51 Ga. App. 141 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1935
Harvey Barber, who lived in Alma, Georgia, Merritt Tanner, who lived in Ware county, Georgia, and Alma Douglas, who lived in Alma, Georgia, were convicted of burglary. Alma Douglas moved for a new trial; the motion for a new trial was overruled, and she excepted. Jesse D. Haley, who lived in Waycross, Georgia, an accomplice, testified that he and the above-named defendants left their respective homes on Saturday and rode around in Alma Douglas’s green Chevrolet automobile, finally spending the night in a tourist camp, and remained away from their homes all day Sunday; that they all four went to Lumber City late Sunday afternoon and burglarized the Suwanee store late that night (giving the details of the burglary), and that he was arrested when he and the above-named defendants were preparing to burglarize another store later on the same night in Alma, Georgia. The corroborating testimony by other witnesses—not accomplices—was in part: that Alma Douglas, the plaintiff in error, together with the other alleged perpetrators of the crime, was seen in Lumber City in her green automobile several times on Sunday night; that she was driving her automobile a part of the time; that the last time they were seen in Lumber City was about 10:30 or eleven o’clock; that the robbery occurred later the same night; that early the next morning Barber, Tanner, and Alma Douglas, who were traveling in a Chevrolet car (it was either blue or green), stopped at a gasoline filling station between daylight and sunup;
The Supreme Court in the case of Whaley v. State, 177 Ga. 757 (171 S. E. 290), said: “To warrant a conviction of felony on the testimony of an accomplice, it is necessary that the accomplice be corroborated, and 'the corroborating circumstances should be such as, independently of his testimony, to lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty. Facts which merely cast on the de
There was no demurrer to the indictment. The State introduced evidence to the effect that the storehouse burglarized was the storehouse of “The Suwanee' Stores.” Nothing appeared to show that “The Suwanee Stores” was not a corporation. The judge charged the jury that “the name ‘The Suwanee Stores’ imports a corporation, and if nothing else appears, it would be presumed that it was a corporation. I charge you that this is a mere presumption and is subject to be rebutted-by evidence, and, to show that it is not a corporation, by evidence or testimony.” It has been held that, “whether a name imports a corporation should, as a general rule, be left to judicial knowledge.” Saint Cecilia’s Academy v. Hardin, 78 Ga. 39 (3 S. E. 305). “If it is a financial, commercial, manufacturing name, or other kindred purpose, the usual subjects of incorporation, such name should import a corporation.” Saint Cecilia’s Academy v. Hardin, supra. “It would seem, however, that if the name imported a corporation and raised a presumption of corporate existence for the purpose of pleading, it would also raise such a presumption for the purpose of evidence, and that it would be incumbent upon the accused to prove affirmatively that no such corporation existed.” Mattox v. State, 115 Ga. 212, 221 (41 S. E. 709). It was also held in Crawford v. State, 68 Ga. 822, “where an indictment charged the defendant with ‘breaking and entering the depot of. the Savannah, Florida and Western Bailway, a corporation chartered by said State, doing business un
Judgment affirmed.
