28 N.J. Eq. 581 | N.J. | 1877
This is a bill for divorce, exhibited by a wife against her husband. The grounds laid are, desertion and adultery. In order to prepare the way for such a decree, the complainant asks that a judgment, rendered by the’ circuit court of Whiteside county, Illinois, in a suit by her husband, the appellant, against her, declaring her marriage with him to be null and void, shall be avoided by a decree. Whether this judgment has a legal existence or not, is the only contested question in this cases for, on the assumption of its invalidity, it is not denied that the appellant has been guilty of the statutory offence of desertion,, and, also, of a breach of his marriage vows.
The judgment thus put in question is assailed on two grounds: First, because the court in Illinois did not acquire jurisdiction over the cause which it adjudicated.; and, second, because the cause was brought within the jurisdiction of such court, if such jurisdiction existed, by deceit and fraud.
First, then, with respect to the former of these 'grounds. On the 8th of August, 1866, these parties were married in this state. A little over a month after the marriage, the husband departed from this state and went to Illinois, where he has since continually resided. The wife has always resided, and still resides, in this state. From the day of her
On the argument, the case being treated as an ordinary suit for divorce, it was insisted, on the part of the appellant, that this adjudication by the court in Illinois was conclusive in this state, inasmuch as such court acquired jurisdiction from the fact that the domicile of the appellant, who was the plaintiff in that proceeding, was in that state at the time of the inception of the proceedings. It was not attempted to be denied that a judgment, inter partes, settling ordinary rights, which should be obtained by the methods made use of in this case, would be possessed of no efficacy beyond the territorial limits of the state by the tribunal of which it should be so rendered. That a judgment of such a character would, by the principles of international and of interstate law, be treated as an absolute nullity in a foreign jurisdiction, is a doctrine which is now too completely settled to admit of a moment’s discussion. The rule thus established is in nowise a technical one, being founded in the universal concession that it is an element essential to the justice of all juridical action, that all the persons whose rights are to be adjudged should have an opportunity of being heard. The
/The appellant was a domiciled citizen of the state of Illinois, and this circumstance gave, beyond all question, the courts of that state jurisdiction over a suit instituted there by him for a divorce, in pursuance of the statutes established in such state. A judgment obtaiued in such a proceeding, authorized by the local authority, would, incontestably, have a local force. Each government has the undoubted right to regulate the formation and dissolution of the marriage contract so far as such contract affects its own citizens. It can, at will, dissolve a marriage by an act of legislation, unless prevented by a constitutional restraint; and it can ordain that either party may dissolve the relationship at will, in any method that it may see fit to prescribe,/ A statute which should enact that either party to a marriage might file a petition in a court, claiming a dissolution of the matrimonial bond on the ground of incompatibility of temper, or even on the ground of the desire of the petitioner to be divorced, and that thereupon a decree, as asked for, should be made, would be a valid proceeding in the place where it occurred, even though the other party was a non-resident, and w'as not served with process, and did not cause his appearance to he entered. Such proceeding would be legal, if not justifiable in right reason, inasmuch as marriage is not only a contract between the parties, but is, also, a relationship in which the government is interested. Marriage creates a status in which society is deeply concerned, and which, therefore, in all civilized countries, is deemed subject to the control of the civil
But we enter at once upon debatable ground when we attempt to carry such local determinations as these just indicated into foreign states or countries, and call upon the courts of such places to enforce them. In such a situation, the conditions of the question are entirely changed. The consideration that a government has the right to regulate,, as to its own citizens, the matrimonial relationship, has now lost the greater part of its force; and it is met by the countervailing principle, that such government has no just claim to a right to impose its policy beyond the limits of its own territory. This embarrassment reaches its acme when the-parties to the marriage have their domiciles in different states. In such a position of things, it is not difficult to declare that-a proceeding for divorce, carried on in the state wherein is the domicile of one of the parties, shall operate so as to-change the status of such party within the territory of such state; hut it is difficult to find any principle for declaring' that such proceeding shall have the effect of changing the-status of the other party in the state wherein he is domiciled. In suits of this character, the doctrine that gives jurisdiction from the mere fact of the domicile of one of the parties, must inevitably lead to the imposition of the policy of one state, with respect to marriage, upon the other state in which the other party to the marriage has his residence.
In the present ease, it is claimed that the judgment in the court of Illinois had the effect not only of changing the status of the appellant in that state, and thus, in that respect, enforcing the policy of the laws of that locality, but the further effect of changing the status of the respondent in this state, her citizenship here being undisputed. The right of the foreign court to adjudicate with respect to the status of its own domiciled citizen is undisputed; but I have failed to see how its right to decide the status of a citizen of this state, by such adjudication, is to he conceded.
In that proceeding the existence of the marriage was not admitted. On the contrary, it was, in the most explicit terms, denied. The complainant in that suit did not allege that he was forced to consent to the marriage by duress or from fear; but he'asserted, both in his complaint and in his proofs, that he never consented, either by expression or implication. If his complaint and proofs were true, then he was never married in this state; the ceremony was a
I also agree with the view taken by the vice-chancellor on the second point. I am satisfied that the appellant went to the state of Illinois for the purpose of getting rid of this marriage. TIis conduct in leaving this state and putting himself under a foreign jurisdiction is to be interpreted by the light of his subsequent conduct. Judged by the proofs made in this cause, the case set up by him in the court of Illinois was a pure fabrication. Tie knew that it was such. The published notice of the pendency of the suit did not correctly state the name of the respondent. It is the reasonable conclusion, in view of the fact that the entire scheme was a fraud, that this was a contrivance to diminish the risk of the publication which was necessary to give juris
With respect to the" merits of the cause, no question has been made in the argument. The complainant is entitled to the relief prayed for. The decree should be affirmed.
Decree unanimously affirmed.