125 Iowa 86 | Iowa | 1904
The whole controversy between the parties is occasioned by a difference of opinion as to where the southerly line of the street is located. There, is no difficulty as to the center line of the street. Before the incorporation of this territory as a part of the city of Cedar Bapids by annexation, what is now First avenue was a country road sixty-six feet wide. By the first plat, First avenue, which was then designated as Iowa avenue, corresponding as to its center line with this country road, was laid out as one hundred and twenty feet in width. Subsequently an attempt was made to vacate a portion of the plat, and it is contended for appellee that the strip twenty-seven' feet in width between the former road and the'southerly line of Iowa avenue as platted, and along the front of the property in question and adjoining tracts, ceased to be a part of Iowa avenue, and never became a part of First avenue; while it is contended for appellants that this twenty-seven-foot strip is a part of First avenue. Wynn’s irregular plat was made on the theory that First avenue was one hundred and twenty feet wide. But, at the time of the conveyances above referred to, the fence in front of the premises and separating .them from the street was actually on the southerly line of the original road, and not on the southerly line of Iowa avenue as platted in the original plat of the addition, and as indicated on Wynn’s irregular plat; and there is no question left under the evidence as to the fact that in the negotiations between S. L. Dows, husband of the grantor, and her agent, and one Young, the agent of the grantee, with reference to the sale of the prem
We think it clear that both parties perfectly understood the exact location of the boundaries of the tracts which the grantor was intending to convey to the grantee, and that these tracts were laid out with reference to the fence then existing on the southerly line of the original country road. About that time a fence of some description was constructed under the authority of grantee along what was supposed to be the southerly end of the parcel of land embracing the two tracts; that is, along a line two hundred and fifty feet distant from the existing fence at the front of the street. There is no direct evidence as to who constructed the fence at the southerly end of this parcel of land, but it is shown beyond controversy that such a fence was there soon after the second conveyance was made, and that the parcel was occupied for more than ten years as extending from the fence at the northerly end to this fence at the sctutherly end, and that these two fences were recognized by all parties concerned as the boundaries of grantee’s premises. After the lapse of more than ten years, Wynn was called in as a surveyor by defendants, the remote grantees of Miss Rogers, to establish their southerly line, and, considering the south
Under the facts above recited, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the boundaries recognized by the parties at the time of the original conveyance, and with reference to which the premises were occupied by Miss Rogers and her grantees, including-the defendants, for more than ten years, must control. We reach this conclusion on well-established principles, without following the elaborate arguments made- on each side, and without necessity for citation of authorities in support of elementary rules as to boundary lines. The actual monuments with' reference to which a conveyance is made will control the description, and holding-adversely for ten years to a line recognized by both parties as the true boundary will establish such boundary by acquiescence. Neither defendants nor their grantors made any claim to this twenty-seven foot strip beyond the original southerly line of the premises until more than ten-years from the time the premises were first occupied by Miss Rogers. They cannot now assert title under their original conveyance to this strip, which had by-acquiescence during all that time been conceded to be the property of plaintiff and its grantors.
Some reliance is placed on a quitclaim deed executed in 1890 by Henrietta W. Dows to the defendants, but the description in this deed is the same- as in the original deeds, and expressly refers to the original deeds to Miss Rogers, and clearly must be construed as conveying no other property than that included in such original deeds. Therefore
There is some contention for appellants that the plaintiff has acquired no title to this twenty-seven foot strip, but, without going into the details as to the devolution of title upon plaintiff from Henrietta W. Dows, it is sufficient to say that it clearly appears that, if this twenty-seven foot strip belonged to Henrietta W. Dows after the original conveyances to Miss Rogers, it is now the property of plaintiff.
The conclusion which we have indicated as based upon the evidence requires that the decree of the lower court be affirmed.