[T1] Appellant Lori Ann Walker, (formerly Lori Ann Dowlin) filed a civil suit against her former husband Charles Douglas Dowlin, requesting damages for "Fraud on the Court (Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 1-16-401(a)(iv))," allegedly committed during divorce proceedings. The district court granted Mr. Dowlin's motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 1 Ms. Walker contends the dismissal was in error. We affirm.
ISSUE
[T2] Did the district court err in concluding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 (Lexis-Nexis 2007) and W.R.C.P. 60(b) do not create a tort duty that, if breached, gives rise to an independent cause of action for damages?
FACTS
[T3] Ms. Walker initiated this civil tort action while her divorce from Mr. Dowlin was pending. In her original complaint, she alleged several causes of action against Mr. Dowlin and several other parties. Ms. Walk
[T4] The divorcee trial was held on May 12, 2005. On June 7, 2005, the divoree court issued its decision letter distributing the marital assets and debts of the parties. Thereafter, Ms. Walker amended her complaint in the district court to allege a new cause of action for both compensatory and exemplary damages. The new cause of action was entitled "Fraud on the Court (Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 1-16401(@)@iv))"' against Mr. Dowlin and a codefendant, Mr. Howard 2 This new cause of action is the subject of this appeal. In her new cause of action, Ms. Walker alleged the following:
Ti. By this reference Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 67 of this Amended Complaint as though set forth in their entirety.
78. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants [Messrs.] Dowlin and Howard were both responsible for the preparation and submission to the divorcee court of Hyland's 1991 business valuation and [Mr. Dowlin]'s personal financial statements.
79. Defendants [Messrs. Dowlin]} and Howard were obligated to testify truthfully under oath at trial and to verify the truth and accuracy of those documents and exhibits provided to the Court; and they were further obligated to include, and not intentionally omit, all material information the Court would rely upon at trial,
80. [Ms. Walker] is informed and believes that prior to and during the divorce trial, [Messrs. Dowlin] and Howard made misrepresentations of material fact by testimony and through exhibits, and omitted providing material information to the divoree court, which statements and information were knowingly false and intentionally omitted. These misrepresentations and omissions include, among others:
a. The false representation that the value of Hyland [Enterprises, Inc.] on December 31, 1991 was $6,173,509.98.
b. The false representation that [Mr. Dowlin|'s net worth on April 80, 2005 was $2,663, 494.44.
c. The omission of material information which would have disproved those representations set forth in subparagraphs a and b above.
81. - [Messrs. Dowlin] and Howard expected the Court to rely upon those false representations and omissions of material fact as true and correct representations made under oath, and on the basis thereof to determine the allocation of marital property awarded to [Ms. Walker].
82. As a direct and proximate result of the Court's reliance on the defendants [sic] fraud and intentional omissions, [Messrs. Dowlin] and Howard were successful in obtaining a judgment that substantially reduced [Ms. Walker]'s award of marital assets and interests.
Ms. Walker's prayer for relief apparently applies to all her claims, and is somewhat difficult to follow. It is nevertheless clear from her arguments in the district court and this Court that she sought a jury trial, and compensatory and exemplary damages, on all counts, including the claim of fraud on the court.
In response to Ms. Walker's allegations, both Mr. Dowlin and Mr. Howard moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), asserting that Ms. Walker had failed to state any claims for which relief could be granted. The district court dismissed all of Ms. Walker's causes of action except for the claim of fraud alleged against Mr. Dowlin. The district court certified its dismissal of the "Fraud on the Court (Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 1-16-40l(a)iv)) by Dowlin" claim as a final judgment under W.R.C.P. 54(b). Ms. Walker appealed.
[T6] The district court granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), finding that Ms. Walker had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Our standard for review of [a 12(b)(6) ] dismissal is well known: (1) we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the appellant; (2) we sustain the dismissal only if it is certain from the face of the complaint that the appellant cannot assert any facts that would entitle him to relief; (3) we employ the same standards and examine the same materials as did the district court; and (4) such review is de novo.
Becker v. Mason,
DISCUSSION
[T7] Ms. Walker's challenge to the dismissal of her cause of action is rooted in her contention that W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 "establish a tort duty that was breached by [Mr.] Dowlin. [Mr.] Dowlin's breach of those duties permits [Ms.] Walker to assert a cause of action at law [for damages], to be determined by a jury of her peers. [McCulloh] v. Drake
[T8] Preliminarily, we begin with two comments relating to our standard of review and the cause of action at issue here. Although we are required to assume that all factual allegations contained in the complaint are true, we are not required to give that same deference to legal conclusions. Paragraph 17 of the amended complaint contains legal conclusions to which we do not defer. It states:
17. In preparing and presenting evidence as to the amount of [Mr. Dowlin]'s increase in net worth during the marriage, [Ms. Walker] and her attorneys had no alternative except to rely on the truth of evidence presented under oath by the defendants named herein; [Ms. Walker]'s reliance was necessary as a matter of evidence in the divorcee proceedings even where [Ms. Walker] personally did not believe in the truth of the evidence presented.
The complaint contains no factual underpinnings for the allegations contained in paragraph 17. Nowhere in the complaint does Ms. Walker allege that she was prevented from conducting discovery, or limited in any way in her ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses. We are not aware of any legal principle, and Ms. Walker has offered none, that would require Ms. Walker and her attorneys "to rely on the truth" of testimony and other evidence provided by the opposing party. Although not pivotal to our decision, we wish to make clear that in conducting our review we do not assume the legal conclusions set forth in paragraph 17 are true.
