83 Ind. 357 | Ind. | 1882
Lead Opinion
The appellant Avas convicted and adjudged to pay a fine of $75 upon a charge of having unlawfully removed
The appellant complains of the admission in evidence of the papers, proceedings and judgment of the Ohio Circuit ■Court, in an action in ejectment, wherein the prosecuting witness obtained against the appellant and another a judgment for the recovery of the possession of the land, from which the appellant removed the fence as charged; and further complains that the court misdirected the jury in refei’ence to that evidence.
So far as necessary to be stated, the instructions excepted to by the appellant were to the effect that if, “ by an action in the circuit court between them, the lines and boundaries of the lands were determined and established by the judgment and order of such court, and Ricketts found to be the owner ■of certain lands therein described, and such judgment is still in force, unreversed and not appealed from, the lines so found by the court in the judgment would be the line dividing the lands and the lines that should be recognized by them.”
“We refer on this point,” say counsel, “ to Glenn v. State, ex rel., 46 Ind. 368, and the authorities therein cited. These judgments were not offered merely to prove the fact that such judgments were rendered, but to prove the ownership of the land, the location of the line, and the ownership of the rails, ■etc. Prof. Greenleaf, after stating the inadmissibility of judgments in criminal causes, on the trial of civil causes, ;.says: ‘The same principles render a judgment in a civil action inadmissible evidence in a criminal prosecution.’ Vol. 1, section 547, seventh edition. Various reasons are given for the rule, and, amongst others, that civil causes are decided upon a preponderance of the evidence, while in criminal causes fhe evidence must prove the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”
We do not question the authorities cited, but are of opinion
If the appellant had been prosecuted for an act committed before the rendition of the civil judgment, then, in reason as well as by authority, the evidence would not have been admissible. But, as is well and accurately stated in the case of Maple v. Beach, 43 Ind. 51, “A judgment is always evidence of the fact that such a judgment has been given, and of the legal consequences which result from that fact: 1 Starkie Ev. 317; 1 Greenl. Ev., section 538. This is true whether the person against whom it is offered as evidence was a party to the action in which it was rendered or not.” See, also, Queen v. Hickling, 7 Q. B. 880. And so, in this case, whatever theretofore may have been the true location of the boundary line between the lands of the appellant and those of his prosecutor, from the time that judgment was rendered the line thereby ■defined became the true line. This was the consequence of the judgment, and hence the judgment was admissible, not •only as evidence of, but as constituting, the fact, and excluding all enquiry on the subject into facts antedating the judgment.
It is claimed that the evidence did not warrant the verdict. Citing Dawson v. State, 52 Ind. 478, and Palmer v. State, 45 Ind. 388, counsel insist that it is an effort on the part of the prosecuting witness to try the title to real estate by a criminal prosecution, which ought not to be encouraged. The facts
We can not, in view of these facts, say that there has been an abuse of the criminal process and powers of the court for the furtherance of private ends.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Rehearing
On Petition for a Rehearing.
After a careful consideration of the petition-for a rehearing', we are confirmed in the conclusion already declared.
It is said in the petition, that “ there is no warrant in any authority cited by us (the counsel) or the court for the distinction made in the opinion, that if the judgments had been, rendered after, and not before, the alleged offence, they would, not have been admissible.” If the distinction is not stated,, neither is it expressly or impliedly denied by any authority which has come under our observation, and its inherent forcéis not less because no case has arisen before, if such be the fact, which called for its recognition. It is, however, not a new distinction, and is implied in the rule stated by Green-leaf and recognized by the other text-writers, that a judgment is not only evidence, but is “the only proper legal evidence.
“Where the judgment constitutes one of the muniments of the party’s title to an estate,” it is admissible; and “ So a judgment inter alios is admissible, to show the character in which the possessor holds his lands.” 1 Greenl. Ev., section 539. But why this proposition, unless for the manifest reason, that, no matter what has been the tenure before the rendition of the judgment, an adjudication in respect to its character between the possessor and the one under whom he has been holding becomes at and from the date of the judgment conclusive; and when thereafter the character of the tenure is put in issue, the judgment is the proper evidence. And so the judgments in question were admissible, not, as counsel claim the decision to be, to prove “ the facts upon which they rest,” but to prove the fact consequent upon their rendition, namely, that whatever theretofore may have been the true location, the line declared by the judgment became by force of the adjudication the true line, with reference to which the parties, their privies and all the world were bound thereafter to govern their conduct. So long as there has been no final adjudication in reference to a disputed boundary, it is plain that one accused of a trespass can be convicted only by showing that he had gone beyond the true line; but when, in a suit between the adjacent owners, the location of the line has been adjudged, and the judgment has not been and can not be appealed from, it would be a singular system of law which did not both by civil and criminal procedure compel a proper respect thereafter for the line so established, and forbid further inquiry in reference to its original proper location.
It is to be observed that we have not held that the judgments in question were admissible, as evidence of the ownership of the land on one or the other side of the adjudicated line. The instruction complained of is that “the lines so
Petition overruled.