Donna Reilly v. United States

Mandell, Carlin, Din- Mark S. Susan Lisa Mandell, Goodman, erman, Famiglietti & al. Donna REILLY et Schwartz, Ltd., Providence, for plaintiffs. Sammartino, Attys. C. U.S. Of- Everett UNITED STATES of America. Providence, fice, defendant. 87-468-Appeal. No. OPINION Supreme Court of Rhode Island. SHEA, Justice.

Aug. 5, 1988. Supreme comes before the This matter States District Court from United Island. Court for the District of Rhode questions Two certified to us have been Pettine, Raymond J. senior Honorable questions judge that court. The were following in that of a trial certified medical-malpractice brought pursu- action Act, 28 ant Tort Claims to the Federal (West 1965). through U.S.C. §§ questions be- The factual basis for adjudicated in case of fore us has been Reilly, Reilly, Peter and Heather Donna Reilly and Reil- Reilly, p.p.a. Donna Peter ly. Reilly was born at the New- Heather Hospital Newport, port Rhode Is- Naval land, severe on November damage. brain brought parents claim Heather’s They America. States of United injuries and result- claimed Heather’s ing including past and care future pain also made as as but well their behalf claims on own love, society, and affection loss daughter, loss of other’s each their consortium. found that Heath judge

The trial from the er’s resulted mother, given her and her treatment Donna, during delivery at the labor damages to hospital. He awarded naval in excess of $11 an amount Heather ruling parents’ on the million but reserved negligent infliction of emotional claims for decision the two pending our distress They are follows: questions. certified who has suffered “Must a mother meets injury and who the criteria psychic States, of D’Ambra United (1975) (i.e., physical proximity, witnessing actual minor child as a direct result of the de- act, negligent personal negligence, the and close rela- fendant’s maintain an tionship victim) negligent in she action for infliction that was of emotion- distress, present throughout despite al participated and in the fact that she her- daughter’s physical danger.” self in negligent her traumatic and was never delivery, was of all aware the difficulties expanding zone-of-physical-danger the by attending physician, encountered the rule, being this court listed three factors as devastating saw and heard the results of scope potential liability relevant to the negligence attending the of the obstetri- bystander-plaintiff that would allow cian, experiences and and will continue to negligent recover for infliction for mental experience the constant stress inherent injury: and “physical proximity, emotional caring for child who has suffered a accident, witnessing the actual of the and nearly total devastation of her mind and personal relationship existing the between body, physical also suffer symptomatolo- bystander-plaintiff the and the victim.” Id. gy in damages negli- order to recover Although physical 338 A.2d at 531. gent infliction of emotional distress?” symptomatology of emotional distress was 2. “Must a father who has suffered not included as one the factors to recov- psychic injury and who meets the criteria damages negligent er infliction of emo- States, of D’Ambra v. United R.I. tional it was inherent in this (1975) (i.e., 338 A.2d analysis specific holding court’s to its physical proximity, witnessing actual the “serious mental and emotional act, the personal and close accompanied by physical symp- rela- harm [was] victim) tionship with the in that he toms.” was

present throughout participated Furthermore this court addressed in daughter’s his traumatic and concept D'Ambra the that there must abe delivery, was aware of all the difficulties physical inju manifestation of an emotional by encountered attending physician, the ry in damages order to recover for the saw and heard devastating results of negligent infliction of emotional distress. attending of the obstetri- “Despite artificiality the admitted of link cian, experiences and will continue to ing recovery for mental distress to the experience the constant stress inherent possibility physical injury, this limitation caring for a child who has suffered a does reflect the core notion some reason nearly total devastation of her mind and negli able relation or nexus between the body, physical symptomatolo- also suffer gent upon. conduct and the sued gy in order to recover negli- Moreover, being relatively rule gent infliction of emotional distress?” administer, easy to it has the virtue of predictable application.” Id. at precise question this has not to A.2d at 530-31. directly court, date by been answered this the issue has been addressed in Rhode Is- Therefore, although land case prior law and in federal-court inju manifestation of interpreted cases that have Rhode Island ry was not one of the criteria listed law. recovery, bystander it D'Ambra quite that when read in the context evident States, In D'Ambra v. United analysis of this court’s of the issue and the 643, 657-58, this holding question on the certified from the responded question to a certified Appeals, First Circuit Court of the fact that Appeals from the First Circuit Court of mental and emotional harm held that accompanied by physical symptoms was nonnegligent mother, although “a who prerequisite was an essential to the deter physical impact no suffers seri- of the issue. mination accompa- ous mental and emotional harm Second, by physical symptoms actually being

