*1 DOZIER, Appellant, Pamela H.
TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COM KLH Medi
MISSION and
cal, Inc., Appellee.
No. 14-98-01096-CV. Texas, Appeals (14th Dist.).
Houston
March *2 Houston, Larsen, appellants.
Jеff Butler, Houston, Fred Lee D. William Austin, Kimbrough, appellees. marketing goals. A. The contract plans Panel consists of Justices ROSS SEARS, LEE, help further answer ERIC NORMAN Thus, phone and receive customer orders. ANDELL.* if personal attributable to her sales were *3 MAJORITY OPINION independent of activities that were KLH’s primary marketing program, she received LEE, (Assigned). NORMAN Justice company pro- The to commissions. was The Texas Workforce Commission1 re- to adequate per- “an environment” vide eligibility considered Pamela H. Dozier’s KLH also responsibilities. form her benefits, for found provide “marketing necessary tools to (“KLH”) Medical, KLH Inc. had not em- [her make the transition of All-Health de- during her Af- ployed necessary period. supply company’s] funct medical accounts exhausting procedures, ter administrative disputed to KLH The contract accounts.” pursued a Dozier “de novo evi- provides payment for work re- no County to Harris appeal dence” Civil marketing quired primary on KLH’s activ- The judge Court at Law Number Three. ities. found there was “substantial evidence” parties review the contract The were to agency hearing the time of the period from November 1993 to after the TWC’s conclusion that Dozier was January named 1994. The document employee. KLH’s affirm. We review, possibilities this three for relationship. terminating The Summary I. Factual parties could: disputed A. The contract 1) contract; existing Continue writings signed Dоzier and KLH The 2) Hire Pam Dozier as a full time em- If there no ambiguous. are not was testi- or, ployee; disputed clearly mony, contract would 3) salesperson independent Enter an employment contract. be an Unlike contract. contract, disputed a second contract for an “independent option to an The “enter” undisputed period states Dozier would be “continue person sales contract” instead of “independent person.” an sales Under suggests “this exist- existing this contract” contract, paid KLH disputed “independent contract” was not against commissions. Dozier draw sales The person contract.” written con- sales (1) “making for received her commission however, tract, was not (2) transition,” increasing sales to before TWC. already All-Health accounts county B. Evidence before the court customers, KLH for new accounts supporting the decision TWC’s brought independently of normal KLH she court, However, marketing. in to the Upon appeal addition there paid, objection the tran- she was the contract to admission of duties which was provide evidentiary level required “concepts, script Dozier to hear- also TWC’s ideas, hearing the TWC on strategy, help ings. and to do the before money to KLH charged KLH’s delete necessary” accomplish work * Lee, Sears, upon this case. when it ruled Ross A. Norman Commission Senior Justices sitting Justice Eric Andell simplicity, and Former we as the TWC will refer it For assignment. throughout. Commission, Workforce The Texas "TWC,” Employment known as the Texas stages, job all in said her occurred two but was Dozier testified first. She title Marketing Consultant. WMle transcript. appar- same When it became indicated her as a full- hiring appeal ent KLH’s that Dozier’s benefits employee “option” time was an when the issue, should also be at continued TWC up review, contract came said she hearing provide Dozier five, eight days worked five a week at notice. KLH during the whole contract. Dozier hearing 1. The first found explained that did not tell her to transcript2 TWC five, eight Monday through work Fri- day, necessary but that was to accom- officer hearing nоted plish her duties under the contract. *4 could not from the first employee typical subtracted none Nevertheless, hearing date Dozier. to this pay. deductions her Dozier from testified judicial evidence was relevant to a evalua- provided KLH oral written and review of tion of what evidence existed at the time of (which her performance contended she hearing. the second supported employee) claim to her be an At hearing, company presi the first near the time contract was to be re- (“Mr. dent King”) Herbert Dozier testified viewed. She admitted she could have done employee was an the term during at some her work home. the first explained contract. Hе that Dozi testimony Henry King’s b. using er was the transition of customers to KLH, vice-president Henry King, liquidate inventory KLH to KLH had King’s Henry King was Herbert son. rep- purchased partner All-Health, her from resented KLH at the hearing. second He her defunct supply company. medical He testified Dozier chosen title as KLH gave any testified never in Dozier Marketing said Consultant. He she re- structions because she was supposed to be quested paid Al- bi-monthly. her draw be expert. He testified the second con her, though KLH provided facilities for he tract was a renewal the first. He fur said, anywhere Dozier free to work ther testified if he sent the she wanted to. He said if Dozier had
wage reports, it was a mistake3. home, at wanted to work KLH would have Further, taken her for calls her. he as- hearing
