Donovan v. St. Joseph's HomeDonovan v. St. Joseph's Home
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Cartwright
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellant, John Donovan, son and heir-at-law of Patrick Donovan, deceased, filed his bill in this case in the circuit court of Peoria county to set aside the probate of the will of Patrick Donovan, making the beneficiaries of the will defendants and charging a want of testamentary capacity and undue influence of certain beneficiaries of the will. Upon a trial the court withdrew the issue of undue influence from the jury and the remaining issue was found for the defendants. A motion for a new trial having been overruled, a decree was entered finding that the instrument in question was the last will and testament of Patrick Donovan and dismissing the bill for want of equity.
Patrick Donovan was the owner of a small farm of 54.97 acres near Mansfield and a house and lot in Rantoul. By the will he directed his executor to sell all his real estate and “personal property and after the payment of funeral expenses and the costs of a suitable monument, to distribute the same, one-seventh to each of his two sons and two daughters,
Based on the testimony of the witnesses for the complainant, and particularly that of the physician, the court was asked by the complainant to instruct the jury that if they
The court gave to the jury, at the instance of the defendants, the following instruction:
“You are instructed that the law presumes that every person of legal age has sufficient mind and memory to make a valid will, and casts upon those who contest a will the burden of establishing by the greater weight of evidence that the person seeking to make the will was not at the time of a sufficiently sound mind to make a valid will.”
This instruction stated, without qualification and without reference to the rule that the proponents of the will must first make a prima facie case of testamentary capacity, that the law presumed the testator to be of- sufficiently sound mind to make a valid will, and it virtually told the jury that the law settled that question in favor of the validity of the will. There is no view of the law that would justify the giving of such an instruction. It is not a requirement of the system for advising juries of the rules of law that a
It is perhaps quite natural that there should be some misunderstanding as to the application of the general presumption of sanity in the case of the contest of a will in chancery arisirig from the double meaning of the term “burden of proof” and its application to a case of that kind. The term “burden of proof” is used with different meanings. In one sense the term expresses the burden of the party who has the affirmative of the issue and must ultimately establish such affirmative, but in another sense the term expresses the duty of a party to offer evidence at any particular stage in order to prevent an adverse judgment. That duty is cast upon the party against whom the decision would be if no further evidence were offered. (Bartelott v. International Bank, 119 Ill. 259.) In view of the different meanings attached to the term it seems advisable to bring together the decisions on the subject relating to will contests.
. The question which party has the burden of proof first came before the court in Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15, and the court there said that the Illinois statute had been adopted from Kentucky, where it had been interpreted, and the same interpretation was applied. It was held that on the trial of an issue under the statute the burden of proof is on the party affirming the execution and validity of the will, and consequently he has the right to open and conclude the case; that the issue is to be submitted to the jury as a new and original question, without regard to the fact that the instrument has been admitted to probate, and while the certificate of the oaths of the witnesses at the time of probate may
The burden of proof is on the proponent of a will to prove that the will was in writing and signed by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction and was attested in his presence by two or more witnesses, and that the testator was of sound mind and memory at the time of signing or acknowledging the same; and this is sufficient to establish prima facie the validity of the will. It is the duty of the proponent of a will to offer in chief not only the evidence making a prima facie case, but all other evidence relating to the issue of testamentary capacity; (Craig
The court gave at the request of the defendant an instruction, which, after stating the rule as to testamentary capacity, advised the jury as follows:
“If you find from the evidence in this case that Patrick Donovan, at the time it is claimed he executed exhibit No. I offered in evidence, did execute it by signing with his mark in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, who in his presence and in the presence of each other, at his request, signed their names as witnesses to his such act, and you believe that he then and there had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing and that he intended to make his will, and that he knew the natural objects of his bounty and what property he had, then he, Patrick Donovan, was possessed of sufficient mental capacity to make a valid will; and if, after a full consideration of all the facts in this case, you find he had at the time the mental capacity above indicated, and that he know*ingly and intentionally signed such instrument as and for his will in the presence of at least two witnesses, who at his request and in his presence and in the presence of each other signed the same as subscribing witnesses, then it would be your duty to find for the proponents in this case.”
This instruction directed a verdict if Patrick Donovan had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing and intended to make his will, and knew the natural objects of his bounty and what property he had, and executed the instrument with the formalities required by law. The verdict for the defendants would naturally follow, ber cause there was no question but that the testator knew what he was doing and that .he intended to make a will and knowingly and intentionally signed it. But that is not the measure of capacity required to make a valid will. It is not sufficient that the testator understand that he is makiñg a will, but he must have mind and memory sound enough to appreciate
Complaint is made that the court gave an instruction that it was the duty of the executor to sustain the document and establish it as a will, but there was no error in giving that instruction.
Complaint is also made that the court permitted an attorney to testify to communications by the testator which were privileged. The witness had been solicitor for the testator in 1907 in a bill filed to set aside a trust deed, and the bill and decree in the case had been admitted in evidence. The solicitor related the facts stated by the testator incorporated in the bill, which was already in evidence, and the court did not err in overruling the objection.
The court did not err in withdrawing the issue of undue influence from the jury, as there was no evidence tending to show that anyone connected with St. Joseph’s Home exercised or attempted to exercise any influence whatever over the testator.
It is urged in support of the decree that, notwithstanding errors committed on the trial, the decree should be affirmed because justice was done. This is not a case where that can be said.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded,.