*1 negated given certain testimony police officer at the on hearing motion to quash.
I agree such a is rehearing required but since there was no prej udicial error in the admission Officer Kwilos’ trial testimony be error, cause the has made majority no other direction of a finding its People trial new is Thus I inappropriate. procedure believe that Holiday 47 Ill. 2d and, should followed I accordingly, would vacate the judgment and remand with directions the court hearing conduct new the motion quash sup press grant reinstate the if the judgment motion denied but trial if motion is new allowed. Dotson, DOTSON, Estate of De- NEELY Indiv. and as Adm’r Ida al., SEARS, COMPANY, ceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees, et ROEBUCK AND
Defendant-Appellant. Division) (3rd First District No. 86 — 0799 30, 1987. Opinion filed June *3 RIZZI, J., concurring. specially Klein,
Arnstein, Gluck, Lehr, (Arthur Milligan, Chicago Barron L. & Heinz, Waxman, counsel), appellant. Kurt J. S. David Lane, Chicago (John Stephen I. Munday, Munday Lane & J. counsel), appellees. opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the court: *4 This and fire occurred in the explosion cause arose from which on after a February repairman employed home Dotson on Ida gas premises. defendant a clothes located the repaired dryer in the died approxi- Dotson and Stevie Hall were accident and injured later Dotson suffered minor mately plaintiff Tony two weeks and for alleged Plaintiffs that defendant was liable the vicariously burns. explosion of the which caused the and negligent repair 'dryer clothes went to fire. defendant admitted and the cause Ultimately, liability damages of the issue County only. trial in the circuit court Cook on $2,310,000 injuries wrong- The for the to and jury plaintiffs awarded the to injuries Tony ful deaths of Ida Dotson and Stevie Hall and Dot- to $1,700,000 wrongful son. Defendant the death award the appeals Dotson, Ida the $400,000 estate of death award es- wrongful $10,000 tate of Stevie Hall and the award to Dotson. Tony excessive, not sup- are Defendant contends these awards were ported and resulted from several errors competent the evidence complains trial defendant that Specifically, committed the court. to and in- (1) prevent plaintiffs’' prejudicial the trial court: failed either a or to declare a mistrial as result flammatory closing argument thereof; Dotson to advance a claim loss (2) plaintiff Neely allowed withdrawn; (3) had to admit evi- of consortium after it refused been limit his re- remarriage order to plaintiff Neely dence of Dotson’s Steve to recover consortium; permitted for loss of Dotson covery (4) son, Stevie Hall. illegitimate It plaintiffs’ closing argument. Defendant initially complains to its violated a liability claims that references admission repeated limine, jury to inflame the and motion were intended and did reasonable in- beyond drawing “went far limit permissable [sic] further and from the evidence.”' Defendant ferences conclusions to case oth- compared that plaintiffs’ improperly claims counsel Defendant objects. ers and decedents’ lives animals inanimate that, closing objected plaintiffs’ argument contends it timely sponte sua stop had not, duty if it did trial court a even court erred that trial Defendant concludes prejudicial argument. at the conclu- for a mistrial doing in not and in its motion denying so arguments. sion man- object timely that
Plaintiffs defendant failed respond con- Alternatively, the issue appeal. ner and has thus waived did not liability that their references to defendant’s admission tend the introduction into the motion in limine prohibited violate *** of “all the occurrence arguments trial or evidence counsel’s purpose action.” further assert gave They rise to this liability that defendant admitted argument to show any evi- damages by present its failure and conceded plaintiffs’ determination its assert Lastly, plaintiffs dence of own. has party denied argument prejudicial closing whether a *5 is, instance, fair trial not in the first for the trial court and will be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. adequately failed to ob timely
We believe defendant argument to in ject plaintiffs’ closing the errors committed allegedly and, thus, no au to this issue for Defendant offers preserve appeal. closing thority during plaintiffs’ for the assertion that its “objection” motion, to argument, adequate made in the form of a reserved was The rule preserve any closing argument. error committed in plaintiffs’ con argument Illinois is that a “failure to at the time object any added.) (Duffy stitutes waiver of error.” v. Midlo (Emphasis 429, thian Country (1985), 438, Club 135 Ill. 3d App.
