Dowling v. SlotnikDowling v. Slotnik
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Callahan
Lead Opinion
Opinion
CALLAHAN, C. J.The principal issue in this appeal is whether a claim for a work-related injury by the claimant, an illegal alien, is within the jurisdictional confines of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
The following facts and procedural history are uncon-troverted. On February 14, 1994, the respondents, Sol V. Slotnik and Diane Reverand,1 who are husband and wife, hired the claimant, Victoria Dowling, as a live-in housekeeper and nanny for their two sons. At that time, the claimant informed the respondents that she was an illegal alien. She also exaggerated her prior work experience on her application for employment. In return for her services, the respondents agreed to pay the claimant a gross weekly salary of $400 and provide her with health insurance, room and board, use of an automobile and an allowance toward the cost of a private telephone. The respondents did not obtain workers’ compensation insurance coverage for the claimant, as required by
The respondents appealed from the order of the commissioner to the compensation review board (board) pursuant to
On appeal, the respondents claim that the commissioner improperly determined that the claimant had sustained a compensable injury. Specifically, the respondents argue that: (1) the commission’s authority was preempted, under the circumstances of this case, by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986;12 (2) the commission lacked jurisdiction over the claimant’s claim because illegal aliens are not included in the group of “persons” eligible for workers’ compensation benefits; (3) the commission lacked jurisdiction over the claimant’s claim because the employment agreement between the claimant and the respondents, having been tainted by the illegality of the claimant’s immigration status, does not constitute a “contract of
I
Before reviewing the merits of the respondents’ claims, we address a challenge raised in the claimant’s brief to our jurisdiction over Reverand’s appeal. The claimant argues that Reverand’s appeal is not properly before this court because the Appellate Court lacked authority to permit the respondents to file a corrected appeal. In effect, the claimant contends that the Appellate Court lacked authority to allow Reverand to file a late appeal. We disagree.
“We note at the onset that... a claim that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time. Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . The objection of want of [subject matter] jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . and the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of
Section 31-30 lb authorizes a party aggrieved by a final decision of the board to appeal from the board’s decision to the Appellate Court. See Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink, Inc., 218 Conn. 181, 184-85, 588 A.2d 194 (1991).
II
We turn now to the respondents’ substantive claims. We note that ordinarily we would not address the respondents’ claim that the commission’s authority to award workers’ compensation benefits to the claimant was preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Immigration Reform Act) until after the respondents’ remaining jurisdictional claims had been resolved, because if the commission lacked jurisdiction over the claimant’s claim for benefits, we would not need to consider the respondents’ federal preemption claim. Because, however, the respondents’ jurisdictional claims are inextricably intertwined with the Immigration Reform Act, we depart, for purposes of clarity, from our usual practice and first discuss the respondents’ preemption claim.
We begin with a brief overview of the purpose and relevant provisions of the Immigration Reform Act. “The [Immigration Reform Act] constituted a major . . . response to the vast tide of illegal immigration that had produced a ‘shadow population’ of literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United States.” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479,
Consistent with these goals, the Immigration Reform Act makes it unlawful knowingly to employ unauthorized workers.
“The question of preemption is one of federal law, arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution. . . . Determining whether Congress has exercised its power to preempt state law is a question of legislative intent.” (Citation omitted.) Serrano v. Serrano, 213 Conn. 1, 5, 566 A.2d413 (1989); see Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Commission of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493, 509, 109 S. Ct. 1262, 103 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1989). Preemption may be express or implied. Assn. of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1996). “Express preemption occurs to the extent that a federal statute expressly directs that state law be ousted to some degree from a certain field. . . . Even where there is no express statutory statement ousting state law from a given area, [however] there may be implied preemption.” Id. “The United States Supreme Court has instructed us that, absent an explicit statement that Congress intends to preempt state law, courts should infer such intent where Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947), or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-18, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248 [reh. denied, 374 U.S. 858, 83 S. Ct. 1861, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1082] (1963), or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Serrano, supra, 6; see Northwest Central
The respondents make two arguments in support of their claim that the Immigration Reform Act preempted the commissioner from awarding workers’ compensation benefits to the claimant. They argue that to the extent that a workers’ compensation award requires an employer to make payments to an undocumented alien, the award constitutes a civil sanction against the employer that is expressly preempted by
A
We turn first to the respondents’ claim that the Immigration Reform Act expressly preempts the commissioner from awarding workers’ compensation benefits to undocumented aliens.
