Douglas v. DerwinskiDouglas v. Derwinski
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- Before:
- Steinberg
STEINBERG, Associate Judge, filed the opinion of the Court.
STEINBERG, Associate Judge:Because this opinion overrules a portion of Sawyer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 130, 135 (1991), this case has been presented to the full Court for en banc consideration. See Bethea v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 252, 254, (1992) (“only the en banc Court may overturn a panel decision”).
In an earlier opinion in this case, dated January 24, 1992, the Court vacated the decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA or Board) and remanded the record for readjudication. Douglas v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 103 (1992) (hereafter referred to as Douglas I). On February 21, 1992, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Secretary) filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, en banc review. The Secretary makes the following primary arguments: (1) the BVA was not required to consider, under
For the reasons set forth below, the en banc Court will grant the Secretary’s motion for review, and reaffirm all parts of the January 24, 1992, opinion with the exception of the part relating to the Secretary’s fourth contention above, and vacate that portion of Douglas I, specifically, part II.E., 2 Vet.App. at 110-11. The Secretary’s motion for panel reconsideration will be denied as moot. On May 4, 1992, the Court received from the Secretary notice of action taken by the BVA in this case to comply with the Court’s January 24, 1992, opinion. See Douglas I, 2 Vet.App. 103. The BVA had issued a decision on April 8, 1992, remanding the record to the originating agency for the submission of additional evidence on the issue of direct service connection for basal-cell carcinoma and actinic keratosis, for the conduct of a thorough medical examination, and for adjudication of the issue of direct service connection for skin diseases resulting from in-service exposure to the sun. Since the Court will affirm all parts of Douglas I that relate to the Board’s remand order, its instructions to the originating agency are not in conflict with this opinion.
We will summarize the facts previously before the Court and the Court’s conclu*438sions in Douglas I, and will then address the Secretary’s objections to those conclusions.
I.
The appellant appealed to the Court the BVA’s March 23, 1990, denial of his claim for service connection for basal-cell carcinoma of the neck. Charles M. Douglas, BVA 89-03499 (Mar. 23, 1990). He claimed that the carcinoma resulted from his exposure at the close of World War II to ionizing radiation from the atomic bomb site at Hiroshima. Ibid.
Medical evidence submitted by the veteran to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA or Department) suggested that his basal-cell carcinoma may have resulted directly from excessive exposure to the sun during his tenure as a deckhand in the Navy, and the veteran’s representative thrice raised this alternative ground at a hearing before the BVA. Douglas I, 2 Vet.App. at 106-07. However, the BVA made no findings with regard to this contention, addressing only whether exposure to ionizing radiation could have caused the veteran’s illness. Regarding the possibility of direct service connection, the Court found the BVA’s decision defective for failing (1) to consider the entire evidence pursuant to
II.
A. Consideration of the Entire Evidence
In its earlier opinion, the Court held that the BVA had failed to adhere to
The Secretary now argues that neither the case law nor the regulations “compel[ ]” the Court’s holding. Mot. for Recons. at 4. He further argues that, under
Decisions of the Board shall be based on the entire record in the proceeding and upon consideration of all evidence and material of record and applicable provisions of law and regulation.
(Emphasis added.)
When the Court “find[s] the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances”, as where “application of the statute as written will produce a result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions *439of its drafters’ Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 111 S.Ct. 599, 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)); see Thompson/Center Arms Co., A Div. of the K. W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 924 F.2d 1041, 1044 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“[o]nly very clear evidence of contrary legislative intent can displace the plain meaning of a statute”). Review of the legislative history reveals no intention by Congress to limit the BVA’s consideration of evidence to only that evidence supporting a legal issue expressly raised in the Form 1-9 substantive appeal. Similarly, nowhere do the statutory provisions relating to the claimant’s filing a “formal appeal” in order to perfect an appeal to the BVA (initiated by the filing of a Notice of Disagreement with a regional office decision, followed by a Statement of the Case by a regional office) provide that only legal issues raised in the formal appeal, and evidence pertinent to those issues, must be considered by the Board. See
The Secretary seeks to bypass the plain meaning of the above statutory and regulatory provisions as well as the applicable precedents of this Court, arguing that
Furthermore, the Secretary’s interpretation of the actions the BVA must undertake in evaluating appeals is also contrary to a basic principle of the VA claims process that claims will be processed and adjudicated in an informal, nonadversarial atmosphere, and that to ensure a just outcome under this rubric VA will assist claimants in many ways. See Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 90, 91-92 (1990). This principle has been codified in many statutory provisions requiring VA to take a variety of steps to aid veterans in the development, presentation, and consideration of their claims. See
For the reasons above, the BVA’s failure to adhere to
Similarly, in the instant case, the appellant presented sufficient evidence to require consideration and discussion of the application of
B. Application of
The Court’s previous conclusions regarding the applicability of
In his reconsideration motion, however, the Secretary argues that the Court’s position conflicts with VA’s adjudication and appeals process as “envisioned by parts 3 and 19 of title 38” of the Code of Federal Regulations. Mot. for Recons, at 4. The Secretary asserts that the portion of chapter 3 dealing with “administrative provisions”, of which
This argument is unpersuasive. First, the cross-reference in subsection 19.101(c) to
The Secretary also posits in support of his argument that the references in chapter 3 to “claimánts” as contrasted with “appellants”, to which reference is made more predominantly in chapter 19, demonstrate the exclusion of VA’s subsection 3.103(c)(2) responsibilities from the obligations imposed on the BVA. Mot. for Recons, at 5-
6. However, subparagraph (1) of
Hearings in connection with proposed adverse actions and appeals shall be held before VA personnel having original determinative authority who did not participate in the proposed action or the decision being appealed.