1037.) Moreover, an must to objection sufficiently specific apprise the trial court of the grounds of v. Industrial Com. objection. (Dixon (1975), Here, 60 Ill. 2d N.E.2d defendant’s counsel merely informed the court that he wanted to make a motion but he would reserve it until he plaintiffs’ counsel was finished so that could complete Thus, his argument. during the court plaintiffs’ argument, was not of the apprised basis of the motion and had no reason to be lieve that defendant’s counsel had to any objection plaintiffs’ closing result, argument. As a defendant waived errors in any plaintiffs’ has closing argument. Even if defendant’s motion adequate reserved constitutes an ob-
. jection, any plaintiffs’ closing errors did argument deny defend- ant a fair trial.
The motion in limine introduc sought parties bar from ing trial, into the relating and from otherwise “all using, evidence” gave occurrence which rise to the contended litigation. Defendant that it was error prejudicial to admit evidence of the facts of the oc currence giving (Bullard rise the suit. v. Barnes 112 Ill. 485, 102 Ill. 2d aff’d closing argument Plaintiffs’ made no reference to the eviden Rather, facts rise” to the tiary “giving argued action. a noneviden fact, tiary defendant’s admission of al liability, jury such, it ready well aware. As did not the motion in limine. violate plaintiffs’ did not Additionally, closing argument improperly compare their case to others or decedents’ to animals or inani lives mate objects. Plaintiffs’ counsel told the that the suf jury tragedy fered by plaintiffs magnitude any litigant that ever came into the courtroom asking damages and that there had never a litigant been who had that the plaintiffs sustained kind of loss had. In attempting meaning to illustrate the “substantial” used in the pecuniary instruction the law a substantial jury presumes decedent,
loss to the told and children of a counsel spouse plaintiffs’ substantial, horses, the jury that a million dollars is but that certainly ar- paintings are and sold for that much. These computers bought guments argument. did not exceed the bounds of fair
The
closing argument
at issue Richardson
Nelson
ex rel.
grounds People
N.E.
overruled
other
Ill.
Dempsey (1957),
Noren v.
139 N.E .2d
referred
judgments
Here,
awarded in other cases.
counsel made no
plaintiffs’
or
In Hansel v.
Tran
any specific
Chicago
cases
awards.
reference
Authority
sit
270 N.E .2d
defend
ant’s counsel
in other cases where
had
jury
employees
told
The
negligent
giving
damages.
been
he had advised the
of money
he had
court held that it was error for counsel to tell the
what
relevance,
(132
done in
no
to the suit at issue.
having
other cases
*6
402, 406,
Here,
2d
N.E.2d
counsel did not
App.
553.)
plaintiffs’
270
tell the
that he
loss exceeded that
jury
personally
plaintiffs’
knew
argument
other
nor could his
have been so
any
litigant
interpreted.
also find the Federal court cases cited
defendant distin
We
Sears,
267
guishable.
(7th
1959),
In Klotz v.
Roebuck Co.
Cir.
F.2d
&
114,
cert.
4
Ed. 2d
80 S. Ct.
denied
U.S.
L.
plaintiff’s counsel asked the
to do unto others as
would
jurors
they
have done unto them and to test defendant’s counsel’s sincerity by
he
takén
them
asking what
would have
for
He also told
that
eye.
his
no amount
to him and
given
enough
defendant’s counsel would be
and it
their
to
purchased
eye
job
that defendant had
plaintiff’s
it. The court held that this
decide the amount for which he would sell
the
to
them
arguments asking
jurors
put
similar to
argument was
to the
to substi
appeal
jury
in
and a
plaintiff’s place
selves
deliberate
55.)
