230 S.W. 103 | Mo. | 1921
Lead Opinion
This case comes to us upon certification by the Springfield Court of Appeals. The opinion written by the presiding judge of that court, in which both of his associates concurred, is as follows: "This is a suit on a promissory note given by defendants to T.P. Tuck Company in payment of a horse. The plaintiff sues as a purchaser for value of said note and, having lost in the trial court, appeals the case here claiming to be an innocent purchaser for value.
"The horse in question was purchased by defendants who were farmers living near Mountain Grove, Missouri, for breeding purposes, each defendant purchasing one or more shares in the horse but giving a joint note. The pleadings in the case are so framed that defendants charged in their answer and plaintiff admitted by reply that this note was procured by fraud, the fraud being that the agent of Tuck Co. gave two or three prominent farmers or stockmen without consideration an interest or share in the horse for the purpose of representing, as he did represent to defendants, that such persons were purchasers of such shares for cash, thereby inducing these defendants to believe that such prominent farmers and stockmen were *418 joint purchasers of the horse with them. The nature of the fraud perpetrated and admitted will be fully seen by reference to the case of Ozark Motor Co. v. Horton, 196 S.W. 395.
"The sole issue is whether the plaintiff is a holder in due course as defined by the Negotiable Instrument Law, Section 10022, Revised Statutes 1909, in which case the defense of fraud is not available. The title of Tuck Co. who negotiated this note to plaintiff being admitted to have been defective, the burden was cast on and assumed by plaintiff to prove that he acquired the title as holder in due course as provided by Section 10029, Revised Statutes 1909.
"The plaintiff's evidence is to this effect: The note is dated July 18, 1911, due October 1, 1915, at seven per cent interest, payable annually. Plaintiff purchased this note and another from T.P. Tuck June 26, 1912. Plaintiff was then a banker at Carl Junction, Jasper County, where he had lived many years and had previously been in the mercantile business. He became acquainted in a business way with T.P. Tuck in 1911. Tuck then and thereafter lived in Springfield, Mo., and was engaged in selling imported stallions. Tuck desired to have plaintiff or his bank handle some of his commercial paper and at that time offered to sell plaintiff a note on some parties in Arkansas. Plaintiff wrote to the Bank of Greene County at Springfield, getting the name of this bank from a bank directory, as to Tuck's financial and business standing. This bank replied that Tuck was not one of its customers and it had no `line on him,' and referred plaintiff to the State Savings Bank of Springfield. Replying to plaintiff's inquiry the cashier of this bank said Tuck was worth from $6,000 to $10,000 and `concerning the financial responsibility, etc., of Mr. T.P. Tuck of this city, beg to say that I have had considerable business dealings with Mr. Tuck in the last seven years, and I have always found him to be absolutely reliable and honest in all dealings I have had with him.'
"This was in August, 1911, and after further inquiry plaintiff bought the Arkansas note which was later *419 paid. In January, 1912, Tuck offered to sell plaintiff or his bank the present note. The plaintiff then wrote a letter of inquiry to the Frst National Bank of Mountain Grove as to the financial responsibility, integrity, etc., of the makers of this note, these defendants. This bank replied by its cashier not unfavorably but somewhat indefinitely. Not being altogether satisfied plaintiff wrote a similar inquiry to E.H. Farnsworth, an attorney at Mountain Grove, who replied giving the property and worth of each of the defendants in detail, the purport being that two of the makers are "all O.K." being worth $3,000 to $5,000 above exemptions, others worth less but "considered good," "honorable and industrious," etc. Another letter of inquiry was sent to and answered by J.M. Hubbard, president of the First National Bank at Mountain Grove, in which he was asked in confidence as to the financial standing of each maker of the note and his "candid opinion of the loan as an investment." His answer is that he would have loaned each maker his proportional part of the note and "they are all good farmers and part of them are patrons of this bank. Now I consider each separately good for his proportionate part, but I don't consider either one single good for the whole amount, for they are not able or worth the amount, but each is good for his proportionate part at this time and I hope the future will prove a verification of these indications.'
