45 Conn. App. 707 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1997
Opinion
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the workers’ compensation review board
The commissioner found the following facts. The plaintiff was employed by the named defendant
The commissioner found that the plaintiffs notice of claim was timely filed. The board, by majority, reversed the commissioner’s decision and determined that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to file notice within one year following the date of last exposure pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c (a).
To resolve the plaintiffs claims on appeal, we must determine whether the plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding a repetitive trauma injury extends the one year statute of hmitations for filing a notice of claim beyond one year after the last date of exposure.
There is no question that hearing loss is a type of repetitive trauma not specifically referenced in the relevant portion of the statute of limitations, which provides: “No proceedings for compensation . . . shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim ... is
“[T]he date of injury is either the last day of exposure to the work related incidents of repetitive trauma or the date of the accident.” Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, 43 Conn. App. 224, 226-27, 682 A.2d 145, cert. granted, 239 Conn. 953, 688 A.2d 325 (1996). “The last day of exposure is usually the last day of employment.” Id., 227. There is no question that § 31-294 provides a one year statute of limitations for an accidental injury, regardless of a plaintiffs knowledge of a causal relationship to his or her employment. Keegan v. Aetna, Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 42 Conn. App. 803, 806-807, 682 A.2d 1321, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 942, 686 A.2d 120 (1996). We conclude that the statute of limitations in repetitive trauma cases runs one year from the date of last injurious exposure, regardless of when the plaintiff developed knowledge that the injury resulted from his employment. See Discuillo v. Stone & Webster, supra, 226-27; see also Keegan v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 808.
The plaintiff also claims that the board, in applying the one year provision of the statute to run from the last day of exposure rather than from the first known manifestation of an injury, violated his rights to due process and access to the courts.
The decision of the compensation review board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The board’s judgment was by majority vote with chairman Jesse M. Frank! dissenting.
In addition to the named defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Cigna Property and Casualty Company are also defendants.
General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides: “No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the deceased employee, may make claim for compensation within the two-year period or within one year from the date of death, whichever is later. Notice of a claim for compensation may be given to the employer or any commissioner and shall state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting from the accident, or the date of the first
The plaintiff also claims a violation of his rights under article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiff offers no separate analysis for