35 Tex. 741 | Tex. | 1872
This suit was originally instituted by the appellee in the County Court of Houston county, against the appellants, to recover certain notes which appellee’s intestate had, during his lifetime, transferred
There is, however, one question raised in the lower courts, and contended for with much zeal in this court, which, under the laws in force at the institution of this suit, was of the first degree of importance to the interest of estates of deceased persons. The petition or complaint originally filed in the county court presented a ■case fully authorizing the county court, under Article 1380, Paschal’s Digest, to take cognizance of the matter. There can be no doubt that under that clause of the statute, where the administrator made complaint in writing that any person had papers belonging to the ■estate he represented, and refuses to give them up on demand, it was the duty of the court to take cognizance of the matter ; and it made no difference how that person became possessed of the papers, or what those papers were, so that they belong to the estate and were valuable to it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the county court very properly took cognizance of the original complaint, filed in this cause. And, therefore, if the administrator established the fact that the notes set out in his complaint were the property of the estate of Jesse Duren, and that the appellants in this court
The only question, then, which should have been determined in the county and district courts, was, did the notes described in the administrator’s complaint legally belong to the estate of Jesse Duren ?
It appears by the receipt of appellants, which was made a part of the amended petition in the district-court, and which is the foundation of this action, that in 1861 Jesse Duren transferred, by his indorsement in blank, a large number of promissory notes to appellants, for the payment and satisfaction of certain judgments, which the appellants, as the agents and attorneys of other parties, had obtained against the said Jesse Duren in the district court of that county. This transfer, by the indorsement in blank and delivery of the notes, and by the express terms of the receipt, was absolute; and the indorser thereby lost all control or legal property in the same, and the appellants thereby became the trustees of Duren’s judgment creditors. They accepted the trust, and agreed to collect the notes so transferred with due diligence, and to pay the money, when collected, to the judgment creditors, as specified in the receipts. This was to all intents and purposes a complete assignment to trustees for the benefit of certain specified creditors; and by indorsing the notes, Duren himself became liable to be sued by the trustees upon the notes thus assigned; and instead of reserving any interest in or rights over the same, he might, if still living, have been compelled to pay the entire amounts of the notes and interest to the trustees, for the benefit-of his creditors; and even his administrator is now liable-
Mr. Parsons says, that where the assignment passes the property to the assignee, the death of the assignor will not defeat the assignment. We are, therefore, of -the opinion that the transfer or assignment by Jesse Duren to appellants passed the property in the notes assigned absolutely and irrevocably, and that the death ■of the assignor did not defeat the assignment. And if .not, then the administrator could not maintain his suit ;for the notes so transferred and assigned; and that, •therefore, the court erred in overruling the exceptions .of the defendants to the petition of plaintiff, as that Aid not set out a good cause of action.
It may be proper to remark, that while the administrator cannot, under the receipt set out in his petition, ^maintain a suit for the possession of the notes, yet he
For the erroneous ruling of the court, the judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.