*1 COCKREL, Plaintiff-Appellant, Donna
v. SCHOOL SHELBY COUNTY DISTRICT, AL., ET De-
fendants-Appellees.
No. 00-5259. Appeals, United States Court of Sixth Circuit. Argued March 2001. Decided and Filed Nov. *5 SILER, MOORE, CLAY,
Before: Judges. Circuit
OPINION
MOORE, Judge. Circuit (“Cockrel”) ap- Plaintiff Donna Cockrel granting decision peals the district court’s Shelby County Public School District (“School “District”), Superin- or District” Mooneyhan, Principal tendent Leon (collectively Bruce Slate’s referred to as “defendants”) summary judg- motion for respect ment to Cockrel’s First with claim, which she Amendment retaliation § brought pursuant U.S.C. REMAND case REVERSE and We proceedings court for further district opinion. consistent with this
I. BACKGROUND Cockrel, a tenured fifth- Plaintiff Donna *6 Elementary Simpsonville teacher at grade Kentucky Shelby County, in the School terminated July District was School Dr. by superintendent, the District’s District’s Mooneyhan. Leon The School for termi- proffered grounds insubordination, conduct unbe- nation were teacher, incompeten- coming inefficiency, for duty. of As the basis cy, neglect and District detailed charges, these School of misconduct specific instances seventeen Cockrel, fading including: engaged the school’s “Just disparaging to teach and curriculum; Har- calling Principal Think” members front of staff ry Slate names students; cooperate with failing and and I aides in program I and the Title the Title (briefed), F. Mooney Eugene James M. class, faculty as with other as well (ar- (briefed), Mooney L. Mooney Matthew Ele- Simpsonville members and staff briefed), Mooney Mooney, & gued and mentary School. KY, Mooney, Lexington, Plaintiff-Ap- for pellant. alleged numer- the School District While decision to terminate ous reasons for its (argued), John C.
Robert L. Chenoweth fired Office, Cockrel, that the District (briefed), she claims III Law Fogle Chenoweth Woody to invite Frankfort, KY, her due to her decision Defendants-Appellees. Trees,” in the use of industrial film which Harrelson, and actor the television “Woody” on alternative to hemp possible role as fibers as a most famous for his “Cheers,” discussed, and the network television show pulp wood was to be Cockrel give presenta- her classroom to others to representative contacted was of in- environmental benefits (“CNN”) tions on the and asked News Network Cable illegal hemp. Hemp, substance dustrial cameras to film permit if she would CNN’s 218A.1422, Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ Kentucky, in a presentation larger her class for use 218A.010(14), from plant is a which both conservation. Cockrel program on tree can har- marijuana and a valuable fiber be immediately then informed claims that she two varieties of the There are vested. visit to their potential Slate of CNN’s marijuana plant. plant is the hemp One school, does not recall this though Slate itself, approximately four to seven with conversation. tetrahy- weight comprised of its percent Hickey, early May presi- Joe (“THC”), the active chemi- drocannabinol Kentucky Hemp Growers As- dent of marijuana drug; cal in the the other is sociation, Woody informed hemp, plant grows which might Kentucky with Harrelson visit can taken stalks and from which fibers CNN, might and that Harrelson also visit paper goods to make various such Cockrel claims that she her classroom. Mintz, Splendor John in the clothes. specific information as to given was no Grass?, Post, 5, 1997, at Washington Jan. classroom, might when Harrelson visit marijuana, HI. Unlike the industrial morning that it was not until the only comprised of 0.1 and plant is between 30, 1996, May day the last of the school THC, amount to percent 0.4 an insufficient year, that she was notified that Harrelson any narcotic effect. Id. Neverthe- have visiting Simpsonville Elementary would be less, Kentucky prohibits possession law day. School that Cockrel informed Princi- hemp plant, including varieties of the both visit, and he pal impending Slate of the any compound, resin mix- “its seeds or or it, claims that agreed though to allow Slate ture, or which preparation contains only presentation he told that the Ky.Rev. substances.” quantity of these *7 agriculture. given be was about 218A.010(14). 218A.1422, §§ Stat. Harrelson arrived at the school later claims that on at least three Cockrel seven-year morning “entourage, that with an includ- during occasions tenure Elementary organized Kentucky she Simpsonville ing representatives of speakers Kentucky Hemp outside to come her class Hemp Museum and hemp. fur- speak Association, about industrial Cockrel Cooperative Growers several that Principal ther claims both Slate countries, foreign hemp growers from Mooneyhan knew that she Superintendent CNN, Kentucky and various media news organized hemp presentations. representatives.” Appellant’s Br. at 4-5. never Principal alleges While Slate that he complaint, As stated in Cockrel’s Harrel- hemp being knew industrial was discussed op- with the children about his spoke son class, he does admit that use, marijuana position yet he distin- plans, Cockrel’s lesson on at least one oc- marijuana hemp guished from industrial casion, specifically hemp mentioned that hemp and advocated the use of industrial was to be discussed. ef- logging as an alternative to increased presentation, prod- 9, 1996, part forts. As April following
