does seek the law but also re- Majority As the fail. challenge will Sorrell, message.” suppress disfavored stated, placed burden peatedly at 2668. merely incidental by the Act is analysis, of this prong the first As Under conduct. professional the. precise interests stated, “supplant bur- we repeatedly Majority also *56 suppo- with other the State by put that forward by the speech State on placed dens 624, It, at 515 U.S. For of a sitions.” Went regulation to the merely incidental (internal quotation marks at 2376 S.Ct. First Amendment no receive profession omitted). scrutiny’s second Intermediate Hence, facing if the doctor protections. speculation mere satisfied prong a “is not Act asserts violating the discipline for rather, governmental a conjecture; defense, con- or the court Amendment First on a restriction seeking to body cite to- sustain simply will challenge sidering his that demonstrate speech must reject the de- commercial opinion day’s Majority that its are real and harms it recites his the assertion The doctor’s fense. a them to alleviate will fact restriction fail since the must protected is at at degree.” S.Ct. Id. material unequivo- speech is placed on burden omitted). (internal marks quotation merely Majority, the according to cally, profession. a incidental clearly established has Court not The it is do- Majority asserts that Though necessary to requirements evidentiary refusing to guarantee than ing no more of intermediate prong survive the second when assert prevail will that doctors if explains It scrutiny, Went For but against disci- defense Amendment First studies,” “the “no presents the State Act, Majority this action under plinary any anecdotal not disclose record [does] will that doctors guaranteeing in fact is to con- tended instead] ... [but evidence fail. tradict, strengthen” State’s rather than is insufficient.

argument, then evidence III. “a few” anecdotal clarifies that Id. Sorrell es- necessarily sufficient are not stories to the conclusion leads foregoing to the State’s posed the harm tablish that First than intermediate nothing less at 2669. 131 S.Ct. real. interest See Act scrutiny applies. For Amendment of inter- prong the third Finally, under must survive, “First, government least apply not scrutiny, we do of mediate support interest a substantial assert extreme, test, happy one who is to answer their doctors’ at the one means restrictive review, firearms suffer as a inquiries at the other. or rational basis Act; second, It, result of the the First 115 S.Ct. at 515 U.S. Went For rights everyone Amendment who wel- narrowly tai- Instead we look for inquiries comes their doctors’ and informa- chosen means fit the State’s lored between infringed. have ends, tion firearms been As though the need and its asserted community point, to the first fit. Id. also clari- perfect not be a Sorrell ought thinks doctors to be free to ask burdening speech if regulation' fies that under-inclusive, provide patients about firearms order to addressing but one area information, potentially life-saving but is evidence that larger problem, of a law, they because of this will not do so. A to sus- justification may be insufficient imagination required to think scrutiny. vivid under intermediate tain the law the innumerable adverse health conse- at 2668. quences go along with unsafe firearm following inter- The State asserts ownership, consequences but those health (1) health- securing improving ests: likely people are now more to befall who (2) owners; care, for firearm particularly inquiry would have welcomed doctor’s privacy rights; firearm owners’ protecting into ownership. firearms (3) rights; protecting Second point, protection As to the second “the (4) preventing against discrimination [by afforded the First is to Amendment] and harassment of firearm owners. I as- communication, to its source and to its that each of the State’s asserted sume recipients [F]reedom both.... ultimately but con- interests is substantial necessarily right to protects the receive.” provisions of clude that all four relevant Pharmacy v. Va. State Bd. Va. Citizens second and third the Act fail under the *57 Council, Inc., 425 U.S. Consumer because, analysis of this while the prongs 756-57, 1817, 1823, 96 S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d 346 substantial, the interests are interests are omitted). (1976) (internal marks quotation by activities either not under threat here, right The to receive is burdened and by the or the Act at most scribed in by cutting opening question off even the indirectly marginally and advances them. conversation, virtually the firearm right altogether. eliminates that To the A. life-saving Majority, cutting off this flow of Act will suggests The record that cutting than off information is no different worse, not bet- make healthcare Florida pharmaceutical, unapproved the flow of an my It is the opinion. ter. That is not manifestly different. It is anathe but it is many leading medical associa- opinion of First Amendment to treat truth ma tions, signif- the AMA. If there is including ful, non-misleading information the same in the disagreement opinion icant with this dangerous drug. way we would treat community, did not men- the State to be “The First Amendment directs us simply tion it. There is no evidence show- regulations that especially skeptical of ing inquires during about firearms in the dark for what keep people seek to negatively affected medical examinations their own perceives to be government well-being medical care or the health and (internal Sorrell, at 2671 good.” of patients. omitted). quotation marks give patients Act does not even

