ROY G. DOWDY v. FIELDCREST MILLS, INC.
No. 21PA83
IN THE SUPREME COURT
(Filed 7 July 1983)
308 N.C. 701 | 299 N.C. 126 | 261 S.E. 2d 803
Furthermore, there is no “good faith” exception to the Edwards holding. The officers who questioned Edwards had no actual knowledge that he had invoked his right to counsel,4 just as Officer Styron had no actual knowledge in the instant case.
I do not reach the question of whether defendant‘s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been violated because I believe the confession must be excluded under Edwards and Miranda.
I also dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that no error was committed in death qualifying the jury for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E. 2d 803 (1980).
I concur in the majority‘s treatment of the corpus delicti issue.
*
1. Master and Servant §§ 68, 91- workers’ compensation - occupational disease-statute of limitations
The two year time limit under
Findings of jurisdictional fact by the Industrial Commission are not conclusive upon appeal even though supported by evidence in the record, and when a defendant employer challenges the jurisdiction of the Commission, any reviewing court, including the Supreme Court, has the duty to make its own independent findings of jurisdictional facts from its consideration of the entire record.
3. Master and Servant §§ 68, 91- workers’ compensation - occupational disease-statute of limitations
The two year period within which claims for benefits for an occupational disease must be filed under
4. Master and Servant § 68- workers’ compensation-claim for occupational disease not timely filed
Plaintiff was disabled from an occupational disease within the meaning of
5. Master and Servant § 68- workers’ compensation-chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis
For purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis.
6. Master and Servant § 68- workers’ compensation-occupational disease-information from medical authority on nature and work related cause
Even though one doctor informed defendant that he had chronic obstructive lung disease and another doctor told defendant that he suffered from byssinosis, plaintiff was sufficiently informed by competent medical authority of the nature and work related cause of his disease where both doctors informed plaintiff that his disease severely restricted his ability to breathe and that the disease obstructing his lungs and reducing his ability to breathe was related to cotton dust in his work environment at defendant‘s mill.
The single claim rule applies equally to cases involving injury by accident and cases involving injury by occupational disease, and the two year time limitation for filing claims prescribed in
8. Master and Servant §§ 68, 91- workers’ compensation - occupational disease-no estoppel to assert untimely filing of claim
Defendant employer was not equitably estopped from asserting plaintiff‘s failure to file his claim for an occupational disease within the applicable two year period where the record shows that defendant at no time attempted to conceal the plaintiff‘s condition from him or to mislead him with regard to his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and the evidence shows that a medical employee of defendant specifically advised plaintiff to leave his employment with defendant and file a claim for disability benefits under the Act.
Justice MEYER concurring in result.
Chief Justice BRANCH and Justice COPELAND join in this concurring opinion.
ON discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 59 N.C. App. 696, 298 S.E. 2d 82 (1982), affirming the North Carolina Industrial Commission‘s order and award of compensation for the claimant.
On 24 February 1978, the claimant plaintiff, Roy G. Dowdy, Sr., filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits for an occupational lung disease caused by exposure to cotton dust in his employment. On 30 May 1978, the defendant employer filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to file his claim within the time allowed under
Deputy Commissioner Ben E. Roney, Jr. entered an opinion and award on 14 April 1981 awarding the plaintiff $20,000 as compensation for damage to his lungs. Both parties appealed to the Full Commission.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The plaintiff filed cross assignments of error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of the Industrial Commission. On 8 March 1983, the Supreme Court allowed the defendant‘s petition for discretionary review.
Michaels and Jernigan, by Leonard T. Jernigan, Jr. and Paul J. Michaels, for plaintiff appellee.
Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by J. Donald Cowan, Jr. and Caroline Hudson, for defendant appellant.
MITCHELL, Justice.
The primary issues presented by this case are whether the plaintiff filed his claim within the time prescribed by
The defendant assigns as error the entry of the order and award for the plaintiff by the Industrial Commission. In support of this assignment, the defendant contends that the Industrial Commission was without authority to enter the award as the plaintiff‘s claim was filed more than two years after his disability arose and was barred by
[1] Subsection (c) of
[2] Except as to questions of jurisdiction, findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence even though there is evidence to support contrary findings.