On or about hemp ucts made from were shown to the to end the 1995-96 Cockrel’s decision seeds, children, hemp as were a banned year project “Saving school with a entitled Kentucky. in the state of Har- In the following substance months Harrelson’s vis- it, Simpsonville Elementary relson’s visit received both local and na- School adopted a policy new visitors for “contro- tional media attention. One student who topics required versial” that ap- advance parental permission did not have to be proval by school administration and writ- videotaped photographed by or the news ten consent parents. students’ This press media was included in a class policy when, put to use during the photograph with Harrelson. next year, Cockrel informed Slate Following Harrelson’s visit and the me- that Harrelson making would be a second garnered, parents dia attention it visit to her classroom to discuss industrial teachers wrote numerous letters to mem- hemp. Cockrel met all require- Shelby County bers School District ments of the new policy, visitors including voicing dismay regard- their concern and providing requisite advance notice to ing hemp presentation. the industrial Sev- Principal Slate and obtaining permission eral of the letters noted the mixed mes- parents from the of her students for their sage sending drug the school was use children to attend the presentation.2 Slate presentation Harrelson’s occurred on attempt did not to discourage Cockrel day many Simpsonville the same Ele- from having another presentation class mentary School students were graduating hemp, nor did tell he her that Drug from the Abuse Resistance Edu- Harrelson should not invited back to (“D.A.R.E.”) cation program offered in the Cockrel, the school. According to howev- school. er, Superintendent Mooneyhan did tell her the complaints expressed Based on year earlier in the school that it would not letters, Superintendent be in her Mooneyhan de- best interests if Harrelson made cided investigation to initiate an more visits to her class. into Cock- While Har- relson was unable to Following day rel’s conduct. attend on the investigation, visit, his scheduled a small Mooneyhan group par- Kentucky advised the Edu- ents, unaware that Harrelson was not com- cation Professional Standards Board ing, (“EPSB”) “loudly went to the school and voiced Cockrel had allowed objections” their to Slate about permit- his seeds, substance, illegal passed to be ting Harrelson to visit the school a second around to students in her during class (Slate Dep.). time. J.A. at 182 Harrelson’s class visit. The Standards Board, matter, after investigating the ulti- Harrelson rescheduled the visit for the mately dismissed Mooneyhan’s complaint week, following January 1997, and prejudice, stating without that there was again fully complied with the *8 an “insufficient basis to warrant certifi- [a] school’s policy. Principal visitors Slate cate revocation action.”1 Appendix Joint again approved Harrelson’s visit. This (“J.A.”) (EPSB Cockrel). at 288 Letter to time appearance. Harrelson did make an 3, 1996, September 1. On based on the find- about when she first learned Harrelson would ings investigation, Mooneyhan gave of the visit; coming failing to have all the private reprimand Cockrel a both for her con- hemp presentation visitors associated with the during duct the Harrelson visit and for other office; register allowing at the school and a inappropriate actions that were discovered. photographed by student to be the media specifically pertaining The criticisms to Har- parental permission. without visit, relson's which were also listed as rea- discharge, sons for her eventual included: al- given per- 2. All but one of her students was lowing hemp passed seeds to be around to her presentation. mission to attend the Harrelson students; allegedly lying to the administration in his Slate stated every years. three group parents bymet was Harrelson his reason for Cockrel’s protesting deposition who were that the school outside problems, scheduling things perception Due to school early visit. review was his only speak able to was Harrelson “going downhill” between had been the stu- minutes before for few students years. previous two two of them for for lunch. Harrelson’s had to leave dents (Slate further Dep.). at 159 Slate J.A. media atten- national again garnered visit neither com- that Cockrel was explained Slate, had Principal who from CNN. tion him and cooperating with municating nor re- an interview asked CNN for been faculty of and the rest of the staff on indus- presentations garding Cockrel’s Elementary, nor was she ade- Simpsonville a written state- hemp, trial chose issue curriculum following the school’s quately statement, said In his Slate ment instead. policies. and following: trend Citing examples of this downward Ms. reported has Cock- The media performance, attitude and in Cockrel’s with experienced problems has Shel- rel want that Cockrel did not Slate testified officials, me, County including police charge officer in Deputy Yeager, the teaching about industrial regarding her Simpsonville D.A.R.E. at program prob- I admit that we have had hemp. Harrelson spoken against had out who however, lems, are not all our concerns visits, instructing her stu- her classroom teaching about Ms. Cockrel’s about asked Slate to find someone dents. She complaints also received hemp. I have program. to teach the D.A.R.E. Slate else areas. The about her conduct other ap- had that two teachers further stated and I do Shelby County school officials him to let him know that Cockrel proached teaching disapprove of Ms. Cockrel calling pres- him names outside his se, which hemp, per admit has we about addition, parent and notified Slate as to its historical ence. educational value as an al- potential current uses and its call that her child had heard Cockrel Slate Rather, have crop. ternative we been also noted that a name class. Slate the methods Ms. Cock- concerned about many times when Cockrel sim- there were regarding present rel has used to issues with him failed to ply speak refused to or hemp to students. meetings. attend CNN) (Statement (empha- J.A. year, during In the 1996-97 school then sis in Slate’s statement original). that Harrelson would be after the news permitting went on to criticize Cockrel’s students, again, five visiting her class once around to the passed seeds to be parents’ request, were transferred at their first as well