"This note was then three months old; that plaintiff stated that he understood it was given in part payment of a horse and no intimation is made by any of these persons that anything is wrong with the note or that any party thereto was thinking of contesting it. It is not shown when the defendants discovered the fraud of which they complain but neither the bank officers nor Mr. Farnsworth, living in the same neighborhood, indicated that they had then heard of anything wrong. It is true that J.H. Hubbard is one of the parties who had been given a share in the horse (plaintiff not knowing this however) and he might be friendly to Tuck but not so of the others. *420
"The plaintiff did not buy the note at this time and in May, 1912, Tuck again offered him this note and a Texas note in a letter saying: `As to the Mountain Grove notes I would endorse them as I am confident they are all O.K. The horse is doing extra good and they are extremely well satisfied with him and that is the keynote to horse paper. That alone makes it good when everything else fails. The Texas paper is strong enough that collection can be forced on it. I would consider it quite an accommodation and a personal favor if you could place these two sets of notes for me.'
"The plaintiff then bought the notes mentioned, the face value of which aggregated $1626.68, and paid therefor $1586.68. His profit was $40 and the accrued interest not then due. There is no question as to plaintiff having paid this amount for these two notes as this was proven not only by plaintiff but by documentary evidence. The Texas note was later paid without trouble. The notes in question were assigned to plaintiff `without recourse' as Tuck stated that he did not and would not endorse any of the paper sold by him. There was a credit on this eight hundred dollar note of $266 made on the same date as the date of the note of which plaintiff knew when it was first offered to him, but nothing was said as to this credit and plaintiff made no inquiry as there was nothing unusual. The plaintiff testified positively that when he bought the note he had no knowledge or information or even suspicion of any fraud in its procurement.
"The defendants offered no evidence, except some of the defendants testified that they had never paid anything on the note. The defendants state the facts most favorably to them in these words: `The plaintiff purchased the notes, amounting to one-third of all he had, on statements from men that knew the makers of the notes and which statements the plaintiff himself in his letter to J.M. Hubbard said would lead him not to consider the notes and took them from Tuck endorsed without recourse, when Tuck before had written him that he would endorse them; took them endorsed without recourse by a man that he believed *421 to be solvent; took them on men that lived one hundred and seventy miles from him and men that he had not heard of prior to the purchase of notes; did not know whether they were farmers or not, whether they were worth a thousand dollars or nothing, and whether they existed or not and endorsed by the only man he believed to be solvent without recourse.'
"The evidence has been set out at some length to see if there is any substantial evidence justifying a finding on the evidence that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the fraud in procuring the note or had knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the note amounted to bad faith, as that is the only question in the case. This question we think is wholly apart from any suggestion that plaintiff acted with poor business judgment in buying a note on the representation made to him and with no actual knowledge as to the financial worth or integrity of the makers. Evidence which raises a doubt as to a note not being a safe investment because of the risk taken as to the solvency of the makers mustFraud not be taken as equivalent to showing knowledge of fraud in the procurement of the note. The price paid is so nearly equal to the full value of the note that no point is made as to that indicating fraud, but on the contrary it is a strong argument of the purchaser's good faith. It is seldom that a man, who is anxious to rid himself of a note because of his fraud in procuring it, can sell it to another, who knows such fact, for full value.
"The fact that plaintiff took the note endorsed without recourse by the payee is not a badge of guilty knowledge of the fraud. To hold that a transfer in that manner casts suspicion on the title of the holder is to impair the negotiability of commercial paper. [Mayes v. Robinson,
"It appears, therefore, that considering the evidence as it is in the record, there is no substantial evidence showing that plaintiff was other than a holder in due course, that is, took the note in good faith and for value before maturity and without notice of any defect in the title as defined by Sections 10025 and 10026, Revised Statutes 1909.
