Dos Santos v. F. D. Rich Construction Co.Dos Santos v. F. D. Rich Construction Co.
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Katz
The dispositive issue in this appeal from the compensation review board (board) is the meaning of the term “agreement” within the notice requirement for the transfer of liability to the second injury fund (fund) pursuant to
The following facts are undisputed. On September 17,1986, Dos Santos suffered injury to his chest, ribs and legs during the course of his employment with Rich. As a result of this injury, he has been totally disabled since September 18,1986, and has received temporary total disability benefits from Rich pursuant to
On May 25,1988, Rich sent to Dos Santos a voluntary agreement that had been signed by Fidelity, but that did not bear Dos Santos’ signature or a notation of the approval of the commissioner. See
*18On that same day, May 25, 1988, the defendants mailed a certified letter with return receipt requested to the treasurer of the state of Connecticut to provide the fund with notice of their intent to transfer to the fund, pursuant to
On August 24,1988, the defendants sent to the fund a copy of the fully signed and approved voluntary agreement related to Dos Santos’ claim. The defendants subsequently filed with the fund additional medical reports pertaining to Dos Santos’ claim. On May 13,1991, after contacts between the defendants and the fund pertaining to the transfer of Dos Santos’ claim, the fund for*19mally advised the defendants that it would not accept transfer of Dos Santos’ case because of late notice to the fund. Following a formal hearing before a workers’ compensation commissioner on September 10, 1991, the commissioner agreed with the fund that the notice was defective because the defendants’ “failure to file with the Fund within the prescribed period both the notice and [an] executed and approved Voluntary Agreement or [a] Finding and Award constituted a failure to comply with the requirements of
The defendants then appealed that decision to the board pursuant to
The defendants claim that the board incorrectly concluded that the notice provisions of
“In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, 224 Conn. 382, 390, 618 A.2d 1340 (1993). “It is an axiom of statutory construction that legislative intent is to be determined by an analysis of the language actually used in the legislation. Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 662, 666, 560 A.2d 975 (1989).” Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, 391. “[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature’s intent. American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178,193, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). We have acknowledged, however, in the context of workers’ compensation legislation, that [s]uch guidance is often of little help . . . since words seldom have precise and unvarying meanings. Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352, 359 n.3, 349 A.2d 847 (1974). Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., 223 Conn. 336, 340-41, 612 A.2d 1203 (1992).
“When the language of a statute is unclear, we may ascertain the intent of the legislature by looking beyond the language to the statute’s legislative history and the purpose that the statute was intended to serve. [Weinberg v. ARA Vending Co., supra, 223 Conn.] 341. We have *21previously recognized that our construction of the Workers’ Compensation Act should make every part operative and harmonious with every other part insofar as is possible .... Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91,104, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). In applying these principles, we are mindful that the legislature is presumed to have intended a just and rational result. Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 187, 592 A.2d 912 (1991).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, 224 Conn. 390-91. Finally, although we ordinarily accord deference to the construction of the act by the commissioner and the board; see Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 354, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993); we do not do so in this case because the meaning of “agreement” under
Our primary focus, therefore, is on the express language of
*22In this case, it is undisputed that the defendants did not provide the fund with a copy of an award within the prescribed period. It is also uncontested, however, that Dos Santos has been receiving workers’ compensation benefits since his injury in 1986 and that the defendants, within the statutory period, did provide the fund with a copy of an agreement that was subsequently signed by Dos Santos and approved by the commissioner. Thus, the resolution of this case depends upon whether the agreement of May 25,1988, was an “agreement” within the meaning of
The defendants, quoting Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81, 85 (1826), contend that the term “agreement” under
The fund contends, on the other hand, that we should construe the term “agreement” under
These arguments indicate that the fund does not dispute the defendants’ contention that the plain and ordinary meaning of “agreement” requires neither the signatures of the parties nor the approval of the commissioner. Instead, apparently recognizing that the term “agreement” is not susceptible, in and of itself, to an interpretation that requires the present agreement to have the signatures of the parties or the formal approval of the commissioner, the fund substantially argues that the term “agreement” should be construed in light of the remainder of the act as requiring the formalities necessary for a “voluntary agreement” within the meaning of
Our analysis of the structure of the act and the purposes that it serves persuades us that the legislature did not intend the term “agreement” under
Also, a 1989 amendment to
We are also unpersuaded by the fund’s argument that the conjunction “or” between the phrase “the copy of the agreement” and the term “award” indicates the legislature’s intent to give the two terms equivalent meanings. Although such a conjunction may indicate the legislature’s intent, in this case that intent, without further contextual support, is unclear. Indeed, although the fund argues that the conjunction indicates their equivalence, the appellants assert an equally plausible interpretation that, because
Second, we disagree with the fund that our interpretation somehow conflicts with the purposes underlying the creation of the fund and the purposes served by the notice requirement. “[I]n 1945, the legislature established the fund, primarily to encourage the employment of persons with an existing disability and, at the same time, to provide adequate workers’ compensation benefits for them. Civardi v. Norwich, supra, 231 Conn. 293; Hernandez v. Gerber Group, 222 Conn. 78, 82, 608 A.2d 87 (1992); Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., supra, 166 Conn. 355. Additionally, by creating the fund, the legislature intended to relieve employers from the hardship of liability for those consequences of compensable injury not attributable to their employment . . . Civardi v. Norwich, supra, 293, quoting Hernandez v. Gerber Group, supra, 82; *26Plesz v. United Technologies Corp., 174 Conn. 181, 185, 384 A.2d 363 (1978); Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., supra, 356; 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law (1994) § 59.31 (a), p. 10-492.399 and § 59.34 (a) (1), p. 10-528 . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Norwich, supra, 232 Conn. 320.
“The object of the ninety-day statutory notice is to enable the fund to be apprised promptly of such a claim being made, to obtain a copy of the agreement or award and to have immediate access to all medical reports. Such information is essential to enable the fund to assess promptly its alleged liability and to establish immediately its financial reserves. A further objective is to give the fund a reasonable period of time within which to investigate the claim and to prepare to meet it. Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, [supra, 224 Conn. 392] (construing notice requirements of
*27At the same time, our interpretation properly fulfills the reasonable expectations of employers that have hired employees with previous disabilities. These employers may hire particular employees based on their ability to look to the fund in the event of a second injury. Thus, although we note that payment from the fund “ ‘should be made only in accordance with express statutory authority’ id., 324; Civardi v. Norwich, supra, 231 Conn. 294; we conclude that the fund’s “interpretation would require a strained reading of the statute. ’ ’ Vaillancourt v. New Britain Machine/Litton, supra, 224 Conn. 392.
In sum, we conclude that a document qualifies as a copy of the “agreement” under
*28The decision of the compensation review board is reversed and the case is remanded to the board with direction to remand the case to the commissioner with direction to grant the defendants’ claim for transfer.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
We look to the statute in effect at the date of injury to determine the rights and obligations between the parties. See Civardi v. Norwich, 231 Conn. 287, 293 n.8, 649 A.2d 523 (1994); Iacomacci v. Trumbull, 209 Conn. 219, 222, 550 A.2d 640 (1988). This rule applies to the employer’s right to transfer liability to the fund pursuant to
The fund was also a defendant in the administrative proceedings. For purposes of this opinion, however, references to the defendants are to F. D. Rich Construction Company, Inc., and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company.
Rich also claims that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner’s determination that the second injury fund was not estopped from asserting lack of proper notice under