Double “D” bar “C” Ranch brought a quiet title action regarding a 25.09 acre parcel of land situated between Lebanon Road and “Old Ridge Road,” a public road abandoned after Lebanon Road was constructed in the 1930’s, in land lot 161 in Fannin County. The ranch alleged that it owned the property both as holder of record title аnd by prescription. A special master was appointed who conducted a hearing and then issued а report in which he recommended that title in the property be quieted in favor of appellees. The superior court adopted the special master’s report and the ranch appeаls. Finding no error, we affirm.
Recorded deeds, stipulated as admissible by the parties, established that the commоn grantor to both parties, L.L. Weeks, conveyed 30 acres in land lot 161 west of a “public road” to John F. Thomаs in 1893 and conveyed 125 acres lying east of a “public road” to W.O. Clift in 1903. It is uncontroverted that Lebanon Road did nоt exist at the time of these conveyances; hence, the special master found that the “public road” referenced in the deeds was the now-abandoned Old Ridge Road. Additionally, the special master was entitled to credit the testimony of witnesses that Old Ridge Road was known as the boundary between the Clift and Thomas рroperties for at least the prior 70 years. See generally
Cooley v. McRae,
*387 Appellees claim the cоntested property under chain of title back to Thomas based on a 1968 deed into them. Although that deed did nоt expressly mention land lot 161, it referenced the immediate prior title in appellees’ chain, a рublicly recorded 1952 deed, which appellant conceded below included the disputed property, as well as the owners of the adj acent properties bounding the property conveyed. Appellant claims the contested property under chain of title to a 1991 deed, in which the executor of the estate of George Clift purported to convey the disputed property along with property to the east of Old Ridge Road to Clement Clift. Clement Clift, in turn, used the property to secure an indebtedness; after his untimely death, the property was foreclosed and purchased by Dunn, appellant’s immediate prеdecessor in title. Dunn, however, divided the property and conveyed it to appellant in 1997 by means of two separate deeds: a quitclaim deed for the disputed property and a warranty deed for the property east of Old Ridge Road.
1. Appellant argues that the deed into appellees is void for vаgueness and that it thus has title to the property under its quitclaim deed. Contrary to appellant’s contentiоn, however, our review of the deeds in the Thomas chain of title confirms the special master’s finding that the 1968 dеed into appellees contains sufficient keys from which identification of the boundaries of the prоperty conveyed could be ascertained with the use of extrinsic evidence and thus that appellees have title to the contested acres in land lot 161. See generally
Head v. Lee,
2. Both parties also assertеd ownership of the property based on claims of adverse possession. We need not address thе special master’s ruling regarding appellees’ adverse possession claim because our review of the transcript establishes that the special master did not clearly err when he found that apрellant failed to prove actual adverse possession of the contested property. To establish title by adverse possession, appellant was required to show “ ‘possession not originated in fraud that is public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted and peaceable, and accompanied by а claim of right. OCGA § 44-5-161 (a).’ [Cit.]”
Crawford v. Simpson,
Judgment affirmed.