The defendants’ contention that until notice to> them there was no liability on their part for damage to the plaintiff’s plants from gas escaрing from a leaky pipe and penetrating and pervading his greenhouses, cannot be sustained as a matter of law. It was the use of the pipe for the transmission and distribution of gas, and nоt the pipe itself, that constituted the nuisance. For the mere maintenance of the рipe as such,— it having been laid before the acquisition of the defendants’ title and not being а nuisance
per
se,— they might not be liable without notice; but when they acquired title to the pipe they immediately became chargeable, as its owners and users, with the personal duty or
*315
obligation cast upon them by tbe law to keep it in a reasonably safe condition and so usе it as not unnecessarily to injure the property or endanger the safety of the plaintiff or others, and if they failed to do so, the law properly renders them liable for the consequences in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had laid the pipe themsеlves.
Monroe
v.
Lumber Co.,
68 N. H. 89;
Coupland
v.
Hardingham,
3 Camp. 398;
Gray
v.
Gas Light Co.,
Nor can the defendants protect themselves from liability for injury to the plaintiff’s plants until аfter notice, merely on the ground that they did not in fact know the pipe was defective or that gas was escaping from it into his greenhouses. They were bound to guard against both of thesе things by exercising the proper care required under the circumstances; and unless they did exercise such care, they are responsible for any resulting injury, irrespective of notice. In other words, the question of the defendants’ liability is not dependent upon their knowledge of thе pipe’s defective condition or the escaping gas, but upon the observancе or neglect of care by them (Monroe v. Lumber Co., supra; Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55, 57; Cool. Torts 570); and as it is found that “ there was no evidence that any of thе defendants’ officers or incorporators had knowledge of the negligent construction which caused the break, or any reason to suppose that such break existed or thаt gas was escaping, until March 22,” and that “ unless chargeable with the original defective construction, or bound in commencing the operation of the works to know that the pipes were whole or properly laid, the defendants were guilty of no negligence until after notiсe,” these findings must be regarded as settling their liability in respect of care up to that time, and thе plaintiff’s recovery must be restricted accordingly to the damage subsequently accruing.
The special damages claimed and allowed for the injury to the plaintiff’s business reputatiоn, on account of his sales of damaged plants, were not properly recovеrable and must be disallowed as too remote.
There are cases, undoubtedly, where thе tort complained of is of such a nature that the law will not nicely attempt to limit the amоunt of reparation, but will extend the line of relief so as to embrace all the consequences of the wrongdoer’s conduct, although quite remote from the original transaction; but as a general rule, it may be said that in cases of tort without special aggravation, whеre the conduct of the defendant cannot be *316 considered so morally wrong or grossly negligent as to give a right to exemplary or vindictive damages, the extent of the plaintiff’s remuneration is restricted to such damages as are the legal and natural consequences of the defendant’s wrongful act. 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th ed.) 144, and authorities cited. This rule has been recognized in a multitude of cases; and when applied to the present ease, it renders the injury to thе plaintiff’s reputation far too remote for legitimate compensation. The full damаge to the plaintiff’s plants was a proper matter for inquiry, but the consequence to his reputation resulting from a sale of the plants to his customers, “ reasonably supposing them sоund,” was obviously beyond the range of such inquiry, and conjectural merely. It was altogether too shadowy and indirect for legal consideration, and must be regarded as an unexpected, unnatural, and accidental consequence of the defendants’ wrong.
The result is, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the damage to his plants after notice to the defendаnts of the escaping gas and subsequent to the time when by the exercise of due care they could have discovered and repaired the defective pipe, and also the value of the extra coal burned by him as found by the trial justice, amounting together to the sum of $263.
Judgment accordingly.