DONNIE HOLLAND, a citizen and resident of North Carolina, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a Panamanian Corporation, d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-10298
United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
October 4, 2022
[PUBLISH]
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
Donnie Holland appeals the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint against Carnival Corporation for failure to state a claim under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Carnival, a Panamanian corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida, operates a number of cruise ships, including the Horizon. Holland, a passenger onboard the Horizon, “was descending the glass stairs from Deck 5 to Deck 4[,] when he slipped on a wet or slippery transient foreign substance.” As a result, Holland “sustained serious injuries, including a complete
Holland filed an action against Carnival in the Southern District of Florida. In his amended complaint, Holland alleged that Carnival “had actual and/or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” he slipped on, i.e., the “wet or slippery transient foreign substance” on the glass staircase. He alleged that the glass staircase was “one of the most highly trafficked areas of the ship,” as it was “flanked by shops on either side staffed by dozens of crewmembers” and opened up to a casino and approximately six different bars and dining areas. Holland also alleged that “[s]everal hundred passengers and crewmembers traverse[d]” the glass stairway “every day, many of whom [were] carrying drinks,” that the “[c]rewmembers in the surrounding shops have a clear unobstructed view of the staircase,” and that there were “frequently spills on the staircase,” which Carnival was “aware of due to the frequent nature of prior slip and fall incidents on this staircase.” And Holland alleged that, at the time of his fall, “the surrounding shops were staffed with crewmembers who had been present in their shops for approximately four hours or more,” meaning that Carnival “knew or should have known that the particular wet, foreign or transitory substance upon which [he] fell was present prior to [him] falling.” Holland also claimed that various safety agencies had “developed safety standards applicable to [the] staircase [at
Holland’s amended complaint asserted two negligence claims against Carnival: (1) vicarious liability for negligent maintenance; and (2) vicarious liability for negligent failure to warn of a hazard. As to the negligent maintenance claim, Holland alleged that Carnival had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition and that its crewmembers failed to “conduct sufficient routine inspections of the area,” to “maintain the glass stairs in a reasonably safe condition,” and to “properly clean and dry the glass stairs.” As to the negligent failure to warn claim, Holland asserted that Carnival had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and that its crewmembers failed to adequately warn Holland of the condition before he fell “by appropriate signs, markings, written or oral warnings, or otherwise.”
Carnival filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
The district court granted Carnival’s motion to dismiss. The district court found that Holland “failed to allege that Carnival was on either actual or constructive notice of the hazard in question”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of a
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Holland argues that the district court erred in dismissing his negligence claims against Carnival for failure to state a plausible claim—specifically, that Holland failed to plausibly allege that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition. We disagree.
While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This analysis is not formulaic; instead, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” in reviewing the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at 679. Additionally, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and “conclusory statements” are insufficient. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To that end, we have counseled that the first step in evaluating a motion to dismiss is to “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions.” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)).
“Maritime law governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters,” and we “rely on general principles of negligence law” in analyzing those actions. Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336). General principles of negligence law, as applied in the maritime context, recognize a claim
The elements of a negligence claim based on a shipowner’s direct liability for its own negligence are well settled: “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1336). “With respect to the duty element in a maritime context, ‘a shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of the crew.’” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959)). “This standard ‘requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have had actual or constructive notice of [a] risk-creating condition, at least where, as here, the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical adventure.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a shipowner “is not liable to passengers as an insurer, but only for its negligence”). Thus, a shipowner’s
In contrast, a shipowner’s duty to a plaintiff is not relevant to a claim based on vicarious liability. When the tortfeasor is an employee, the principle of vicarious liability allows “an otherwise non-faulty employer” to be held liable “for the negligent acts of [that] employee acting within the scope of employment.” Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In other words, liability for the agent’s negligence is legally imputed to the non-negligent principal. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285–86 (2003) (“The principal is liable for the acts and negligence of the agent in the course of his employment, although he did not authorize or did not know of the acts complained of.” (quoting parenthetically New Orleans, M. & C.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 649, 657 (1872))).
In his amended complaint, Holland denominated each count as a claim for vicarious liability and alleged in each count that Carnival “was vicariously liable for any negligence or failure to exercise reasonable care by its crewmembers” to maintain a hazard-free stairway or to warn of any hazardous condition on the stairway. But other than the claims’ titles and the conclusory allegation asserting that Carnival was vicariously liable, there is nothing in Holland’s complaint that would lead one to understand his claims as seeking to impose liability on an otherwise nonfaulty Carnival for an employee’s negligence. First, Holland did not identify any
It is thus apparent that, despite what he has called his claims, Holland seeks to hold Carnival directly liable for its own negligence and not vicariously liable for a specific employee’s negligence. Under a theory of direct liability, in order to survive Carnival’s motion to dismiss, Holland had to plead sufficient facts to support each element of his claim, including that Carnival had actual or constructive notice about the dangerous condition.