2. The second require serted, company Dozier Proceedings May resumed on system. to enter computer invoices after official advance notice to Dozier that fact, claimed, In gave KLH he never her a to going eligi- TWC was reconsider her security code clearance to enter invoices. bility employment At benefits. issue It undisputed Dozier entered some in- payments were whether from voices. KLH wages should be included as in Dozi- Henry testified King Dozier made the period, er’s base and whether the TWC potential decision market charge KLH a would result. by by personal clients mail or visits. He testimony
a. designed fliers, Dozier’s KLH’s own and Dozier’s session, During May 2. Pam Dozier testified before the court the hear- law, testimony employee at officer that he had nothing noted KLH’s added quarters lists for the submitted two relevant a lack indicate of substantial evidence mistakenly wage reports KLH submitted hearing. existence at the time of the TWC Dozier. Her name was not on lists. reason Dozier promoting fliers never crossed his She testified the answered that, although phones it explained desk. He was that was hard others telephones, Kings suggested she answer know when one Dozier’s accounts gotten King-Ritter have into the caller. testified she did Dozier would not trouble Dozier, if independent supervise had not. The but answered Dozi- she phonеs questions. people sales answered when er’s in the office. gave employees very its detailed contrast, performance gave it review. King Henry testified Dozier did not re- general King-Rit- Dozier a more review. contrast, employee ceive benefits. ter to inform Dozier testified was where her, Harper, had Sandy who worked with providing sales by Dozier’s num- stood employment, health insur- bers, offering helpful opinions ance, and He other benefits. said suggestions. company gave Dozier direction estab- lishing goals. sales had to Harper King-Ritter testified KLH entered the five, eight work from and received di- provide Dozier the second contract daily. period rections The first contract repay draws in her means unearned was, said, to “see if this period he a trial *5 spare to work for going time. Dozier project going to work.” competitor, a KLH terminated Medco. un- Dozier’s second contract when Medco testimony King-Ritter’s
c. Patricia prices with merchandise dercut KLH’s sister, Henry King’s King-Rit- Patricia purchased through from KLH Medco ter, closely with Dozier. worked more Dozier. ini- testified that when Dozier King-Ritter her, Do- tially approached King-Ritter told III. of Standard Review zier that KLH could not hire her. In the Appeals’ of A. Court of review coun- beginning, King-Ritter, proposed said Pam ty court Granger, like of KLH’s work Bob one must look at the evidence salespeople. We independent court, county presented to the KLH, worked for ex- While Dozier alone, to agency record determine plained King-Ritter, designed Nuern the court abused its discretion. fliers, actually directing own veterinary Comm’n, Employment Texas 858 berg v. on the com- King-Ritter putting flier (Tex.1993). 364, Interpreting 365 S.W.2d independent ac- puter. Besides her sales statutes substantial evidence review supervision Dozier worked without tivities analyze of or are issues law. Failure sourcing on materials a bid project correctly the law is abuse hospital Japan. King- KLH to a Packer, v. 827 discretion. See Walker Dozier did not train em- Ritter testified (Tex.1992). 833, 839-40 S.W.2d set ployees as Dozier had claimed. Dozier appellate re- B. court’s super prices “unless it was advertised proceeding view low,” keep price structure partly to price similar to All-Health’s structure sufficiency review Judicial them KLH customers. convert support ruling is the evidence to a TWC Id. de novo substantial evidence review. King-Ritter testified Dozier’s duties contract, reviewing if Even court would reach those written on the while unreasonable, conclusion, only ar different employees at do most of may capricious agency decisions bitrary like Dozier’s. contracts that looked receive 309 Ross, presumption be set v. aside.4 Mercer 701 S.W.2d dence review starts with (Tex.1986). 830, 831 existed evidence Further, reviewing decision. instead of Substantial evidence review re agеncy actually the evidence the consid- legal sufficiency sembles “Sub review. ered, prove de appellant novo must stantial evidence” more a scintilla. supporting “substantial” evidence Am., Olivarez Corp. v. Aluminum 693 (Tex.1985). hearing. exist its 931, fact, when held S.W.2d 932 even 212.202(a); Mercer, if § greatly preponderates See Tex.Lab.Code decision, against can agency’s there 701 S.W.2d Metropoli substantial evidence. Lewis v. Analysis IY. Ass’n, tan Loan Savings and 550 S.W.2d 11, (Tex.1977); 13 Browning-Ferris, Inc. parties agree regarding None of the Health, v. Department Texas application correct of section 201.042 of the (Tex.App. S.W.2d —Austin appellate Texas Labor Code. The attack is n.r.e.). writ refd The reviewing tribunal parties’ evidentiary, framed as but the dis- may not decide factual issues. Texas See pute appeal primarily on concerns what State Bd. Dental Examiners v. Size applies statute and what evidence is rele- more, 114, 116(Tex.1988). Re vant. view for substantial purely evidence is matter of Bank law. Am. North on appeal, Dozier’s ultimate contention Board, State Banking trial, as at is that there was (Tex.1973). disputed peri- her services in qualify od employment contrast failed legal sufficiency *6 however, analysis, de novo substantial evi- 201.042 section of the Texas Labor Code point evidentiary 4. Whether Deciding conflicting Dozier’s is or an a case on evidence is statutory issue of construction matters little intrinsically an abuse оf discretion. Grif because the de novo substantial re Indus., evidence Appeals, Inc. v. Thirteenth fin of view simply evidentiary is test 349, (Tex.1996). 