"The question arises then, and the able briefs discuss this question only, whether plaintiff's guilty knowledge is shown or may be inferred from the lack of credible evidence on plaintiff's part showing the contrary, the jury beingGuilty the sole judges of such credibility. This questionKnowledge. arises on the rule of law, codified by the Negotiable Instrument Law, Section 10029, that when fraud or other such infirmity in the note is shown, then the burden is cast on the plaintiff as holder to prove himself a holder in due course. The concrete question is whether a plaintiff, as holder of the note by assignment, can, in case it turns out the note was originally tainted with fraud, in any case by oral evidence (and such his evidence must generally be in whole or in part) discharge this burden of proof so as to entitle him to a verdict; or may the jury in all cases more or less arbitrarily disbelieve the plaintiff's evidence, though uncontradicted and unimpeached and free from impeaching circumstances, and from lack of what it deems credible evidence to the contrary find that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the infirmity or knowledge of facts which made his taking the instrument an act of bad faith as required by Section 10026, Revised Statutes 1909. It would appear from a reading of this section that, notwithstanding Section 10029 casts the burden of proof on plaintiff to prove his good faith and lack of notice of the fraud on purchasing the instrument, yet in order to constitute notice of the fraud there must be a finding that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the fraud or of facts which make his taking the instrument an act of bad faith; and it is not sufficient to defeat plaintiff that the facts in evidence raise a suspicion of guilt *423 knowledge or that the facts known to the plaintiff would have put an ordinary prudent man on inquiry. It seems illogical to hold that mere disbelief of positive testimony showing innocence should be more potent in this respect than belief of facts in evidence exciting suspicion and putting a prudent man on inquiry.
"It is generally held that the Negotiable Instrument Law, including the sections just referred to, is a mere codification of the general law on that subject. [3 R.C.L. sec.Statute a 31, p. 853; Ogden on Neg. Instruments, 253 and 256;Codification Crawford on Neg. Instruments (3 Ed.), p. 5; Selover, Negotiable Instruments (2 Ed.), p. 1.]
"Corpus Juris, vol. 2, sec. 1291, p. 983, speaking of our Section 10029, Revised Statutes 1909, says: `This provision, as far as shifting the burden on to the holder is concerned, has been applied in many cases, but is merely declaratory of the common law.' The cases cited support this statement. [See, also, Link v. Jackson,
"Certain it is that Section 10029, Revised Statutes 1909, enacted in 1905, casting the burden of proof on the holder to prove his good faith and lack of notice of the fraud when fraud has been shown in the procurement of the note, is a codification of and in accordance with the law of this State as previously established. [Hamilton v. Marks,
"This court fell into error by holding that the Negotiable Instrument Act changed the general law by *424
including want or failure of considerationConsideration. unmixed with fraud as one of the things the proof of which cast on the holder the burden of proving himself a holder in due course. [Bank v. Mills,
"It is equally true that Section 10026, Revised Statutes 1909, declaring that the notice of fraud in procuring the note which will defeat a holder for value before maturity must amount to actual knowledge of the fraud or knowledge of factsNotice of showing bad faith in taking the note, is likewise aFraud. codification of the prior law on that subject, and it is now the law and was before the Negotiable Instrument Act was adopted in 1905 that knowledge of facts which would excite suspicion or put a reasonable man on inquiry or even negligence is not sufficient to charge a purchaser of a note with notice of the fraud. [Hamilton v. Marks,
"`Knowledge of facts which would put a prudent man on inquiry is not sufficient to affect the title of an indorsee of a negotiable instrument purchased before maturity. Nothing short of actual knowledge or bad faith will defeat his title.' [Bank v. Hammond,
"The law is the same in this respect since the adoption of the Negotiable Instrument Law. [Link v. Jackson,
"We fully agree that the Negotiable Instrument Act, Sec. 10029 places on plaintiff, in cases where the note is obtained by fraud, the burden of proving all the facts making him a holder in due course as defined by Sec. 10022, and this includes his good faith and his having no notion of any infirmity or defect of title. While some courts have held that proof by plaintiff of his purchase for full value before maturity is alone sufficient to make him, prima-facie at least, a holder in due course, such is not the rule under the Negotiable Instrument Act.
"In 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6 Ed.), sec. 819, p. 979, speaking of the Negotiable Instrument Act, it is said: `In accordance with what is considered as the effect of the statute, it has so far been generally held that on a showing of fraud on the part of the payee . . . the plaintiff must sustain the burden of proof that he is not only a holder for value and before maturity, but also without notice. This seems clearly to be required by the statutory definition of "a holder in due course."'
"In Ruling Case Law, vol. 3, sec. 245, p. 1040, it is said: `A broader view, and it would seem a better one, is that, upon proof of fraud or illegality, an obligation *426 is imposed on the plaintiff to prove that he came fairly into possession of the instrument under such circumstances as entitle him to recover. Evidence that the note was taken for value before maturity will not meet the requirement. The plaintiff cannot prove himself a bona fide purchaser of the note merely by showing that he paid value for it before maturity. He must go further, and show that he had no knowledge or notice of the fraud. Specifically he must disclose the facts and circumstances under which he acquired the paper.' This we think is good law and fully supported by the authorities.