F.2d
In Leathers
General
judgment. (267
tute
for
sympathy
asked
1976), 546 F.2d
counsel
Corp. (4th
plaintiff’s
Motors
Cir.
worth
legs
the
how much the loss of the use of
would be
jurors
that,
argument
held
rule”
did
“golden
to them. The court
while this
reversal,
it
it
coupled
not
did
when
automatically require
require
with
Here,
clos
(546
plaintiffs’
the closeness of the case.
F.2d
itself in
ing argument
put
plaintiffs’ position
did not ask
to
jury
to
in
egregious appeal
sympathy
and did not otherwise
approach
Moreover,
liability
since defendant had conceded
Klotz and Leathers.
own,
not
close case.
of its
this was
a
present
declined to
evidence
not
to the level
argument
here did
rise
Finally, because
not
trial, the trial court did
denied defendant a fair
argument which
(see
Coop
it of its own motion
duty
stop
have the
to
Belfield
in
mistrial,
rests
grant
.2d
or to
a
249)
8 Ill. 2d
134 N.E
absent
and will not be reversed
of the trial court
the sound discretion
911, (Benuska
App.
v. Dahl
an abuse thereof
in
deter
the rule
Rather,
governed by
this case is
249).
N.E.2d
ar
trial due to
denied a fair
or not a
has been
party
whether
mining
argu
of the
and character
permissible scope
guments
jury,
a
not be
its determination will
left
the trial court and
ment is
largely
v. Chi
(Lawing
discretion.
it
abused its
clearly
reversed unless
has
125-26,
Authority
cago
Transit
in
must be
Moreover,
presumption
every reasonable
exercised its discretion because
dulged
properly
that the trial court
effect, if
prejudicial
any,
in much
position
judge
better
498, 301 However, N.E.2d until 303.) Elliott v. Willis 163, 2d claims for loss of not consortium were recov- Thereafter, erable in such actions. Carter Chicago & Illinois Mid- land Ry. (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d held that El- liott had implicitly overruled Watson and that of remarriage evidence was relevant to a for claim loss of consortium and admissable at trial
because of recovery loss consortium limited loss, i.e., to actual “loss up to the of remarriage.” time 130 Ill. App.
N.E.2d 458.
Although neither Elliott nor Carter explicitly holds that a claim for loss of spouse’s material services is incorporated henceforth into the now recoverable claim for wrongful loss consortium in a action, must be construed to such effect. While Elliott did mention the material services the component of loss consortium claim, it affirmed an court decision which appellate held the trial court should have given consortium, an instruction on loss of “i.e., services, lost and society, companionship sex.” (Emphasis added.) (Elliott Willis Ill. Moreover,
N.E.2d “in supreme court noted that consortium cludes society, guidance, companionship, felicity sexual relations.” (Elliott v. Willis Dini v. Naiditch citing turn, 20 Ill. 2d case, N.E.2d That in observed *** services, consortium “in includes addition to material com felicity intercourse, concep and sexual into a panionship, all welded tualistic unity” incapable separation that consortium was into (Emphasis added.) “material sentimental services.” 20 Ill. 2d 406, 427-28, 170 881. cases,
From these always we conclude material services have a claim loss of al- component been consortium and that the wrongful recovery lowance of death actions to Elliott prior was a this rule. further necessary departure general from We con- clude finding that Elliott mandates a that material services are now part death actions as of a loss of recoverable consor- such, tium As claim. the trial court erred when allowed evidence Dotson’s quality marriage evidence that Ida’s services Neely would continued the future. Because withdrew Neely consortium, his claim for loss under Elliott included his claim services, for loss of material evidence this was irrelevant issue re- amount of to which This error damages Neely was entitled. $1,700,000 of Ida quires reversal award to estate Dotson and a new trial. argues that to extent trial al-
Defendant next court
