201 N.W. 305 | Minn. | 1924
Plaintiff has no claim for accidental injury, even though he may have suffered his supposed disabling detriment by reason of and in the course of his employment, for it is not the result of accident as defined in section 66. "Accident" is there defined as "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body." Plaintiff does not claim to have been a victim of a mischance of that kind.
Likewise, plaintiff is excluded from all advantage of the provisions of the compensation law furnishing relief on account of occupational disease, for it is provided in subdivision 9 of section 67, that "for the purpose of this act only the diseases enumerated * * * shall be deemed to be occupational diseases." Neither "chemical poisoning" nor "chronic bronchitis" is included in the enumeration. Therefore they are excluded, and plaintiff is wholly *242 without remedy under the compensation law, although for present purposes it must be assumed that he has been grieviously injured in the course and by reason of his occupation, and through a fault of the employer amounting to a violation of statutory duty.
Defendant contends, and upon this theory the complaint was held bad, that although in a given case an employe may have contracted a noncompensable disease through the negligence of his employer, it is a wrong without a remedy, the purpose and effect of the compensation law being to take away from employes subject thereto all remedy except where they suffer accidental injury, or become afflicted with one of the occupational diseases for which compensation is allowed.
The argument is predicated upon Mathison v. M. St. Ry. Co.
As already indicated, the compensation law, so far as it covers the field of rights and remedies as between employer and employe, is exclusive. No other effect can be given to the decisions referred to, except possibly by wrenching from its context here and there a sentence or so of the very proper discussion of the questions involved. The statute is a substitute for the common law on the subject which it covers and so far as it goes. But it does not affect rights and wrongs not within its purview, or which by implication or express negation are excluded.
By section 9 of the compensation law it is provided that, as to parties subject to part 2, "compensation according to the schedules hereinafter contained shall be paid * * * in every case of personal injury or death * * * caused by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Section 10 goes on to say that subjection to the act, "shall be a surrender by the parties * * * of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation * * * and an acceptance of all the provisions of part 2 of this act." The scheme of compensation and the various provisions thus made operative do not include a case of the kind now under consideration, for the disease involved is not referred to by, *244 in fact it must be taken as intentionally excluded from, the portion of the act (section 67) dealing with occupational diseases for only "disablement * * * resulting from an occupational disease, described in subsection (9) of this section * * * shall be treated as the happening of an accident within the meaning of part 2 of this act." Finally a conclusive internal evidence to the same effect is the last sentence in section 69, reading as follows: "Except as otherwise expressly provided, Part 1 of this act shall not apply in cases where Part 2 becomes operative in accordance with the provisions thereof, but shall apply in all other cases, and in such cases shall be in extension or modification of the common law." Thus it appears clearly to have been the legislative intention to leave actions of the kind now under consideration under the common law, as modified by part 1 of the compensation act.
Any other construction of the statute would bring it within a condemnation pronounced by the supreme court of appeals of West Virginia in Cox v. U.S. Coal Coke Co.
The case is directly akin to Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins,
Courts are not permitted by construction to carry a statute, particularly one in derogation of the common law, beyond its clearly defined scope. It is for the legislature to limit or extend the operation of its enactments and, even though there are no self contained limitations, it would be judicial legislation to extend a statute beyond its subject matter. That is a general rule which would be violated if we were to hold otherwise than we do. But there is a more particular rule equally applicable. It is, "that an existing common law remedy is not to be taken away by a statute, unless by direct enactment or necessary implication." King v. Viscoloid Co.
This case may be summed up by the statement that defendant is charged with violating its statutory duty to furnish adequate ventilation in the room where plaintiff was employed, and that thereby plaintiff claims to have become afflicted with a disease not enumerated in subsection 9 of section 67, chapter 82, L. 1921. Our conclusion is that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply; that the employe has his action for damages and that the demurrer to the complaint should have been overruled.
Order reversed. *246