70 Iowa 693 | Iowa | 1886
Tbe property insured consisted of a bouse and certain personal property therein. Tbe application for tbe policy, wbieb was signed by tbe plaintiff, contained certain statements wbieb were made warranties, and among them were tbe following: That tbe bouse was of tbe cash value of $3,000; that it was built in 1872; and certain additions thereto were constructed in 1880; and that there was $500 insurance in another company on tbe personal property. The jury found specially that tbe value of tbe bouse was $2,000
I. Counsel for appellant insists that the application is a part of the contract, and that, as it is in writing, any evi-
It will be conceded that the agent was a soliciting agent only, and that he had no power to bind the defendant by any contract he might make. But he made no contract. All that he did was to solicit insurance, and fill up a blank application furnished him by the company. "Where an insurance company appoints an agent to solicit insurance, and furnishes him with blank applications, it must be assumed that he is vested with the power to fill up the
Counsel are mistaken in the assumption that parol evidence was introduced for the purpose of contradicting the written contract. The force and effect of the statements in the application are in no respect impaired, but, under the circumstances disclosed in evidence, the defendant is estop-ped from setting up their falsity as a defense to this action. It therefore follows that the instructions asked by the defendant were properly refused, and those given by the court bearing on the question under consideration we deem to be substantially correct.
"We understand it to be insisted that the evidence shows the application was, at least partially, filled up by the agent in the presence of the plaintiff, and in accordance with information furnished by him, and that, therefore, the finding of the jury is against the evidence in this respect. We have read the evidence with Gare, and deem it sufiicient to say that we cannot interfere with the special findings.
A copy of the application was attached to the' policy in question, and therefore counsel for the appellant insist that the plaintiff was bound to know what representations were contained in the application; and as the same were false, and as he failed to notify the company of such falsity, that he is now estopped from relyihg on the fact that he signed the application in blank, and had no knowledge of the representations therein made. In our opinion, the statute should not be so construed, for the reason that, in order to recover, the assured is not required to prove that the statements therein contained are true. This being so, he was not required, nor had he any occasion, to examine the copy of the application indorsed on the policy.
The view taken of this case renders it unnecessary to consider several errors discussed by counsel, and, in our opinion, the plaintiff, under the special findings of the jury, was clearly entitled to recover, and no prejudicial error was committed by the court:
Affirmed.