This is an appeal from a judgment following a verdict in favor of plaintiff upon a promissory note for two thousand two hundred dollars. Plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife. The note was executed by the wife on March 28, 1914. She defends on the ground *260 of want of consideration and that the execution of the note was secured by coercion and duress. [1] Upon the latter defense the finding of the jury, as evidenced by its verdict, based as it is on conflicting evidence, cannot be disturbed. As to the first defense, appellant’s case rests upon the question whether, as a matter of law, the facts proved show a failure of a legal consideration.
Defendant’s testimony was that there was no consideration whatever for the note and that it was given merely to appease her husband, who was suffering from a nervous mental condition as a result of his injury. A few months after the execution of the note plaintiff was committed to a state institution for the insane, where he remained for nearly two years. This condition no doubt affected his memory of the events and accounts for his conflicting and evasive testimony. In answer to defendant’s positive testimony that no consideration passed he advanced several different claims in support of a consideration, based upon the theory that it was an adjustment of the community interests of the parties. For instance, he claimed a community interest in the defendant’s separate property in El Paso until the record was produced showing a conveyance to defendant before the marriage relation existed. He claimed that he had paid some one thousand two hundred dollars for street work, assessed against his wife’s separate property in El Paso, and $240 for painting and repairing the same, and, when this was disputed, admitted that the El Paso transactions were not taken into consideration when the note was executed. He claimed that the note was given him by his wife so he could have money to speculate with. Yet no money passed in the transaction, and he testified that when the note was signed he immediately handed it to his attorney, with instructions to hold it until Ms death and then to give it to his wife. Another claim was that he gave his wife one thousand one hundred dollars from their joint account in the bank in San Luis Obispo to purchase an automobile, and that this was a consideration for the note. Yet the automobile was purchased for his own benefit, and immediately after his commitment his wife sold it. These discrepancies are pointed out, not for the purpose of discrediting the witness, but to show the unstable ground upon which plaintiff’s claim of a consideration stands.
Of course, the note itself imports a consideration and the burden was on defendant to show there was none. This she met by clear and positive evidence. The burden of proof was then shifted to plaintiff. Eliminating the El Paso transactions from the consideration, as, of course, they must
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be under any reasonable view of the evidence, and eliminating the claim that the note was given him so he could raise money for speculation, as this is negatived by his instructions to his attorney to keep the note until Ms death, the situation is that the parties came to California with about one thousand dollars, which was the result in part of their community savings and the rentals of their separate estates. [3] To this was added the sick benefits received by plaintiff, which were in lieu of wages and hence community property, and also the proceeds of the damage suit. Was this money separate or eommuMty property? Section 163 of the Civil Code defines the separate property of the husband as that owned by him before marriage and that acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. “All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is community property.” (Civ. Code, sec. 164.) The proceeds of the judgment for damage for injury to the husband, sustained during the course of his employment, represent an award for the injury to the family relation, and not being included within the definition of separate property in section 163 of the Civil Code, and being acquired after marriage, they become a part of the community estate.
(McFadden
v.
Santa Ana etc. Ry. Co.,
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Brittain, J., and Langdon, P. J., concurred.