The available evidence does establish This first, question- every- option to consent to the doctors’ things: two the healthcare of Sorrell, rarely, giving doctors very will be asked In the Court ing on firearms. patients to find out that fewer occasions decisionmaking can “private explained and thus fewer non-cooperative would and thus in- partiality governmental avoid deny care on this basis. occasions to from First measures privacy sulate benefit, but it is a potential That is a challenge.” Id. 2669. Therefore, great one with costs. slight Here, there is no mechanism because not meet the the burden on does consent, decisionmaking private patients to proportionality discussed standards topic on the patients and doctors between Sorrell. drastically reduced. has been of firearms favoring partiality Governmental there is no important It is to recall that messages predominates, ownership that firearm owners suggesting evidence ownership drastically they care because were fire- against firearm were denied entirely prevented only patients The who were if not arm owners. limited those who refused to to hear them. denied care were who want reaching people thus, questions, answer doctor’s Considering only the healthcare of fire- did not even know whether doctor owners, there is no evidence that the arm Doctors un- patient was a firearm owner. doc- their care diminished when quality of they jobs— cannot do their derstand they guns. out owned There is tors found liability malpractice and risk medical —if ownership that their sta- also no evidence broadly. they inquire fail to Patients who fire- improperly disclosed. Indeed tus was inquiries jobs resist make doctors’ more likely the ones most arm owners are present doctors with risks difficult provided by information benefit from the compliant patients do not. Doctors subject, on this and there is evi- doctors speaking significant thus have a interest many firearm-own- suggesting dence freely, making inquiries, recording pa- the information. ing patients appreciated tients’ answers. Sorrell, As in “The defect law is [the] course, answer, if wish not to Of many fact that made clear listeners Ordinarily, are free not to. those instructive.” Id. at information] find [the questions who wish not to answer receive unques- “ample protection from [their] Sorrell, engage.” tioned to refuse to arguably who stand to people *58 (internal quotation at 2670 marks medically from the Act are those benefit omitted). may freely patients These voluntarily choose not to answer who doctor questioning choose another whose questions their doctors’ about firearms. sensibilities, comports patients’ with the Act, doctors are free to ask Without and there is no in the record evidence questions, people who firearm-related suggesting any non-compliant patients that may questions to answer such be refuse away who were turned could not find other a result. denied care as With doctors.24 questions refuse to answer people who care, see Fla. may justify forcing relinquish still be denied Stat. To doctors to 790.338(4), solely questions questions § firearm-related their freedom to ask but acknowledges only square. Majority 24. that the But the Court has said that First The right questions requires people to to answer is suffi- Amendment sometimes to refuse questioning, protect people face far more intrusive shielded cient to from unwelcomed engage, public only by than questioning they when enter their to refuse to patients’ options freedom not to worse than the protect by means to faced those who any would have to refused to answer other questions, private, po- answer the State tentially question. irrelevant That patients show that faced a dilemma of right to to questions refuse answer refusing and that to answer was not sorts garners special protection firearms belies Beyond failing solution. sufficient preference preference State’s were patients offer evidence unable —a designed patients to ensure that who wish doctors, find other the State has offered no protect privacy will have access to suggest patients evidence to would medical care but designed instead anything by answering have sacrificed pro-firearm tect a message pre- the State no questions. doctors’ There is evidence fers. See id. at (explaining that a through the information obtained State’s failure address a wider problem inquiries these was misused. It has not through a policy” “coherent addressing the disclosed, been and care did not diminish problem as a whole is evidence that the patients those who answered. asserted interest justify cannot the burden appear perfectly from the record to face a (internal placed quotation marks presented free choice when with a doctor’s omitted)). questions they may about firearms: find (which question new doctor or answer the Finally, one amicus curiae favoring the and, any- if consequences has no adverse Act suggests improve the Act will lifesaving lead to a thing, conversa- by improving healthcare the doctor-patient tion). options, These are not bad and are relationship. argument, as far I can options far better than those available to tell, goes previously, as follows: grieving father whose son’s funeral unwilling owners were to share firearm- harassing, protests. Sny- draws vile See ownership information with their doctors der, 131 S.Ct. at 1213. If the First any because feared —without evidence protects protests, funeral might to validate this fear —that doctors and, “benign many say, would beneficial” gathering this information for nefarious inquiries and conversations about firearms purposes. Once had the informa- doctors that are burdened the Act are “also tion, would, in patients feared that doctors protection entitled to the of the First principles violation of ethical and several Sorrell, Amendment.” S.Ct. laws, pass government the information to bureaucrats. Further, there is no evidence that the

options by patients Now, however, faced who refused to because doctors are told questions answer questions about firearms were not to ask irrelevant about fire- dent, Majority suggest. Majority suggests seems As Sorrell who explained, "[pjersonal privacy even in one’s voluntarily particular physician select ‘ample protection’ own home receives physician ask for her services are entitled *59 unquestioned right the 'resident's to refuse to protection ques- to more from the doctors’ engage in conversation with unwelcome visi- tioning person than the in his own home or ” (quoting tors.' 131 S.Ct. at 2670 Watchtower ques- the doctor in her own office who faces N.Y., Bible & Tract Soc. Inc. v. Vill. tioning from an unwelcome visitor. It would Stratton, 150, 168, 536 U.S. 122 S.Ct. quite give greater rights odd to to the (2002)). ap- 153 L.Ed.2d 205 Sorrell unwelcome visitor in a doctor's office than to plied logic concluding the same that doc- herself, Majori- the doctor but that is how the are tors in their own "entitled to no offices ty would have it. protection.” greater Despite prece- Id. this to that this law will cause doctors if doubt arms, can rest assured patients less, more, firearms, relevant, patients’ about their it know is ask about doctors ownership status. As the amicus firearm in their interest know it is best so poten- this information is course, suggests, curiae there Of question. to answer patients’ well-being. tially important to prohibiting protections are no additional of that lost information will include information, Much disclosing this the doctor initially questionable information of rele- remains in full force. fear original so the late, that, only will vance after is too owners also know But firearm peo- to be critical. That is bad for prove answering of not consequences health The falls far short of ple’s health. State now, because the more serious probably showing directly that the Act and material- Thus, the cal- more relevant. question is At ly anyone. advances healthcare for answering, while changes slightly: culus most, poli- State seeks to achieve its “[t]he privacy rights, to detrimental potentially objectives through the indirect means of cy doing because not appealing more becomes restraining speech by certain certain to likely to be detrimental so is more Sorrell, at 2670. speakers.” healthcare. efforts do not survive intermediate Such accepts premise argument This scrutiny. a patient’s information about conveying po- her is ownership physician B. patient’s health. tentially beneficial accepts premise also argument The an The State next asserts interest that, potentially this information because privacy of firearm owners. promoting healthcare, important it is

