78 N.Y.S. 348 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
Lead Opinion
On the 22d of February, 1901, the parties to this action entered into a contract by which the plaintiffs agreed to sell, and the defendant to purchase, for a specific consideration, certain real estate situate in the city of New York. At the time fixed for the completion of the contract by the passing of the title the defendant refused to accept the same upon the ground that the plaintiffs did not have a marketable title to the land contracted to be sold. Subsequently this action was brought to compel the defendant to., specifically perform.
The alleged defects in the title on which the defendant relied at the trial, as well as on the argument of the appeal from the. judgment, are (1) that the. plaintiffs. “ did not have and still do not have a title to the north one-half of that part of the-premises contracted to be sold, which were included within the ^street’ laid down on the 1 Map of Northern Division of North Melrose ’ made by D. 0. Buckout, surveyor, dated'March 31,1851, and filed in the office of the Register of Westchester County^ and the title to the bed of' the entire street ’ is subject to easements in favor of Charlotte M. Stoker 'and the David Mayer Brewing Company, and Mary Mayer being owner and mortgagee of the premises adjoining on the north.” (2) That the plaintiffs “ did not have and still do not have title to-so much of. the premises contracted to be sold as lies within the lines, of Railroad avenue as describéd in- the deéd” from Gouverneur Morris to the Board of Trustees of the Town of Morrisania, dated November 8th, 1864.
The answer alleged certain other defects in title, but they were not relied upon at the trial nor' upon the argument of the appeal from the judgment, so it is unnecessary to consider them.
This description, as well as the description of the lots sold to McLaren, indicates that it was not the intention of Morris to convey to either of his grantees, McLaren or Miller, any portion of the “ street ” lot, or any right to, or easement therein. It will be observed that the deeds do not recite that the respective lots are bounded by a street, but, on the contrary, by a piece of ££ land marked £ street.’ ” That land was not then opened as a street. It is not so designated upon any of the maps offered in evidence upon the trial, and there is no recital in the deeds, or either of them, that it was to become a street or used as such. The grantees, therefore, of the adjacent premises were limited by the boundaries mentioned in their respective deeds, which was in one case the northern boundary of the “ street ” lot, and in the other case the southern boundary of the same. Indeed the description in both of the deeds disproves the contention that Morris intended to convey any "right or interest in the “street” lot. The lots are conveyed by metes and bounds stated in the deeds, and which do not include any part of the “ street ” lot. The title, therefore, to the “ street ” lot, after the conveyances to Miller and McLaren, remained in Morris and he, by deeds to one Chauncey Smith and wife, quitclaimed all his right, title 'and interest therein, and this title has since been acquired, and is now held, by the plaintiffs. This title is good. There is not a suggestion of any defect in it other than the one already indicated, viz., that the lot was designated on the map “ street ” by Morris, and this, under the proof presented, falls far short of creating any defect in it.
It is also claimed that the plaintiffs have acquired title to the triangular strip by adverse possession and to the street lot by the Stoker deed. We deem it unnecessary to consider these questions, preferring to rest our decision upon the ground that the plaintiffs have a good record title to both pieces, irrespective of such claims, and that, the defendant’s objection thereto was not well founded.
The judgment appealed from is right and should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson and O’Brien, JJ., concurred; Lau.ghlin, j., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent on the ground that the grantees of the .abutting parcels obtained an easement in the strip designated “ street for light, air and access.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.