presentation, students at the class. Each time Slate out of Cockrel’s promptly her failure inform him attempted to inform Cockrel of a student’s visit, Harrelson’s first which occurred transfer, to talk with Cockrel would refuse day graduation. the same as the D.A.R.E. him, right past him walking sometimes ini- following In the months Harrelson’s her, with or turn- speak when he tried to visit, shortly tial after his second visit him, to meet ing refusing her back to or January Slate sat on Cockrel’s request- he with him in his office when so conducting class for evalua- purposes *9 ed. the year, tions. That Cockrel was school 20, 1997, in wake of February the On only Simpsonville teacher at Ele- tenured discussing to continue Cockrel’s decision years, mentary to be reviewed after two of industrial with out- the benefits in the whereas tenured teachers School Simpsonville Parent only speakers, side typically District are reviewed once (“PTA”) mentary. a adopted There no evidence Teachers Association statement,” stated, record, however, in part: which “position that Cockrel had been reprimanded activity prior for such behavior opinion, In our Mrs. Cockrel’s inap- few months has been past over the Harrelson’s visits to her classroom. a teacher and role model propriate for law, right Kentucky As is her under our children. We feel she violated for initially decided appeal Cockrel the Su- KY. [sic] code of ethics for professional perintendent’s decision to terminate her. personnel. opinion, school our she thereafter, however, Shortly she withdrew longer can no be an effective educator appeal. her and children’s education system our our 161.120, Ky.Rev.Stat. § Pursuant Su- by would be better served another perintendent Mooneyhan forwarded on to teacher. proffered EPSB reasons for termi- (PTA Statement). A at 291 Position J.A. nating in case Cockrel the Board wished to later, Principal little more than a month teaching revoke certificate. Fol- Cockrel’s issued a “summative evaluation” of Slate EPSB, lowing review Cockrel en- performance, stating that Cock- tered a agreement whereby into written requisite rel did not meet level of teaching her certificate was surrendered forty-three cat- performance five of the (June 1999) years for two 1997 June and egories perfor- of evaluation. Deficient suspended years (July for two following mance was noted in the areas: 2001). through agreement The June parents regarding communication with stated, in part: performance and teacher expecta- student tions; plans; documentation of lesson any wrongdoing While Cockrel denies sensitivity showing “consistent to individu- and further denies that her conduct is academic, social, physical, al and cultural any way a violation of 161.120 KRS responding] differences and to all stu- the Professional Code of Ethics and/or manner”; ability in caring dents to build Personnel, Kentucky for School she positive relationships within the school and evidence, agrees present- that the when community; between the school and hearing, ed formal is such to result with and with acting accordance laws charges all that her finding conduct regulations procedures. J.A. 161.120, inis violation of KRS and the (Performance Evaluation, Mar. at 292-97 Professional Code of Ethics for Ken- 1997). Attached to the evaluation Therefore, tucky Personnel. School parents were several letters from com- it is in her best Cockrel believes plaining about Cockrel’s discussion of interest at this time to enter into this class, hemp in as well as documentation of Agreed Order. alleged other misconduct. Based on this (EPSB Order). Agreed J.A. at 68-69 evaluation, Superin- recommended to Slate 4, 1998, filed in the On June Cockrel suit Mooneyhan termi- tendent that Cockrel be for the East- United States District Court nated. Cockrel was terminated Moo- Kentucky. brought ern District of neyhan July § pursuant to 42 1983 in a claim U.S.C. informing The termination letter Cock- alleged was terminated which she she discharge detailed numerous rel of exercising for her First in retaliation misconduct, alleg- all instances of of which right Amendment of free when dis- discharge. edly served as the basis cussing potential environmental bene- charges of these detailed miscon- Several in- hemp. Cockrel also fits duct that occurred well before Harrelson law contract claim. Simpsonville his initial Ele- cluded state breach of made visit *10 1046 Estoppel discovery, A.
Following limited
the defen-
Collateral
summary judgment
on
dants moved
that,
argue
The defendants first
§
Cockrel’s 1983 claim and asked that the
appeal
because Cockrel failed to
the Su
deciding
district court abstain from
her,
perintendent’s decision to terminate
state law claim of breach of contract.
law,
right
Kentucky
as was her
under
she
collaterally estopped
is
challenging
from
agreed
The
court
from
district
abstain
her dismissal
this court. As this circuit
deciding Cockrel’s state law breach of con-
n
explained,
estoppel,
has
collateral
other
tract
claim. As
for Cockrel’s First
preclusion,
wise known as issue
“refers to
claim,
Amendment retaliation
the district
the effect
a
judgment
foreclosing
granted
court
the defendants’ motion for
relitigation of a matter that
liti
has been
so,
summary judgment.
doing
In
the dis-
McDowell,
gated and decided.” Barnes v.
trict court held that Cockrel’s decision to
(6th
Cir.1988),
848 F.2d
n.
728
5
cert.
bring
speaker
a
to discuss industrial
denied,
488 U.S.
109 S.Ct.
hemp constituted
conduct
was neither
(1989).
L.Ed.2d 780
The Barnes court
expressive
convey partic-
nor intended to
explained
further
that federal courts must
message,
ularized
and thus was not consid-
give
findings
agency
the factual
of a state
protected speech
ered
Supreme
under
judicial
acting
capacity preclu
jurisprudence.
Court
The district court
sive effect if such findings would have
further held that Cockrel’s decision to dis-
preclusive effect in the State’s courts.