vital to effective It be assumed that firearm owners doc- that the flow of information between in keeping “have an interest their [owner- be unobstructed. patient tor and But ship [the Act] confidential. status] reasons, Act im- amicus curiae that interest.” Id. at not drawn to serve it removes a proves healthcare because Indeed, entirely unnecessary it is suspicion that potential obstruction — serve that interest. disclosing firearm privacy consequences of asks, Majority disagrees, and “What The outweighs the health benefits— ownership way protect patients’ privacy better the free flow of informa- blocking that was unnecessarily into inquire pri- than not to doctor and on the tion between Maj. Of Op. vate matters?” at 1215. Legis- If was the subject of firearms. way protect privacy course the best poorly means are goal, its chosen lature’s all, but if not to share information task. In order to remove an suited to the disclosing took that information we view information, to the flow obstruction doctors, very to our doctors would not be altogether. the flow This State eliminated give The information we them effective. withstand intermediate simply does not lives, potential has the to save our so we scrutiny. give freely, should it rather and doctors accept unlikely premise if we Even should ask for it without hesitation. unwilling to Majority that firearm owners who were lists a host of ethical canons de- confidentiality of a ownership signed protect disclose firearm information to support information in passed patient’s this Act was doctors before Majority’s *60 now, point, contrary to the will to so there is no its but willing do confidentiality to sure that breaches of do not canons do not exist assumption, these justify burdening information occur. between doc- For the State limit the flow of interest, protect privacy order to serve this how patient or tor ever, They directly serve it must show that this Act from the doctor. patient by materially us confi- and addresses a real concern. purpose, giving opposite freely information concern that ownership can share firearm sta dence we tus, doctors, files, without hesitation and if recorded medical will not with our entirely speculative that the information will be remain confidential is fear without It, need these assur- and therefore insufficient. For revealed to others. We Went 626, 115 in these situations at at ances hesitation U.S. S.Ct. 2377. because us, literally, to die. Im- quite cause might The record reflects no incidents of fire- communi- in the fact that the medical plicit arm-ownership information from medical ty high such walls around has erected parties, being records disclosed to outside relationship concept is the doctor-patient variety of measures in and there are walls, no those there should be that within that such incidents will place to ensure doctor-pa- The entire edifice of secrets. princi- In to ethical never occur. addition confidentiality is built around a sim- tient confidentiality of medical records ples, the principle: it is better ple, common sense dis- is secured state and federal laws more rather than less for doctors to know by Majority, Maj. Op. cussed at 1213- the conse- because about suggested n. It was also at oral knowing of not are life-threaten- quences that, argument as a result of the Afforda- ing. digitization Act and the of medi- ble Care recognize that medical ethics Failing to records, government may cal bureaucrats confidentiality a means to en- prioritize records, to medical gain somehow access courage an unrestrained flow of informa- information providing government doctor, Majority tion from ownership. on firearm To the extent that policies advising suggests that medical already information is not available such ownership inquire doctors to sources, from the Affordable Care other “may a matter course be in conflict” information explicitly prohibits Maj. n. principles. Op. with ethical being gathered through medical rec- however, just po- such explained, 11. As provided the authorities ords: “None of perfect harmony lices are in with confiden- Care Secretary under [Affordable need to know as tiality principles. Doctors ... construed to authorize or shall be Act] can, they questions much as so ask infor- may be used for the collection limit- freely, questions even be of (A) ownership the lawful relating mation (or no) ed immediate relevance. Both the ammunition; of a firearm or possession or policy principle encourage greater and the (B) of a firearm or ammuni- the lawful use sharing doctor-pa- information within (C) tion; storage of a firearm the lawful relationship, premised assump- tient on an § 300gg- or ammunition.” U.S.C. confidentiality. Contrary to the tion of 17(c)(2). may refrain from Patients also conclusion, not the Majority’s is this status, ownership their firearm disclosing that is practice over-inquiring, which, above, proven has not as discussed out of line with millennia of medical tradi- except anyone’s care to be detrimental tion. pa- ways uncooperative all that befall tients, to answer just those who refuse undoubtedly has an interest in The State about firearms. principles questions to en reinforcing these ethical *61 1262 cept integral person too confidentiality of medical that

