25 W. Va. 708 | W. Va. | 1885
The counsel engaged on the trial ot this cause have not suggested either in the pleadings or argument that any question of law arises in this controversy, and the only questions involved are questions ot fact. The suggestion made in the answer of the administrator of Reeves, that the plaintiff purchased the land subject to the incumbrance of $800.00, then existing thereon, is not only wholly unsupported by the evidence, but the attending circumstances show clearly that such was not the fact. It was never pretended that $1,500.00 was not the full value of the land, and there is no question about the truth of the facts, that at the time the down-payment was made, Reeves paid to Rutherford $292.26, aud that he afterwards transferred to him the plaintiff’s first'note of $225.00, the amount of which $244.12 he collected May 10, 1882, both of which were applied as credits upon the said trust-debt. It clearly appears from the pleadings and proofs that the price of the land was $1,500.00, that on September 11, 1880, when the deed was made and the $1,050.00 paid, the incumbrance amounted to $826.90 and no more; that on that day Reeves paid the administrator of Richard Rutherford $292.26 on account of that debt, and that on May 10, 1882, the proceeds of the plaintiff’s first note ot $225.00, amounting to $247.50 was also applied on said debt, and that the unpaid residue thereof on May 10,1882, was only $841.42, with interest from date: and the plaintiff’s last note then and still unpaid amounted to the like sum of $247.50, which if also applied to the said trust-debt, there would remain unsatisfied of that incumbrance only the sum of $98.96 as of date, for which the estate of Reeves would be primarily responsible to the estate of Richard Rutherford, deceased, and in case the plaintiff should be compelled to pay the same, then the estate of Reeves would be responsible to him lor the same amount. In the determination of this case it is wholly immaterial to the plaintiff, whether there was or was not . any agreement made between the plaintiff and Reeves and Rutherford, that said trust-lien should be released before the two deferred payments of his purchase-money should be paid. This land was actually purchased, articles of agreement entered into on September 1, 1880, and the execution of the
From what has been said it is evident that the funds to be realized from the estate of Reeves, when added to the amount still due from the plaintiff will be more than sufficient to discharge the balance of said trust debt. While the plaintiff is entitled to be fully indemnified against this trust-lion on his lands, it must be borne in mind that the defendant Rutherford, has taken no steps whatever to enforce this demand against the plaintiffs land, nor does the plaintiff allege that he has done or attempted to do so, nor that he is in any degree responsible for the act of the administrator of Reeves, in bringing suit for the recovery of said last installment of $225.00 of purchase-money. On the contrary Rutherford has prosecuted to final decree his suit against the administrator and heirs to said Reeves, and has therefore provided and secured for the plaintiff from his estate more than enough to save him from all possible loss. Before the plaintiffs suit can be finally heard the court should by its commissioners ascertain the exact amount of said trust-debt still unsatisfied, whether any, and if any, what portion of this unpaid balance
The decree of the circuit court of Ritchie county rendered in this cause on March 1, 1884 must be reversed with costs against the appellee J. R. Douglass, and remanded to the said circuit court for further proceedings therein to be had, according to the principles settled in this opinion and according to the rules and principles governing courts of equity.
Reversed. RemaNded.