ORDER
Bеfore the Court are cross-motions for partial summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Peter Donatti and Matthew Cowan, and defendants Charter Communications, L.L.C., and Charter Communications, Inc. (collectively “Charter”).
Plaintiffs are or were previously employed as Broadband Technicians with Charter. Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to be paid for the time they spent driving to and from work in company-provided vehicles and performing activities they are required to complete before or after commuting. Charter asserts plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation for such time and that their policies do not violate the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Portal-to-Portal Act, or the Employee Commuter Flexibility Act.
Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Once the moving party has done so, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond his pleadings and show, by affidavit or by “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” that there is a genuine issue of fact to be resolved at trial. Celotex,
Summary judgment, however, “is an extreme remedy, to be granted only if no genuine issue exists as to any material fact.” Haas v. Weiner,
If “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the court must grant summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Facts
Plaintiff Matthew Cowan is a current Charter employee, and plaintiff Peter Donatti is a former Charter employee. Plaintiffs were employed by Charter during the relevant periods as Broadband Technicians (“technicians”). Charter allows, but does not require, technicians to commute to and from work in their assigned company vehicles. The decision to use a Charter vehicle to commute is voluntary. Instead of commuting in a company-provided vehicle, employees may choose to commute in their personal vehicles and park their assigned company vehicles at a Charter facility. Mr. Donatti elected to commute in a Charter vehicle, but Mr. Cowan did not. Mr. Cowan left his Charter vehicle at Charter’s Sedalia office each night. However, there is an exception when technicians, like Mr. Cowan, are “on-call.” During the time that a Charter technician is “on call,” policy states that an employee may be required to take their company vehicle home.
Mr. Donatti held the positions of Broadband Technician II and Broadband Technician III during the relevant period of June 27, 2009, through June 27, 2011 (the “Class Period”), and Mr. Cowan held the position
During the relevant periods, Charter has had written timekeeping and vehicle-use policies in place, named Vehicle Policies, Timekeeping Policies, Timekeeping Memoranda, and an Employee Handbook, that specify when technicians such as plaintiffs begin and end their workday, and how they should record their work time for payroll purposes. (Doc. 57, Affidavit of Colleen Judson, (“Judson Aff.”), ¶¶ 24-28; see generally, Doc. 58, Ex. 9, 2008 Timekeeping Policy; Ex. 10, July 2009 Timekeeping Policy; Ex. 11, October 2009 Timekeeping Policy; Ex. 12, 2010 Timekeeping Policy
The written policies further specify that technicians who commute in Charter-provided vehicles are not paid for performing certain activities that are related to their commute, such as carrying specified equipment and customer payments to and from their vehicles and conducting a limited safety check before beginning the drive to work. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 1-4. The written policies specify that Charter will pаy its nonexempt employees for all hours they work, and strictly prohibit employees from working “off the clock” — that is, before their shift begins, after their shift ends, or during a meal break — without advance authorization. See Doc. 58, Ex. 12, 2010 Timekeeping Policy at 1; Ex. 16, 2011 Employee Handbook at 15. Nevertheless, if an employee works off the clock, even without authorization, Charter’s policies require that the employee be compensated for the time worked. Id. Technicians are required to comply with Charter’s timekeeping and vehicle-use policies, as amended from time to time. See Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶¶ 4, 5. Plaintiffs acknowledged, in writing, that they had read and understood Charter’s timekeeping and vehicle-use policies. (Doc. 57, Judson Aff. ¶¶ 6, 12-17; see Doc. 58, Ex. 17, Donatti Acknowledgment of 2008 Timekeeping Memo; Ex. 18, Donatti Acknowledgment of 2009 Timekeeping Memo; Ex. 19, Donatti Acknowledgment of 2010 Timekeeping Memo; Ex. 20, Cowan Acknowledgment of 2008 Timekeeping Memo; Ex. 21, Cowan Acknowledgment of 2009 Timekeeping Memo; Ex. 22, Cowan Acknowledgment of 2010 Timekeeping Memo.)