Moreover, even if we assume, arguendo, that workers’ compensation benefits somehow do constitute a
B
The respondents also maintain that to the extent that the Workers’ Compensation Act authorizes the commissioner to award benefits to undocumented aliens, the Workers’ Compensation Act impliedly is preempted
The primary purpose of the Immigration Reform Act was to establish procedures that make it more difficult to employ undocumented workers and to punish employers who knowingly offer jobs to those workers. National Labor Relations Board v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., supra, 134 F.3d 55-56; see United States v. Todd Corp., 900 F.2d 164, 165 (9th Cir. 1990). The Immigration Reform Act itself gives no indication that Congress intended the act to preempt state laws whenever state laws operate to benefit undocumented aliens. Indeed, “it is clear from [the] legislative history [of the Immigration Reform Act] that Congress anticipated some conflict between the new statute and . . . various state . . . statutes .... As explained in the House Report: ‘It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in existing law ....’” Montero v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, supra, 124 F.3d 384; see H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), p. 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. “[I]n an effort not to exacerbate the appeal of illegal workers to unscrupulous employers, [the Immigration Reform Act] . . . does not
Furthermore, there is no merit to the respondents’ argument that providing workers’ compensation benefits to undocumented aliens would stand as an obstacle to “removing the employment ‘magnet’ that draws undocumented aliens into the country.” Montero v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, supra, 124 F.3d 384. Potential eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits in the event of a work-related injury realistically cannot be described as an incentive for undocumented aliens to enter this country illegally. See Patel v. Quality Inn South, supra, 846 F.2d 704 (procurement of employment at any wage, not prospect of job-related protections, attracts illegal immigrants). More important, excluding such workers from the pool of eligible employees would relieve employers from the obligation of obtaining workers’ compensation coverage for such employees and thereby contravene the purpose of the Immigration Reform Act by creating a financial incentive for unscrupulous employers to hire undocumented workers. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, 1913 Sess., p. 124, remarks of Professor Willard C. Fisher (“[u]nless the employer is required to pay the same [insurance premium for all workers] . . . he is ... under inducement to take on [uncovered workers] . . . [the Workers’ Compensation Act] must not . . . exclude aliens from the benefits; because there would be precisely the same inducement under such a provision for an employer to take on the men who are not citizens of the country”); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 288 N.J. Super. 240, 247, 672 A.2d 221 (1996) (“immunity from accountability [under Workers’ Compensation Act] might well have the further undesirable effect of encouraging employers to hire illegal
The respondents have failed to establish that Congress intended the Immigration Reform Act to preempt state laws that benefit undocumented aliens, nor have they demonstrated that including undocumented aliens in the pool of employees potentially eligible to receive state workers’ compensation benefits would result in “clear and manifest” damage; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. 485; to the goal Congress sought to attain when it enacted the Immigration Reform Act. We conclude, therefore, that the Immigration Reform Act does not preempt, either expressly or impliedly, the authority of the states to award workers’ compensation benefits to undocumented aliens.
