74 Mo. 13 | Mo. | 1881
"We have adopted the statement of this case made by the court of appeals, having, from an examination of the record, found it substantially correct.
!£his is an action for damages for injuries done to plaintiff whilst in the,employ of defendants, a corporation carrying on a foundry in St. Louis. At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendants offered an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, which was granted. Plaintiff then took a non-suit, and the court having overruled a motion to set it aside,- plaintiff appeals. There was evi
The question presented for determination is not free from difficulty. The principles of law on the subject of the liability of the master to the servant for injuries received by the latter in the service of the former, are reasonably well settled, and the only difficulty lies in their application to the facts of a given case. One who enters the service of another, takes upon himself the ordinary risks of the employment. Smith v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern R’y Co., 69 Mo. 39; Porter v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co., 71 Mo. 66; Coombs v. New Bedford C. Co., 102 Mass. 572. On the other hand, if there are concealed dangers known to the employer, and unknown to the employe, it is the duty of the employer to notify the servant of their existence. Ib. "We think the doctrine equally well settled by the authorities, that although the machinery, of tha! part of it complained of as especially dangerous, is visible, yet, if by reason of the youth and inexperience of the servant, he is not aware of the danger to which he is exposed in operating it, or approaching near to it, it is the duty of the master to apprise him of the danger, if known to him.
In Grizzle v. Frost, supra, a girl sixteen years of age was employed in a dangerous service, and was injured by having her hand caught between two revolving rollers of the machinery. Cockburn, C. J., observed that: “ If the owners of dangerous machinery, by their foreman, employ a young person about it, quite inexperienced in its use, either without proper directions as to its use, or with directions which are improper, and which are likely to lead to danger, of which the young person is not aware, as it is their duty to take unusual care to avert such danger, they are responsible for any injuries which may ensue from the use of such machinery.” In that case the revolving rollers, and the manner in which they worked, were visible. The plaintiff was sixteen years of age, but it was not inferred as a matter of law, because she was of that age and knew of the existence of the revolving rollers, that she was also aware of the risk and danger to which they exposed her. As was observed by the same learned Chief Justice in Clarke v. Holmes, supra: “A servant knowing the fact may be utterly ignorant of the risks.” The case of Hayden v. Smithville Manufacturing Co., 29 Conn. 558, cited by respondent, is not in conflict •with but sustains these views.
Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., supra, is directly in point. It was there held that the defendant had the legal right to run its machinery without fencing or boxing, unless by so doing it exposed persons in its employment, or others who came upon its premises by procurement or invitation, to danger of which it gave no notice; but if the danger was apparent, and the plaintiff had reasonable no
Nor do we think that in this instance, King, who gave the plaintiff the order to stop the engine, was plaintiff’s fellow-servant. "While it appears that Fisher was foreman of the establishment, King had charge of the construction of the turntable, and Fisher directed plaintiff to go with King and do whatever he directed. In McGowan v. R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 528 : “ There was no proof that the conductor had the superintendence or control-,over the men, or the work, or power to provide or replace machinery.” Here King was foreman of the hands constructing the turntable. They were under him, and the plaintiff was expressly ordered by Fisher to do whatever King told him. A foreman of the entire establishment, as extensive as defendant’s, can
The counsel for appellant contend that plaintiff cannot recover on his petition, “ because the only negligence alleged consisted in the defect of the machinery, in wanting physical guards to keep people safe from its supposed dangers.” This position in untenable. The petition, it is true, alleges that: “ It was the duty of defendant to have them properly and safely guarded,” etc., and that this duty was neglected, but proceeds as follows: “That defendant had in its employment at the time herein mentioned, one G. L. King as superintendent of its said foundry; that plaintiff was under the general charge and control of said superintendent in performing his said duties and labors in said foundry under his said employment; that on or about the 19th day of August, 1872, the defendant, by its said servant, King, unlawfully, negligently and carelessly ordered and directed the plaintiff' to stop an engine in said foundry, which was then in operation; that plaintiff proceeded to obey said order and direction, and while so doing, by reason of said wrongful conduct and carelessness of defendant, plaintiff was caught by a set-screw and collar
It will be perceived that it alleges that King negligently and carelessly ordered and directed plaintiff- to stop the engine, and that while obeying said order he was caught by a set-screw and collar revolving with a certain counter-shaft, which was attached to and being operated by said engine. This, in connection with the allegation of the dangerous nature of the machine and the youth and inexperience of plaintiff, states a cause of action, and the additional negligence alleged, with regard to the screw and collar being uncovered, does not operate to eliminate the other alleged negligence and confine plaintiff to proof that the set-screw and collar were not properly guarded. In fact, this matter of negligence is a circumstance which the