77 Iowa 607 | Iowa | 1889
the same. II. Counsel for defendant insists that the evidence wholly fails to sustain the allegation of negligence. This position is based upon the fact that there is no direct’ evidence that the pin was ever on the train. But, as we have pointed out, it cannot be doubted that it was not upon the bridge. It must, therefore, have been upon the cars, and, as pins
the same. III. It is insisted by counsel for defendant that if it be found that the pin was on the car there can be no conclusion that the defendant was negligent, for the reason that the accident was so unusual and extraordinary that it could not reasonably have been expected to happen. It may be true that the accident, in the precise form and with the precise attending circumstances which resulted in plaintiffs injury, could not have been expected to happen from the falling of the pin from the car upon the track. The reason or imagination is unable to determine just the effect of an obstruction upon the track of a railroad. The result may be unusual, unexpected, indeed a surprise to the most experienced, — never before heard of by any one, — yet the act of putting the obstruction on the track is none the less negligent, for it threatens danger in many directions, and is liable to produce many familiar results which would cause injury. Now, surely, if it causes an injury in any way that may be expected,— if the results have before been seen, — it cannot be said not to be negligent because the result was before unheard of, and not within the observation of any one, or even not anticipated in the exercise of reason or imagination. The negligence in this case produced an effect never. before observed. It cannot, therefore, be said that it was the exercise of care. The rulings of the district court upon instructions are in accord with the foregoing conclusions.