nied liti from while D'Ambra was Court, witnessing prior our nonnegligent gated death of her in the Federal though question presented gence of defendant even there answer to certified Appeals, physical impact no at the time First Circuit Court actual accident, Court for Dis- fright United States District if was followed opin- separate in two trict of Rhode Island gave ills or rise to nervous under Rhode Island ions determined that to physical turn led disturbances required law, recovery for mental distress ills. manifestation illness.1 law has af Recent Rhode Island case States, 354 In D’Ambra v. United F. interpreta firmed the Federal Court’s (D.R.I. 1973),the District Court Supp. 810 In Champlin was correct. tion Simone dismiss the defendant’s motion to denied 478 Washington Westerly, Trust v. Co. of cause action. failure to state a It 1984) (R.I. (finding no A.2d 985 intentional negli- of action for the held that cause in infliction of emotional distress a debtor- gent injury exists un- psychic infliction of stated, dicta, relationship), in creditor we discussing der Island law. the Rhode days by, recognized gone “In this court noted, Rhode Island the court law of by right damages who the to recover one “The ‘sifter’ established under Simone subjected to intentional or the has been the out to ferret the claims most amenable infliction of mental distress is the that no recov- fraud accompanied by long as the distress was ery for mental distress that can had Hos physical ills. Bedard v. Notre Dame manifested itself in has not (1959) (in 89 pital, R.I. 818. symptoms.” Id. at Co., tentional) v. Rhode Island and Simone later dam- Six months the awarded (1907) (negligent).” A. 66 202 noted, again ages plaintiff. the It A.2d 478 at apparent intent of the doc “One Simone agree fed We continue to with both the is to out those claims of trine ferret interpretation of Rhode Island eral and the by fright caused which are most injury Therefore, must the we answer Simone. It therefore is the amenable fraud. by the District questions certified to us objective manifestation of the in find that un the affirmative and Court crucial, not whether the which of Rhode Island a der the of the State law terms, is, physical or in conventional physical symptomatol plaintiff must suffer States, mental.” D'Ambra v. United in ogy to recover (D.R.I. 1973). Supp. 1183 F. 396 an emotional distress. In so fliction of upon analysis was The case which swering to the law that has been we adhere Compa v. Rhode Island based Simone majority adopted persuasive of states by a (1907). In 186, A. 202 ny, 28 R.I. Si law is the issue.2 The that have confronted rejected impact rule this court mone (Second) Torts Restatement stated could not recover for that states (1965): 436A resulting physical injuries from a mental negligent as conduct is “If the actor’s unless the mental disturbance disturbance causing risk of creating unreasonable by physical impact to the was caused distur- bodily harm or emotional rule, either abandoning impact plaintiff. another, in such it results bance to plaintiff may re this court decided alone, without fright, disturbance bodily injury caused cover for bodily compensable dam- negli- harm or other fright by the was caused when the Industries, Inc., Laboratories, A.2d gy); v. L & R v. Abbott 1. See also Plummer Seitz cf. (D.R.I. 1983) (R.I. 1981) (granting (denying compensation Supp. a motion under F. negli- summary judgment on claim of compensation statute for worker’s the workers’ prod- gent distress in infliction of emotional injury produced mental stimulus uct-liability brought against the manufac- action nor causes are neither which there DES; decision in a well reasoned turers results). predicted Judge Selya Rhode Island that under negli- plaintiffs not recover for law could Law Torts 54§ 2. Prosser gent when there infliction of emotional distress (5th ed. accompanying physical symptomatolo- no Correra, age, psychiatry, the actor is not liable such emo- of 430 A.2d State (R.I. 1981), ability tional disturbance.” as well as the legal system adequately to defend it our on We base our adherence to this rule prospect