Dorothea Gravely v. John Madden

in this case IV. presented the circumstances by § 20-1- covered not intended were reasons, foregoing For the legislature en- Tennessee 119. In the District Court is AFFIRMED. § concerns 20-1-119 address acted following the Tennessee arose liability joint and several abolition of Court’s Balentine, McIntyre 833 S.W.2d

(Tenn.1992). Halstead v. Niles-Bolton See 01-A-01-9503-CV00113,

Assocs., No. (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. at *1

WL with- disposition). Even

1996)(unpublished us, may history guide legislative

out pre- the concerns was assume that one of GRAVELY, Plaintiff-Appellee, Dorothea naming and attribut from vent a defendant responsible previously to a unknown fault time for the when the party its answer MADDEN, Defendant-Appellant. John party bring newly into plaintiff to named passed. This insufficient or had the suit was No. 96-4395. course, concern, only where the arises unaware, until the defen plaintiff has been Appeals, United States Court answer, individ of the fault of another dant’s Sixth Circuit. Indeed, a of Tennessee case law ual. review 3, 1998. Argued Feb. only implicated § suggests that 20-1-119 apprises the answer where defendant’s April Decided responsible first time of a plaintiff for the See, Truckstops e.g., party. Owens (Tenn.1996)(when America, 915 S.W.2d where against restaurant

complaint was filed stool, plaintiff was un

plaintiff fell off of a designed and companies who

aware of the company the stool

manufactured restaurant); to the see

which sold the stool Inc., Stores, Soper v.

also Wal-Mart (M.D.Tenn.1996)(plaintiff

F.Supp. party identity of third until

was unaware of to disclose named defendant

court ordered following assertion of identity defendant’s answer; 90-day party in its

an unnamed triggered § 20-1-119 was

period under filed because

the time answer was party a third

had reasonable notice of opportunity to discover the adequate

and an is, thus, identity). plain It party’s

third was not intended 20-1-119 who, Whittlesey long before the

plaintiff like complaint, to the

defendant’s answer may

knowledge party be at fault that a third injuries.5 complained of

for the alleged damages merely assuming applies to factual statute 5. Even here, presented employee complaint there is substantial scenario were not caused States, in its the United as whether paragraph Drs. 21 stated that United States answer, paragraphs alleged and 21 that a employees Holley of the Unit- were not Cole and injury party caused or contributed third ed States. damages. Paragraph 20 for which seeks (briefed), Jay Kevin J. O’Brien E. Presser briefed), Lease, (argued and & Co- O’Brien lumbus, OH, Plaintiff-Appellee. Timothy briefed), Mangan (argued J. Atty. Gen., Litiga- Office of the Corrections Section, OH, Columbus, tion for Defendant Appellant. MERRITT, KENNEDY,

Before: BOGGS, Judges. Circuit MERRITT, J., opinion delivered the court, BOGGS, J., joined. in which KENNEDY, 350-53), (pp. J. delivered a separate opinion concurring in the result. OPINION MERRITT, Judge. Circuit Madden, John Defendant an Ohio correc- officer, appeals tions denying an order summary motion judgment qualified immunity grounds rights civil action arising out of his use of apprehending felon. The District rejected qualified claim of Madden’s immunity concluding there is “a version jury of the facts from which could objec- conclude use of force was not tively reasonable, objectively and the reason- able been well-established Gamer, the law at least since Tennessee v. L.Ed.2d 1 was argues decided in 1985.” Madden improperly employed District Court Gar- analysis deny- ner’s Fourth Amendment qualified immunity claim and instead Amendment, applied should have which he contends allowed use of force under the circumstances. For rea- below, briefly sons conclude applicable under standard, Madden’s use of was reason- able as a matter of He is law. therefore immunity. Accordingly, entitled to we vacate the District Court’s order entry summary remand for the in favor of Madden. 25,1987, prison- Amendments. The Gravely, a and Fourteenth District David