Given to allow its right too essential to freedom already, closely guarded is records just manipulation support those ideas privacy prevent further ensure need to Sorrell, prefers.” 131 government placed on justify the burden misuse cannot S.Ct. at 2672. by Act: “The choice doctors’ infor- dangers suppressing between C. if it mation, dangers of its misuse that the Act The State next asserts one that the First freely available is is rights. Amendment There is tects Second Sorrell, for us.” Amendment makes right keep that the and bear no doubt (internal quotation marks at 2671 S.Ct. guaranteed by is the Second Amend- arms omitted). an ment and that the State has interest that, even if suggests also State unclear, It how- protecting right. is kept confidential from the information is ever, pose threat doctors to Second what world, patients may still incur ad- outside rights. Doctors do not have consequences privacy and a loss of verse weapons nor is ability patients’ to seize professionals are able to if other medical any have ever there evidence ownership status from determine firearm agents are also not tried to do so. Doctors the harm ad- Again, medical records. to the extent that government, so entirely speculative. here dressed message one-sided doctors send a personnel and medical Those doctors more harm than ownership causes confidentiality convey gov- restric- by good, message bound the same does might raise Sec- just disapproval there is no ev- ernment tions discussed. And any Like other ond Amendment concerns. fear that idence to validate the State’s citizens, group private doctors are free ownership is re- patients whose firearm on firearm owner- express views in their medical files will receive corded ordinary expectation is that a ship, and subsequent doctors as a worse care from from unwanted person’s rights to be free result of this information. Fear of this amply protected by the “un- speech are cannot sat- type purely speculative engage to refuse to questioned isfy the burden under intermedi- State’s at 2670. conversation.” Id. It, scrutiny.25 For ate See Went at As the U.S. at it is true that within the confines While office, can persuade a con- of a doctor’s doctors explained, “[p]rivacy Court has purpose. only speculating statute has another As the Court 25. Given that the State is Sorrell, "[pjerhaps patients’ explained in the State that irrelevant notations in confidentiality have addressed ... files will cause them to receive worse care could doctors, equally through policy.... A statute subsequent if a more coherent it seems type present quite a different plausible subsequent of that would not more to think that presented the one here. But the provide would worse care based on a case than doctors purpose with that history patient's recalci- State did not enact a statute documented Instead, time, trance, tardiness, pay design.” 131 S.Ct. at 2668. failure to bills on or viewpoint-based frequent follow-up State enacted a restriction on calls. Yet doctors re- speech just invalidated in Sorrell like the one main free to make these—and other— privacy See medically patients’ rec- with at most incidental benefits. irrelevant notations in ("To ords, privacy though consequences obtain the limited even would id. [provided patients] are forced just for] [the the concerns the seem to be as severe as goal burdening purportedly acquiesce in the State’s addresses. a statute is When under-inclusive, speakers.”). speech by that the disfavored disfavored so it belies the fact *62 regulated out of exis- opinion for other cannot be would not do things to do we us citizens, tence. true that as soon it is also private leave, drasti- power that diminishes as we right For the to bear arms to be under I re- recommends that cally. If a doctor serious threat from doctors—a threat suf- home, I my per- am a firearm from move justify response ficient to a State that get him I home. ignore to when fectly free rights speak intrudes on doctors’ —doc- however, advice, I cannot If I take his than doing simply per- tors must be more gun own a was complain my right that voluntarily suading firearm owners to re- than a upon any more infringed They doing linquish their arms. must be smoking after his doctor told quits