III
We begin our analysis of the respondents’ jurisdictional claims by setting forth the standard of review applicable to workers’ compensation appeals. “The principles that govern our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established. ‘The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or
In determining that the claimant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits was within the jurisdiction of the commission, the commissioner relied on the board’s determination in Tavares v. Noel, 15 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 172, 174 (1996), that illegal aliens are included in the group of persons eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. The claimant maintains that we must accord great deference to the board’s determination in Tavares that illegal aliens are eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. Neither that issue nor any of the other issues raised in the respondents’jurisdictional challenges, however, has been subjected previously to judicial scrutiny, and, consequently, our review of the respondents’ jurisdictional claims is plenary.
“We have previously observed that the workers’ compensation commission, like any administrative body, must act strictly within its statutory authority .... It cannot modify, abridge, or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it that power.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 242 Conn. 570, 576, 698 A.2d 873 (1997); see Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996); Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 428, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). “A commissioner may exercise jurisdiction to hear a claim only ‘under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’ ” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 576; Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44 (1963). “[I]t is settled law that the commissioner’s jurisdiction is confined by the [Workers’ Compensation Act] and limited by its provisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Discuillo v.
“The entire statutory scheme of the Workers’ Compensation Act is directed toward those who are in the employer-employee relationship as those terms are defined in the act and discussed in our cases. That relationship is threshold to the rights and benefits under the act; a claimant . . . who is not an employee has no right under this statute to claim for and be awarded benefits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanzant v. Hall, 219 Conn. 674, 678, 594 A.2d 967 (1991); Castro v. Viera, supra, 207 Conn. 433. “[A claimant] may invoke the remedy provided under the Workers’ Compensation Act only if [the claimant], as a matter of law, satisfies the requisite jurisdictional standard of ‘employee’ as
The respondents maintain that, as a matter of law, the claimant does not meet the jurisdictional standard of being an “employee” as defined in
A
The respondents first maintain that illegal aliens are not included in the group of “persons” who, by virtue of the definition of “employee” under
Our analysis begins with the language of
A brief review of the legislative genealogy of
We turn next to the legislative history of chapter 138 of the 1913 Public Acts. “It is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees maybe considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by the legislation. . . . This is because legislation is a purposive act . . . and, therefore, identifying the particular problem that the legislature sought to resolve helps to identify the purpose or purposes for which the legislature used the language in question.” (Citations omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 450, 692 A.2d 742 (1997); see State v. Ledbetter, 240 Conn. 317, 337, 692 A.2d 713 (1997); Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 430-31 n.15, 650 A.2d 557 (1994); State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 273-74 n.8, 528 A.2d 760 (1987). During the committee hearings on the bill that ultimately became chapter 138 of the 1913 Public Acts, Professor Willard C. Fisher, an economist from Wesleyan University who had been engaged by the standing committees on judiciary and labor to assist in drafting the Workers’ Compensation Act; A. Grillo, supra, 38 Conn. B.J. 244-45; remarked that “[u]nless the employer is required to pay the same [insurance premium for all workers] . . . he is . . . under inducement to take on [uncovered workers] . . . [the Workers’ Compensation Act] must not . . . exclude aliens from the benefits; because there would be precisely the same inducement under such a provision for an employer to take on the men who are not citizens of the country.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p. 124. He further stated that “the [proposed] bill is open to serious criticism . . . [and] you must not allow . . . discrimination between aliens and residents and citizens. . . . Connecticut cannot afford to discriminate against the employment of her own citizens . . . .” Id.,
Furthermore, we previously have stated that the Workers’ Compensation Act “applies to every natural or artificial person who enters upon a contract of employment(emphasis added) Douthwright v. Champlin, 91 Conn. 524, 528, 100 A. 97 (1917); and “includes every alien of any nationality.” (Emphasis added.) Frasca v. City Coal Co., 97 Conn. 212, 214, 116 A. 189 (1922). “[The] language [of the Workers’ Compensation Act] is not that of restriction or limitation, but all-embracing. . . . [I]t applies to ‘all contracts of employment,’ and this was intended to mean ... by whomsoever made. ... It defines an employer and an employee as ‘any person.’ It excepts certain classes, and the designation of these exceptions marks the only limitation upon the definition.” (Emphasis added.) Douthwright v. Champlin, supra, 527.