"The next question arises whether after plaintiff has gone forward and shown his purchase for value before maturity in good faith and disclosed all the facts and circumstances attending his acquisition of the note, all of which are consistentSubstantial with good faith and negative any notice of the fraudEvidence. and no damaging or discrediting circumstances of substantial value are shown and defendant produces no countervailing or impeaching evidence, may the jury yet bydisbelieving plaintiff's evidence make a finding that after all plaintiff did have actual knowledge of the fraud and that there were facts known to him which made his act in taking the note bad faith on his part. Is not such a verdict unsupported by any substantial evidence? Answering this Ruling Case Law, vol. 3, sec. 245, p. 1041, says: `While it must not appear from his own case that he was chargeable with notice, yet the ultimate fact that he had actual notice must be proved by the opposite party. The rule requires only that the party disclose the facts and circumstances attending the transfer of the instrument; if from this evidence it appears that he had no knowledge or notice, he has satisfied the requirement. The ultimate burden of proof as to good faith rests, it is understood, upon the defendant, inasmuch as he is the party setting up that fact; and the evidence being balanced upon the question at the conclusion of the case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.' The cases cited support this view. *427
"Unless the Negotiable Instrument Act has changed the law in this respect such is the law in this State. It has been repeatedly held that when plaintiff's evidence discloses all the facts and shows all the elements constituting him a holder in due course, discloses no damaging or impeaching facts and is uncontradicted, then he is entitled to recover. [Johnson v. McMurry,
"In Leavitt v. Taylor,
"`It is well settled that mere suspicion alone that a negotiable note is without consideration, or was obtained by fraud, brought home to the transferee before he acquires the note, will not be sufficient to defeat a recovery upon the note by him, but in order to do so, actual notice of the facts which impeach the validity of the note must be brought home to him. [Mayes v. Robinson,
"In Hayes v. Blaker,
"It will be noted that the adjudged cases and text writers frequently use the expression that `the burden of proof again shifts to the defendant' when the plaintiff has successfully shown himself a holder for value, but this is somewhat inaccurate. A better theory is *428
that when it is shown that the note has been in guilty hands the law presumes that it remains in such hands until the holder, because of having peculiar knowledge of the facts, rebuts such presumption by disclosing his knowledge of the facts. [Hamilton v. Marks,
"The judges and text-writers had constantly used the term `burden of proof' and `shifting of the burden of proof' back to defendant in discussing this subject, and there is noBurden reason to say, as intimated in Link v. Jackson, 158of Proof. Mo. App. 63, 86, 139 S.W. 588, that any other or different meaning was intended when codifying the general law into the Negotiable Instrument Act.
"This is contrary to the ruling of this court in several cases where it is in effect held that no matter how strong plaintiff's evidence makes a case showing him to be a holder in due course and defendant introduces no evidence, yet the evidence being oral, the question is one for the jury who may without cause disbelieve plaintiff's evidence and find for defendant. [Link v. Jackson,
"Such ruling it seems overlooks the fact that the note itself makes a prima-facie case for plaintiff, and by Section 10029 the burden is only placed on plaintiff to overcome the prima-facie defense arising from fraud in procuring the note. This question arises on facts presented in plaintiff's reply and is different from plaintiff's failure to prove the facts of his petition necessary to constitute a cause of action. This ruling also ignores the requirement of Section 10026 that when all the evidence is in the defense of fraud must fail unless it is shown that plaintiff had actual notice of the fraud or of facts making his purchase of the note an act of bad faith.
"In Bank v. Railroad,
"In Johnson v. Grayson,
"In Hill v. Dillon,
"We therefore disaprove of the cases of Link v. Jackson,
"We now hold that the law as declared by the Negotiated Instrument Act is the same in this respect as it was before such act and as declared in: Wright Inv. Co. v. Friscoe Realty Co.,
"We also call attention to the fact that there are many cases not involving the Negotiable Instrument Law where it is held that an affirmative defense, as to which the burden of proof is on defendant, may be made sufficiently strong by clear and unequivocal verbal evidence that if same is not contradicted or impeached the court will direct a verdict for defendant. [Guffey v. Ry. Co.,
"There are many cases from other states upholding this view of the law which are cited in appellant's able brief and will be cited in the notes of the Reporter, but which we need not now discuss.