who favoring amicus curiae more than what one that his doctor complain him to do so can doing, are which is the Act claims doctors right to smoke. The Second violated his thereby] in- “question[ing] [patients right not include a to be Amendment does terfering] patients’ with exercise of the persuasion. The State’s private free from right by putting patients [to arms] bear argument is essential- Second position they question a where hesitant can ly “that the force [doctors’] ownership their of firearms because to stifle justify government’s attempts disapproval.” Indeed much of physician defends the law it. Indeed the State good question patients what doctors do is hafye] strong a in- insisting that [doctors] thereby expressing about certain behavior reasoning incompatible fluence .... This (psychologists disapproval of the behavior Amendment.” Id. at 2671. with the First why say things people certain ask us we with; having difficulties cardiolo- we are clearly expressed has not a The State routinely unhealthy if eat gists ask us we preventing doctors general interest foods; enough if get internists ask us we patients’ rights” by “infringing from on enough drink too much soda and not sleep, rights certain giving advice not to exercise water, engage in unsafe and whether we ways. in certain The State has not ex- causing (hopefully) practices), sexual though even pressed general interest we should continue question us to whether routinely range about a doctors ask in that harmful behavior. No engage things than firearms which are not other anyone’s right that it is disputes one immediately relevant to our care and any aforementioned activi- engage may implicate rights. our This is which ties, absolutely there is no evidence certainly ap- almost because the State intruding on firearm own- that doctors are asking about these other proves doctors in- any than doctors are rights ers’ more however, topics. guns, As for the State the above-mentioned truding on questioning pa- disagrees with doctors right a to do some- rights. That we have firearms is relevant to medical tients about right to be thing does not mean we have care, dis- disapproves persistent and it about that or questioning free from might passionate- topic cussion on the people people suggestions of other — message. an anti-firearm So the ly convey advice on voluntarily went to see for we message and that mes- State silenced may tell us healthy how to live lives—who alone, protecting sage guise under a par- in a exercising particular right rights. It is clear that State’s inter- “[t]he way ticular is a bad idea. burdening of [doctors] est compelling more potentially than a difference of As for other nothing turns on more use, could persuasion means of doctor at 2672. Such differences of opinion.” Id. make bad decisions people fear that would providing refusing treatment such if relinquishing firearms] their give up [such unless treatment worse justify truthful information cannot given absolutely no evidence arms, there at speech.” on Id. content-based burdens being used. Such such means (internal omit- quotation marks 2670-71 justify are insufficient fears speculative ted). message fact that a doctor’s subject to intermediate that is safety may be incompatible It, For 515 U.S. scrutiny. Went *63 own- protect desire to firearm the State’s at 2377. 115 S.Ct. questioning or ers from uncomfortable as noted respond, could Perhaps one safety does not im- counseling on firearm asking from above, doctors preventing that Amendment concerns and plicate Second in situa- most questions firearm-related a simply desire to silence belies State’s people put that fewer are ensure tions will disagrees. with which it message away turned for being in position a questions. But the failing to answer such D. a arms does not include right to bear a about whether question not to be asked finally that the Act is The State asserts privacy “Personal even one bears arms. prevent harassment and dis- designed to ‘ample protec- home receives in one’s own against crimination firearm owners. unquestioned ‘resident’s tion’ from the very little evidence—no provides State engage in conversation right to refuse to support anecdotes —to its more than a few Bi- visitors.’ Watchtower with unwelcome being discrimi- contention that N.Y., Village Inc. v. Tract Soc. ble & against nated and harassed on the basis of 2080, Stratton, 150, 168, 122 S.Ct. 536 U.S. It doubtful whether ownership. (2002). of- physician’s 205 A 153 L.Ed.2d such evidence is sufficient to establish is entitled to no private fice is no more in a “di- the Act will advance an interest Sorrell, at 131 S.Ct. greater protection.” It, way.” rect and material Went For omitted). (second citation This state- (internal at 115 S.Ct. at 2377 U.S. regard to doctors rendered with ment was omitted). “governmen- A quotation marks a If do not have in their own offices. on body seeking tal to sustain a restriction right to be free from unwelcomed visitors speech ... must demonstrate that offices, patients who volun- their own harms it recites are real and that its re- certainly doctors do tarily chose to visit to a striction will in fact alleviate them ques- greater protections not have degree.” material Id. at by doctors themselves. That is tioning omitted). (internal marks quotation when, already ex- true particularly particular, Regarding harassment any question about plained, the answer to provision puts on chill that the harassment lead to conse- firearms will not adverse speech significant, protected doctors’ quences. minimal provision and the benefit regard to the State’s asserted Sec- With “harassment” given how innocuous the justification, like its medi- ond Amendment As allegedly place takes seems to be. justification, I, cal seeks to simple “[t]he State in Part doctor’s rec- discussed objectives through achieve remove firearms from policy its ommendation to present certain children were was restraining indirect means of home where passage prompted the incidents that speakers.... But the one of speech certain inquiry, recording, provi- and harassment presumably Act and that would this sions, if doc- speech directly targeted by Even is less “harassment.”26 constitute for ultimately disciplined might provision not of the Act. A doctor could tors behavior, certainly cause this Act will inquire such into and record information about engage in it. them not to many of facing fear of a discrim- firearms with little charge simply doing those ination harassment evidence of Were mean, however, that things. That does not greater, and had owners against firearm remained, provision if the discrimination history explicitly stated legislative prohibited would be or chilled. no prohibit doc- the Act was needed relinquish advising patients tors from so, who obviously less doctor While agenda— political of a pursuit firearms of firearm presses on issue is, apparent were it not engages tough questioning ownership, unpopular to eliminate goal State’s was subject, repeated- and recommends con- rather than harassment —the *64 firearms from his ly patient that a remove provision of the harassment stitutionality discriminating could be seen as home But that is not the different. may well be typically against patient. that We would nearly Confronted with case before us. think of such behavior more as harassment harassment anecdotal evidence of identical discrimination, the Act itself than as but Sorrell, “[A] Court stated: Supreme patient not either.27 A who is does define they coerced reported that felt few have harsh, subjected relatively tough-love con- It is doubtful that and harassed.... easily from a doctor could be- treatment may have physicians who cern for ‘a few’ being against be- lieve he is discriminated and harassed’ ... can sustain ‘felt coerced patients cause he owns a firearm —other Act. rule like” the a broad content-based being firearms are not who do not own here, The same is true 131 S.Ct. at 2669. doctors, by lectured their but persistently cannot with- provision the harassment being who do own firearms are patients scrutiny intermediate as a result. stand they own fire- precisely scolded because Indeed, en- “[m]any are those who must me, That, it seems to could arms. like, they not but is a speech dure do that by the Act. prohibited discrimination necessary cost of freedom.” Id. Further, provi- if the other three even provision presents The discrimination down, with, doctors’ unlike the sions of the Act are struck question. begin To closer confronting similar Majority 27. In a case a somewhat Again, defines "to harass” as issue, Judge Alito used the term persistently.” I am then Circuit disturb or irritate “[t]o "discriminatory fed- by harassment” to describe are "harassed” certain that most smokers prohibitions. Coll. Area smoking eral Saxe v. State under this defini- their doctors about Dist., Cir.2001). (3d persistence 240 F.3d apply the same Sch. tion. If doctors provision is invalidat- including Even if the harassment safety recommendations — then, ed, which chil- it seems that same removing firearms from homes with might constitute "dis- they smoking recom- constitutes harassment dren—as do to cessation mendations, are, criminatory and thus be they according Major- harassment” by provision. Fur- the discrimination ity, harassing patients their and therefore scribed I, ther, legislative supra in Part subject discipline. think that as noted One would by said to contain encouraging history cited the State was ought persist in doctors discrimination” faced genuinely examples be- of "actual patients to do what the doctors examples almost ex- Those patients' health and firearm owners. lieve is best for their clusively speech. involved well-being. status, people fused to disclose firearm not chilled as result will be inquiries There who were known firearm owners. Inquiries consti- provision. discrimination involving billing for ser- was an incident discriminatory mo- strong tute evidence rendered, but that in- allegedly not vices see, Cnty., tive, Barbano v. Madison e.g., away for volved a who was turned (2d Cir.1990), 139, 141-46 F.2d questions. And other refusing to answer they if rightly fear that ask doctors will service, for which patients were declined patients subsequently about firearms conduct, discriminatory not constitutes treat- any aspect of their complain speech, they but were declined for service ment, inquiries initial will be the doctors’ because, again, they refused to answer sup- against as ammunition them used they questions, not because were known standing Even port discrimination claims. Thus, there is evidence firearm owners. alone, provision the discrimination thus people being are discriminated significantly chills firearms prohibits and against refusing to answer their doc- doctors, speech by though proba- related questions, tors’ but there is no evidence bly effect on than the has lesser being discriminated provisions. Act’s other against because own firearms.28 Accordingly, reject I asser- the State’s simply support The State cannot its as- prevent- is a means of provision the discrimination sertion tion ing type against of discrimination fire- scrutiny evades First Amendment as a examples arm owners because those do not conduct, discriminatory regulation of *65 against firearm constitute discrimination sure, speech. Supreme To be Court did, owners. And even if the Act explained that anti-discrimination has expressly away pa- allows doctors to turn discriminatory designed visions to address questions, tients who refuse to answer see matter, not, general vio- conduct “do as 790.338(4), § Fla. Stat. so it cannot be late the First or Fourteenth Amend- justified an that form effort to eliminate Hurley Gay, ments.” v. Irish-Am. Lesbi- discrimination, Further, either. Bos., 557, Grp. an & Bisexual 515 U.S. unnecessary protect patients 571-72, 2338, 2346, 115 S.Ct. 132 L.Ed.2d rendered, being billed for services not (1995) added). (emphasis But this is surely other remedies exist to resolve that anti-discrimination not a or a typical law As for the list of other problem. State’s case, typical because unlike the statute examples discriminatory conduct that in Hurley, before the Court the Act here is might occur on the basis of firearm owner- way, “unusual in obvious it ] since does an[ (denial times, referrals, ship longer wait ..., face, ... target speech on its on the appointments, and cancelled name 572, basis of its content.” Id. at 115 S.Ct. few), presented no evidence the State has at 2347. any of discrimination these forms against have ever oc- owners The almost no evidence of State offered curred. Indeed, the conduct-based discrimination.