1045 services, it erred claim for loss of material Neely lowed to a prosecute some six excluding remarriage, of his which occurred evidence (1) this respond months after death of Ida Dotson. Plaintiffs that: the his loss of Neely was excluded since had properly evidence withdrawn services; (2) not material Carter consortium claim which did include including claim not held such evidence relevant a consortium services; (3) that was plaintiff material defendant’s counsel knew the claim for loss material services. withdrawing loss separate that a claim for Having Neely concluded could not consortium, material from a claim for also con- services loss we that extent Neely clude the trial allowed to advance a court claim for such services it should allowed evidence of his remar- Such riage. properly recovery evidence was admissable to limit (Carter Chicago material to “actual v. & Illinois lost' services loss.” 431, 436, 458.) In Ry. 130 Ill. N.E.2d Midland conclusion, disagree that the claim for reaching plaintiff this we with recognized remarriage in Elliott and as to which loss of consortium include material This held relevant in Carter does not services. was the of the trial court in allowing plaintiff error error compounded lost after he that he represented a claim for material services advance claim the were in- withdrawing properly which such services and a of the award to Ida’s estate requires cludable and also vacation new trial. handling in its
The trial court committed a third error v. Fisch Neely’s fact of which reversal. Watson remarriage requires holding that bach addition for the remarriage damages wrong was irrelevant to the recoverable remarriage ful relevancy death of a also considered spouse, jurors It held that the impartial jury. prospective the selection of an fact and asked whether were remarriage must told of the 303.) (54 the new Ill. 2d acquainted spouse. with some approach adopted by explicitly rejected The court supreme her married and spouse by introduce a new jurisdictions merely remarriage. fact of informing jury maiden without names 502-03, the one (54 approach This Ill. 2d in Watson the rule established taken the trial court and violated The case Elliott. partial overruling unaffected of the fact of Neely apprise trial court’s failure adequately necessi spouse of his new remarriage identity Dotson’s thus tates a new trial. trial court allowed next contends
Defendant
Hall
fact
despite
for the death of Stevie
Steve Dotson to recover
father of an
illegitimate child not entitled to recover under
the Illinois
Death Act
he
Wrongful
because
is not
“next of kin” of
such child as that term is
therein. (111.
used
Rev. Stat.
ch.
par.
Defendant relies on
given
the definition
“next of kin” in
Wilcox Bierd
N.E.
overruled
other
grounds
McDaniel Bullard
Ill. 2d
Plaintiffs is no viable respond longer Wilcox because change Wrongful changed in the of.the Death Act has language also used meaning of “next kin” as therein. Wilcox was decided the Act in provided recovery wrongful when death action and proportion “shall be distributed widow next of kin in the [the] relation provided by personal property law in distribution of left by persons intestate.” v. Bierd dying (Wilcox 170.) as N.E. The Act was amended in not 1979 thought by is to plaintiffs, provide that be distributed recovery according percentage dependency surviving spouse next of kin (111. decedent. Rev. Stat. ch. par. Plaintiffs assert that this reflects intent that a change legislative wrongful recovery go dependents should a decedent’s to their Act. regard rights blood relatives under Probate without technical, kin” legal meaning Plaintiffs conclude of “next of recognized in “persons degree Wilcox nearest blood surviv 170) (Wilcox ap Ill. 162 N.E .2d ing” v. Bierd under the version of statute to include the father plies present this construc- adopt that we must urge Plaintiffs child. illegitimate uncon- the statute would render to avoid one which tion statute stitutional. contend Parham. Plaintiffs