934 S.W.2d 355 Factual de general "arbitrary, capricious, or unreason clearly against great so terminations able” abuse of discretion Gerst v. standard. weight preponderance and of the evidence Nixon, 350, (Tex.1966). 411 S.W.2d 354 This "clearly unjust," -wrong are that and how test determining avoids what evidence was ever, contributing assessing be a can in factor actually agency before the because courts are non-evidentiary E.g. abuses discretion. of more legal concerned with whether the effect Regula Dep’t v. Texas & Trimble Protective of hearing of the is correct than of the wisdom Serv., 211, tory (Tex.App.— 214 981 S.W.2d employed. informal methods Texas Rail 1998, pet.). [14th Dist.] "[I]n- Houston Co., Magnolia road Comm’n v. Pet. Tex. 130 may agency’s stances arise in which ac 484, 967, (Comm’n App. 109 S.W.2d 970 evidence, supported by tion is substantial 1937) (opinion adopted). More a scintil arbitrary capricious and is nonetheless." la of evidence sup exists where the evidence Texas Health Facilities Comm’n Charter whole, porting finding, as a a rises to level Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 454 that would reasonable enable and fair-minded 1984). (Tex. Examples in listed Charter Medi people in to differ their Bur conclusions. cal, prejudic a process included denial of due roughs Crye, Co. v. Wellcome rights litigant; (Tex. Thus, agency an 1995). substantial оf a deciding instead of case; fact, solely relying upon reviewing issues facts of another or of court determines enough non-statutory basing evidence enable decision on existed to a criteria. someone of reasonable mind to Applying wrong reach Id. statute would also be conclusion the reached. Dotson v. an abuse of discretion. Examiners, Texas State Bd. Medical of (Tex.1981). presumption that un- provides negate procedural salesperson. as a Section 201.042 statutes, either part: in der at least one of relevant 201.042(2). or 201.041 § or 201.042. of Driver Sales- Service man out, Appellant points As the subtitle, “employment”
In this includes presumption with begins 201.041 a section service: testimony employers’ employment. or ... traveling city of a salesman direction and control is Dozier was free of
who, basis, on a full time ... obtains ... substantial evidence services retailer, wholesaler, from a con- orders under qualify employment section supplies review, ... or for use presuming tractor for resale Upon judicial 201.041. operation in if: in indulging the business’s and substantial in discre agency’s ferences favor (A) provides employment tion, very takes little evidence over it personally performs that the individual presumption. come service; substantially all of the (B) a the individual does have upon judi burden The difficult facility investment used cial 201.041 is even more review under service, performance except starting difficult 201.042. Instead facility transportation; that presumption with a substantial evi (C) part continuing is service overcome, must 201.042 dence Section relationship principal with Instead, it presumption. starts without a single transaction. evidentiary hurdles inclu up three sets (Vernon § 201.042 has “employment.” Tex.Lab.Code Ann. sion as 1996). mistakenly con- appeal, On weight or no to attach little discretion employment presumption tends the Short any particular piece evidence. her, argues applies to 201.041 facts stipulated of stipulated evidence 201.042 criteria that must be section adds law, the criteria as matter satisfying presumption. negated overcome impossible to ovеrturn difficult or would be Nevertheless, if not substantial there was under 201.042 for lack agency decision determina- factual *7 of substantial evidence. 201.042, necessary under tions for denial Indeed, agreed KLH before and Dozier then her contention substantial had the signed the writ- TWO agency’s the decision did parties’ memo- ten contract. The written would be correct. contract does not ex- rialization their argu- mistaken the same makes personally Dozier had pressly state that employ- definition of general ment that in the contract. to the duties perform applies. in section 201.041 Henry King, Testimony by King, Harold contrast, claims, only pro- that 201.042 provided sub- King-Ritter Patricia under “guidelines” disposition vides that the stantial evidence before requirements of section 201.041. legal Pam Dozier contract would have allowed perform to obli- correctly to hire someone explains The TWO hearings The 201.042(2) gations contract. salespersons’ categories adds weigh writing as officer was free scope “employ- of the term services wished, finding par- perhaps even procedur- he To the courts’ ment.” overcome much of disregarded ties al that substantial evidence presumption The arrangement. decision, worked out different Dozier had agency supported 3H parties’ TWC’s determination of what the judgment contentions. The of the trial provided factual, contract legal5. court is affirmed. agency’s The administrative interest was ANDELL, J., dissenting.