Both the Industrial Commission and the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff was disabled at the time he quit his job with the defendant on 1 March 1976 because of health problems. The Industrial Commission and the Court of Appeals also found that the two year time limit for filing claims under
The record before us on appeal reveals, inter alia, that the plaintiff was born on 1 April 1921 and completed the sixth grade in public school. He began work in the card room at Dan River Mills in 1936 where he was exposed to cotton dust. He worked continuously in the card room, exposed to thick cotton dust in the
[3] In Taylor v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E. 2d 144 (1980), we indicated that sections (b) and (c) of
[4] In order to perform our duty of determining necessary jurisdictional facts in this case, it is necessary for this Court to determine at what time all of the factors referred to in Taylor first existed. In finding these jurisdictional facts, we must now turn to a review of the entire record.
We first must determine when the plaintiff initially “suffered injury from an occupational disease.” The defendant sent the plaintiff to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to be examined by Dr. Mario C. Battigelli in February, 1973. The written report of Dr. Battigelli‘s examination of the plaintiff reveals inter alia the following:
Impression: Obstructive disease in cigarette smoker with distinct aggravation on cotton dust exposure.
PATIENT: Encouraged to discontinue smoking and dust exposure and follow bronchial drainage treatment a half an hour each day.
In conclusion this patient is severely disabled and he should not be exposed any further to air borne irritants namely cigarette smoke and industrial dust. He presents a well documented degree of respiratory impairment of moderate to severe extent, and he is entitled to a total disability rating on respiratory grounds. The etiology of such an impairment is probably due to in part to the cotton dust exposure in spite of the fact that the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted in view of the only occasional occurrence of complaints in relation to cotton dust exposure. If this subject has byssinosis this problem appears only an addition rather than the substance of his present impairment.
The defendant himself testified that he had first noticed his breathing problem before 1973, but “I thought it would get better.” He also testified that:
I first noticed that I was experiencing any breathing problem in about 1970. I thought I could shake it off, and again back in 1973 I think they brought the blowing machine through the mill and that‘s when they really found out that I was bad. I had no breath. Dr. Springer, the company doctor, got me to see Dr. Battigelli.
In the early ‘70‘s, on Mondays and Tuesdays I would tighten up. Then it would let off a little. I would push through the week and get out and get a little air and loosen up and go back. By 1973 it got bad. That‘s why Dr. Springer wanted me to go to Chapel Hill to Dr. Battigelli.
The record reveals that the plaintiff also testified to the following facts:
Q. Now, Mr. Dowdy, I want to go back to 1973 when you went down to Chapel Hill to see Dr. Battigelli. You remember doing that?
A. Yeah, I remember that.
Q. Okay, were you having problems with your breathing pretty bad at that time?
Q. Did it cause you to miss some time from work?
A. Yes.
Q. Both before and after you went to the hospital at Chapel Hill to see Dr. Battigelli you were having to miss time from work because of your breathing problems, weren‘t you?
A. That‘s right.
It is clear in this case, as it was in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E. 2d 359, 369 (1983), that if the plaintiff had an occupational disease in 1973 it was a chronic obstructive lung disease, which may be an occupational disease under
[C]hronic obstructive lung disease may be an occupational disease provided the occupation in question exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting this disease than members of the public generally, and provided the worker‘s exposure to cotton dust significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease‘s development. This is so even if other non-work-related factors also make significant contributions, or were significant causal factors.
Id. at 101, 301 S.E. 2d at 369-70. Dr. Battigelli‘s report tended to show that the plaintiff‘s disease was “probably due in part to cotton dust exposure” and that there was “distinct aggravation” of his symptoms when exposed to cotton dust. When viewed in light of the testimony by the plaintiff and others that the plaintiff‘s condition became substantially worse each time he was exposed to cotton dust, this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff‘s exposure to cotton dust in his employment significantly contributed to or was a significant causal factor in the disease.
We find that the plaintiff suffered from a chronic obstructive lung disease in 1973. We further find that the plaintiff‘s employment with the defendant exposed him to a greater risk of contracting this disease than members of the public generally and that his exposure to cotton dust in his employment with the defendant significantly contributed to and was a significant causal
In making our findings in this regard, we have reviewed the entire record and considered the medical evidence, the extent of the plaintiff‘s exposure to cotton dust during his employment, the manner in which his disease developed with reference to his work history and the other factors which we have indicated may be considered in making such findings. See generally Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E. 2d 359 (1983).