Id.
cuss industrial hemp
part
as
of the fifth-
(citing University
at 730
Tennessee v.
grade curriculum could be considered
Elliott,
788, 796-98,
478 U.S.
106 S.Ct.
nothing more than private speech by a
(1986)).
92 L.Ed.2d
Kentucky
teacher who
communicating
was
give preclusive
courts
effect to factual find
citizen,
employee,
role as an
not as a
ings
previous
in a
proceeding “only as to
thus did not
public
touch on matters of
matters which were necessarily involved
Ultimately,
concern.
the district court
action,”
and determined in the former
concluded that because Cockrel’s conduct
opposed “to matters which were immateri
could
expressive
not even be considered
al or unessential to the determination of
because,
speech, and
if it
speech,
even
prior
action or which were not neces
her curricular choices did not touch on
sary
Barnes,
uphold
judgment.”
concern,
public
matters of
she did not have
(quoting
proceeding. As Cockrel notes in her reply
“[tjhere
brief,
hearing
any
was no
issue
II. ANALYSIS
involved in this action. There are no state
We must
procedural
first address two
court or
findings
administrative
arguments
appellees
raised
if
factual
Appel
matters
involved here.”
successful,
Reply
would render a review of the
lant’s
if
appeals
Br. at 13. Even the
merits of Cockrel’s First Amendment re-
board had decided that
prof
the reasons
taliation
unnecessary.
claim
fered
the defendants for Cockrel’s dis-
*11
is not a form
support
protec-
the ter-
of
entitled
charge
adequate
were
by
that
there was substantial
tion
the First
J.A. at 41
mination and
Amendment.”
2000).
(Dist.Ct.Order,
14,
proffered
of
reasons
The court
evidence
defendants’
Feb.
record,
her
unless
raised
in light
in the
Cockrel
further stated
of the law
claim, it would not have decid-
granting
retaliation
discussed in its memorandum
considered,
ed,
whether the true
summary
nor even
judgment, “[permitting Plaintiff
defendants’ actions was to
motivation of
response
to file a belated
would
be
exercising her
against
retaliate
her for
futility.”
exercise in
J.A. at 42.4
Barnes,
See
F.2d
speech rights.
free
for reconsideration filed
Motions
Thus,
First
at 731.
because Cockrel’s
days
ten
final
within
of
district court’s
not ad-
retaliation claim was
Amendment
was,
judgment,
generally
as this one
are
issue
any prior proceedings,
dressed
treated as a motion to alter or amend the
her federal
preclusion
prevent
does not
59(e).
judgment pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P.
Id.
suit.
al.,
12 James Wm. Moore et Moore’s Fed
(3d ed.2000).
§
eral Practice
59.30[7]
B.
Motion to Reconsider
Cockrel’s
generally
While this court
reviews the de
brief,
defendants note
their
Coek-
As
59(e)
nial of a Rule
motion to alter or
respond
rel failed to
to their motion for
judgment
amend a
for an
abuse
discre
summary judgment
requisite
within the
tion, a de novo standard of review ap
is
court,
The district
without
period.3
time
59(e)
plied when the Rule
motion seeks
by plaintiff, issued
response
benefit of
grant
summary judgment.
review of a
granting
and order
de-
its memorandum
Stores, Inc.,
v.
Smith Walr-Mart
167 F.3d
summary judgment
motion for
fendants’
Cir.1999).
(6th
286, 289
2,
January
February
on
2000. On
Indeed, because the district court
filed a motion with the dis-
Cockrel
exercising
was not
its discretion
refus
asking
trict court
it to reconsider and set
response,
allow
in
ing to
but
granting
the issuance of its order
aside
law,
stating,
stead was
as matter of
parties’
of the
summary judgment
light
any response by
plaintiff
would be
agreement
enlarge
time an additional
futile,
apply
we
a de novo standard of
thirty days
plaintiff
respond
so that
could
legal conclusion. We now
review to this
summary judg-
to defendants’ motion for
turn
of the
to the merits
case
order
The district court denied this mo-
ment.
futil
tion,
finding
evaluate the district court’s
stating that
remains clear to this
“[i]t
later,
ity.
only
"willbe discussed
of industrial
As
Court
Plaintiffs selection
bring in
part
curriculum it clear that Cockrel’s decision to
hemp as
of her classroom
agreement
writing
3.
motion for sum-
and circulate it to
The defendants filed their
opposing
signature,
mary judgment by mail on December
counsel for his
the dis-
28, 2000,
judge,
January
giving
eighteen days to file
trict
issued his
thus
(i.e.,
ruling
summaiy judgment.
response
days
respond
on the motion for
the fifteen
by
the Eastern District
allotted
local rules of
Kentucky plus
days pursu-
three additional
Although
arguments
4.