There is nothing in the language or legislative history of
B
The respondents nevertheless maintain that even if illegal aliens come within the definition of “employee” provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, the employment agreement between the claimant and the respondents, having been tainted by illegality as a result of the claimant’s immigration status and the respondents’ actions in knowingly employing an undocumented alien, does not constitute a “contract of service” as is required by
In dictum in Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., 111 Conn. 229, 234-35, 149 A. 679 (1930), the only case in which this court previously has considered what impact, if any, a taint of illegality in an employment agreement has upon a worker’s status as an employee under
As a general rule, a “court will [not] lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of a contract, the inherent purpose of which is to violate the law . . . but if both parties are in pari delicto, the law will leave them where it finds them.” (Emphasis added.) Tator v. Valden, 124 Conn. 96, 101, 198 A. 169 (1938); see Connecticut Importing Co. v. Janowitz, 128 Conn. 433, 436, 23 A.2d 514 (1941); Vaszauskas v. Vaszauskas, 115 Conn. 418, 423, 161 A. 856 (1932). “It is not for [a defendant’s] sake however that the objection [to enforcement of the contract] is ever allowed, but [the court’s refusal to enforce the contract] is founded in general principles of policy [of] which the defendant has the advantage . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Funk v. Gallivan, 49 Conn. 124,128 (1881); see Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 199-200,
In Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., supra, 111 Conn. 229, as in the present case, the taint of illegality did not arise by virtue of a contractual provision that required the employee to engage in an unlawful activity. Instead, it arose in connection with a child labor statute, which, like the Immigration Reform Act, had not been enacted at the time the Workers’ Compensation Act was adopted and which, like the Immigration Reform Act, prohibited the making of certain employment agreements.14 Id., 234-35. Seeking to avoid liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the employer maintained that the employment agreement at issue in Kenez did not constitute a “contract of service” because the “legislature must . . . have intended ... to include only legal contracts and therefore it cannot have intended to include one made in violation of [the child labor] statute.” Id., 234. The court determined that construing the employment agreement to constitute a “contract of service” under the Workers’ Compensation Act would accord with both the language and legislative intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Id., 236-37. The court noted that, with respect to the violation of the child labor law, the parties were not in pari delicto and that the common-law doctrine against judicial enforcement of “illegal” contracts might preclude a
We turn now to the merits of the respondents’ claim that the illegal taint attached to the employment agreement between the respondents and the claimant by virtue of the claimant’s immigration status precludes that agreement from constituting a “contract of service” under
In relying on the doctrine against judicial enforcement of “illegal” contracts, the respondents, in effect, urge us to recognize an exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act for reasons of public policy. We, however, consistently have eschewed recognizing such exceptions, repeatedly observing that the Workers’ Compensation Act “ ‘represents a complex and comprehensive statutory scheme balancing the rights and claims of the employer and the employee arising out of work-related personal injuries’ Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 241 Conn. 170, 174, 695 A.2d 1036 (1997); Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., 222 Conn. 775, 781, 610 A.2d 1277 (1992); and that “ ‘the responsibility for carving out exceptions from any one of its provisions belongs to the legislature and not to the courts.’ ” Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., supra, 174-75; Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., supra, 781; Bouley v. Norwich, supra, 222 Conn. 760; Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 605; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 106. “Because of the statutory nature of our workers’ compensation system, policy determinations as to what . . . jurisdictional limitations apply . . . are for the legislature, not the judiciary ... to make.” (Emphasis added.) Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 242 Conn. 577.