[¶10] Second, for the purposes of this opinion, we use the term "fraud" to refer to Ms. Walker's "Fraud" claim against Mr. Dowlin. That claim is not predicated upon violation of the duties allegedly created by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 or W.R.C.P. 60(b), but appears to be analogous to common law fraud. The fraud claim was not dismissed by the district court and remains pending. Because her fraud claim is not before us, we make no comment as to whether it is viable under Wyoming law. We use the term "fraud on the court" to refer to Ms. Walker's claim that a tort duty originates from W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401. We note that some courts in other contexts may mean something different in their use of the term. E.g., Billington v. Billington,
[¶12] As mentioned previously, Ms. Walker's "fraud on the court" claim is predicated upon alleged duties created solely by W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401. We must review the rule and statute to see if they support her position. W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides relief from judgments under certain cireumstances:
On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (8) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.... This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding as provided by statute.... [The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
This rule allows a party to obtain relief from a judgment by motion, but it also recognizes that a party may seek relief from a judgment by "independent action to relieve a party from a judgment ... as provided by statute." Id. Ms. Walker has chosen to proceed by independent action. As the statutory basis for her independent action, Ms. Walker relies solely upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401(a), which states as follows:
A district court may vacate or modify its own judgment or order after the term at which it was made: ... G@v)[flor fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining a judgment or order|[.]
[¶13] The statute plainly provides that the available remedy is vacation or modification of a judgment or order. Ms. Walker does not ask to vacate or modify the divorce court's judgment. Instead, she seeks monetary damages, a remedy not available under either the statute or the rule. Further, nothing in the language of the statute or the rule creates any tort duty that Mr. Dowlin owes to the court or to Ms. Walker. Compare Hulse v. First Am. Title Co.,
By the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, [Ms. Walker]'s claim must be dismissed.... [Tihe statute does not address imposing liability on another for any damages that [Ms. Walker] believes she suffered by way of what the divorce court awarded her and what she believes it would have awarded her had certain acts not occurred.
[ ¶4] We now turn our attention to cases from other jurisdictions that Ms. Walker claims support her fraud on the court claim. There is a wealth of authority from other jurisdictions - contradicting Ms. Walker's claim that there should be a new cause of action where a defendant's misrepresentations to a court result in a less favorable judgment for the plaintiff. See, eg., Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr.,
[T15] MacArthur v. Miltich,
[T 16] In St. Pierre v. Edmonds,
[T17] In Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell,
[¶18] Ms. Walker apparently overlooked Cresswell's subsequent history. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' action was not one at law, regardless of how it was pleaded, but was instead equitable in nature. Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell,
[¶19] In this case, we are particularly troubled by Ms. Walker's position that she is entitled to bring a tort claim to recover compensatory damages based on a property division in a divorce. Her alleged compensatory damages are the difference between what she received in the divorce proceeding and the amount she believes she would have received absent the alleged fraud. In other words, she wishes to have a jury in her tort proceeding decide the fundamentally equitable issue of dividing property in a divorce. This would improperly remove the question of equitable property division from the Judge's hands-where it properly belongs.
[T20] As we have said before, "[a] civil action in tort is fundamentally different from a divorcee proceeding. The issues involved in each are entirely distinct." McCulloh, 28,
[¶21] Our decision is also supported by our policy of finality of judgments. We have previously recognized
the interest held by society in having differences conclusively resolved in a single action thereby avoiding the vexation and expense which are associated with piecemeal litigation. The necessity for sustaining this social interest is the justification for the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.... These doctrines ... promote the reliance by citizens of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they conserve judicial resources.
Delgue v. Curutchet,
[Tirials are time-consuming and costly proceedings and while a litigant is entitled to a fair trial, certain it is that he has responsibilities to assist the trial court in bringing about such a result. It will not do to permit a litigant to remain mute and speculate on the outcome of a jury trial on the record made with knowledge of irregularities or improprieties therein that might readily and easily have been corrected during the trial and then, when misfortune comes his way, to attempt to set the invited result aside by way of a new trial because of such matters. It is not fitting for the trial court or this court knowingly to reward or condone such conduct. As so aptly stated by Judge Rossman in Fischer v. Howard,201 Or. 426 ,271 P.2d 1059 , 1063,49 A.L.R.2d 1301 , a loser should not by design get "two bites at the cherry."
DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo.,
[¶22] Ms. Walker obviously knew of some of the alleged fraudulent behaviors at the time of the divorce hearing because she filed her first complaint before the divorce trial. Moreover, she filed her amended complaint alleging the remaining misconduct between the time the divorcee court issued its decision letter and the final divorcee decree. We will not allow litigants to "sit on" useful information in one proceeding in order to collaterally attack the result in a subsequent action. We do not now directly rely on res judicata, collateral estoppel, or Ms. Walker's failure to contest any improprieties in the divorcee court. Nevertheless, the very same policies behind these doctrines support today's result.
CONCLUSION
[¶23] Both W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401 provide a remedy to a litigant alleging that a judgment has been obtained fraudulently. The litigant may seek relief from the judgment in the form of modification or revocation of that judgment. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Ms. Walker has apparently chosen not to seek the relief authorized by W.R.C.P. 60(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401(a). Instead, she seeks an award of damages from a jury. There is no language in the rule or the statute that establishes a duty giving rise to a tort cause of action for damages, nor do any cases from Wyoming or other jurisdictions support the result Ms. Walker desires.
[¶24] Affirmed.
Notes
. For the sake of convenience, we refer to the "district court" as the court from which this appeal is taken. We refer to the district court entering the decree of divorce and dividing the parties' marital property as the "divorce court."
. Ms. Walker's claims against Mr. Howard were dismissed, and he is not a party to this appeal.