Cockrel did not submit
6(e)
ant
to Fed.R.Civ.P.
because she was
her claims in her motion to
merits of
mail). Thus,
reconsider,
served with the motion
Cock-
the district court did not fault
Instead,
by January
response was due
rel’s
for this omission.
the sole basis for
18, 2000,
attorney
futility
January
On
Cockrel's
ob-
its denial of Cockrel's motion
prior legal
agreement
light
court's
tained defense counsel's
that time
of her claims in
thirty
teach
enlarged
days to re-
conclusion that Cockrel’s decision to
an additional
spond
was not
to the defendants' motion. Neverthe-
her students about
less,
protected
put
speech under the First Amendment.
the time Cockrel's counsel could
*12
con-
ordinary firmness from
a
of
person
use of industrial
advocating the
speakers
activity; and
in that
tinuing
engage
to
the First
speech under
hemp
protected
is
(3)
motivat-
the adverse action
re-
was
Amendment,
First Amendment
that
but
response
a
to the
part
as
enough to survive
ed at
strong
least
claim is
taliation
rights.
summary judg-
constitutional
[her]
of
motion for
exercise
defendants’
the
denial, on
Thus,
district court’s
ment.
the
(6th
Daeschner,
729, 737
228 F.3d
Leary v.
59(e)
Rule
of Cockrel’s
futility grounds,
Cir.2000).
that she was
To demonstrate
er-
judgment was
reconsider its
motion to
constitutionally protected
engaging
ror.
speech
must show that her
speech, Cockrel
concern, and
public
on matters of
touched
Retalia-
Amendment
First
C. Cockrel’s
upon
commenting
that her “interest
tion Claim
outweigh[s]
...
public concern
matters of
State,
of Review
employer,
an
Standard
of the
the interest
efficiency
public
the
promoting
novo a
reviews de
This court
through
employ
performs
services it
its
summary
grant
court’s decision
district
omitted); see also
(quotation
ees.”
Id.
Heavy
v. Am.
judgment. Miller
Lift
Educ., 106
Floyd County
v.
Bd.
Bailey
Cir.2000).
(6th
242,
F.3d
246
of
Shipping, 231
(same).
(6th Cir.1997)
135,
If the
144
F.3d
only if
may
granted
Summary judgment
the three elements
plaintiff can establish
material
issues of
genuine
there
no
are
claim,
Amendment retaliation
of her First
judg
is entitled to a
party
fact and one
to the
persuasion
then shifts
the burden
law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
a matter of
ment as
defendants,
show, by
prepon
must
56(c).
who
a
fact can
dispute
A
over material
evidence,
they
that
“would
jury
the
unless a reasonable
derance of
“genuine”
not be
in the
nonmoving
the
the same action
a verdict for
have taken
even
could return
Inc.,
Lobby,
Leary,
Liberty
v.
conduct.”
party.
protected
Anderson
absence of the
omitted).
106
91
477
S.Ct.
(quotation
U.S.
228 F.3d
737
at
(1986).
reviewing
the dis
202
L.Ed.2d
Speech?
a.
This
Was
summary
grant
decision to
trict court’s
Cock-
deciding
Before
whether
all the
and the
judgment, we view
facts
constitutionally
speech
protected,
rel’s
was
light
drawn therefrom in
inferences
question
must first address
this court
nonmoving party.
most favorable
activity
be con
can
whether
v. Zenith Ra
Elec. Indus. Co.
Matsushita
at all. The district court’s
sidered
speech
106 S.Ct.
Corp.,
dio
475 U.S.
(1986).
First
disposing
decision
Coekrel’s
1348, L.Ed.2d 538
appears to be based on
claims
Amendment
Amend-
Elements of a First
2. The
uses
separate theories that
court
two
Retaliation Claim
ment
First,
court
interchangeably.
district
bring
in a
Cockrel,
stated
Cockrel’s decision
a teacher
Donna
District,
give presentation
County
speaker
would
Shelby
Public School
who
public em
not be
employee.
hemp
For a
industrial
should
considered
public
is a
Amend
held
a claim of First
The district court further
ployee
speech.
to establish
retaliation,
regarding
court
held that
ment
this
has
that a
decisions
teacher’s
demonstrate:
she will teach to
she
content
the curriculum
must
class,
still
speech,
if considered
(1)
even
engaged
a constitu-
[she]
protected by
the First Amendment.
(2)
activity;
that the
tionally protected
holding aside for
putWe
the second
[her]
adverse action caused
defendant’s
the first.
likely chill moment
turn to
injury
that would
suffer
court held
because
The district
To the extent that the district
simply
bring
speakers
chose
court relied on
argument
that Cock-
hemp,
who would talk about
conduct
speech
rel’s
was not
because she
speaking
rather than
on the matter her-
had no advocative purpose
bringing
when
self,
free
claim is
sole-
“[h]er
based
class,
enthusiasts to her
(Dist.Ct.Mem.
ly
on conduct.” J.A.
this was also error. The Supreme Court
*13
in
Op.). Also influential
the district court’s
films,
has held that
programs,
radio
and
that,
staging
decision was its notion
an live
protected by
entertainment are all
the
hemp presentation,
Cockrel was First Amendment.
v. Borough
Schad
of
intending
convey
“particularized
not
a
Ephraim,
61, 65,
Mount
452 U.S.
101 S.Ct.
message,” nor
advocating
was she
or
(1981).
2176,
Moreover,
rather than
was doing
speak-
Education,
(6th
Board
1051
ty[.]”