Actual notice exists when the defendant knows about the dangerous condition. See Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322; Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720. Constructive notice exists where “the shipowner ought to have known of the peril to its passengers, the hazard having been present for a period of time so lengthy as to invite corrective measures.” Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322. A plaintiff can establish constructive notice by alleging “that the ‘defective condition exist[ed] for a sufficient period of time to invite corrective measures.’” Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 838 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1988)). A plaintiff can also establish constructive notice by alleging “substantially similar incidents in which ‘conditions substantially similar to the occurrence in question must have caused the prior accident.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 661–62 (11th Cir. 1988)). On appeal, Holland relies only on constructive notice and has abandoned any argument as to actual notice. We therefore will focus our analysis on whether Holland alleged a facially plausible claim that Carnival “ought to have known of” the hazardous wet or slippery surface that caused him to slip. See Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322.
Turning to Holland’s amended complaint, and accepting his allegations as true, we conclude that Holland failed to include factual allegations that plausibly suggest Carnival had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Therefore, Holland has failed to satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. Rather, Holland’s amended complaint contains only conclusory
But while Holland alleges facts that establish the possibility that Carnival had constructive notice of the hazardous substance on the staircase as to invite corrective measures, a claim only has facial plausibility when the plaintiff’s allegations allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As to constructive notice, Holland was required to plausibly allege that either (1) the
As to whether there were substantially similar incidents, Holland’s conclusory allegations that “[t]here are frequently spills on the staircase” and “prior slip and fall incidents on this staircase” are insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[C]onclusory statements[] do not suffice.”); see also Am. Dental Ass’n, 605 F.3d at 1293–94. And Holland has not alleged any facts concerning a substantially similar incident to the one at issue. Therefore, Holland has not plausibly alleged that Carnival had constructive knowledge based on a substantially similar incident.
As to the length of time the alleged hazardous substance was on the staircase, we conclude that the inferential leap from Holland’s premise—that the staircase is highly visible and well-trodden—to his conclusion—that the hazard existed for a sufficient length of time—is too great. Indeed, Holland’s amended complaint lacks any allegation as to how long the “wet or slippery transient foreign substance” existed on the glass staircase. Nor does the amended complaint allege any factual allegations describing that substance in a way that would suggest it existed on the staircase for a sufficient period of time such that Carnival should have been aware of it or that would tend to show that the liquid was on the staircase for an amount of time sufficient to impute constructive
Furthermore, while Holland alleges that there were crewmembers in the surrounding shops, he does not allege that there were any crewmembers in the immediate area of the glass staircase that could have observed or warned him of the hazard. Simply put, Holland’s allegations do not cross the line from possibility to plausibility of entitlement to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Finally, we conclude that Holland’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Yusko v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 4 F.4th 1164 (11th Cir. 2021) is misplaced. In Yusko, the cruise ship’s employee—a professional dancer—was partnered with the plaintiff in a dance competition during a cruise. Id. at 1166. During their performance, the cruise ship’s employee released the plaintiff’s hands as she leaned away during a dance move, causing her to fall and hit her head on the deck. Id. In analyzing the plaintiff’s negligence claim, which was brought under a theory of vicarious liability, we held that “a passenger need not establish that a shipowner had actual or constructive notice of a risk-creating condition to hold a shipowner liable for the negligent acts of its employees.” Id. at 1170. But Yusko also reaffirmed that where, as here, a plaintiff is relying on a theory of direct liability “to hold a shipowner liable for maintaining dangerous premises” or “for failing to warn of dangerous conditions,” the plaintiff must establish notice to the shipowner as a part of those claims. See id. Indeed, we cited with approval both Keefe
And although we stated in Yusko that a plaintiff “may choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both,” we noted that “common sense suggests that there will be just as many occasions where passengers are limited to a theory of direct liability” and that “[s]ometimes, as in Keefe, a passenger will not be able to identify any specific employee whose negligence caused her injury.” Id. at 1170. This case is exactly the type of case described in Yusko where a passenger is limited to a theory of direct liability. Unlike the plaintiff in Yusko, Holland has not identified any specific Carnival employee’s negligent action that caused his fall. And nothing in Yusko suggests that Holland can avoid pleading the elements necessary to allege Carnival’s direct liability for negligent maintenance and failure to warn by titling his claims as claims for vicarious liability and asserting in a conclusory allegation that Carnival was vicariously liable for any negligent action by any of its crewmembers. We thus conclude that this case is like our decisions in Keefe and Everett, and we decline to apply and extend Yusko here. We therefore hold that Holland has failed to state plausible claims of negligence against Carnival.
IV. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.