onslaught self of an of the explanations two listed comment b Digby Digby, law suits. fraudulent First, to this “in the section. absence of R.I. guarantee genuineness provided by harm, resulting bodily such emotional dis- However, requiring physical sympto- easily feigned, turbance be too de- for the matology as an element a claim must, pending, very largely upon as it negligent infliction of emotional subjective testimony plaintiff; we focus our attention our concern might open that to allow for it too subjectivity inherent a claim for wide a door for false claimants who have purely Accordingly emotional distress. we Second, suffered no real harm at all.” “is adopt reasoning applied by the Su- merely where defendant has been preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts negligent, without element of intent to problem. It when faced with same harm, great do his fault is not so that he stated: required good purely should be to make determining “The task of whether a disturbance.” Id. comment b. plaintiff purely has suffered explanation The first deals es however, with the does not fall conve- problem concerning sential claims for emo categories niently into the traditional tional distress: difficulty inherent of separating responsibilities proof. Emotional distress is an judge jury. plaintiff from those of the A vague ambiguous symptoms. The evi genuinely, though wrongly, con- dence subjective of the illness is in the vinced that a defendant’s has control of the recognize sufferer. We caused her to suffer emotional distress. injury may genuine a mental not be less believed, a.plaintiff’s testimony If such physical absent symptomatology. How objective and there is no of ever, we believe that of because the nature corroboration of the emotional distress of the illness it is too difficult to substanti alleged, held a defendant would be liable objective physical ate absent symptomatol unjustifiably. recognition It is in of ogy. agree following We observa play tricks that the human mind can tion made the late Justice Samuel Rob itself, deception upon as much as of the Pennsylvania Supreme erts of the Court in people capable perpetrating are of dissenting Burd, opinion his in Sinn v. another, upon one that we continue to 146, 177-78, (1979): Pa. to rely upon traditional indicia of harm provide objective plaintiff there is no evidence reasonable measure of “[I]f plaintiff’s pain, actually has suffered emotional dis- any recovery then will be Labs, Then, too, essentially speculative. Payton tress.” v. Abbott the na 540, 547, society requires ture of our Mass. of each of us (1982). degree remarkable emotional forti It tude. is not unreasonable to draw the denying recovery The reason for second degree line between that which is re infliction of emotional dis- for quired and that which is not reference symptomatology list- tress absent to that emotional distress which causes find instruc- ed under comment b that we physical injury serious or harm. And it a defendant’s actions have tive is that when genuine cannot be denied that if not the intentional, negligent, opposed to been ness, intensity then at least the and thus great is not so that he or his or her fault injury, may the nature of the be difficult purely responsible held for a she should be to assess where it causes no focusing “not We are mental disturbance. injury.” loss, but on on the nature of the acknowledge scope of the defendant’s We that this court rec- the source and Inter- ognized liability.” Presbyterian the advancements made in the field Norwest v. outrageous it is Hospital, 293 Or. we believe that community 652 Rather We are reluctant of a de P.2d and reckless or intentional nature impose potentially unlimited and unde courts, encourages conduct that fendant’s liability upon a defendant who is served reasons, impose liability public-policy gener See guilty unintentional conduct. plaintiffs’ emotional dis defendants for Comment, Negligently Men ally Inflicted objec indicia requiring without tress Indepen Distress: Case tal by physical symptomatolo tivity provided Tort, L.J. dent 59 Geo. Prosser has noted gy. As Professor pres