146,
Id. at
While discussion of teaching, when even if upcoming an about plainly meets concept the broad of “public presidential election or importance the of inter- and Fifth Circuits’ If Fourth Fifth the Fourth and the Rights, Bill of
our
correct,
such
then
leave
reasoning would
of Connick were
pretation
Circuits’
protection,
constitutional
speech
employee
speaking
without
was
public
a
time
employee,
anas
speaking
is
the teacher
for
Myers
like
was when she
employee,
as
not as a citizen.
employees being
question
about
asked
at
speech
issue
campaign,
that the
pressured
indicate
The facts
Connick
Supreme
have read
Fifth Circuits
As
protected.
not be
Fourth
would
In
broadly.
language
however,
too
Supreme
analysis,
Court’s
clear in its
made
Court
attorney, fol-
Connick,
district
an assistant
person
a
key question is
whether
supervisor,
with a
disagreement
lowing a
or a
employee
role as an
speaking
his
seeking
opin-
questionnaire
a
prepared
speech
citizen,
employee’s
whether the
but
as
on issues such
ions of her co-workers
con-
public
of
touches on matters
fact
morale, the
office
policy,
transfer
“office
Thus,
148^49,
1684.
Id.
S.Ct.
cern.
committee, the level
grievance
need for
acting out
employee were
public
even if
and whether
supervisors,
of confidence
with no intent
air
motive
private
politi-
to work
pressured
felt
employees
was the case with
publicly, as
speech
Connick,
campaigns.”
U.S.
cal
relates
as the
Myers,
long
so
later fired
was
1684. Connick
103 S.Ct.
social,
con-
or other
“political,
matters
on the
questionnaire
circulating
community,”
opposed
as
cern to
Id. The Court
grounds of insubordination.
interest,” it shall
“only
personal
matters
many
questions
while
held
touching upon matters
be considered
efforts
plaintiffs
simply reflected
146-49, 103
Id. at
S.Ct.
public concern.
against her su-
information to use
gather
dis-
private employment
pervisors in her
pres-
regarding the
Myers’s question
pute,
case, although she
*16
campaigns did
political
to work on
sure
employee
role
an
when
in her
as
speaking
Id. at
public
of
concern.
on a
touch
matter
the environmen-
information on
presenting
Thus,
held
149,
the
103 S.Ct.
Court
hemp, the content
tal
of industrial
benefits
Myers
speaking as
was
though
even
supra, most
her
as discussed
speech,
of
in
private interest
out of her
employee
an
related to
certainly involved
the
matters
combating
supervisors’
decision
of the commu-
and social
political
concern
her,
ques-
that
of
fact
one
transfer
the
private
of
to mere matters
nity,
opposed
as
the fundamental constitu-
dealt with
tions
Thus, contrary
analyses
to the
in
interest.
coerced into cam-
right not to be
tional
Kirkland,
hold that Cock-
and
we
Boring
political
candidate
paigning
a
pub-
touch matters of
does
speech
rel’s
touch
particular
make this
issue
enough to
lic
Id.
concern.5
public concern.
on a matter of
Cockrel,
speech on matters
entails that her
of
teaching her students
fession
5. While
in
likely to
political and social
is
be
interest
benefits of industrial
about the environmental
citizen,
employee and a
the
both as an
arguably speaking both as an em-
made
hemp, was
Instead,
citizen,
speech is not mixed.
of her
we do not
content
ployee and as a
believe
employee
concerning,
part, an
speech”
than
in
analyzed
a
rather
is best
as
"mixed
this case
Lorenzo,
dispute,
private
grievance or some
as
other
v.
241 F.3d
case. See Bonnell
speech
professor's
(6th Cir.2001).
with the
in
speech
was the case
mixed
In
811-12
Bonnell,
speech
cases,
relates matters
only
Cockrel's
employee
speaks not
the
at issue
public
Even if we
particularly
employee,
of
concern.
but the
both a citizen and an
as
speech analysis,
apply
so
the mixed
were to
involves
of both
speech
content of her
matters
employee’s speech,
long
"any part of
an
private
In this
public and
concern. See id.
discharge, relates to
case,
to the
pro-
contributes
very
which
the
nature of Cockrel’s
while
Pickering Balancing
ii.
in
engaging
“particular
Before
a
ized balancing”
competing
of the
interests
Having held that Cockrel’s
case, Connick,
at stake in this
at
U.S.
speech
public
touches on matters of
con
important
103 S.Ct.
it is
to note
cern,
weigh
employee’s
we must now
the
employee’s
that “if an
speech substantially
against
employer’s
in
the
speaking
interest
concern,
public
involve[s] matters of
an
in regulating
speech
interest
to deter
employer may
required
be
to make a par
if
speech
constitutionally pro
mine
is
ticularly strong showing
employ
that the
In Pickering
tected.
v. Board
Edu
of
speech
ee’s
interfered with workplace
cation,
1731, 20
391 U.S.
88 S.Ct.
functioning
taking
before
action.” Leary,
(1968),
Supreme
L.Ed.2d 811
Court
omitted).