Finally, we note that our conclusion that the claimant’s immigration status does not preclude the claimant from meeting the jurisdictional standard of “employee” under
The respondents next contend that the commission lacked jurisdiction over the claimant’s claim for benefits because the employment agreement between the claimant and the respondents was invalidated by misrepresentations the claimant made on her employment application and, consequently, does not constitute a “contract of service” under
In essence, the respondents ask that we recognize an exception to eligibility under the Workers’ Compensation Act in order to effectuate a public policy against resume fraud. This we cannot do. We reiterate that “the responsibility for carving out exceptions from any one of [the] provisions [of the Workers’ Compensation Act] belongs to the legislature and not to the courts”; Libby v. Goodwin Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., supra, 241 Conn. 174 — 75; Durniak v. August Winter & Sons, Inc., supra, 222 Conn. 781; Bouley v. Norwich, supra, 222 Conn. 760-61; Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 605; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 106; and that “[b]ecause of the statutory nature of our workers’ compensation system, policy determinations as to what . . . jurisdictional limitations apply . . . are for the
Furthermore, two provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act directly address worker fraud.
The respondents further claim that the commissioner’s order awarding benefits to the claimant is violative of their equal protection and due process rights under the United States and Connecticut constitutions.19 They reason that: (1) the claimant’s immigration status precludes her from obtaining lawful employment,20 and consequently, if and when the claimant becomes able to work, she will not be able to do so; (2) because the claimant will be unable to work, the respondents will be required to continue making total disability payments to the claimant regardless of the fact that she is no longer disabled; and (3) those payments, therefore, will deprive the respondents of equal protection and due process. The respondents’ argument is based, therefore, on a hypothetical factual situation.
We frequently have noted “ ‘the imprudence of adjudicating constitutional questions in a “factual vacuum.” ’ ” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 844, 633 A.2d 296 (1993); State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 78, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991); Lehrer v. Davis,
The respondents’ claim is based on future events that are speculative and hypothetical at this point, and consequently the claim does not present an “actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hallas v. Windsor, 212 Conn. 338, 347, 562 A.2d 499 (1989); Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 30, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987). In the unlikely event that the commissioner in the future orders the
VI
The respondents’ final claim is that the commissioner abused his discretion by ordering the respondents to pay a $10,000 fine to the second injury fund for failing to comply with the workers’ compensation insurance and self-insurance requirements provided in
In determining whether the commissioner abused his discretion, we make every reasonable presumption in favor of sustaining the commissioner’s action, and the manner in which his or her discretion has been exercised will not be disturbed as long as there is a reasonable basis for its exercise. See Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 592, 626 A.2d 259 (1993); Walton v. New Hartford, 223 Conn. 155, 169-70, 612 A.2d 1153 (1992). We note that
The decision of the board is affirmed with respect to the compensability of the claimant’s injuries and the board’s related orders; the decision of the board is reversed with respect to the order of the commissioner directing the respondents to pay a fine of $10,000 to the second injury fund, and the case is remanded to the board with direction to vacate the commissioner’s order insofar as he imposed a fine of $10,000 upon the respondents and to remand the case to the commissioner for further proceedings with respect to the amount of fine, if any, to be imposed.
In this opinion NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js., concurred.
Notes
The second injury fund was named as a respondent in the proceedings before the workers’ compensation commissioner but did not participate in this appeal. References to the respondents are to Slotnick and Reverand.
See
“(i) Has entered into or works under any contract of service . . . with an employer . . . .”
General Statutes § 31-275 (9) (B) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Employee’ shall not be construed to include:
“(i) Any person to whom articles ... are given to be treated ... on premises not under the control ... of the person who gave them out;
“(ii) One whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business;
“(in) A member of the employer’s family dwelling in his house . . .
“(iv) Any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week;
“(v) An employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded ... or
“(vi) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless . . . .”
See
See
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is codified as amended at
The inclusion in a federal statute of an express provision regarding preemption does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that aspects of a state law not expressly within the federal preemption provision may be preempted by implication. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-88, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1995); Assn. of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. Abrams, supra, 84 F.3d 607.