only actual examples speech of adverse conduct it clear that will be while by provision, cited of this it is people befell who re- burdened as result State way who re- There is no evidence in the record one doctors continued to treat point, suspect questions, or the doctors would other on this but I fused to answer significant malprac- patients away refusing seemingly exposed to doctors would turn Indeed, questions any liability topic. to answer on if tice as a result. Sorrell, discriminatory agrees. conduct This it cannot do. See unclear (“[Intermediate scrutiny ex- 131 S.Ct. at 2668 As Went For It will be eliminated. ensure that the State’s standards] survive intermedi- a statute cannot plains, proportional interests are to the resulting that it will scrutiny assumption on the ate burdens on but also placed that the entirely speculative problem. See solve an suppress law does not seek to a disfavored 626, at 2377. This 515 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. message.”). that, Hurley, unlike in where a proves also found not to provision

discrimination was Amendment, the First here the implicate IV. point prohibition [is not] “focal of [the] I also believe the Act to be void for discriminating against the act of individu- outset, vagueness. At the because this provision publicly in the available als “law interferes with the of free ... at 115 S.Ct. services.” 515 U.S. ..., stringent a more vagueness added). legislative (emphasis at 2347 The test should apply.” Vill. Es- of Hoffman that the Act was in- history makes clear Estates, Inc., Flipside, tates v. Hoffman primarily prohibit speech, tended 489, 499, 1186, 1193-94, 455 U.S. 102 S.Ct. recognize may prohibit I though (1982); 71 L.Ed.2d 362 see also Reno v. if that discriminatory type some conduct ACLU, 844, 871-72, 521 U.S. conduct ever occurs the future. Given (1997) (ex- 2329, 2344, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 facts, Amendment applies these the First “vagueness plaining speech- of [a See, e.g., even to anti-discrimination laws. special raises First related] (“ Saxe, pure at 240 F.3d 206-07 ‘Where Amendment concerns because of its obvi- involved,’ antidiscrimination expression chilling speech”). ous effect on free territory of the First law ‘steers into Majority stringent does not find this more v. DeAngelis Amendment.’ El Paso Mun. applicable test because it does not believe (5th Ass’n, Police 51 F.3d Officers implicated that the First Amendment is Cir.1995). because, especially This is true foregoing, all Act. on the Based it is noted, as the Fifth Circuit has when anti- *66 disagree, apply clear that I so I would ... ‘applied discrimination laws are stringent vagueness more standard. solely founded on ver- harassment claims standard, on the Under this based Ma- insults, matter, pictorial literary bal or jority’s interpretation own content-based, impose[ view- statute[s] ] vague Act is as to one of the most common point-discriminatory restrictions actually practices firearms-related doctors 51 F.3d at 596-97.” speech.’ DeAngelis, namely, practice asking of engage in— (alterations original)). in patients ownership ques- about firearm Therefore, provision the discrimination given that are as a matter of tionnaires subject scrutiny, is also to intermediate course before the doctor and ever and the has failed to show that this State Many inqui- claim such meet. doctors provision addresses a real harm or ad- always potentially ries are relevant direct, vances a State interest material part practice making them is It, way. See Went For 515 U.S. at Consequently, doctors good medicine. 115 S.Ct. at 2377. The Act is instead they need to know if can continue ask silencing directed at doctors who advance a mat- patients ownership about firearm as by using question- an anti-firearm —not an anti-firearm own- intake ter of course which the dis- naires. -viewpoint with State er— I know whether state requirement, nor do is written inquiry provision