Alternatively, plaintiffs distinguish fathers of prohibiting expressly that in there are no statutes Illinois deaths wrongful for their recovering from children illegitimate legitimize may unilaterally fathers which such there are no means Georgia, statutory children, to the situation whose in contrast Wis- assert that while both at in Parham. Plaintiffs scheme was issue establish may which a father provide consin and Illinois means or en- child, not the child legitimate of a such actions would paternity Wrongful Death Act. position hance the father’s under the if that can reasona We must construe the statute as constitutional of validity. in construction favor done and resolve doubts bly be any .2d How N.E (People v. Sturlic Wrongful ever, can construe the reasonably we do believe we right of children a recov allowing illegitimate Death Act as fathers of of action right there no common law thereunder. Because ery death, who sue determining may is the the statute source (In construed. conditions; strictly and under the statute must be what re Estate Edwards *10 22.) 1379, 307, 89 N.E.2d Re citing Tromly (1949), Wilson v. 404 Ill. in the covery solely clearly limited to those beneficiaries described 635, 638, (In statute. re 106 Ill. (1982), App. Estate Edwards limits recov 1379.) 435 N.E.2d It is that the statute well established under of kin” as surviving spouse any and “next determined ery estate of Act, i.e., who persons personal the Probate those take 571, 162 N.E. (1928), an intestate decedent. Wilcox v. Bierd 235, Ill. 110 170; (1953), 414 Agency v. Consumer Sales Gustafson 865; 1982), Supp. 535 E City Chicago (N.D. Means v. Ill. N.E .2d 455. that offer no contention authority
Plaintiffs under the statute recovery the method distribution amending persons amend the class of whom also intended to legislature legislative That such was not the be distributed. recovery not ex that the statute was so may intent from the fact be inferred It so amended since. plicitly at that time and has been amended that in 1953 the statute also inferred from the fact may parent an that “next of kin includes provide amended to adopting and a parent a natural child, shall be treated as they adopted was enacted af 368.) Ill. This amendment (1953 natural child.” Laws 587, 673, 97 N.E.2d de (1951), 342 ter Fiscar McDavid 1048
cided that “next of kin”
as used
the statute
an adopted
included
and, thus,
son
codified
holding.
that
Since
has
legislature
explic
amended the
itly
statute to
provide
adoptive parents
children
are
of kin,
next
we may assume that it would have amended the stat
ute
provide
fathers of illegitimate children are also their next
of kin
if
so
statute,
intended. In
construing
we cannot inject
it,
such a provision into
however desirable or beneficial it
be.
may
(Droste
v. Kerner
cert. denied
(1966),
495,
73,
34 Ill. 2d
456,
612,
17
overruled on
509,
385 U.S.
L. Ed. 2d
87
Ct.
S.
grounds
other
Paepcke
Public Building
Com.
330,
46 Ill. 2d
illegitimate
Because fathers of
are not
children
clearly
statute,
described
beneficiaries under
are
we
con
strained to
are
find
not entitled to recover
the Act
under
for the wrongful deaths of their children. In re Estate
Edwards
635,
638,
This is half the inquiry, however. We must also determine Parham whether this v. Hughes prohibition is statutory valid. 347, 441 U.S. L. Ed. 2d S. 99 Ct. upheld Georgia stat- ute which prohibited only the fathers of illegitimate children from re- covering for their if they legitimated deaths had not them. A second statute allowed them to do so in a unilaterally simple judi- Supreme cial The proceeding. Court relied on the unilateral nature of this proceeding find that mothers and of illegitimate fathers chil- thus, dren and, were not situated in- similarly that the statute did not vidiously against discriminate the fathers on the basis of sex. (441 U.S. 60 L. Ed. 2d S. 1747-48.) Ct. The court reasoned that Georgia did not against discriminate fathers as a class since fathers who legitimated their right children had same to sue their wrongful deaths as did fathers whose children were born légitimate merely distinguished but between those who had and those who had not legitimated their children. (441 U.S. 269, 277-78,
