Timothy DORRELL, Appellant v. Alanna DORRELL, Appellee
No. CV-13-1110
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Sept. 24, 2014
2014 Ark. App. 496 | 925
Burbank Dodson & Barker, PLLC, El Dorado, by: Jack W. Barker, for appellee.
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge.
Timothy Dorrell appeals an order of the Union County Circuit Court granting appellee Alanna Dorrells petition for modification of the couples joint-custody arrangement and awarding Alanna primary custody of their daughter. On appeal, Timothy raises three arguments, contending that the circuit court erred in (1) destroying joint custody in light of a new statutory provision favoring joint-custody agreements; (2) finding it to be in the childs best interest to place custody with Alanna; and (3) not awarding Timothy judgment on unpaid medical expenses. For the reasons discussed below, we are unable to reach the merits of his first and third arguments. On Timothys second argument, we find no error and affirm.
I. Factual Background
The Dorrells daughter, A.D., was born in 2007, and the couple was divorced in 2009 by consent decree. The consent decree of absolute divorce provided that Tim-othy
Within months of the consent decree, Timothy filed an initial petition for change of custody; however, he never took action to prosecute his petition.1 In 2013, Alanna filed a counterpetition for change of custody. In her counterpetition, she alleged that it was time for A.D. to begin kindergarten, but the parties could not agree on where to send her to school, despite the provision in the decree to reach an agreement on that issue. Alanna sought to have primary custody placed with her. In response, Timothy filed an amended petition for change of custody, asserting that it was in A.D.s best interest for him to have primary custody. Essentially, both parties sought to have primary custody based on what they believed was in the childs best interest. The circuit court granted Alannas counterpetition in an order filed on August 19, 2013, finding that it was in A.D.s best interest for Alanna to have primary custody of the child. It is from this order that Timothy appeals.
II. Procedural Issues
Timothys first point on appeal raises numerous arguments concerning the interpretation and application of Act 1156 of 2013. With this act, the General Assembly amended
Procedurally, Timothy did not raise the issue of the amendment to
This issue was raised for the first time in Timothys motion for stay and motion for reconsideration, which were filed on August 23, 2013. On September 12, 2013, Timothy filed a notice of appeal that designated the circuit courts August 19 order modifying the custody arrangement. The circuit court did not rule on the motion for reconsideration within thirty days. How-ever,
Because the circuit court did not rule on Timothys posttrial motions within thirty days, they were deemed denied by operation of law on the thirtieth day pursuant to
A notice of appeal filed before disposition of any of the motions listed in paragraph (1) of this subdivision shall be treated as filed on the day after the entry of an order disposing of the last motion outstanding or the day after the motion is deemed denied by operation of law. Such a notice is effective to appeal the underlying judgment, decree, or order. A party who also seeks to appeal from the grant or denial of the motion shall within thirty (30) days amend the previously filed notice, complying with Rule 3(e).
Because Timothy did not file an amended notice of appeal after the deemed denial of his posttrial motion, we are without jurisdiction to address the issues raised in those pleadings.
Our court has addressed this jurisdictional issue before. In Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 Ark. App. 227, 2010 WL 816244, this court declined to address the circuit courts denial of the appellants motion for new trial where appellant failed to file an amended notice of appeal that encompassed that denial: “We are without jurisdiction to address this issue. Appellants notice of appeal, filed after the decree but before disposition of the new-trial motion, was effective only to appeal the decree; the record fails to show that appellant ever filed a new or amended notice of appeal after the new-trial motion was deemed denied.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Ark. R.App. P. Civ. 4(b)(2)); see also Wilson v. Ark. State Highway Comm‘n, 2014 Ark. App. 130, 2014 WL 668211 (refusing to address issues pertaining to the denial of a new-trial motion where appellant never filed an amended notice of appeal from the order denying the motion); Troutman Oil Co. v. Lone, 75 Ark.App. 346, 57 S.W.3d 240 (2001). We reach the same conclusion in the instant case: we can address Timothys arguments only insofar as he challenges the circuit courts order awarding primary custody to Alanna, but we are unable to reach his argument that the circuit court erred in failing to consider the amendments to
For the same reason, we neither reach nor address Timothys third point on appeal concerning the circuit courts failure—in the August order—to award him half of
III. Modification of Custody
We turn then to the remaining issue that is properly before us: whether the circuit court erred in finding it to be in A.D.s best interest to modify the joint-custody arrangement and award primary custody to Alanna. In reviewing child-custody cases, we consider the evidence de novo but will not reverse a circuit courts findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hamilton v. Barrett, 337 Ark. 460, 989 S.W.2d 520 (1999); Preston v. Preston, 2014 Ark. App. 58, 2014 WL 245783. We give due deference to the superior position of the circuit court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Hamilton, supra. This deference to the circuit court is even greater in cases involving child custody, as a heavier burden is placed on the circuit court to utilize to the fullest extent its powers of perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. Id.