On June Pickaway Institute parties’ Correctional Court denied the motions for er cross Ohio, Orient, escaped from a minimum secu- summary judgment, appealed and Madden later, days Four rity prison farm detail. summary denial of his motion for court’s person- and law enforcement Madden other immunity. qualified the basis of on they where deter- nel raided a residence previous panel A of this Court denied the visiting a Gravely was friend. Officer mined plaintiff's appeal motion to dismiss the corrections officer were Madden and another Madden, jurisdiction. Gravely lack of No. landing of on of the rear stationed either side (6th 21, 1997). Cir. March building officers as other initiated through door. Both had their raid the front to Madden asks this Court reverse was wear- revolvers drawn. Madden service the District denial of his Court’s motion badge had his dis- street clothes but summary judgment seeking qualified immu wearing a played. The other officer was § nity plaintiff’s claim. from the department uniform corrections order to establish his entitlement to badge displayed. When and also had immunity, first Madden must show that he through and Gravely stepped the back door acting scope was of his within discretion porch, stepped officers back onto the both ary authority when the incident occurred. landing light. into the Madden from the and Wegener City Covington, See of Gravely object in his observed Cir.1991) curiam) (although (per the other officer ordered hand. Madden and plaintiff proving of carries ultimate burden up. give and himself Gravely to freeze immune, that defendant defendant landing past leaped off and ran Gravely showing acting of he bears initial burden was the other officer officers. Madden and discretionary authority scope within of Gravely stop, ignored to but he again told question). in time of incident away. run Madden then them and turned to Madden, argues that in 1987 as a correctional shot, in single Gravely fired which struck a officer, authority engage in lacked the back, injuring fatally him. After Madden recapture escaped efforts to inmate. Gravely, approached and the other officer argument, points of this she out that knife they partially a be- discovered butcher no on the books until 1994 there was statute Gravely’s appar- leg. neath The knife explicitly authorizing corrections officers to Gravely had in hand ently object escaped apprehend inmates. See Ohio Rev. building. Although Madden he left the (1994).1 § rea 5120.48 he not believe Code testified that did provision of a an immediate threat when fired sons that the enactment posed shot, way authority he had no other conferring he believed that on corrections this escape. Gravely’s Madden under- prevent possess did officers establishes regulation that an administrative stood persuaded time. We are not before that him authorized effect time argument. Section 5145.21 apprehend escaped prison- deadly force to Code, re Ohio Revised enacted er. quired penitentiary the warden the state peniten again commit to “arrest brought Gravely, plaintiff, Dorothea ... found tiary escapes who and is a convict § as the adminis- under 42 U.S.C. suit § large____” 5145.21 Ohio Rev.Code estate, asserting Gravely’s of David trator (1953), simultaneously repealed and amend- force violated that Madden’s use (effective Fourth, Oct. by 1994 Laws H 571 Eighth, ed Ohio Gravely’s rights under the necessary appre- persons appropriate staff as follows: 1. Section 5120.48 reads prisoner. Appre- Correctional officers and Deployment hend the Assignment of Staff Escaped may carry required in Prisoners firearms when hend officials escapes a correctional prisoner If from state discharge apprehending, their duties in institution, managing officer of institu- transporting place taking custody, into tion, upon ad- with and consultation escaped prisoner who has of confinement officials, appropriate law enforcement vice correctional institution. from state community deploy assign into the shall 1994). § posed significant anyone. Pursuant 5145.21 and related threat of harm to provisions, department state of rehabili- Dep. Madden J.A. at 89-90. Under promulgated tation and correction a number might the Gamer standard there be some regulations clearly contemplated question as to whether Madden’s actions ap- involvement corrections officers in the objectively were reasonable. Gamer does prehension See, escaped e.g., inmates. however, not, provide the relevant standard (au- § Ohio Code Admin. 