L. Ed. S. Ct. The court upheld bar as related to statutory rationally permissible objectives. State 347, 357-58, U.S. 269, 278-79, 1742,1748-49. 60 L. Ed. 2d 99 Ct. S. In Illinois are no means comparable statutory there means provided Georgia legitimize for a father to illegitimate children. *11 Defendant misconstrues a father’s of putative paternity establishment corpus proceedings or habeas through declaratory the le- judgment (See, e.g, Pritz v. Chesnul gitimization Ill. (1982), his children. 106 969, However, App. 631.) 3d 436 N.E.2d such are proceedings brought merely rights obligations, including establish parental obligation right (106 App. and the of visitation. Ill. 3d support
1049 al have been proceedings Such 969, 970, 436 N.E.2d allowed.as only Act could which Paternity under the ternatives to proceedings Illi or the children illegitimate the mothers of brought by been 973, 436 N.E.2d 969, (106 Ill. 3d App. of Public Aid. Department nois that the recognized Pritz 1979, 40, par. 1354.) ch. 631; Ill. Rev. Stat. a father’s was to convert proceeding a statutory paternity purpose a one legal children into illegitimate obligation support moral allow by effectively promoted more and that “this would be purpose *** actions to estab fathers to maintain ing unwed mothers both 974, 969, 436 Ill. 3d (Pritz (1982), App. lish v. Chesnul 106 paternity.” involve le do not paternity That establish proceedings the fact that by is also gitimization of the children involved evidenced defendant, In by of the cases cited re Ozment two Mecklenburger (1981), 409, 3d v. 1044, Happel 378 N.E.2d App. had 107, 974, the father plaintiff putative 427 N.E.2d a in lawful wed legitimacy child bom presumption rebut of the child. lock to his own paternity establish that, 2—2 Probate Moreover, the fact under section llOVa, illegiti an 2(h)), Rev. Stat. ch. (111. par. Act 2— acknowledged is heir of his father if the decedent had mate child or during or the father his lifetime adjudged to be paternity a compel thereafter court of does not con competent jurisdiction of in conclusion. This amended the former allowance trary provision in section by illegitimate only heritance children from their mothers (111. 12), of the Act Rev. Stat. ch. par. Probate in Trimble v. Supreme Court held violative of Gor equal protection don 52 L. 97 S. Ct. and was U.S. Ed. (80th Ill. Gen. intended to cure that' constitutional infirmity. Assem., 10, 1978, Bill Proceedings, May (House House at 76-79 child 2447).) illegitimate That of the of an adjudication paternity legitimization does not of the child is further evidenced accomplish illegitimate 2—2 provision person section who “[a] acknowledged is the father as parents whose and who intermarry IIOV2, par. 2(h).) is legitimate.” (111. child Rev. Stat. ch. [his] 2— If quoted adjudication paternity accomplished legitimization, statute, it provision However, construing would surplusage. Ill. 2d must be read as whole Jordan (People word, or and, if no clause sentence 569) so that possible, Edgar is meaningless (Ekco, rendered or Inc. superfluous Thus, an 130). adju evident the father’s during child illegitimate dication of the paternity legitimization accomplish lifetime or thereafter does *12 merely child but allows the illegitimate child to inherit from the fa- ther.
The only statutory means provided in Illinois for the legitimization of a child are not of unilateral. Section 303 the Illinois Marriage alia, Dissolution of Marriage inter provides, Act that children whose parents after marry their birth are legitimate. (111. deemed Rev. Stat. ch. par. 303.) Section 2—2 of the pro Probate Act alia, inter vides, that a person illegitimate who was in parents whose termarry and who is acknowledged by legiti father his child is (111. HO1^, mate. par. Rev. Stat. 2(h).) Additionally, ch. 2— section 212 the former Act provides children bom of in valid or marriage common legitimate. (111. law are Stat. ch. Rev. 40, par. 212(c).) Plaintiffs do not contend that Steve Dotson and Vickie Hall were married or to legally were a common law or parties Therefore, otherwise invalid marriage. Stevie Hall illegitimate when born and could been legitimated through have the inter marriage or, of his parents purposes inheritance or from him, their through intermarriage and Steve acknowledge Dotson’s ment him as his child.
