Dоuglas A. Maresh, Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee.
No. 04-4142
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Submitted: September 13, 2005 Filed: February 27, 2006
Before MELLOY, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
The district court affirmed the deсision that Douglas A. Maresh is not entitled to disability-insurance benefits and supplemental-security income because he has the capacity to work. Maresh appeals. Because he meets Listing 12.05C, this court reverses and remands with directions to award benefits.
This court reviews de novo a district court‘s denial of social security benefits. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2000). This court determines “whether the Commissioner‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner‘s conclusion.” McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). This court will “consider evidence that detraсts from the Commissioner‘s decision as well as evidence that supports it.” Id.
Maresh argues that the ALJ erred in finding that his impairments do not meet Listing 12.05:
Mental retardation: Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22.
The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.
* * *
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.
Maresh and the Commissioner disagree about what the Listing requires. According to the Commissioner, the introductory paragraph of the Listing requires
This court agrees with the Commissionеr that the requirements in the introductory paragraph are mandatory. The overall introduction to the mental disorders section states: “Listing 12.05 contains an introductory paragraph with the diagnostic description for mental retardation. It also contains four sets of criteria (paragraphs A through D). If your impairment satisfies the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph and any one of the four sets of criteria, we will find that your impairment meets the listing.”
However, this court disagrees with the Commissioner that the Listing‘s introductory paragraph requires a formal diagnosis of mental retardation. The plain language of the Listing does not so state, and the Commissioner cites no supporting
In sum, to meet Listing 12.05C, a claimant must show: (1) a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70; (2) an onset of the impairment before age 22; and (3) a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function. Because the Commissioner does not contеst that Maresh meets the first requirement, this court focuses on requirements 2 and 3.
Although the ALJ did not address the issue, the record indicates that Maresh‘s mental retardation initially manifested itself before age 22. Maresh struggled in special education classes through the ninth grade, and then dropped out of school. The Commissioner concedes that Maresh had trouble with reading, writing, and math. In addition, Maresh emрhasizes his verbal IQ score of 70, recorded at age 37. True, the score was recorded after the developmental period, but “a person‘s IQ is presumed to remain stable over time in the absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant‘s intellectual functioning.” Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 65 Fed. Reg. 50,753 (2000) (explaining that the regulations “permit us to use judgment, based on current evidence, to infer when the impаirment began.“) (emphasis added). Maresh also exhibited deficits in adaptive functioning at a young age, when he had frequent fights with other children. Based on the substantial evidence, the ALJ should have found that Mаresh‘s impairment manifested itself during his developmental period.
[Maresh‘s work history] is marked with short couple of weeks of employment terminated because of difficulties with suрervisors, co-workers, or his temper.
. . . .
He reports a suspiciousness and distrust of others “all” his life. He doubts the trustworthiness of friends, is reluctant to confide in others, misinterprets benign remarks, is unforgiving and persistently сarries grudges, and overreacts to benign comments with angry counterattacks.
. . . .
His greater difficulties . . . will be found in his demonstrated inability to get along with others, be they supervisors, co-workers, or the public. Also, his lack of impulse controls will interfere with his ability to exercise good judgment and his ability to appropriately adapt to changes in the work place.
In a separate evaluation, psychologist Dr. James N. Marchman diagnosed Maresh with personality disorder, and noted that he “interacts poorly with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” The findings of Drs. Hamer and Maresh demonstratе that Maresh‘s personality disorder would have more than a slight or minimal effect on his ability to work. See Bailey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2000) (speech disorder was more than slight or minimal because speech was “noticeably in error,” аlbeit intelligible.)
Additional evidence confirms that Maresh‘s personаlity disorder satisfies the Listing. Maresh reported to his physician in 1998 that his neighbors had called the police after he became upset and began destroying his own car. He further reported homicidаl thoughts about his father, and that Maresh once waited on the porch with a shotgun after becoming upset with another man. Maresh‘s clinical social worker also reported that he “has onе of the most disabling personality disorders I have seen in my eleven years at the mental health center.” In sum, Maresh has shown that his personality disorder would have more than a “slight or minimal” effect on his аbility to work. Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1011. Accordingly, he meets Listing 12.05C. See Shontos v. Barnhart, 328 F.3d 418, 427 (8th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of benefits because substantial evidence showed that claimant met Listing 12.05C).
The Commissioner argues that Maresh‘s mental retardation does not preclude him from working, noting he wоrked for General Mills for about a year and a half in 2000 and 2001, although he often missed work there.2 However, “[t]he issue is not whether the claimant can perform gainful activity; rather, it is whether he has a[n] . . . impairment, other than his conceded mental impairment, which provides significant work-related limited function—in other words, whether the second prong of § 12.05(C) is met.” Sird, 105 F.3d at 403 (reversing ALJ‘s denial of benefits for a claimant who met Listing 12.05C). Because Maresh meets Listing 12.05C, he is entitled to benefits.3 See Jones, 335 F.3d at 699 (“If the claimant wins at the third step (a listed impairment), she must be held disabled, and the case is over.“)
III.
The ALJ‘s decision to deny benefits is not supported by substantial evidence on the record. The district court‘s judgment is reversed, and the case remanded to the Commissioner with directions to award benefits.