216 Pa. 292 | Pa. | 1907
Opinion by
The legal title to the land that is the subject of this controversy was in one E. M. Peters; the actual ownership was in Peters, Henderson and Roby, who each held a one-third interest. Peters had given an option on his one-third to Henderson, who had assigned it to the plaintiff, John S. Douglas. Subsequently, on October 6, 1906, Douglas procured an option from Henderson and Roby for their interests. It is this latter option that concerns us in the present inquiry, since the action in the court below related only to the interests of Henderson and Roby. By the terms of this option Douglas was to have until the 80th of October following to indicate his acceptance of the land, at the rate of $29.00 per acre, the purchase money to be paid on or before the 30th of December following. Within the period fixed, . Douglas gave written notice of his accept-, anee, and the option thereupon became a contract of sale. Peters, holder of the legal title, lived in the state of Ohio ; Henderson, Roby and Douglas resided in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, and the land was in Greene county. While the agreement was for a sale to Douglas, it was in contemplation* of the
While it is difficult to understand the reason assigned" by Kyle for his refusal to deliver the deed, his good faith in the matter is not questioned. It does not concern us to inquire into the adequacy of the reason; that concerns none but Kyle andi those for whom he was acting ; his act was their act, and fixed upon them a clear and unmistakable default under the terms of the contract. Manifestly they were not in position on the following day, or any time thereafter except upon notice, to declare the contract at an end. Douglas’ rights remained as they were; nothing that occurred subsequently affected them in any way. He continued to assert his rights under the contract, and nothing more was required of him to preserve his status with respect to it, in view of the defendant’s persistent refusal to recognize the contract. To allow Henderson and Roby to take advantage of their own default, to escape from the contract with Douglas, and thereby give effect to another of larger advantage to themselves relating to the same subject-matter, would not only be inequitable but would offend against common honesty. Whether the conduct of Kyle in connection with the deed be regarded as constituting a default by the vendors, or as an agreement between him and the vendee for an enlargement of the time for the completion of the contract, no particular date being fixed, the result would be the same. In either case the rights of the vendee would remain unaffected.
The judgment is affirmed.