We must next determine when the plaintiff‘s occupational disease rendered him incapable of earning the wages he was receiving at the time of his incapacity by injury from the occupational disease. We find that the plaintiff was rendered incapable of earning such wages no later than 1974.
The plaintiff testified that both before and after his 1973 visit to Dr. Battigelli he was having to miss time from work because of his breathing problems. The plaintiff also testified that, despite the fact that an ordinary work week for one in his position with the defendant involved forty hours, he was often unable to work forty hours a week. He indicated that during that first quarter of 1974, he sometimes worked sixteen hours a week, sometimes twenty hours a week and sometimes twenty-four hours a week. He indicated that his breathing problems prevented him from working more hours at that time. He was asked, “And those are the breathing problems that we are here about today and is the subject of your claim. Is that right?” The plaintiff answered, “That‘s right.” The plaintiff also specifically stated that he was not paid for the time he missed from work by reason of his breathing problems.
The plaintiff contends that such evidence does not indicate that he was incapable of earning the wages he was receiving at the time of his first incapacity by injury from the occupational disease. He argues that he was at all times still receiving the same hourly wage he had previously received and, therefore, that he had not lost his capacity to earn wages. He also argues that the fact that he was able to work forty hours or more during several weeks in 1974, 1975 and 1976 establishes that he had not lost his capacity to earn wages. Such arguments may be relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff had been rendered totally
The plaintiff also argues that there was no evidence tending to show that after his injury he was incapable of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment. We disagree.
A review of the entire record in the present case reveals that, beginning with the first quarter of 1974, the plaintiff was frequently unable to work a full forty hour week. In 1973, the plaintiff was 52 years old and had a sixth grade education. He had lost his right foot in a streetcar accident early in his life. His only job experience had been working in the card room of a textile mill. When these facts are viewed in light of Dr. Battigelli‘s conclusion in 1973 that the plaintiff “is entitled to a total disability rating on respiratory grounds,” the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that no later than 1974 the plaintiff was incapable of earning the same wages, either in the same or any other employment, that he had received before his injury. See Little v. Food Service, 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E. 2d 743 (1978). Having reviewed the entire record, we so find.
We must next decide when the plaintiff was first informed by competent medical authority of the nature and work related cause of his occupational disease. When Dr. Battigelli examined the plaintiff in Chapel Hill in 1973, he discussed the nature and work related cause of the plaintiff‘s occupational disease with the plaintiff. The plaintiff testified that, “I don‘t know whether he said byssinosis there or not, but he told my wife I needed a lot of help.” The plaintiff was then asked the following question and gave the following answer:
Q: Did he tell you your breathing problem was related to the dust at Fieldcrest? Did he tell you not to work and told you your breathing problem was related to the dust at Fieldcrest?
A: Right.
The plaintiff further testified that, sometime after he returned to work in the defendant‘s mill after seeing Dr. Battigelli in 1973, Dr. Springer advised the plaintiff that he had byssinosis. The plaintiff was uncertain of the date on which this occurred. He testified that Dr. Springer told him “to file a claim; he gave me a leave of absence and he said he didn‘t think I would be back. He wrote it out for me to give to Fieldcrest.” The plaintiff then identified Defendant‘s Exhibit B as being the paper which Dr. Springer had given him on this occasion. That paper reveals on its face a stamp mark bearing the word “MEDICAL” and a date of June 17, 1974. It reads in its entirety:
JOSEPH G. SPRINGER, M.D.
To Whom it may Concern:
I am recommending that Mr. Roy Dowdy be placed on a medical leave of absence for 3 to 6 months to see if he gets any better out of the cotton dust environment.
In the event that he improves, which I doubt, I have advised him to:
- Apply for Soc. Sec. disability retirement
- Dan River - pension
- Va. Workmen‘s Comp for byssinosis
- Fieldcrest disability retirement
- N. Car. Work Comp disability due to byssinosis
Sincerely,
s/ J. G. Springer, M.D.
This evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff was notified by Dr. Springer in 1974 that he had and was disabled by byssinosis
[5] We do not think that the fact that Dr. Springer informed the plaintiff that he had byssinosis rather than chronic obstructive lung disease is determinative. We have indicated that both chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis are occupational diseases when the occupation in question exposes the injured worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than members of the public generally and when the worker‘s exposure to cotton dust significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the development of the disease. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E. 2d 359 (1983). Thus, we think it unimportant here to determine whether byssinosis is a particular type of chronic obstructive lung disease or a separate disease often found in conjunction with or evolving from chronic obstructive lung disease. For purposes of awarding worker‘s compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis. The simple fact is that both impair the worker‘s ability to breathe. Whether either will be compensable depends upon a showing of the factors set forth in Rutledge.
[6] Similarly, the fact that Dr. Springer told the defendant that he had byssinosis, when Dr. Battigelli may still have thought the disease was chronic obstructive lung disease not involving byssinosis or involving byssinosis only in addition to the chronic obstructive lung disease already causing the plaintiff‘s impairment, is not determinative of whether Dr. Springer gave the plaintiff notice of the “nature” and “work-related cause” of his occupational disease in 1974. Both Dr. Battigelli in 1973 and Dr. Springer in 1974 informed the plaintiff that his disease severely restricted his ability to breathe. This informed him of the “nature” of the disease. Both Dr. Battigelli in 1973 and Dr. Springer in 1974 informed the plaintiff that the disease obstructing his lungs and reducing his ability to breathe was related to cotton dust in his work environment at the defendant‘s mill. This informed the plaintiff of the “work-related cause” of his occupational disease. Therefore, each doctor informed the plaintiff - by whatever name the individual doctor called the disease-of the nature and work related cause of his occupational disease. No
We have found that the three factors identified in Taylor as triggering the onset of the two year period prescribed in
[7] The plaintiff further contends, however, that he was at worst partially permanently disabled prior to 1976, and that he was not totally permanently disabled until he left employment with the defendant during that year. He argues that the two year time limitation for filing claims prescribed by
We note that the evidence before the Industrial Commission would have justified a determination that the plaintiff was per-
All of the evidence in the record indicates that the plaintiff was at least permanently partially disabled by reason of his occupational disease no later than 1974, and we have so found. An accident or occupational disease resulting in compensable injuries to an employee gives rise to only one right of action or claim. See Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 119, 95 S.E. 2d 559, 561 (1956). The employee is required to file but a single claim, and the amount of compensation payable is predicated on the extent of the disability resulting from the accident or occupational disease. Wilhite v. Veneer Co., 303 N.C. 281, 284, 278 S.E. 2d 234, 236 (1981).
In Taylor v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. at 98-99, 265 S.E. 2d at 147, we held that the two year time limitation upon filing claims prescribed in
More to the point,
The plaintiff correctly notes that Wilhite v. Veneer Co., 303 N.C. 281, 278 S.E. 2d 234 (1981) and Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 95 S.E. 2d 559 (1956) were cases involving claims for injuries by accident. He contends that the single claim rule applied in those cases should not be extended to cases involving injuries by occupational disease. We find nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act tending to indicate that the legislature intended any such distinction, and we conclude that the single claim rule applies equally to cases involving injury by accident and cases involving injury by occupational disease.
The plaintiff additionally contends that Smith v. American and Efird Mills, 51 N.C. App. 480, 277 S.E. 2d 83 (1981), modified and affirmed, 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E. 2d 634 (1982) controls the present case and requires a holding that the two year time limitation for filing claims prescribed in
The plaintiff was at least suffering from permanent partial disability no later than 1974, and the triggering factors described in Taylor v. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E. 2d 144 (1980) had all occurred at that time. Assuming arguendo that he was only partially permanently disabled at that time, he could have filed a valid claim for such partial disability under
The plaintiff chose not to file his single claim within the two years prescribed in
[8] The plaintiff additionally contends that the defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting the plaintiff‘s failure to file his claim within the two year period for filing claims. In the present case, there is no evidence suggesting that the defendant employer engaged in false representations or in the concealment of material facts reasonably calculated to mislead the plaintiff. To the contrary, the entire record reveals that the defendant at no time attempted to conceal the plaintiff‘s condition from him or to mislead him with regard to his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The evidence in fact reveals that Dr. Springer, an employee of the defendant, specifically advised the plaintiff in 1974 to leave his employment with the defendant and file a claim for disability benefits under the Act. Therefore, we do not reach the question of whether a party can or cannot be estopped to attack the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, since the evidence in the present case does not cause the question to arise. See Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E. 2d 673 (1956); Poythress v. J. P. Stevens, 54 N.C. App. 376, 283 S.E. 2d 573 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 153, 289 S.E. 2d 380 (1982); Barham v. Hosiery Co., 15 N.C. App. 519, 190 S.E. 2d 306 (1972).