Based on our de novo review of the evidence, we hold that the circuit court did not err. At the time of the hearing, Timothy lived in Spearsville, Louisiana, but worked forty-to-fifty hours per week in El Dorado, including frequent overtime hours. Alanna lived with her parents in Junction City and held a job working from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, with very little overtime. Timothy wanted A.D. to attend Westside Christian School in El Dorado or a private school in Louisiana, while Alanna, whose father was on the school board in the Junction City School District, wanted A.D. to attend Junction City schools. Alanna noted that her parents would be available to care for A.D. after school every day. She also expressed a great deal of concern that it would be confusing and stressful for A.D. to have to alternate back and forth between her parents while she was attending school. Alanna said that she felt that it was important for A.D. to have “one home to lay her head down at night, one place to bring her book bag and get her lunch ready.”
Based on this evidence, the circuit court determined that both parents and their homes were suitable. Regarding custody, the court made the following findings:
10. The court finds that joint custody is not in A.D.s best interest, because of the confusion that it causes A.D., because the parties are unable to agree upon school choice for A.D., and because it would require that A.D. live out of a suitcase as she goes back and forth between her parents, while attending school five days a week.
11. Both of the parents are employed. [Alanna] works as an office manager at Hill Services. Her work hours are 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Monday through Friday. [Alanna] works from one to three hours per week overtime.... [Timothy] is employed at El Dorado Chemical Company. He regularly works overtime, working from 40 to 50 hours weekly. [Timothy] is called into work after his regular work hours; when this occurs, his wife cares for A.D.
12. There are numerous relatives and friends that live in close proximity to [Alanna], and such persons serve as a support group for [Alanna] in providing nurture and care for A.D. 13. As between the parents, [Alanna] can spend the most time with A.D. During the work week, [Alanna] can spend every evening with A.D. [Timothys] work schedule is such that A.D. would spend many evenings with [Timothys] wife, if he was the primary custodian. [Timothys] wife has a very good relationship with A.D. and has been a positive influence in her life; however, the same can be said of [Alanna].
14. The court finds that it is in the best interest of A.D. that she be placed in the custody of [Alanna].
15. Timothy is awarded reasonable and seasonable visitation in accordance with the courts visitation guidelines.
On appeal, Timothy argues that the circuit court erred in awarding custody to Alanna. We disagree. Arkansas law is well settled that the primary consideration in child-custody cases is the welfare and best interest of the children; all other considerations are secondary. Preston, supra. A judicial award of custody should not be modified unless it is shown that there are changed conditions that demonstrate that a modification of the decree is in the best interest of the child, or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interest of the child that were either not presented to the circuit court or were not known by the circuit court at the time the original custody order was entered.4 Id. In making a decision whether a modification of custody is in a childs best interest, the circuit court should consider factors such as the psychological relationship between the parents and children, the need for stability and continuity in the relationship between parents and children, the past conduct of the parents toward the children, and the reasonable preference of the children. Bamburg v. Bamburg, 2014 Ark. App. 269, 435 S.W.3d 6; Rector v. Rector, 58 Ark.App. 132, 947 S.W.2d 389 (1997).
Here, the court carefully considered the parents financial and working situations, weighed who would be able to spend more time with A.D., and factored in A.D.s need for stability and security as she begins school. Based on the record before us, we are unable to say that the circuit courts decision was clearly erroneous, and we therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
GRUBER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
