Dormer v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance CompanyDormer v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company
Under New York law, the determination of whether collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue requires the court to pursue two general lines of inquiry. Initially, the court must determine whether the issue sought to be litigated is identical to an issue necessarily decided in the prior action and decisive on the present action. Upon satisfaction of the issue identity requirement, inquiry turns toward whether the party to be bound had a full and fair opportunity to contest the determination now said to control.
Conte v. Justice, 996 F.2d 1398, 1400 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). “We review a district court‘s application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel de novo ....” Chartier v. Marlin Mgmt., LLC, 202 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). As an initial matter, the family court never found that emergency circumstances did not exist on October 27, 2006, when the defendants removed E.D. and A.D. from the plaintiffs’ custody. In fact, it authorized temporary removal of the children on the ground that removal was “necessary to avoid imminent danger to the child[ren]‘s life or health.” J.A. 228-29. In “paroling” E.D. and A.D. to the plaintiffs’ custody, the family court did not conclude that the defendants lacked a reasonable basis for removing the children upon their investigation of the plaintiffs’ apartment. Instead, it determined that E.D. and A.D. could return to their parents’ custody “under very close [ ] supervision” “during the pendency” of the family court‘s proceedings. Id. at 243. The plaintiffs therefore have not identified any issue raised on summary judgment that is “identical to an issue necessarily decided” in the family court action. Conte, 996 F.2d at 1400.
Moreover, the Appellate Division‘s reversal of the family court‘s finding of neglect would not be impaired by any ruling of this Court. In re Am. Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1527 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Issues are considered identical if a different decision in the second suit would necessarily destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first.“) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying New York law). A decision that the defendants did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights likewise would not “destroy or impair rights” established by the family court. Id. The plaintiffs’ collateral estoppel argument therefore fails on this ground as well.
We have considered the plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Michelle J. d‘Arcambal, d‘Arcambal Levine & Ousley, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and J. GARVAN MURTHA, District Judge.*
SUMMARY ORDER
Dr. Anita Dormer appeals from a judgment dismissing her complaint against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern“) and rescinding her insurance policies. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.
Under
Dormer has barely challenged the district court‘s finding with respect to the factual falsity or materiality of the representations in question. She therefore may be treated as having abandoned any challenge to the district court‘s finding on those issues. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005). In any event, Northwestern‘s underwriting guidelines and uncontroverted trial testimony from a Northwestern underwriter make clear that, had Dormer been forthright in her insurance applications, her applications would have been denied. Under New York law, that evidence amply established materiality. See Crotty v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 80 A.D.2d 801, 437 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (1st Dep‘t 1981); Myers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc‘y of the U.S., 60 A.D.2d 942, 401 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (3d Dep‘t 1978).
However, Dormer insists that the record does not support the district court‘s factual finding that she intended to defraud Northwestern. We review that finding for clear error. See Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 1989).
The record contains more than enough evidence of Dormer‘s intent to defraud to support the district court‘s finding. In applying for disability insurance, Dormer routinely denied suffering from illnesses that she later admitted to having and otherwise misstated her medical history. For example, Dormer‘s applications denied any muscle weakness, but she later admitted to a history of facial weakness leading to a diagnosis of myasthenia gravis. Dormer also claimed that her physician had concluded that “all [was] normal” after a recent examination, but medical records from that doctor reveal complaints ranging from hypotension to shoulder pain. Simi
Moreover, Dormer‘s misrepresentations continued in her trial testimony. The district court noted numerous examples of “false or misleading” testimony and concluded that Dormer‘s answers “seemed designed ... to place the best possible gloss on a momentary issue even if it was inconsistent with testimony she gave on some other related issue.” These credibility findings by the trier of fact are entitled to deference, Wade v. Orange County Sheriff‘s Office, 844 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1988), and in any event we see no error in them. This lack of candor supports the inference created by the factual record that Dormer acted with fraudulent intent. We therefore find no error, let alone clear error, in the district court‘s finding that Dormer‘s misrepresentations were intentional and intended to mislead the insurer.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.