5120-9-01 in this case. thorizing reasonably the use of force where it was While 1987 that Tennessee inmate). necessary governed v. Gamer the use of excessive regulations Some of were these relied on for by law enforcement officers free years before the enactment 5120.48 citizens, clearly it was not established that 1994, simply and it is clear that 5120.48 applied in Gamer excessive force cases in authority already codified existed. Hence, volving escaped reject convicts. The use of plaintiff’s exces the assertion that recapture sive acting escaped force discretionary Madden convict was outside authority problem at the time of creates different than the use of the incident. apprehend fleeing force to a nonviolent felo Because is clear Madden act was ny suspect. The Fourth Amendment is not discretionary power within his he triggered by attempts recapture anew at be engaged Gravely, in efforts to apprehend “seized,” cause the convict has been Madden un immunity is entitled to tried, convicted, and incarcerated. addi Gravely’s less the establishes that tion, the historical provided reasons we in right application free from be the of dead in opinion our Garner v. Memphis Police ly clearly force was so at time established the 240, (6th Dept., Cir.1983), 710 shooting of the that a reasonable in official 1, aff'd, 1694, 471 U.S. S.Ct. 105 position clearly Madden’s would have under 1, against deadly for the rule on a force free duty stood that he was under an affirmative citizen not and incarcerated do not to have using refrained from such force. respect with escaped convicts. Bass, 483, Williams v. Cir. 486 distinction, Recognizing Supreme this the 1995). another way, question Put the Albers, 312, Whitley Court 475 U.S. 106 protected by qualified whether Madden is 1078, (1986), S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 251 stated that immunity objective turns on the reasonable Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual actions, light ness of his assessed Clause, Punishment rather -than the Fourth legal clearly rules that were at established or the Due Process Clause of the time were taken and based on the Amendment, provides Fourteenth facts to him. Fitzgerald, available Harlow v. deciding rule for excessive force claims 800, 818-19, 102 2727, 457 U.S. S.Ct. because, “those convicted of crimes” (1982); 73 Creigh L.Ed.2d 396 Anderson v. respect persons, to such ton, “the has 635, [al State 641, 3034, 107 S.Ct. 3039- ready] complied guar with the constitutional 40, (1987). 97 L.Ed.2d 523 The District traditionally antees associated with criminal Court in case concluded that at the time prosecutions.” Id. at at S.Ct. 1083- Gravely’s clearly death it was established (citations omitted); 84 Garner, see also Graham v. 1, under Tennessee v. 471 105 U.S. Connor, 386, 10, (1985), U.S. n. 109 S.Ct. S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 1 law that a n. 104 L.Ed.2d 443 officer deadly enforcement could use (“After conviction, fleeing force felon unless it “necessary as the prevent primary was ‘serves source of escape” and substantive protection ... ... “probable the officer had cases where the delib cause to believe suspect pose[d] significant challenged that the erate use of force is as excessive threat ”) harm, physical unjustified.’ (quoting Whitley, serious and either the officer U.S. 1088). or to Id. Whitley others.” at 106 S.Ct. at S.Ct. case Although Gravely legal was armed with a knife made it status of the house, when he ran from the Madden later victim the excessive force determines Fourth, testified that he did Gravely Eighth, not believe whether or the Four- deadly Ms to use force under the circumstances. governs excessive teenth presented no evidence tend- claims. weapon Ms ing to that Madden fired show well before 1987 clearly established It was sadistically for maliciously purpose conviction, person such as Grave- that after Rather, Gravely. harm evi- inflicting against and enjoyed protection cruel ly dence establishes that Madden used Eight punishment afforded unusual attempt prevent good faith pro- tMs It also clear that Amendment. felon twice escape of armed who had right to free from the included the tection oMy capture. weapon evaded He fired Ms unnecessary pain wanton imposition Gravely ignored repeated warnings by corrections officers. See suffering give up. stop There is no Mmself 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at Whitley, 475 U.S. Gravely aban- indication that would have 1084-85; Wolfish, 535 n. Bell v. attempt doned Ms if Madden had n. 60 L.Ed.2d 447 Simply put, a warning fired shot. there is (1979). restoring context of order on notMng contradicting record Madden’s ex- prison grounds, Gravely have but whether the plained that or Madden’s asser- unnecessary actions “inflicted defendant’s sole tion that fired suffering ultimately pain and and wanton purpose preventing escape. Ms Under the of good in a applied force was turns on ‘whether circumstances, Madden’s conduct cannot be discipline or restore effort to maintain faith Gravely’s right to have violated David to said sadistically very for the maliciously and or pumshment. free from cruel and unusual be ” causing Whitley, 475 harm.’ purpose of plaintiff suggests that Madden’s (quoting at 1085 S.Ct. regu of an administrative use force violated (2d Glick, 1028, 1033 v. 481 F.2d Johnson shooting in time the lation effect the of Cir.1973)). Whitley identified the Court defeats Madden’s and that violation of the factors from which inferences some of regulation ques immunity. of