"This case should be reversed and remanded and in so holding we are in accord with Reeves v. Letts,
"We are in apparent conflict, however, with Southwest Natl. Bank v. House, 157 S.W. 809, by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which we said in Hill v. Dillon,
We fully concur in the conclusions reached by the learned Court of Appeals in the foregoing opinion. The lack of harmony in the decisions which it points out has no doubt arisen out of different interpretations that have been put upon what is now Section 845, Revised Statutes 1919. In construing that section it should be borne in mind that the Negotiable Instrument Law, enacted in 1905, of which it is a part, is just what it purported to be, a codification of the then existing laws relating to negotiable instruments. The language of said Section 845, viz., "when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he . . . acquired the title as holder in due course," is merely declaratory of a rule of law that has been recognized and followed in this State since the decision inBurden Hamilton v. Marks,
"There may be, at this juncture, a shifting of the burden ofproof from the defendant to the plaintiff, for the principle is well established that if the maker or acceptor, who is primarily liable for payment of the instrument, or any party bound by the original consideration, proves that there was fraud or illegality in the inception of the instrument; or if the circumstances raise a strong presumption of fraud or illegality, the owner must then respond by showing that he acquired it bona-fide for value, in the usual course of business while current, and under circumstances which create no suspicion that he knew the facts which impeach its validity." On both reason and authority it must be held that the "burden to prove" of the statute is the "burden of evidence," *433
as distinguished from the "burden of proof" in its strict sense. Let us take a typical case of the class under consideration, where the indorsee sues the maker of a note which had its inception in fraud. The petition alleges the execution of the note and as an affirmative defense the answer alleges the facts constituting the fraud and avers that the plaintiff took the instrument with notice of such facts; reply merely traverses the averments setting up the affirmative defense. The only issue raised on such pleadings is tendered by the answer and the defendant has the affirmative. It, therefore, devolves upon him to show by the greater weight of evidence that the note was obtained by fraud and that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud when he took it, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith. This obligation, the burden of proof in its primary sense, rests upon the defendant throughout the trial, and if he fails to discharge it, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. [Johnson v. McMurry,
The principles governing the shifting of the burden of evidence during the progress of a trial, by reason of the presumptions that rise and disappear as the evidence goes forward, are not peculiar to suits on negotiable instruments. They are of general application. [Guthrie v. Holmes,
Guthrie v. Holmes, supra, is fairly illustrative. It was a suit for damages against the owner of an automobile, for personal injuries due to negligent driving of the car by the chauffeur in the absence of the owner. The sharply contested issue was whether at the time of the accident the chauffeur was acting within the scope of his employment. Plaintiff had the affirmative of this issue and put on evidence showing that the defendant was the owner of the car and that the chauffeur was in his general employment. Defendant then introduced evidence tending to show that the chauffeur was out on a mission of his own — a drunken joy ride — when he ran the plaintiff down. Plaintiff offered no substantial evidence in rebuttal. It was held that the evidence offered by plaintiff in chief raised a presumption that the chauffeur *435 at the time of the accident was within the scope of his employment. It was further held that defendant's evidence destroyed this presumption and the burden then shifted to plaintiff requiring him to make positive proof that the chauffeur was at the time engaged in the owner's business, and that having failed to make such proof the verdict should have been directed for defendant.
In the instant case the answer averred that the note in suit was obtained by the person who negotiated it through fraud and that plaintiff had notice thereof when he took it. The reply admitted the procurement by fraud, but denied the notice. The presumption, however, that arose from the admitted facts was in no way different from the one that would have arisen from evidence tending to prove those facts, and it was completely destroyed by plaintiff's evidence. It is fully set out and carefully analyzed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. All reasonable minds would agree that no inference could be drawn from it that plaintiff had knowledge of the fraud, or that he acted in bad faith in taking the note. Defendant then failing to make proof of specific facts tending to show fraud or bad faith, the court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for plaintiff as prayed in his petition. Brown and Small, CC., concur.
Addendum
The foregoing opinion of RAGLAND, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur. *436