By way comparison, many states discussing the reasons for ently recovery intentional inflic allow requirement, “the courts manifestation any physi tion of emotional distress absent quite unwilling protect been have injury. Annot. cal manifestation negligence where the mere Intentional Modern Status Infliction outrage moral of extreme elements Tort; Independent Mental Distress as weight in such which have had blame 4th In so “Outrage” A.L.R. lacking.” Pros tort context are intentional doing they adopted the Restatement have Torts, The Law 54 at & ser (1965) Torts (Second) which states: 46§ contrast, (5th when a ed. “Outrageous Causing Severe Conduct justi negligent, conduct is Emotional Distress strong so fication tort (1) by extreme and out- One who require damages should intentionally rageous or reck- conduct proof of the illness. objective emotional distress to lessly causes severe most recent case In Rhode Island the liability subject for such another of emo dealing intentional infliction with distress, bodily and if harm to emotional Depart Curtis v. State tional distress it, bodily results from for such another Families, and Their ment Children harm.” 1987). (R.I. In that case we A.2d 203 522 imposed for Generally, liability will be grant of verdict on a upheld the a directed this tort when the defendant’s conduct intentional infliction emotional claim for character, outrageous in and has been “so we cited Bedard v. doing, distress. so degree, go beyond as to all so extreme 195, Hospital, Dame R.I. 151 Notre 89 to be re- possible decency, bounds of (1959), proposition for the A.2d 690 atrocious, utterly garded intolerable as anguish considered an could not be community.” a Restatement civilized damages in the of alle absence element (1965); see (Second) 46, d Torts comment § physi accompanied by gations that it was Co., 371 Agis also v. Howard Johnson 198-99, Id. at at 151 A.2d cal ills. 140, N.E.2d 315 Mass. 355 Washington Champlin v. We further cited requirement for lack-of-bodily harm 985, Westerly, 478 A.2d 989 Trust Co. of distress intentional infliction of emotional 1984), (R.I. adopted Restatement which it is out explained in that been “[t]he (Second) 46 held that a Torts § rageous nature and reckless or intentional infliction emotional claim for intentional permits a of a conduct defendant’s [that] requires proof of the defend also distress plaintiff suffered jury to infer that outrageous conduct. extreme ant’s Payton, 386 genuine emotional distress.” Youngken, 493 A.2d v. 158 See also Elias Mass, at 176. See also 547, plain (R.I. concluded We (Second) 46, comment Torts Restatement for the intention claim tiffs did state agree necessarily with k We do not “ because distress infliction of emotional al distress ‘does reasoning. Emotional this alleged presented evi nor they “neither simply it more real because not become result of ills suffered dence of intentionally Com inflicted.’” detention, they nor daughter’s] did Negligent Emotional ment, [their Infliction part conduct on the Recognized present evidence Tort Proposal Distress: could be considered Action, Marq. L. Rev. of the defendants 600 67