in knowing willingness with re- wantonness 5120-9-01(F)(5) tion, § of the OMo Adminis unjustified infliction of harm can spect to the 1984, Code, promulgated in trative wMch application for of drawn: “the need the be deadly permits a corrections officer to use force, relationship between the need and the reasonably believes force when the officer used, [and] of force that was the the amount necessary such force is the least force to injury Whitley, the inflicted.” extent of escapee. apprehend or to prevent Glick, 321, (quoting at 1085 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. stating that at an affidavit Madden submitted 1033). further The Court stated Gravely, he time he shot believed the of as “the extent the threat that factors such deadly use escaped absent the would have inmates, reasonably safety of to staff force, no evidence and the submitted on the perceived responsible the officials if suggesting otherwise. Even Madden’s them, any of the facts known to basis however, regulation, force violated the severity temper a efforts made qualified immumty. would still entitled response” to the are also relevant forceftd not create regulation does analysis. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. right cause of gives rise to a substantive at 1085. Rather, provides it damages. action for Whitley Although respect the use of dead- involved for officers guideline corrections prison ly during suppression guideline on This turns the use of force. riot, Court factors relied and conclusions the indi observations evaluating such, regu of the that context are also relevant As violation vidual officer. of an render Madden liable apprehension of force would not the use lation alone Scherer, Applying damages. Davis these factors suit for See felon. ease, 104 S.Ct. viewing 194 & n. the evidence 468 U.S. present (officials plaintiff, we con- & n. 82 L.Ed.2d light most favorable not lose violations do for constitutional officer in Madden’s sued clude that reasonable qualified immunity simply because their may permissible their position well have deemed statutory conduct violates some or adminis- actions officials’ violated dece- rather, provision; rights trative become dent’s liable under this Amendment. How- ever, damages judgment for I summary where there is a violation too believe rights appropriate statutory give because the Fourth rise cause of Amend- Starke, damages); applicability ment’s to an Washington action for official’s use of Cir.1988) deadly during attempt apprehend (regula- an escaped, not clearly tion that turns on convicted felon was observations and conclu- established in relevant ac- sions of individual officer does create place. tions took right destroys substantive im- munity). Proper A. Fourth Amendment Provides Finally, contends that if Analyzing Gravely’s Framework 5120-9-01(F)(5) of the Ohio Administrative Claim. Code authorized Madden’s use of Gamer, Tennessee force, regulation itself is unconstitutional. Court ap held that Fourth Amendment We have held that Madden’s conduct plies during the use Gravely’s right did not violate to be free from attempt fleeing felony sus punishment. cruel and unusual For pect. S.Ct. reasons, reject plaintiffs argu- same (1985). The Court reasoned that this was respect ment with to the constitutional validi- apprehension suspect so because the of a is a ty regulation. meaning “seizure” within of the Fourth stated, For the reasons we VACATE the Amendment. Id. at District order and REMAND the ease “[wjhenever (noting that an officer restrains entry summary in favor away, the freedom of a to walk he has of the defendant. person,” although seized that and that “it is always just police not minimal when KENNEDY, concurring Circuit Judge, seizure,” a interference becomes “there can the result. question apprehension by no that the use I respectfully concur in the result subject but dis- is a seizure to the reasoning majority sent opin- requirement from the reasonableness of the Fourth unpersuaded Amendment”). by majority’s ion. I am the The Court did not elaborate analysis regarding applicability holding suspects the of the whether to its limited Eighth upon equally Amendment. The apply persons cases which or would to convicted majority the large. only relies all involve actions taken Id. We are able to find one against persons prison convicted in the con- case that ap since Gamer the decided text. I propriate Because believe a convicted in a ease prison hotly involving whom not officials are a factual scenario to identical the pursuing1 Fuller, analogous fleeing presented is more to a one v. here.2 Patterson felon a prisoner, than to confined I Georgia the Northern District of extended Gamer, apply concluding the Fourth to the Amendment claims that the Fourth Amend ment, escapees. I then Eighth, governs escaped, would find that not the Circuit, Eighth 1. I would amendment to con- 2. The District that the Fifth fleeing prison throughout Kennard, (5th victed felons from a in Wisniewski v. 901 F.2d 