(quotation
228 F.3d
737-38
In
endeavored to strike
balance between
case,
this
it
speech
is clear that Cockrel’s
rights on
public employee’s speech
matters
(in
substantially
public
did
involve
that case a
matters
public
public
interest
school)
concern, and thus the defendants will
speech
school teacher’s
outside of
have
as an
employer
stronger showing
the State’s interest
to make a
their
maintaining
productive workplace.
regulating plaintiffs
interests
speech
balancing
with the
test
accordance
created
outweighed
speak
Cockrel’s interests in
Pickering,
public employee speech, even ing.
concern,
if
touching
public
on matters
Weighing
plaintiffs
favor in
constitutionally
will
un
protected
analysis
this
the fact
that her
employee’s
speaking
less the
interest
substantially
signifi
involved matters of
“outweigh[s]
these issues
‘the
interest
public
Kentucky.
cant
concern in
Defen
State,
employer,
promoting
as an
claim, however,
dants
that their “interest
efficiency
public
of the
services it per
”
in maintaining loyalty,
operation
efficient
through
employees.’
Leary,
forms
its
schools,
workplace
harmony”
(quoting Pickering,
Accordingly, balance, we hold hemp. defendants’ the interests in an efficient operation of the school and a harmonious
workplace do not
d.
outweigh
Was
plaintiffs
Decision
to Terminate
interests
speaking about the
benefits of
Motivated,
Part,
at Least
hemp,
an issue of
substantial
by
Speak
Plaintiffs
Decision
to
political and economic concern in Ken-
Hemp?
About Industrial
Thus,
tucky.
because Cockrel’s speech
The final element of touches on matters of public concern and
First Amendment
retaliation claim re
because the balancing of interests under
quires her to show that defendants’ deci
Pickering
favor,
weighs in her
her speech
sion to discharge
motivated,
her was
at
is constitutionally protected.7 We now
least in part, by the exercise of her free
proceed with an examination of the re-
speech rights.
Id. This circuit has stated
plaintiffs
mainder
elements of
First
that “the nonmoving party may
rely
Amendment retaliation claim.
the mere fact that an
employment
adverse
action
speech
followed
employer
c. Did the
Injury
Plaintiff
an
Suffer
would
have liked
prevent. Rather,
to
Speech
a Result
of Her
That
Would
employee
Ordinary
Chill
must link
an
Person
speech
question
From
Continuing
to
Engage
the defendant’s decision to dismiss her.”
Such
Speech?
(citation
Bailey,
omitted).
For the next element of Cockrel’s
tion for summary judgment, Cockrel must
claim,
retaliation
she must show
“that
present sufficient
to allow a
evidence
rea
defendant[s’]
action
adverse
caused [her]
conclude,
sonable
factfinder to
injury
pre
suffer
that would likely
chill
person
ponderance
ordinary
evidence,
firmness
from continu
that her
ing
engage
speech,
that activity[.]” Leary,
part,
at least in
motivated the de
F.3d at 737.
228
There is
question
no
fendants to discharge her.
Id.
noted,
448,
This circuit
expla-
(1st
has
with
ey,
Cir.1993);
minimal
996 F.2d
453
Silano v.
nation, that an
may
Sag
unconstitutional dilemma
of Educ.,
Harbor Union Free
Dist.
Sch.
Cir.1994),
Bd.
719,
for a
speech
(2d
exist
teacher
denied,
whose controversial
42 F.3d
723
rt.
ce
officials,
approved
1160,
ex
2612,
ante
but
515 U.S.
115 S.Ct.
132 L.Ed.2d
post,
ex
parental
(1995);
used
Schs.,
the wake of
and or
856
v.
Miles
Pub.
Denver
944
community
773,
dismay
speech,
(10th Cir.1991);
with that
as the
F.2d
Bishop v. Aro
nov,
reason
discharge.
for the teacher's
(11th Cir.1991),
Stachura
926 F.2d
Truszkowski,
(6th
denied,
v.
763 F.2d
213-15
cert.
505 U.S.
112 S.Ct.
Cir.1985),
grounds,
rev’d on
(1992).
other
477 U.S.
7. Rather Pickering, speech); than to a Leary, several circuits chosen apply Supreme (applying have Pickering F.3d 737-38 Court’s analysis elementary speech). of students’ rights in-class school teachers' We see *19 Kuhlmeier, School part District v. no Pickering Hazelwood 484 reason from when decid 260, ing U.S. 108 98 involving S.Ct. 592 L.Ed.2d cases a teacher's in-class (1988), to speech, cases in which teachers’ parties in-class nor have either of the in this speech rights are at issue. See Ward v. argued Hick- case Pickering apply. that should not 1056 Rebutting First the Plaintiffs certainly signifi is
Although there Amendment Retaliation at behavior evidence that Cockrel’s cant Claim pre school, from the industrial apart sentations, we be inappropriate, was often has success Because Cockrel enough presented has that Cockrel lieve of the sum fully purposes for established jury could such that a reasonable evidence mary judgment stage the three elements defendants, terminating that find claim, retaliation of her First Amendment her, motivated partially were at least shifts to the de persuasion the burden hemp. speak decision to on industrial earlier, to defeat the fendants. As stated in her pieces of evidence work Several trial, at the defendants plaintiffs claim First, early initiated Principal favor. Slate by a of the evi preponderance must show in the 1996-97 of Cockrel evaluations they would have terminated dence that following Harrelson’s first visit year school engaged she not con Cockrel even had day the last of the 1995-96 to her class on stitutionally protected activity. Leary, 228 year, year. In the 1996-97 school claim on plaintiffs F.3d at 737. To defeat only tenured teacher Slate Cockrel was the however, summary judgment, a for motion of more than one reviewed on a schedule must be sur substantially higher a hurdle In addi every years. three evaluation where, particularly as is the case passed, tion, and teachers’ parents’ on the based here, ultimate moving party bears the Har complaint following letters the initial persuasion on this issue at trial. burden visit, Mooneyhan Superintendent relson al., Moore’s 11 William Moore et James investigation into open-ended initiated an (3d 56.13[1], § Practice at 56-138 Federal de Finally, school conduct. Cockrel’s ed.2000) (stating moving party if the testimony that the March position shows persuasion the burden of also bears as the 1997 summative evaluation served trial, summary initial moving party’s Principal recom upon which Slate basis in that it must judgment “higher burden is Mooneyhan that Cockrel be mended that the record contains evidence show fired, Mooneyhan’s also a factor in and was satisfying persuasion the burden and ultimate decision to terminate Cockrel. powerful the evidence is so that no several to this evaluation were Attached jury reasonable would be free to disbelieve and critical of parents letters from staff it.”). summary judgment in their To merit to teach her students Coekrel’s decision favor, may simply bring the defendants hemp. about jury enough forth evidence to allow evidence, they find that would have terminated examining this we con-
After
Rather,
find,
regardless
speech.