Our with respect conclusions to Illinois law to Wis apply equally is, consin That law. the means for the provided by that State estab lishment of a paternity do not for the provide legitimization child’s Slawek Stroh (See child. 9; 62 Wis. 2d 215 N.W.2d Ann., Wisconsin, Illinois, Wis. Stat. (West 1981).) sec. 767.45 like re quires the intermarriage (See parents legitimate child. Ann., (West Wis. Stat. 1981).) sec. 767.60 While not raised defend ant, we believe it is irrelevant that Wisconsin the father of an ille gitimate child sue for his if he may wrongful adjudi has been cated to be the father in a statutory See Wis. paternity proceeding. Ann., Stat. 1983), (West (West secs. 895.04 852.05 (West 1971), 852.01 1986 Pocket Part), 1981). 767.45 (West law,
As to
may
legiti
Illinois
means
which a child
mated are under the
could not
parents.
control
both
Steve Dotson
unilaterally required Vickie Hall to
him. Without
marry
marriage, any acknowledgement by him of Stevie as
child
Dot
give
him
and to
Steve
completely
legitimate
ineffective
render
Illi
Thus,
son the
right
for his
death.
situation
wrongful
sue
nois
for his
child’s
respect
right
illegitimate
with
father’s
to sue
in Parham. In
Illi
death is
at
fundamentally different from that
issue
nois,
situ
similarly
mothers and fathers
children are
illegitimate
legitimate
ated. Neither has the unilateral
the child. That
power
power
parent.
is mutual and
to the consent of the other
As
subject
for their
children to recover
illegitimate
such, to allow the mothers
constitutes
to their fathers
right
denying
deaths while
protec
denies the equal
discrimination
gender-based
invidious
I, sec.
XIV; Ill. Const.
art.
Const., amend.
tion
the laws. U.S.
1037, cert.
v. Jones
1977), 346 So. 2d
18. Accord Wilcox
(Fla. App.
Thunderbird,
Inc.
Moore
188;
(La.
denied
357 So. 2d
(Fla. 1978),
Insurance Co.
Security
Cobbv.
(Mo.
State
555;
1976), 331 So.
1979),
The situation of a father
Liability
American
&
in Glona v.
Guarantee
like that of the mother
“To that is the issue. For relationship the to avoid biological rather than limits the necessarily authority the Protection Clause Equal *** it the ‘legal’ a State to draw such lines as chooses. Where mother, plainly the the State denies equal protec- claimant is merely child the relief because the tion of laws withhold 73, 75-76, added.) 391 U.S. (Emphasis bom out wedlock.” 441, 443-44, 1515,1516-17. L. Ed. 2d 88 S. Ct. affirm the Glona controls that the case at bar. We thus
We believe trial court’s on this issue and the to Steve Dotson ruling award son, the death of his Stevie Hall. illegitimate to plaintiffs Defendant next contends that the total awards asser closing argument, confirm that the the “back door” improper tion of the loss of the trial court’s refusal to al consortium claim and against the it. remarriage jury low evidence inflamed Neely’s the supported by compe Defendant concludes that the awards are not tent and an to the explained by appeal jury’s evidence can and passion prejudice.
To the extent to the estate of Ida Dotson was influ- award the assertion of the’ material services the loss component enced Dotson, the evi- by plaintiff Neely consortium claim withdrawn dence and relating marriage, Dotson’s quality remarriage trial we excluding Neely’s court’s error evidence sup- and not agree with defendant the verdicts are excessive ported by the evidence. competent however, are otherwise as the awards agree,
We do not
awarding
precluded
plain
was not
from
Specifically,
jury
sailable.
from
resulting
of a future
loss
damages
pecuniary
tiffs
on the basis
the death of tda
earner or
wage
Dotson either because she was
If
they
request
wrong
because
failed to
an instruction
the issue.
kin,
ful death action
or lineal next of
brought
surviving spouse
arising
the law
from the re
presumes
pecuniary damages
substantial
lationship
they
pecuniary
alone and it is immaterial whether
received
assistance from the
past. (Prendergast
deceased
Cox
84, 88-89,
128 Ill.
As defendant chose not to
App.
present
own,
evidence of its
this
was never rebutted
any
presumption
an
even without
justified
damages
proof
award of substantial
loss.
Co.