1276 prison chase so that not be assumed, officials would sub- 1990), appears Cir. to have also without ject to two different sets of constitutional rules deciding explicitly, that a Fourth Amendment during one is true continuous chase. It that a analysis appropriate dealing is with claims pursuit require hot distinction would courts escapee completed made who has point prisoner determine at what a has success- escape being reapprehended. and is then How However, fully completed escape attempt. ever, inapposite. this case Wisniewski was is many fuzzy along lines that courts must draw are felon; only a convicted he had been indicted. edges; pursuit hot is no determination Moreover, explicitly the court declined decide than more difficult currently other determinations courts "difficult issue” whether Fourth Moreover, make. must framework Amendment or Due Process clause applies. making pursuit exists for hot determina- tions. prison context convicted excessive force claim. excessive force claims felon’s (N.D.Ga.1987) Eighth properly and finds Amendment (stating ex- F.Supp. applies brought by to such claims when con- escaped, had plicitly that “because Patterson prisoners. prison Eighth inap- victed officials’ Amendment Since the Court finds against Gravely place actions took outside of plicable,”); generally United States v. see Cir.1990) (9th Hunt, prison any context indeed custodial 893 F.2d (court context, I deciding” do believe Graham Connor without “assum[ed] Hunt, question “standing ... resolves the of whether Fourth escapee, as an Eighth applies to rights against properly un- assert amendment fourth seizure”). Gravely’s excessive force claim. Unfortu- reasonable search nately, the court did not articulate Patterson (6th Dahlberg, Cornwell v. why escaped, should re- convicted felon Center, Cir.1992), Kinney v. Indiana Youth protections as ceive the same constitutional (7th Cir.1991) 950 F.2d 462 and Brothers in- felony suspect than as an fleeing rather Cir.1994) Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 ar- prison. from Id. attempting mate guably provide ma- additional for the majority applies holds that Gamer jority’s belief that only fleeing felony suspects and therefore governs use an official’s inapposite. was a convicted is Since fleeing is a convicted felon who felon, Circuit, that the it asserts from corrections officials. This Cornwell, is the relevant constitutional standard. improper use stated that opin- majority relies Court’s prisoner is of force “asserted support: Eight ion in Graham Connor exclusively be raised under punishment Amendment’s cruel and unusual have not resolved the Our cases clauses.” 963 F.2d 915. The excessive Amendment continues whether the Fourth complained of occurred on protection provide individuals during protest. Kinney, a grounds excessive against the deliberate as he at- correction officer shot an inmate beyond point at physical force which escape by climbing the outer tempted to pretrial begins, arrest ends and detention prison fence. 950 462. The Seventh attempt do not answer and we plaintiff, as a determined that Circuit clear, however, question today. It invoking prisoner, was from convicted barred protects pretrial Due Process clause protections, and the Fourth Amendment’s from the use of excessive force detainee Eighth that Amendment controlled punishment. con- amounts After Brothers, Similarly, in claim. Id. at 465. viction, Eighth as Amendment ‘serves deadly appre- deputies used force sheriffs primary protec- source substantive pretrial attempted to detainee who hend ... ... in cases where the deliberate tion custody during transport from escape from as and challenged is excessive use offorce F.3d 452. holding one cell to another. 28 Any protection ‘sub- unjustified.’ held the Amend- Fifth Circuit Fourth process’ stantive due convicted affords resulting apply to the excessive ment did not is, against prisoners excessive force force claim: held, pro- at redundant have best Eighth Amendment. vided and Once an has been arrested individual surely custody, and placed police is into 395 n. 109 1871 490 U.S. S.Ct. (1989) arresting transferred (emphasis add- after the officer has n. 104 443 L.Ed.2d cell, ed) Albers, jail the individual the individual to (quoting Whitley v. 475 U.S. detainee, protected 1078, 1088, pretrial 251 becomes a 106 S.Ct. Connor, (1979)). however, Due Process against does excessive Graham v. is released is the detainee suggest Eighth Amendment Clause. Until that the custody, never reverts protection from this status only source of constitutional conviction; suspect. Any other merely primary to that of mere it is back Moreover, anomalous would lead to the even conclusion protection. source of Gra- receiving great- only pretrial escapees contemplate result of appears to ham v. Connor protection er fying protection ground than those who on the detainees lesser peacefully remain their cells.3 that the state secured a formal “has adjudication guilt in accordance with due By analogy, Gravely’s