in applying the unemployment compensa- tion scheme to the agreement facts of the ANDELL, ERIC dissenting Justice was, determine whether Dozier or was (Assigned). not, employed for the several months in county The TWC and the court at law dispute. failed to interpret Pamela H. Dozier’s writ- ten according contract to established rules As the Supreme Texas court explained They of law. writing, failed realize the Medical, in Charter the substantial evi- providing personally perform for her dence review seeks indications agency substantially all of the services set forth decision was If unreasonable. there was salesperson, her contract as a controlled conclusive, uncontroverted evidence as a matter of law. This caused the TWC 201.042(2), met all three criteria of court at apply law to sec- decision was not an unreason- tion 201.041 of the Texas Labor in- Code application able wrong statute. The 201.042(2).1 stead of section Applying the legislature intentionally gave section that controlled before legisla- broad discretion in assessing the informa- ture changed the law deprived Pamela Do- presented it, tion and we have no discre- protection zier of the legislature plain- tion to upon intrude that factual determi- ly Therefore, and expressly provided. I nation. respectfully dissent. agree We with the TWC that tеstimony Construing I. the Contract
from KLH supported the finding TWC’s her services employment were not pur- Construction of an unambiguous con- poses of unemployment compensation. law, tract is an issue of not of fact. Our Accordingly, we appellant’s overrule the factually deferential review does not mean Determining whether Dozier persons met the statu- appellant. Standing like the on her tory require conditions did not legal preci- right compensation, Pamela sion a court to a breach of con- H. up Dozier ended liable for a total of dispute. tract The TWC’sfunction was not to $15,961.86, plus accruing interest. Ms. Dozi- split legal through tangle hairs or to cut $5,600 er needed credit for the KLH Mediсal interactions with razor of contract law. paid her over several qualify months to statutory The designed scheme was to deter- benefits. mine facts of relationship, not to resolve disputes. great questions bulk of the from the process administrative would not be hearings clearly officer addressed section *8 exacting suited to analysis. contract Without orally 201.041 instead of 201.042. KLH de- evidence, any rules attempt exacting provided nied that the written contract analysis complexity would add without en- personal performance,, and claimed what the hancing accuracy. The TWC's sole eviden- agency wages had actually credited as efficient, tiary objective was to mаke an ex- agency unearned draws. The reversed its de- peditious parties’ factual assessment of the benefits, cision she was entitled to and decid- relationship purposes unemploy- $4,173 already ed it had disbursed would be compensation Appellant’s scheme. any deductible from unemployment future case, the had to assess three to four compensation. Similarly, court at period. month judgment findings only law's applica- recites legislature provisions 1. The added the in sec- ble to 201.041. 201.042(2) tion com- pensation specifically scheme protect to sales- 312 may legal relationships abandon established clients into between the TWO of contractual
standards constructiоn. clients KLH Medical. Ms. Dozier was salespersons’ rights employ- ideas, Neither nor provide “concepts, strategy, depend upon post ers’ hoc rights should help necessary and to do the work matches lan- swearing applying when accomplish marketing goals.” these This guage unambiguous, of the statute to an language clearly contemplates Ms. Dozier employee written contract determines sta- personally implementing providing and tus as a matter of law. specifically ideas. The contract states expected help “Pam is answer The law of contract con- substantive phone and receive customer orders.” prohibits parol struction consideratiоn of “responsible provid- Medical was ex- evidence contravene intent adequate environment which pressed plain in the words of the written perform responsibili- Pam Dozier can Adams, Lewis contract. v. 979 S.W.2d added). The (emphasis writing ties” 831, (Tex.App. Dist.] 836 [14th —Houston parties’ per- shows intent for pet.) parol (explaining that substantially form or all of her contrac- evidence, evidence rule is not a rule of but obligations personally. tual law). a rule is of substantive The contract ambiguous. not contract The document Agencies may interpret II. the law rea- therefore conclusive evidence of what may sonably, re-write but not provides.” employer’s “contract The sub- jective, oрinions not oral are interpret has discretion provides.2 what the contract reasonably, require. as its functions laws however, may not, the plain It violate
The terms of Ms. Dozier’s contract
statute,
expe
matter how
contemplate personal performance.3 words
“no
clearly
provides
purposes.”