Indeed, VA’s own Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, deflates the Secretary’s argument about the relevance of the labels “claimant” and “appellant” in the Code of Federal Regulations to the division of responsibility within the Department. Chapter 18 of the Manual is entitled “Appeals”. Section 18.17 is entitled “Hearings, General”. The section begins with paragraph (a), which states that the “claimant” in an appealed case may have a hearing before the BVA in Washington or may make an appearance at the regional office “prior to the submission to the BVA”. Here, the Department is clearly using “claimant” in discussing an appealed case.
Additional support for the Court’s interpretation is found in the M21-1 Manual section 18.18, entitled “Conduct of Hearings”. It states in subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a), in pertinent part: “The due process requirements stated in [38 C.F.R. 3.103] are for application throughout the adjudicative process.” (Bracketed portion not added.) The guideline does not exclude any part of the regulation from application by the BVA. Moreover, paragraph (c) of that section of the guideline, discussing the nonadversarial and “Ex Parte” nature of hearings on appeal, explicitly applies
Accordingly, the Court’s conclusion that subsection 3.103(c)(2) applies to the *442BVA not only derives from the plain language of the statutory and regulatory provisions involved, but is buttressed by VA’s own internal guidelines which contradict the position the Secretary has taken here. For these reasons, the Court continues to hold that, under
C. Application of
In Douglas I, the Court held that
The Secretary shall distribute full information to eligible veterans and eligible dependents regarding all benefits and services to which they may be entitled under laws administered by the Department and may, to the extent feasible, distribute information on other governmental programs (including manpower and training programs) which the Secretary determines would be beneficial to veterans.
Relying on the language of the statutory provision and Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118, 121 (1991), the Court held in Douglas I that, because the BVA was confronted with evidence in this case that raised the issue of entitlement to direct service connection for the veteran’s basal-cell carcinoma, the Board was required under
The Secretary argues that this case is distinguishable from Akles, and that, therefore, the obligations of
The Court is unpersuaded by the Secretary’s attempt to distinguish Akles. Indeed, Akles is controlling in the evaluation of the BVA’s obligations in this case. There, the Court found the requirements of former
The existence of the guideline concerning special monthly compensation simply provided an additional reason that VA should have considered the veteran for special monthly compensation in Akles. The Court expressly stated that “[h]ere, the failure by the VA to consider the veteran for special monthly compensation is even more grievous” because of the Manual provision requiring that VA infer a claim for special monthly compensation. Ibid.
The Secretary also argues that the obligations of
D. Application of
We do, however, find the last of the Secretary’s contentions telling. In considering in Douglas I whether the BVA applied the proper standard in the evaluation of the veteran’s radiation claim, the Court relied on the holding in Sawyer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 130, 135 (1991), that
The Secretary has persuaded us that, notwithstanding the Court’s holding in Sawyer, paragraph (c)(1)(h) does not provide the standard for the BVA’s adjudication of claims for entitlement to service-connected disability compensation based on exposure to ionizing radiation. Instead, paragraph (c) applies only to a determination which the Chief Benefits Director is required to make as a prelude to the formal adjudication of a claim covered by
The determination of service connection will be made under the generally applicable provisions of this part, giving due consideration to all evidence of record, including any opinion provided by the Chief Medical Director or an outside consultant, and to the evaluations published pursuant to § 1.17 of this title.
III.
In view of the foregoing discussion and after consideration of the Secretary’s motion for review en banc, that motion is granted, and the Court en banc has reconsidered the panel opinion. The Court, en banc, reaffirms the panel’s original opinion in Douglas I with the exception of part II.E. thereof, 2 Vet.App. at 110-11, which is vacated and superseded by the holding in part II.D., above. The Secretary’s motion for panel reconsideration is denied as moot.
It is so Ordered.