Plaintiff, the insured, appeals a general judgment in favor of defendant, Oregon Mutual Insurance Company, after the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was insured under a motor vehicle insurance policy issued by defendant. As statutorily required, plaintiffs insurance policy included personal injury protection (PIP) coverage, which is Oregon’s version of “no fault” motor vehicle insurance.
“(1) Personal injury protection benefits as required by ORS 742.520 shall consist of the following payments for the injury or death of each person:
“(a) All reasonable and necessary expenses of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services incurred within one year after the date of the person’s injury, but not more than $15,000 in the aggregate for all such expenses of the person. Expenses of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services shall be presumed to be reasonable and necessary unless the provider is given notice of denial of the charges not more than 60 calendar days after the insurer receives from the provider notice of the claim for the services. At any time during the first 50 calendar days after the insurer receives notice of claim, the provider shall, within 10 business days, answer in writing questions from the insurer regarding the claim. For purposes of determining when the 60-day period provided by this paragraph has elapsed, counting of days shall be suspended if the provider does not supply written*674 answers to the insurer within 10 days and may not resume until the answers are supplied.”
ORS 742.524(l)(a).
In 2008, while insured by defendant, plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and she applied for PIP medical benefits, which defendant paid. She also incurred $430.67 in expenses for transportation to attend medical appointments and to obtain medication, but defendant declined to pay those expenses.
Plaintiff then initiated this action by filing, individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, a complaint for breach of contract against defendant. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that her claim for medical expenses under ORS 742.524(l)(a) included the expense of transportation to attend medical appointments and to obtain medication, and that defendant breached its contract by failing to reimburse her for those expenses. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that ORS 742.524(l)(a) did not require it to pay plaintiffs transportation expenses. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment in favor of defendant.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. That ruling involves interpretation of a statute, which we review for legal error. See State v. Thompson,
Plaintiff argues that the phrase “expenses of medical * * * services” in ORS 742.524(l)(a) includes the expense of transportation to obtain those services. She first states that “the legislature did not intend to limit payment of medical expenses solely to the narrow list of medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services.”
Defendant responds that the phrase “expenses of medical *** services” does not include the expense of transportation to obtain those services. Defendant argues that, under ORS 742.524(l)(a), PIP benefits are limited to payments for certain “services” — namely, “medical, hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance and prosthetic services [.]” Defendant also argues that ORS 742.524(l)(a) “contemplates
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to discern legislative intent. State v. Gaines,
To resolve the parties’ dispute, we first focus on four statutory terms: “expenses,” “of,” “medical,” and “services.” ORS 742.524(1)(a). None of those terms are statutorily defined, so we look to the dictionary. “Expense” may be defined as “something that is expended in order to secure a benefit or bring about a result [.]” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 800 (unabridged ed 2002). “Of’ may be defined as “relating to : with reference to : as regards : about [.]” Id. at 1565 (boldface in original). “Medical” may be defined as “of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or with the practice of medicine often as distinguished from surgery [,]” and “medicine” may be defined as “the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health, and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease [.]” Id. at 1402. “Service” may
That construction is supported by context
When we consider the entire text of ORS 742.524(l)(a), along with the definition of the term “provider” as set forth in ORS 742.518(10) and ORS 743.801(13), we infer that the legislature did not intend the phrase “expenses of medical *** services” to include the expense of transportation to obtain those services. ORS 742.524(l)(a) not only lists the services that an insurer is required to cover, regardless of fault, when an insured is involved in a motor vehicle accident, but also contemplates that those services will be provided by a “provider.” We note that the definition of “provider” in ORS 743.801(13) uses the term “means,” which “is used in the definition if the definition restricts or limits the meaning of a word.” State v. Fox,
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that ORS 742.524(l)(a) does not require defendant to pay plaintiffs expenses for transportation to attend medical appointments and to obtain medication. The trial court did not err when it granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
Notes
See ORS 742.520(1) (requiring motor vehicle liability policies to provide certain PIP benefits); Perez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.,
ORS 742.524(l)(a) was amended in 2009. Or Laws 2009, ch 66, § 1. That amendment does not affect our analysis in this case. For simplicity, throughout this opinion, we refer to the current version of the statute.
As noted above, ORS 742.520(1) requires motor vehicle liability policies to provide certain PIP benefits. In their briefs, the parties refer to the language of plaintiff’s automobile policy, which, according to the parties, essentially mirrors the text of ORS 742.524(l)(a). The parties agree that defendant’s obligation to plaintiff is controlled by ORS 742.524(l)(a). Thus, for the purpose of our analysis, the resolution of this case depends on the proper interpretation of ORS 742.524(1)(a). See To v. State Farm Mutual Ins.,
Plaintiff then argues that doing so “would exclude many types of treatments for car crash injuries such as medication, mental health counseling, medical equipment like crutches, walkers and wheelchairs, physical therapy, acupuncture and chiropractic treatment that technically are not services medical doctors perform, and medical supplies, such as bandages and slings.” Because, in this case, the issue is whether ORS 742.524(l)(a) requires defendant to pay plaintiffs expenses for transportation to attend medical appointments and to obtain medication, we decline to address that argument.
The parties also engage in textual arguments involving the Internal Revenue Code, Oregon’s workers’ compensation law, and workers’ compensation laws from other states — arguments suggesting that those statutes provide context for our interpretation of ORS 742.524(l)(a). However, the parties do not cogently explain, or meaningfully develop an argument, how those sources of authority provide useful context to interpret the text of ORS 742.524(l)(a). Accordingly, we decline to look to those statutes as context for interpreting the provisions of ORS 742.524(l)(a).