In order to secure employment, the plaintiff in Kenez, who was a minor, misrepresented his age. The defendant employer failed to comply with a statute requiring employers to obtain a certificate attesting to a minor’s eligibility, under criteria set forth in the statute, for employment. Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., supra, 111 Conn. 232.
See
See
In his dissenting opinion, Justice McDonald concludes that “[pjursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . entering into the contract [of employment] was illegal, the parties committed a criminal act by doing so, and the contract required the alien to commit a criminal act.” Although the Immigration Reform Act makes it illegal for an employer knowingly to employ an undocumented alien, the act does not make it a crime for an undocumented alien to accept employment, nor does the act provide sanctions for doing so. Thus, unless the activities the claimant engaged in pursuant to her duties as a nanny and live-in housekeeper were otherwise unlawful, the employment agreement between the claimant and the respondents reasonably cannot be said to have required the claimant to commit a criminal act.
Moreover, in concluding that workers’ compensation benefits provide an incentive for illegal aliens to enter this country, the dissent relies on the fact that federal law has been amended to preclude illegal aliens from receiving federal public benefits. The legislation to which the dissent refers is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260. We agree that eligibility for public benefits such as welfare, food stamps and public housing operates as an incentive to enter or remain in this country illegally. We do not agree, however, that requiring an illegal alien who has sustained a work-related injury to forgo his right to bring a tort claim for damages against his employer and to accept, instead, workers’ compensation benefits as compensatory damages for his injury provides a similar incentive.
As a practical matter, recognition of such an exception would lead to every workers’ compensation claim being investigated to determine whether the claimant had made a misstatement when hired. The commissioner consequently would be required to adjudicate questions of fact in a forum that is not suited for making wide-ranging factual determinations. See
The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . .”
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, provides in relevant part: “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 20, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments, provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or epjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or mental disability.”
At oral argument before this court, the claimant indicated that she is currently married to a United States citizen and that her immigration status no longer precludes her from obtaining the documentation necessary for lawful employment.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I do not agree that an illegal alien engaged in an illegal contract of employment is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. As the majority points out, the right to receive workers’ compensation benefits arises only in an employer-employee relationship. Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 60, 566 A.2d 670 (1989). Such benefits are granted “without regard to fault” and imposed as “a form of strict liability on the employer.” Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., 208 Conn. 589, 599, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988). The employment relationship is, therefore, at the heart of workers’ compensation coverage.
This case concerns an alien, the claimant, Victoria Dowling, who illegally remained in the United States and a Connecticut couple, the named respondent, Sol
Contrary to the majority, I conclude that employment benefits are an incentive for illegal immigrants to enter or remain in this country. Whatever effect requiring those hiring illegal aliens to pay workers’ compensation benefits may have to discourage that practice, it cannot be disputed that our decision confers employment benefits on illegal aliens. In doing so, it obviously makes employment in this country more attractive. In 1996, Congress explicitly recognized the compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits. It then provided that illegal aliens in general are not eligible for any federal public benefits. Pub. L. 104-193, Title IV, § 400, Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2260.
The effect of creating an incentive for the illegal immigrant to enter or remain in this country leads me to conclude that the contract of service in this case was illegal and does not give rise to workers’ compensation benefits. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act,1
In this case, the alien is seeking to enforce her rights to benefits which, if given, will, in my view, violate an important public policy. Our decision today, in light of the Immigration and Nationality Act, does clear and manifest damage to the goal of Congress to stem the “vast tide of illegal immigration” resulting in “literally millions of undocumented aliens in the United States.” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 481, 111 S. Ct. 888, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1991). Concentrating our fire on the employer while at the same time conferring employment benefits on the illegal alien does not support our policy of controlling our borders. It is a mystery to me how providing state mandated employment benefits to illegal aliens will discourage them from coming to our shores or remaining here.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Immigration and Nationality Act was amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-103, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
It is illegal for an illegal alien to work in the United States. See