(Magnone Chicago
Transportation
actual
& Northwestern
Moreover,
the trial
N.E.2d 1261.)
loss to
determining
pecuniary
court instructed the
jury
loss,
of such
it
plaintiffs,
weight
given
and the
to be
presumption
could consider
value the decedent might
what benefits of pecuniary
have
to her children and widower had she
expected
contribute
lived,
she
earned in the future
including
likely
what
instruction,
of education she
training
superintendence
moral
The
also
might
give
have been
them.
court
instructed
expected
that in
loss to the children
could
determining
pecuniary
advice,
and affec
guidance,
consider Ida Dotson’s
love
companionship,
instructions,
tion as
to occur in the future. These
they
likely
were
an
support
from IPI
et
were sufficient to
seq.,
Civil 2d No. 31.01
fail
damages notwithstanding plaintiffs’
award of
future
substantial
IPI
2d No.
damages
on such
from
Civil
request
ure to
instruction
adults does not
seq.
34.01 et
That most of the Dotson children were
loss to
pecuniary
alter this conclusion. The
of substantial
presumption
adults.
next
kin
and the decedent are
applies
even where
Naslund
1065. decline invitation to the awards to compare
We defendant’s Hall to those in similar cases estates Ida Dotson and Stevie from jurisdictions. judgment other We also decline to substitute our to a award for the Dotson for that of the injuries Tony reasonable $10,000 $3,000 jury merely because he was awarded instead $4,000 heed the requested by attorney. propri We advice that ety of such subject computation awards is not to mathematical cannot comparison be measured with verdicts in other cases. (Northern Trust Co. v. County Cook
335, 481 N.E.2d And we do not believe that ap awards pealed from are so large indicate or on the they passion prejudice v. Karraker jury (Jones 487, 492, part of the 98 Ill. 2d fall limits 23), compensa outside the of fair and reasonable (LeMaster Chicago Rock Is tion, or shock the judicial conscience land & R.R. Pacific in Naslund 65). What the court here: applies equally observed damages “The amount of awarded in a *** jury. Jury
action
rests
the discretion of the
largely within
***
awards,
cases,
such
should not be set aside
unless
are
or
or
no rela-
evidently
passion
prejudice,
the result of
bear
tion
In
case the
recovery
injuries.
the instant
pecuniary
***
plaintiff did not
on the
loss
rely
presumption
pecuniary
decedent, her men-
but offered evidence
the character of the
life,
tal
her
of in-
her
habits
physical capacity,
prospects
***
of the benefits
dustry,
earnings,
her usual
and the nature
at the time of
bestowed
the decedent on her descendants
***
her
Although
persons
might
death.
other reasonable
in this case at a
amount
than that fixed
fixed
award
lesser
***
this
the record
discloses
jury, we do
believe
*15
***
the award
was the result of the
or
jury’s passion
preju
dice, or that
no
relation
bears
reasonable
to the
in
pecuniary
juries suffered
lineal descendants. Consequently,
judg
is affirmed.” Naslund v.
ment
Watts
474,
In we vacate the million summary, award estate Ida $1.7 Dotson due the trial court’s errors in handling plaintiff Neely Dotson’s withdrawn loss of consortium claim and the fact of his remar- riage. These errors necessitate a new trial as to the loss to pecuniary plaintiff from the resulting Dotson death of Ida Dotson. We affirm the $400,000 award to the estate of Stevie Hall and the trial court’s allow- ance of father, $10,000 Steve Dotson. affirm the recovery by We personal injury plaintiff Tony award Dotson.
Affirmed in part, part, pro- reversed in and remanded for further ceedings consistent with this opinion.
WHITE, J., concurs. RIZZI, concurring:
JUSTICE specially However, I I continue agree majority. with result reached by I my concurring opinion believe that what stated specially Cooper Chicago Authority Transit relat IPI No. is correct. ing presumptions and Civil 2d 31.01 LIPSEY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COM- Plaintiff-Appellant, ROBERT al., Defendants-Appellees. et
MISSION (5th Division) First District No. 85 — 0159 2, 1987. Opinion July filed