Id. at 457. status law”). process of Most of these concerns large while he was at remained that of a simply implicated implicated if are Court, convicted felon. Since —or greatly are reduced —where convicted plainly this Circuit and other circuits have successfully escaped felon has and the offi- Eighth the lesser Amendment merely prison. cials seek to return him to conviction, protections apply after the Dis- application trict Court’s Fourth course, may argue poten- Of one that the arguably Amendment dic- contradicted the escaped, poses tial an threat convicted felon However, higher tates of these courts. each granting to citizens militates in of not favor prisoners; of those cases involved convicted greater escapees protection by definition, escapee pris- longer is no However, large. while remain at a con- Therefore, oner. this Court must consider not, by having victed felon is virtue of been policy affording whether reasons for convicted, dangerous fleeing more than fel- Eighth, Fourth, pro- rather than Amendment Moreover, guilty of the same crime. af- prisoners tections convicted also escaped, fording person Fourth applying Eighth Amendment protections place society will not escapees. claims of convicted since, greater risk pursuant to that stan- Eighth lesser Amendment constitu dard, may officer still force to protections prisoners tional courts is afford proba- the felon if the officer predicated part upon in large the need to poses ble cause believe that the felon discipline maintain or restore within threat immediate of harm the officer or prison safety and to minimize threats to the Thus, parties. escapee guilty third if the See, e.g., staff inmates. Whit and per- murder other crimes which would Albers, ley S.Ct. apprehen- mit the use of in his 1084-85; Wolfish, 441 Bell v. U.S. at 99 sion, permissible such force would be under (“Prison ... S.Ct. administrators presents. the circumstances this case wide-ranging should be accorded deference Finally, I hold that adoption policies execution applies long as so the officials practices that in their needed are pursuit,” are in “hot or “immediate and con- preserve discipline internal order and pursuit,” escapee. tinuous See Welsh security.”); Kinney, to maintain institutional Wisconsin, 740, 753, (applying Eighth at 465 Amend 2091, 2099, (defining L.Ed.2d 732 ment to claim of “convicted in state pursuit). hot confinement” that officials used excessive long should so officials are in preventing escape); Sharp (W.D.Mich. pursuit” expect pris- “hot because we cannot Kelsey, F.Supp. 1996) (“The know, learn, guards on or take the time to governs Amendment escapee imprisoned. for what crime the was charged those of custodial care addition, applying persons, including care the lesser constitutional convicted where the throughout pursuit” requires of employed security as a mea “hot an sure.”) added). (emphasis escapee prison- Ingraham v. would be deterrent other Cf. 651, 40, Wright, contemplating escape attempt. 430 670 n. ers U.S. 97 This (1977) (justi- pris- n. 51 L.Ed.2d 711 interest is deterrent served other brief, argued congruity allowing reap As prisoner 3. the defendant in his trou- is greater protections blesome that "an inmate who is in his successful reward of constitutional with- realm, within”); escape Fourth falls within a out the than United States v. (2d Cir.1984) Roy, (stating and an inmate who is unsuccessful in his 734 F.2d 111 escapee remains in an realm. should have constitutional same apparent illegal protections large is reward for successful behavior while at he would if he were However, penitentiary). both inconsistent with the law and with still in the common confined this Hunt, sense.” See States v. F.2d alone is to warrant United concern insufficient lesser (1990) (recognizing protection. possible in- "the law,” witnessing provide “clearly such established prevented from success- are oners unmistakably point must is no these decisions convicted escapes. Once a ful uneonstitutionality of the conduct com- re- hotly eventual being pursued, his longer clearly plained of so and be foreshadowed likely to affect other inmates’ capture is less authority by applicable as to direct leave point, attempt escape. At that decision no mind of a offi- doubt reasonable of Fourth militate in favor policy reasons conduct, challenged cer if on con- protection. grounds, be found want- stitutional would supporting reasons policy Since ing. greater prison adminis- grant of deference to Seiter, Employees Assn. v. Ohio Civil Serv. prison context do trators Cir.1988). felon grant once the equal of deference and continu- escaped and the immediate has authority which As no relevant exists ended, any, I believe the pursuit, if ous clearly that the Fourth Amend- establishes apply to an offi- should Fourth Amendment governs ment the excessive force claims escap- apprehending an use of force in cial’s felons, escaped, defending offi- ee. immunity qualified cer was entitled judgment. summary “Clearly Right Estab- B.

