Dowie v. DriscollDowie v. Driscoll
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hand
delivered the opinion of the court:
It is first contended that the court improperly instructed the jury as to the law. It appears from the record that the chancellor did not base the decree entered by him in this case upon the findings of the jury alone, but based the same upon his own conclusions as to the facts, which conclusions were reached by him from a full consideration of all the evidence in the case, and that the findings of fact by the jury were, at most, treated by him as only advisory. Where, in a case like this, the findings of the jury are accepted by the chancellor only as advisory, and it appears the decree was rendered upon the consideration by the chancellor of all the evidence produced by the respective parties, the fact that the jury may have been misdirected as to the law is not ground for reversal. (Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523; Kinnah v. Kinnah, 184 id. 284; Ring v. Lawless, 190 id. 520.) In the case of Guild v. Hull, supra, it was held (p. 530): “In chancery cases, except in cases where the submission to a jury is required by law or the rules of chancery practice, the chancellor is
It is next contended that the court erred in its rulings as to the admission of evidence offered upon behalf of appellee, the main contention being that the court erred in allowing the evidence of Mary Tindall and Orlando Tindall, given in the county court before the jury upon the hearing as to the mental condition of Mary Tindall which resulted in the appointment of the appellee as conservator, to be read to the jury upon this trial. The testimony of Mary Tindall, given at that time, was not offered for the purpose of impeaching the deed, transfer and trust agreement, but for the purpose of showing her mental condition at the time of the execution thereof. While the declarations of a testator or grantor, made before or after the execution of a will or deed, are not admissible to show undue influence or fraud, they are admissible to prove the mental condition of the testator or grantor at the time of the execution of the instrument sought to be set aside; if not made at too remote a period prior to or subsequent to the execution thereof. (Massey v. Huntington, 118 Ill. 80; Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 id. 625; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157; 62 Am. Dec. 71.) Here the instruments were executed on August 5 and the inquisition of insanity was held in the
The testimony of Orlando L. Tindall, given at the hearing in the county court, was objected to on the ground that he was not jointly interested in the subject matter of this suit with his co-defendants and that admissions made by him were not binding on them. -Under the authority of McMillan v. McDill, 110 Ill. 47, Campbell v. Campbell, 138 id. 612, and Boyle v. Boyle, 158 id. 228, we think this testimony should have been excluded. The presumption, however, is, that the chancellor only considered such testimony as was competent and disregarded such as was incompetent. (Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Ill. 154; VanVleet v. DeWitt, 200 id. 153.) In the latter case it was said (p. 156): “The hearing was before the chancellor, and the rule is, that in such case this court will not reverse for errors in the admission of testimony, unless it appears that the decree cannot be sustained except upon consideration of the incompetent testimony, (Yarde v. Yarde, 187 Ill. 636,) the presumption being that the chancellor considered only competent evidence in arriving at the findings embodied in the decree.” As there is ample evidence in this record to sustain the decree without considering the objectionable evidence, we are of the opinion the admission thereof does not constitute reversible error.
It is further contended that the evidence does not sustain the decree. The evidence was mainly heard in open court and is conflicting, and the chancellor having seen the witnesses and heard them testify, was in a much better position to judge which witnesses were worthy of belief than we are from a perusal of their testimony when written out and read by us in the record. It has been wisely settled in chancery cases that a court of review will not disturb the findings of fact of the chancellor unless it is apparent error has been committed, and the rule thus
It appears from this record that Mary Tindall was very aged and quite infirm at the time the transfers sought to be impeached were made; that the appellant Elizabeth T. Milner lived with her and cared for her and that Orlando L. Tindall and his wife frequently visited her; that they, as well as Mary Tindall, were followers of Dowie and believed in his teachings. It .is apparent from the situation of the parties that the relation of the appellants to Mary Tindall was such that great confidence was reposed in them by her, and that the transfer of her property to Dowie and the execution of said trust agreement were greatly to the advantage of the appellants and
The doctrine repeatedly announced by this court is, that courts of equity “will scrutinize with the most jealous vigilance” transactions between parties occupying fiduciary relations toward each other, (Casey v. Casey, 14 Ill. 112,) and that the burden of proof is on the befieficiary, in such cases, to establish the fairness of the transaction, and that it did not proceed from undue influence. (Jennings v. McConnel, 17 Ill. 148; Zeigler v. Hughes, 55 id. 288; Ward v. Armstrong, 84 id. 151; Wickiser v. Cook, 85 id. 68.) In Sands v. Sands, 112 Ill. 225, on page 232 it was
We have examined this record with care, and in view of the fact that the burden was upon the appellants to show that the transfers made to Dowie by Mary Tindall were not brought about by reason of undue influence exerted by them over her, growing out of the fiduciary relations which they sustained to her, and as the evidence was conflicting and the chancellor had, by reason of seeing and hearing most of the witnesses while testifying, a much better opportunity than we to judge of the weight to be given to their testimony, we are unable to say that the decree is manifestly unsupported by the ¡.evidence. Kinnah v. Kinnah, supra.
The decree of the circuit court will be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.