of her
jury
prepon-
could
clude that
evidence,
reviewing
summary judg
a motion for
the defen-
derance of the
ment, we must view the evidence and draw
discharge
Cockrel was
dants’ decision
motivated,
light
all
inferences
most
part, by
at least in
her decision
reasonable
party, Matsu
nonmoving
favorable to the
to teach her students about
shita,
1348, and
terminating Lang- Cockrel than existed in We are well aware that deci- Cockrel’s ford. sion to speak cannot immunize her from an employment adverse arising decision out of addition, in Langford, plaintiffs su- inappropriate workplace behavior unrelat- pervisor appeared ready and willing to ter- protected speech. Similarly, ed to her plaintiff minate as as plaintiff soon refused employer is not immunized from its deci- speak with her problems about the the sion to an employee terminate based on having. Langford two were was then speech simply that employee because swiftly terminated after she failed to at- engaged has other conduct could meeting they tend a Lane in with which legitimate have grounds constituted for dispute. were to discuss their In the cur- Rather, discharge. review of defen- case, rent there is less evidence that the summary motion for if judgment, dant’s sufficiently defendants were motivated plaintiff the has made out the elements of conduct apart Cockrel’s from her decision claim, her First Amendment retaliation we they to speak when made their decision to must be that the confident defendant’s de- case, although terminate her. In this plaintiff terminate cision to was not Mooneyhan charges cited seventeen consti- part upon plaintiffs based in decision termination, for tuting basis case, speak. In this the defendants proffered several of the provide burden, reasons have not met this and we believe compelling genuine less than basis for termination. that a issue of material facts exists supported a dismissal very con- well have jury could from reasonable which cause, took no toward but the school action have been would not clude that Cockrel until after the of this conduct her for engaged consti- some had she not terminated following Har- Thus, community agitated became this activity. tutionally protected Thus, majority opin visit. rather relson’s resolved at trial matter should relates, upon ion burden summary judgment stage. than at would to show dismissal board III. SUMMARY even in the absence have occurred *23 Healthy City Mt. conduct. See protected reasons, RE- we foregoing For 274, 287, Doyle, 429 U.S. 97 Bd. v. Educ. grant- court’s decision the district VERSE (1977). 568, L.Ed.2d 471 The S.Ct. 50 summary judg- motion for ing defendants’ correctly found that district court court for ment, REMAND to that to show presented evidence school board proceedings. further regard have been fired that Cockrel would SILER, concurring. Judge, Circuit protected conduct. less of Neverthe less, presented has also evidence it, appears inappropri face of it On the this a factual contrary, to the which makes to have a celebri grade a fifth class ate for by summary that cannot be decided issue complicated as on a matter as ty speaker judgment. It is a matter hemp. legalizing Kentucky, as evi concern public in the by anecdotal illustrations denced nevertheless, matters of
majority opinion; may outweighed public concern certain le maintaining interest school’s DISTRICT COUNCIL CHICAGO See gitimate goals or missions. Williams (6th Cir.), OF CARPENTERS PENSION Kentucky, v. F.3d al., Plaintiffs, FUND, et denied, cert. 513 U.S. 115 S.Ct. (1994). 130 L.Ed.2d v. Here, might very school well have CONSTRUCTION, INC., K I& allowing Har- the teacher from
precluded Defendant/Third-Party legalization to discuss relson and others Plaintiff-Appellant, hemp before a of children class v. school, might where it be a grade in a even Chicago and Illinois District Northeast college. One high valid school or topic al., Carpenters, et Third- Council of subjects myriad appro- could out point Party Defendants-Appellees. an older audience would priate for No. 00-3973. for purpose educational promote a valid However, children. grade school Appeals, States Court of United subject in advance the approved Seventh Circuit. pay It must speaker. and the now matter Argued Feb. be- penalty giving prior approval, 2001.* it cannot now be such Decided Feb. cause heard disruptive. Cockrel was conduct true,
Likewise, conduct, if to- may and other principal ward teachers * 23, 2001, of K&I affirming district court's February we order denial On issued an