trans-
dient for administrative
contract
she was to
Sex
Ass’n,
Cemetery
relationships
personally
form
had with ton v. Mount Olivet
720
201.042(2)(A)
use
inappropriate
It would be
to find from the
3. Section
does not
the lan
employers’ testimony
provide."
contract
guage "expressly
Nor does the
during performance, as there
been modified
magic
require
statute
the contract to use
wаs no evidence it had been modified. More
perform.”
"personally
words
Bruni
a scintilla
evidence exists where the
Bruni,
1996),
(Tex.
924 S.W.2d
the statu
whole,
supporting
finding,
as a
tory requirement
for the contract
that the
to a level that would enable reasonable
rises
"[tjerms
agreement
... are
enforce
people
and fair-minded
to differ in their con-
provided by
able as
terms unless
contract
Crye,
Burroughs
clusions.
Wellcome Co. v.
Bruni,
agreement.” See
313
(Tex.1989).
653,
129,
pres
In
(Tex.App.
S.W.2d
137-38
656
S.W.2d
—Austin
ref'd, n.r.e.).
Commonwealth,
1986,
case, as in
ascertaining
In
ent
Sexton and
writ
intent,
not
our factual deference does
mean we
legislative
phrases
words and
must
rubber-stamp
should
mistakes of law.
“be
in
and
accord
read
context
construed
Courts should construe the intended mean
ing
grammar
common
the rules
and
language if that
ing of statutes from the
usage.”
§
311.011
Tex.Gov’t Code Ann.
(Vernon
Fitzgerald
1998).
plain.
See
v. Ad
language
Inc.,
Spine Fixation
Sys.,
vanced
Session,
appeals
the Austin court of
(Tex.1999).
864,
“[E]very
S.W.2d
explained:
presumed
a statute is
to have been
word of
may
implication enlarge
[W]e
purpose,
used for a
cardinal rule of
meaning word in
be-
the statute
construction
that each
statutory
requires
yond
ordinary meaning,
implica-
its
clause,
sentence,
phrase
given
word
be
any statutory
tions from
or
passage
reasonably possible.”
effect if
Reames v.
legislative
word are forbidden when the
Houston,
Police
Pension Bd. of
Officers’
gathered
may
intent
from reason-
a
(Tex.App.
S.W.2d
—Houston
interpretation
able
as it is
statute
pet.).
[14th Dist.]
Implications
written.
permissible
are
legisla-
acknowledges
The TWC
that
only when the court has first concluded
in
provisions
ture added the
now section
Legislature
intended
obviously
201.042(2)
already qualify-
to the services
agency
to have the power it claims
“employment”
201.041. Sec-
by implication.
201.042(2)’sseparate
tion
criteria
inde-
Sexton, 720
138. The case the
pendence support this.
in support
expla-
Austin court cited
of this
does
specifically
Subsection
not add
nation
agency interpretation of a
involved
meeting
services
certain litmus tests of
statutory standard. See Commonwealth of
independence
“employ-
the definition
Co.,
v.
Massachusetts
United N. & S. Dev.
(2)(A)
ment.” Subsection
excludes from
(1942).