Because to me agree. would It is also unclear of com courts vague persons “in terms so of all question could ask the necessarily guess at how doctors must intelligence mon they may, Majority states patients, as application, as to its meaning and differ its on the inquiries must also base if doctors pro essential of due the first violates [it] Majority patient, of each specifics Specialty v. Mexican of law.” Hams cess (11th they gives must. The Act itself suggests Foods, Inc., F.3d Cir. omitted). as to whether or not that no indication 2009) (internal marks quotation to shield doctors specificity required ask think that when doctors might One intelli- discipline. People of common as a ownership about firearm questions guessing. are left gence course, they do not “know” the matter irrelevant, nor the rec to be questions vague- highlighting Further the Act’s record) (the questionnaire itself is ord ness, clear on wheth- the State is not even belief “good of a faith” kept the absence advisory or inquiry provision er the might relevant. Some that the record is mandatory. Initially, responsi- the Board that doctors are free to conclude from this enforcing the Act informed doctors ble for asking all firearm continue about Then, mandatory. the Board that it was they did before the Act’s ownership changed course and stated that was hand, legisla On the other passage. advisory. Similarly, as discussed Part history suggests question that such tive I, inqui- characterization of the the State’s information, is ing, patient-specific absent internally contradictory, ry provision is de- exactly type the Act was advisory and at scribing it at times as prohibit. The Act itself is not designed proscription. Again, people times as point. this clear on intelligence guessing common are left what prohibits. tell, Majority far as I can be- As who continue to ask lieves that doctors plaintiffs have re- surprisingly, Not matter of ownership firearm as a about variety ways, to this Act in a sponded be in violation of the Act. The course will confirming people further of common Majority says physician may that “a make intelligence do not know what the Act so inquiries patients, firearms or all Maj. n. Op. hibits. See 5. Some doctors good long as he or she does so with making inquiries continued have inquiry ... that the is relevant faith belief ownership as a matter of course patient’s safety, medical care or because believe the Act allows them Maj. at 1228. safety Op. of others.” ques- stopped to do so. Others have *67 Majority following the cave- But the adds believe, tioning though they consis- —even good at: the faith belief must be “based on inquiries policy, tent with AMA the Maj. specifics patient’s the case.” they be- good patients for —because requirement at 1228. That is not Op. requires the Act them to do so. lieve itself, many doctors do not the Act at least common intelli- possess Plaintiffs specificity necessary is to believe that such too, gence, they, guessing. are left inquiry make the and record relevant. However, Majority opinion and its rationale would not be The purposes the Act’s Majority the confusion. The requirement. add to achieved without such medically “irrelevant” Therefore, supposedly I do not know whether the likens ownership to questioning about firearm Majority wrong is to add smoking patients medically hab- tance from on a patient’s impor- about a questioning its, clearly medically subject, relevant. Of tant persist is doctors should for the which course, good patient. the Majority example, could have likened the For if a questioning questions patient about doctor knows a smokes and “irrelevant” advises so, game, dangers doing baseball but that would him of the night’s patient last Majority’s chosen become actually prove irritated. While the doctor inapplicable perhaps rationale is here. Based should take a different approach argument regulates counseling, certainly its that the Act con- to his he should not only incidentally speech, simply burdens cease the counseling duct because the Indeed, Majority had no choice but to liken is irritated. the doctor will likely questioning ownership persistent about firearm have to be more and irri- medically-relevant inquiries tating because other this smoker than with the Majority’s argument hinges responds entire on smoker who favorably to the doc- questioning counseling, about firearm owner- tor’s initial equating signaling that the question- message to medical conduct. If the doctor’s has ship been received. ing arguably medically is not at least rele- might think that One the same is true of

vant, possibly how can it be considered firearm owners. If a doctor’s initial coun- conduct, subject seling patient, is well-received scrutiny? questioning without And if the doctor knows that message has been (at cases) many much is least so like received, subject so he need not broach the always subject medical conduct that it is again. But if a counseling doctor’s initial how will regulation, doctors know when resistance, suggests is met with intuition medically that medical conduct is not rele- patient may that this be—like the smoker vant? counseling subject resistant to on the —the

