Dowling v. SchleicherDowling v. Schleicher
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mae A. D'Agostino
Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to
Presently pending before the Court is the remaining Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 40. In their motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on both the merits of Plaintiff‘s First Amendment claim and on the ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA“). See id. Plaintiff has not responded to the pending motion.
In a December 20, 2019 Report-Recommendation and Order, Magistrate Judge Stewart recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ motion in its entirety. See Dkt. No. 43. In his decision, Magistrate Judge Stewart first found that no dispute of material fact exists as to the lack of a causal connection between Plaintiff‘s protected activity and the alleged adverse action. See id. at 7-9. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Stewart found that dismissal was also appropriate under the PLRA because Plaintiff failed to properly grieve his claims against the remaining Defendants and that administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff. See id. at 11-14. Neither party objected to Magistrate Judge Stewart‘s Report-Recommendation and Order.
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court “‘cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.‘” Id. at 36-37 (quotation and other citation omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply rely on the assertions in its pleadings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting
In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Where the non-movant either does not respond to the motion or fails to dispute the movant‘s statement of material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party‘s Rule 56.1 statement; rather, the court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant‘s assertions. See Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment “would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts“).
“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.‘” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that the court is obligated to “‘make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants‘” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). “This liberal standard, however, does not excuse a pro se litigant from following the procedural formalities of summary judgment.” Id. at 295 (citing Showers v. Eastmond, 00 CIV. 3725, 2001 WL 527484, *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001)). Specifically, “a pro se party‘s ‘bald assertion,’ completely unsupported
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge‘s report-recommendation and order, the district court “make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”
In the present matter, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Stewart correctly determined that the Court should grant Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment. As Magistrate Judge Stewart noted, the protected activity at issue, i.e., Plaintiff‘s grievance, was by Plaintiff‘s own admission not lodged against either Defendant and accused neither of any wrongdoing. See Dkt. No. 40-5 at 67-68, 71-72. Moreover, both Defendants indicated that they were unaware of the grievance at any time prior to the issuance of the misbehavior report. See Dkt. No. 40-6 at ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 40-9 at ¶ 8. As such, Magistrate Judge Stewart correctly determined that the undisputed facts demonstrate that there was no causal connection between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory conduct.
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Stewart also correctly found, in the alternative, that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his available administrative remedies. At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he did not file a formal grievance regarding his claim, but instead wrote a
Having carefully reviewed Magistrate Judge Stewart‘s Report-Recommendation and Order, Defendants’ submissions and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Stewart‘s Report-Recommendation and Order (Dkt. No. 43) is ADOPTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 40) is GRANTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants’ favor and close this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Mae A. D‘Agostino
U.S. District Judge
Dated: January 8, 2020
Albany, New York