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this action is remanded to that Court with instructions that it remand the action to the Industrial Commission with directions to enter an order setting aside its order and award for the plaintiff and dismissing the proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.
I concur in the result reached by the majority that the claimant‘s failure to file his claim within the time prescribed by
In 1974 Dr. Springer had made a finding of disablement by reason of the occupational disease, byssinosis, and advised claimant to apply for workers’ compensation for byssinosis in the State of Virginia. The majority concedes as much by its statement that:
This evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff was notified by Dr. Springer in 1974 that he had and was disabled by byssinosis and that disability due to byssinosis was of a sufficient nature and work related cause to entitle him to workers’ compensation disability benefits.
The majority further concedes that by Dr. Springer‘s report “... the plaintiff was informed by competent medical authority of the nature and work related cause of his occupational disease no later than 1974.”
I also believe that on the record before us 1974 was the first year in which the claimant‘s evidence of inability to work for extended periods of time demonstrates a total disability. The majority so concedes in stating that “the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that no later than 1974 the plaintiff was incapable of earning the same wages, either in the same or any other employment....”
We have found that the three factors identified in Taylor as triggering the onset of the two year period prescribed by
G.S. 97-58(c) for filing claims in the case of an occupational disease all came into being no later than 1974. (Emphasis added.)
In order to find that claimant had an occupational disease (one of the Taylor factors) as early as 1973, the majority has found it necessary to rely heavily upon Rutledge. Not only is reliance on Rutledge ill advised, but in light of the majority‘s conclusion that the critical date is 1974, it is completely unnecessary. Nevertheless, in view of the majority‘s inexplicable reliance on the Rutledge rationale, I am further compelled to disagree with the majority‘s reasoning in reaching its conclusion that claimant had an “occupational disease” in 1973.
The only medical evidence of claimant‘s condition in 1973 was Dr. Battigelli‘s report. It is clear that his report concludes that the claimant was severely and totally disabled and that he should not thereafter be exposed to “air borne irritants” such as “cigarette smoke and industrial dust.” It is likewise clear from that report that claimant‘s respiratory impairment was probably due “in part” to cotton dust exposure. It is not clear (and the majority in my view is not justified in finding) that the impairment resulted from an “occupational disease.” Dr. Battigelli specifically reported in 1973 that “the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted” and that “[if] this subject has byssinosis this problem appears only an addition rather than the substance of his present impairment.” Dr. Battigelli‘s diagnosis was “[o]bstructive disease in cigarette smoker with distinct aggravation on cotton dust exposure.” I do not find it significant that the claimant‘s “obstructive disease” was aggravated by exposure to cotton dust. It was clearly also aggravated by cigarette smoke and presumably by other “airborne irritants.” Dr. Battigelli clearly “encouraged” the claimant to “discontinue smoking and dust exposure.” This limited medical evidence of the cause of claimant‘s disablement does not justify a finding that the claimant had an “occupational disease” in 1973.
The etiology of [claimant‘s] impairment is probably due to in part to the cotton dust exposure in spite of the fact that the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted in view of the only occasional occurrence of complaints in relation to cotton dust exposure. If this subject has byssinosis this problem appears only an addition rather than the substance of his present impairment.
I continue to adhere to my position that there is no basis in law or in fact for the proposition that “for the purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits, there is no practical difference between chronic obstructive lung disease and byssinosis.” There is indeed a vast practical difference in “chronic obstructive lung disease” and “byssinosis.” Chronic obstructive lung disease can be due solely to any one or a combination of diseases such as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, etc., which may be totally unrelated to an individual‘s occupation. It is correct to say that whether chronic obstructive lung disease is compensable depends upon other factors. In my view those factors are aggravation or extenuation by conditions of the workplace and not, as the majority says, “factors set forth in Rutledge.”
I find it totally unnecessary to rely on Rutledge to justify a finding of “occupational disease” in this case in 1973 when it was so clearly present, in connection with the other factors set forth in Taylor, in 1974.
Chief Justice BRANCH and Justice COPELAND join in this concurring opinion.