Compounding problem, the State one most in need of further counseling. Here, suggests uncertainty. that doctors can and should con- If creates patients safety. persists, harassing tinue to counsel on firearm doctor he is no doubt Majority is, however, explains patient. question are free to The briefly. if good necessary? do so—albeit So it is that harassment instructions, give safety firearm patients course, Of does not know with doctor possibly questions how can it bad ask any great precision because he cannot ask specifically order to tailor ownership, compounding That, me, those instructions? it seems to problem per- further. Medical intuition suggests asking about firearm owner- haps persistence tells the doctor that always ship Assuming is indeed relevant. necessary, left but the doctor is with no however, mandatory, the Act is I must guidance on whether this intuition is suffi- myself guessing confess that I am left (i.e., persistence cient to render harass- inquiry provision prohibits. what the ment) necessary purposes of the Act. provision, Legislative history suggest The harassment which bans would that this harassment, only unnecessary exactly point also leaves at which doctors are *68 people intelligence guessing supposed stop, simply of common to it is not clear but may go may pun- about how far in counsel- the Act be doctors what doctors safety. Intuitively, doing. Majority’s sugges- ing patients ished for The brief, initially may engage gen- doctors are met with resis- tion that doctors when safety If too good counseling. counseling no because that is does eralized discussions generic pediatri- brief or too know, patient’s from the may the doctor —because sought comply inquiry cian with the no reaction, the initial discussion did that Act—but it provisions harassment Majority’s further The good whatsoever. that proven persistent, specif- can be more cases, that, in some the need to suggestion ically counseling pre- tailored would have clear, also offers doctors no persist will be vented a child who found her father’s load- proceed in the vast guidance on how to ed, accidentally unlocked firearm from cases, per- where the need to majority of herself, shooting jury may I well suspect again, people Yet sist will not be obvious. regardless the doctor And find liable. guessing. are left intelligence of common attaches, malpractice liability I whether feel for that doctor who will have the death uncertainty compounded by Again, the is of a child on her conscience for the rest of claims firearm safe- the fact that the State life. her often, always, good if ty counseling is not counseling good If that is for patients. jobs enough Doctors’ are hard when the State does not enact laws that force them then it makes no sense to limit

patients, asking questions to think twice about counseling to the distribution of a that may providing information that save lives. pamphlet generic and a discussion is vague is,Act thinking Given how this twice Instead, likely impact. to have little to no nearly enough will not be for doctors to counseling good, if the common sense figure protect out what to do to they ought persist tells doctors hand, patients, comply on the one and to point even counseling, past with the on the other. anyone’s guess It is whether irritation. may doing continue so after to- doctors V. they day’s holding, or whether will instead great The Act silences a deal of practice medicine. lose their licenses group speakers topic. one on one subject Precedent therefore directs us to con- people put The who forward these scrutiny. the Act to at least intermediate tradictory internally at times inconsis- Majority’s attempts distinguish The interpretations possess tent of the Act justifi- persuasive, case law are not and its common, if If exceptional intelligence. not expanding cations for a heretofore exceed- they guessing are left about what ingly class of narrow prohibits, proves that all but that the Act burdened without the First implicating Sadly, I vague. suspect that some of equally unavailing. Amendment are continued to practices doctors have holding today unprecedented, reached engage despite probably the Act will essentially says profes- that all licensed subject these well-intentioned doctors to rights sionals have no First Amendment them, I discipline, simply but like do speaking when to their clients or know. patients private. says This in turn have no First Amendment Exacerbating pros- the situation is profes- receive information from licensed pect malpractice liability. If firearm frightening prospect. sionals—a safety counseling brief of ex- —whether capable reducing pros- tended —is Majority applied appropri- Had the injuries, pect of accidental firearm related scrutiny, ate level of we would have to is, as the AMA believes it then to avoid affirm the district court’s decision. This liability, designed prevent firearm law is not irrelevant provide doctors should *69 doctor-patient harming the speech America, irrelevant it allows UNITED STATES

relationship, because relationship to continue speech Plaintiff-Appellee, within stopping Far from it did before. much as v. office, speech a doctor’s irrelevant virtually all irrelevant allows Act instead WATKINS, Charles Marvin virtually stopping while speech to continue Defendant-Appellant. alike— and irrelevant all —relevant is topic: firearms. This law single about a No. 12-12549. improve healthcare be- designed not cause, community the medical Appeals, as far as States Court of United concerned, make healthcare this law will Eleventh Circuit. protect designed This law is not

worse. July information privacy of the privacy because already secured. This law at issue is protect Second Amend- designed doctors have no au- rights

ment because private not used their

thority have —and compel firearm positions power —to weapons. This relinquish owners stop perceived designed

law is instead to con- agenda, and is difficult

political for that designed purpose

ceive of law First Amendment

that could withstand

scrutiny. particularly if—doc- perhaps

Even if— political cam- actually waging

tors were merely being perceived

paign rather than so, would doing the First them from laws like the Act. “What

protect troubling is that there is no evi-

is more actually pursuing

dence that doctors agenda patients. Doctors

political patients from exercis- prohibiting

are not arms; are, per- to bear

ing not to do so—or

haps, convincing patients safely. precisely This is

to do so more the First Amendment

type

designed protect. Because asking from even the first

hibits doctors conversation, the Act is

question Accordingly, the district

unconstitutional. affirmed, and I

court’s decision should be dissent. respectfully

therefore

Case Details

Case Name: Dr. Bernd Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Jul 25, 2014
Citation: 760 F.3d 1195
Docket Number: 12-14009
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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