899 Curtis, Inc., Sampson’s Supermarkets, outrageous.” extreme or 444 A.2d Co., (Me. 1982); Nooney Bass v. at 208.3 433 646 (Mo. 1983); Super Johnson v. S.W.2d 765 physical symptomatology require- If is a Markets, Inc., save 211 Mont. 686 P.2d ment for a claim of intentional infliction of Lieb, (1984); James v. Neb. public-policy argu- emotional (1985); Jaffee, Portee v. N.W.2d 109 requiring physical symp- ment evidence of (1980); v. Schultz N.J. 417 A.2d 521 tomatology negligent when a defendant’s Co., Barberton Glass Ohio St. 3d allegedly conduct has inflicted emotional Burd, (1983); Sinn 447 N.E.2d 109 applies greater distress with even force. (1979); Eliza St. Pa. We hesitate to allow for emotional Hospital Garrard, beth S.W.2d physical symptomatology distress absent Davis, (Tex. 1987); Barnhill v. cf. negli- a situation which a defendant acts 1981) (Iowa (bystander N.W.2d related gently when we do not allow degree victim within second of consan physical sympto- emotional distress absent guinity must have reasonable belief that matology when a defendant has acted seriously injured); Chap victim would be outrageous extreme or manner. petta Inc., Transportation, v. Bowman In conclusion we note that we are not (La. 1982) (liability 415 So. 2d 1019 Ct. attempting to trivialize the severe emotion- reasonably limited to or foreseeable antici plaintiffs al distress the claim to have sus- pated injuries). However, upon prior tained. based Rhode generally Courts cite three reasons for concerns, public Island case policy law and insisting physical-manifestation on the rule. plaintiff physi- we hold that a must suffer They nonapparent-emotional hold that dis- symptomatology cal to recover usually temporary tress is of a and trivial infliction of emotional dis- nature, person easily a state that a can tress. feign imagine. Furthermore the courts perceive of a FAY, Justice, dissenting, Chief compensating for a KELLEHER, Justice, whom joins. purely mental disturbance to be unfair. I believe that the time has come to aban- Keeton, 360-61; See Prosser and 54 at § don the rule that denies all (Second) Torts, 436A, Restatement com- § negligently inflicted emotional when ment b No limit would exist to that any physical lacks manifesta- liability. circumscribe tion. I Accordingly, the cer- would answer Courts also reluctance base their to abro- questions negative. tified in the gate allowing the rule on the fear that such recognize I majority that a of other instigate claims an would excessive number states physicalmanifestation follow the majority opinion in of lawsuits. The the Keeton, The Law rule. Prosser and case, relying on D’Ambra v. United instant of Torts, (5th I at 364 ed. also States, 524, § recognize, however, growing number physical symp- 530-31 reasons that E.g., of rejected states have that rule. tomatology necessary “some is to make Hospitals, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation nexus” the reasonable relation of between 916, 813, 167 Rptr. 27 Cal. 3d P.2d Cal. provide injury, and claimed to State, (1980); Rodrigues v. 52 Haw. predictability, and to ease of adminis- allow Taylor (1970); see also v. 472 P.2d 509 colleagues My emphasize tration. the diffi- Center, Inc., Baptist Medical culty proving injury. So. 2d Al- of (Ala. 1981); Montinieri v. Southern validity, though these concerns have some Co., obstacle; England Telephone New they present 175 Conn. no insurmountable (1978); can Culbert persuaded and I am the court Therefore, doing, applied the we have a stricter standard law in Rhode Island still re- In so quires physical symptomatology ap- an proof as element for this cause of action than that of of a claim when a defendant's intentional con- many plied by states. the Restatement and other allegedly duct has inflicted emotional distress. Action, Marq. L. per- Recognized Tort Rev. in a manner that would address them genuine for serious and emo- mit 598-99 injury. tional Wargelin Sisters The circumstances symptoms argument Corp., 149 Mich. Mercy Health of sincerity of a guarantee (1986), provide example an N.W.2d First, al- for several reasons. claim fails genuine circumstances indicative emo- feign imag- though claimant can also parents case be- tional distress. injuries, have not found ine courts during that their child’s came labor aware deny reason to all either to be sufficient Despite had fetal heartbeat decelerated. Rather, claims. courts have tradition- such requests Wargelin’s repeated for her Ms. process, adversary ally relied on the presence, the nurse failed to sum- doctor’s jurors perspicacity of its and trial bluish-gray child mon him. I judges, false claims. main- to eliminate breathe, begun delivering to had system capable equally tain that apparently did not realize that intern distinguishing gen- fraudulent and between The intern there- child had been stillborn. if injuries, particularly trial uine emotional presented fore the infant the mother with which to courts have clear standards point healthy baby. if it were a At that examine such claims. baby supervising grabbed the physician authenticity guarantors Better than unsuccessfully attempted resuscita- manifestation exist. “It is tion. recovery only entirely possible to allow ensuing In the action for the satisfactory deny it upon evidence and infliction of emotional and mental nothing to corroborate the when there effect of the court held that cumulative claim, guarantee or to look some bring events sufficient to all of these genuineness the circumstances jury before the and “sufficient the action 54 at 361. case.” Prosser and emotional and parent cause a to suffer The issue should viewed as a matter of Wargelin, 149 Mich. mental distress.” adequate proof. Physical manifestation The court App. at 385 N.W.2d at 738. may provide one emotional trauma factor foreseeability established a standard establishing emotion- the existence cases. injury, prima does not similar al but a facie case See, e.g., require such manifestation. evaluating Transport, v. Caron Versland 206 Mont. any physical injury, the court absence of compen- To P.2d 583 avoid plaintiffs present expert require could sating injuries, the trivial emotional psychological To establish evidence. might, example, require that the emo- infliction emo- claim for tional trauma result from either death or distress, Supreme Court the Hawaii tional injury serious to the victim and that stated: bystander share a marital or familial rela- rely psychiatrist must physician “The or tionship victim. Thus when a testimony, the context on the a defendant’s plaintiff can establish that occurred, in which the trauma medical negligence has emotional caused ramifications, testing any physical per- in a reasonable circumstances which knowledge pain and dis- psychiatrist’s plain- similarly, would have reacted son trauma, ability likely to result from such tiff should be allowed some financial remu- expe- of human and even the framework Assessing injury in neration. emotional determine and common sense to rience person reasonable would terms what a resulting naturally as pain amount of of the case experience the circumstances act, response to and wheth- a juries to discriminate should allow beyond it the level stress with er true and false claims but also between may expected which a reasonable man severity of the emotional evaluate the Takasaki, Leong v. Comment, 55 Haw. Negligent cope.” harm. Infliction 398, 413, 758, Proposal A a 520 P.2d 767 Emotional Distress:

901 requirement The grievous disturbance, foreseeable-emotion- the mental and * * * al distress also argu- counters the third emotional distress endured.’ Ma above, ment perceived unfairness of gruder, Mental and Emotional Distur requiring compen- defendant to Torts, bance in the Law L. Harv. plaintiff sate a purely for a mental distur- 1033, (1963).” Rev. St. Elizabeth bance. I opinion am of the in most Hospital, 730 S.W.2d at 652. instances serious injury pro- emotional will Other areas of the law which “mere” duce some effects. See Prosser fully compensated clari- at 362. inten- fy the incongruity majority’s posi- tional infliction of emotional distress commentator, tion. One example, stat- warrant because of the defend- ed: behavior, ant’s extreme justification “the “[Tjhere requirement is no plain- for tort for [negligently inflicted] tiff privacy * whose * * has been invaded or emotional distress is strong. not so who has been physi- defamed show some However, even where the claim is founded cal manifestation of his to recover. only negligence, the level and reason- fact, until the Supreme United States ableness of the emotional distress must be Court’s 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert Payton Labs, v. Abbott assessed.” Welch,Inc., 323, 2997, U.S. 94 S.Ct. [418 540, 581, Mass. 437 N.E.2d 193-94 (1974)], L.Ed.2d 789 (1982) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting). generally intangi- allowed to recover for person Whether manages not to exhibit ble, essentially psychic repu- harm to his physical symptoms does not affect the au- offering proof tation without any dam- thenticity of a injury. traumatic-emotional age whatsoever. psychic Such harm has Contrary reasoning could lead a court long been the core several intentional the anomalous rewarding result of per- torts, assault, such as imprison- false son for his or her essence, weakness. it obviously, ment and intentional infliction encourage would feign claimants to physi- Bell, of emotional distress.” The Bell symptoms cal of nervous disorder. Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for following The reasoning supports this ar- Psychic Injury, 36 Univ. Fla. L. Rev. gument: requirement “The is over inclusive be in Corgan v. Muehling, 167 Ill. permits cause it recovery for mental an 3d 118 Ill.Dec. guish the suffering when accompanies or further illustrates the irrational any results in physical impairment, re ity majority’s position. There the gardless of how injury. trivial the More plaintiff brought a claim for in importantly, requirement is under in fliction of emotional distress clusive arbitrarily because it denies court psychologist engaging defendant persons access to they with valid claims sexual during relations with her treatment. prove permitted