140 Tex.
precedent relevant guide area to arrive at either substantial evidence of the parties or court If below. the TWC wages amount of at the time of the TWC considered this case under correct proceeding or a preponderance standard, won, appellant result the amount of KLH’s contractual showing would be inconsistent with the contract The trial court in construing claim. erred recovery. If Ms. Dozier owes draws presented judg- both contracts it. The Medical, back to KLH (1) thought the trial indicates court wagеs. earned Whatever was she wages, parol supported the TWC’s inter- result, does not owe. As a if the appellant contract, pretation of the first compen- succeeded on her appellant’s second contract cut off the claim, sation would she be relieved her right the first contract commis- debt to the because the draws were sions for six months termination. after debt, and owe a similar amount first, The contract terminated second Medical because the draws same right were a The not cut off conflicting findings debt. did Ms. Dozier’s to the Further, would thus cancel out meaningful re- trial commissions.6 court Trevino, (Tex.1997) Twyman, (re 5. proceed- the wife in a divorce 941 S.W.2d ma negligent recоvered for her nding justice husband’s in- in the interest of when the fliction of emotional wrong legal theory); distress under estab- case was tried on the Kerr, Supreme precedent. (Tex. lished Boyles Texas Court The v. incorporated 1993) (same). trial judgment court had on Since the were inter issues twined, negligent infliction claim divorce into a it remanded both the emotional dis decree. trial Between and the Su- property Texas tress and the issues inconsistent divi consideration, preme negligent Court’s inflic- trial. sion for tion Supreme The abolished. Texas Dozier was accrue Ms. entitled to commis- reversed, officially recognized Court but it sions on accounts for six months after the and set standards for intentional infliction оf employment contract terminated. KLH Med- emotional distress. post-termi- ical counterclaimed below The divorce decree had taken the husband’s extinguished right nation contract awarding same into cruel behavior account in commissions, leaving those her indebted for disproportionate wife a com- share of the $4,268.99 against in draws she had received munity Supreme estate. The Texas future commissions. allowing recovery dispro- found that of both a fact, portionate specifically pro- share marital estate for cru- the second contract elty allowing separate recovery pay inten- vided for KLH to out the full commission brought tional infliction of emotional distress on accounts Ms. Dozier to KLH be- recovery. Allowing constitute a double recov- fore the first contract terminated. If she ery upon the intentional claim contact infliction failed to those customers for three specified pay- would be inconsistent with unappealed, period, percentages month it disproportionate division of the es- could draws. marital outs KLH Without tate. evidence of commissions that would have ac- months, however, during The have unappealed court could left the crued the six place, division in and reversed and rendered second cannot claim the Instead, $5,600 negligent wages. paid infliction claim. to her was not decision, justice required court found the interest of court affirmed the TWC “reim- $4,268.99 plaintiff opportunity try proven to allow the bursed” owed, $7,519.87 attorney’s emotional claim correct distress under the and awarded theory. Authority Edinburg Hosp. recovering appellant See also fees for the draws. trial court its discretion preponderance of dence. The abused considered whether *12 by failing properly analyze draws the law and the evidence showed the were Therefore, I upon respect- debt existence at it to the based facts. hearing. fully the TWC KLH Medi- time of dissent. produce cal did com- its theory
missions because
repugnant to them. Because miscon- contracts, court made its
strued the crucial evidence.
contract decision without
If judg- of contract the erroneous breach stand, Ms.
ment is allowed Dozier will likely possible conflicting have to overcome TIPPITT Preston Preston a/k/a findings, estoppel, collateral or the law of Tippett, Appellant, doctrine. If case she allowed much of the contest the issue how draws commissions, wins, rights Texas, were State. STATE debt will still be frustrated. The No. 2-99-391-CR. future TWC will collect from unem- cancelled, Texas, ployment compensation will be Appeals judg- face but she will KLH’s executable Fort Worth. ment same the TWC found for the draws 15, 2001. March wages. In the interest of earned results,
justice, to avoid inconsistent remand the
we should reverse and entire
case to trial retrial court for principles
correct law.
Conclusion judicial
This need for case illustrates the remedy quasi-judicial
review executive unemploy-
error. Pamela earned protection by working under a writ- providing
ten contract for services that
clearly personal performance.
To add for commissioned sales protection 201.042(2)
employees, section added “employment.”
work to the definition of 201.042(2)(A) provisions of says
Section are an
the contract indicator whether protection. Determining
qualified for this “in obligated fact” to
whether she ap-
perform personally improperly scope inquiry. There is
ply 201.041’s failed meet condition
evidence she 210.042(2) negate indepen- necessary directly challenge recovery. the contractual does not