lished” stated, prison “are majority officials

theAs unless, immunity ‘on

entitled basis, no reason-

objective it is obvious that competent have concluded

ably officer would lawful]; if but officers conduct was [the STRICKLAND, Executrix Joann competence disagree could reasonable ” Hagan, Estate John issue, recognized.’ immunity should be Plaintiff-Appellee, Cincinnati, City Russo (6th Cir.1992) Malley v. (quoting Company, Travelers Insurance 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. Briggs, 475 U.S. Intervening Plaintiff- (1986)). Appellee, Creighton, in Anderson v. Court 3038-39, 107 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 523 elaborates: formerly CORNING, known as OWENS right must suffi- The contours Fiberglas Corporation, Corning Owens official ciently that a reasonable Defendant-Appellant, doing that what understand right. say This is not violates that Company, W.R. Grace by qualified protected official action is al., Defendants. et ques- very immunity unless the action No. 96-6169. unlawful, but been held previously tion has light pre-existing say that in the it is Appeals, United States apparent. the unlawfulness must be law Circuit. Sixth Supreme Court’s decision Following the Argued Jan. Anderson, guid- provided some this Circuit April Decided law should regarding what its courts ance conducting inquiry: rely on in 18, 1998. Rehearing Denied June instance, clearly ordinary find [I]n right, district established binding by the precedent find

court must Court, appeals its court case, may be extraordinary

itself. In an courts

possible the decision of other

Case Details

Case Name: Dorothea Gravely v. John Madden

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Apr 21, 1998

Citation: 142 F.3d 345

Docket Number: 96-4395

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.