could if to do so. Mol apply physical- The court refused to ten v. Kaiser Hospitals, Foundation by manifestation restriction of the Cal. Illinois 3d 616 P.2d stander rule. Rptr. 831, The court reasoned: Cal. justifica- “Nor can there be “Additionally, rational is de- tion for our courts to mandate fective because it ‘encourages extrava- gant pleading qualify psy- order to for in a and testimony.’ distorted Id. To chologist malpractice or social worker requiring proof continue physi- of patient cal case a when mental exhibit manifesta- may be equally recognizable his or her standing tions of emotional trauma suf- alone therapists would force exaggerate to fered at the hand of who are ‘victim[s] symptoms headaches, nausea, qualified of sick in- to minister to their needs somnia, etc., malaise, to make out a technical cases of mental or emotional ba- * * * sis bodily injury upon of predi- especially injury, which to since such an parasitic cate a ‘though may for the more prove, difficult to be as real Torts prov 46 of the Restatement of type can be Section as that of which ” by out- states that who extreme and Cor certainty.’ “[o]ne en with mathematical recklessly rageous intentionally or conduct gan, 3d App. at 118 Ill.Dec. Ill. to another causes severe emotional distress Omer (quoting 522 N.E.2d at 159 liability for subject to such 376, 381, Edgren, Wash. * * The form of certified distress also Rowe v. (1984)); see P.2d questions before this court indicates Bennett, (Me. 1986) A.2d ac- outrageous circumstances of the instant (“because psycho of the nature parents The were tion. therapist-patient relationship, action “present throughout participated patient seri maintained for * * * daughter’s deliv- traumatic [their] negli mental distress ous caused * * * devastating ery, and heard the saw gence therapist despite of his the ab attending results of the [physical symptoms an un sence and] experiences and con- will obstetrician tort”). derlying experience stress the constant tinue physical- that have abandoned the Courts caring for a child who inherent adequately manifestation rule have ad- her nearly total suffered devastation * * remaining arguments. dressed body mind and Lieb, James v. 221 Neb. In traumatic events virtu- this situation the example, for noted N.W.2d Ac- ally guaranteed reaction. a stressful experience that in other states has shown cordingly, I that reject not been over- their courts have negligent-inflic- intentional- and both the area; litigation they whelmed with in this causes of action. tion-of-emotional-distress liability; place on able to limits have been summary, spurious I believe un- society cost has not been damages can be avoid- claims and excessive v. Barberton bearable. See also Schultz setting proof, By ed. strict standards Co., Glass St. 3d at Ohio scrutinizing carefully the circumstances at 111-12. case, relying expert psychological each utilizing reasonable-per- testimony, and Chil Department Curtis State standard, can filter out all but son courts Families, dren and Their serious, genuine claims emo- most (R.I. 1987), that an this court reiterated Accordingly, those tional distress. emo action for the intentional infliction of guidelines, I fall these cases that within plain tional distress will lie where reasons, recovery. For these permit would present tiffs neither evidence respectfully I dissent. proffer of a de effects nor evidence outrageous extreme conduct. fendant’s disagree majority’s interpreta

I the Curtis opinion.

tion

opinion required refers to older cases that inju

physical symptomatology of emotional

ry, holding pertains necessity its outrageous

proving conduct. extreme

Such conduct eliminates the need

physical manifestation.

Case Details

Case Name: Donna Reilly v. United States

Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date Published: Aug 5, 1988

Citation: 547 A.2d 894

Docket Number: 87-468-Appeal

Court Abbreviation: R.I.