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 27, 2011, and an amended complaint on August 15, 2011. In both complaints, plaintiffs assert FLSA claims on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated “Cable Technicians.” Plaintiffs allege a class pеriod of two years in their Amended Complaint. See Doc. 8, Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 28, 44. Because the original
Plaintiffs allege Charter failed to compensate them and the other technicians for time spent transporting company property in Charter vehicles, and for time spent performing certain pre-and post-shift activities, such as gathering tools and paperwork, obtaining routes and orders, and inspecting vehicles. Plaintiffs contend that Charter’s failure to pay for the time spent performing these activities violates the FLSA. On November 30, 2011, the parties submitted a Joint Proposed Preliminary Scheduling Order in which they agreed that there are two potentially dis-positive legal issues that the Court should resolve at the outset. The first threshold issue is whether plaintiffs’ commuting time claims are cognizable under the ECFA. On December 5, 2011, this Court entered the parties’ Proposed Scheduling Order and set a schedule for discovery and dispositive motions on the threshold issues.
Charter’s Compensation and Timekeeping Policies for Non-Exempt Employees
Charter is the fourth largest cable operator in the United States, and provides advanced video, high-speed Internet, and teleрhone services to approximately 5.2 million residential and business customers in 25 states. See Doc 58, Ex. 16, 2011 Handbook at 4. Charter requires its employees to accurately report all hours worked on their timecards. See Doc. 58, Ex. 12, 2010 Timekeeping Policy at 3; Ex. 16, 2011 Handbook at 15-16. An employee who provides false or inaccurate information on a timecard may be subject to discipline. See Ex. 12, 2010 Timekeeping Policy at 2; Ex. 16, 2011 Handbook at 16. Charter’s general policies requiring compensation for nonexempt employees, including the rules described previously, are set forth in its Employee Handbook and Timekeeping Policy. (Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶4.)
All employees are given access to the Employee Handbook and the Timekeeping Policy at the time they begin employment with Charter. Id., ¶¶24, 29. The Timekeeping Policy and the Employee Handbook are published online via Charter’s intranet, and employees are notified of this when they begin employment with Charter through new-hire orientation. Id. Although the Timekeeping Policy is a freestanding policy, it is also incorporated into the Employee Handbook via a hyperlink whereby an employee reviewing the Employee Handbook online may click on a link to be directed to an electronic version of the Timekeeping Policy. Id., ¶ 24. Charter revises its Employee Handbook and Timekeeping Policy periodically; updated versions are published to all employees online, and employees are made aware of this through announcements by Human Resources. Id., ¶¶ 24, 29.
The Timekeeping Policies in effect during the Class Period were issued by Charter on August 7, 2008, July 20, 2009, October 5, 2009, and October 12, 2010. Id., ¶ 24. The Employee Handbooks in effect during the Class Period were issued in June 2006, March 2010, December 2010, and March 2011. Id., ¶ 29.
Plaintiffs’ General Job Duties
Technicians install, disconnect, and repair cable, Internet, and telephone services for Charter’s residential and business customers at the customers’ homes or businesses. (Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶¶ 34-38; see Doc. 58, Ex. 23, Broadband Technician
The Charter vehicles driven by technicians are typically vans or small trucks, suitable for regular street travel. (Doc. 52, Burton Aff. ¶ 6; see also Doc. 53, Affidavit of Robin Samuel (“Samuel Aff.”), ¶ 5; Doc. 43, Ex. 4, Exterior photographs of Charter vehicles, at P000149-000151.) They are not oversized vehicles and do not require that a driver hold a commercial vehicle license in order to operate them. (Doc. 52, Burton Aff, ¶ 6.)
Compensation and Timekeeping Policies for BBTs Who Commute in Charter Vehicles
For technicians who choose to commute in a Charter vehicle, the company pays all vehicle-related expenses for both commute and noncommute periods, including insurance costs, licensing fees, gasoline, oil, and other vehicle maintenance costs, thereby saving the technicians commuting expenses. Id., ¶ 8.
For technicians who elect to commute in Charter vehicles, the terms and conditions governing the use of Charter vehicles for commuting are set forth in Charter’s Vehicle Policy and in various Timekeeping Memoranda periodically distributed to the technicians. See generally Doc. 58, Ex. 7, 2010 Vehicle Policy; Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo. The Vehicle Policy sets forth requirements for the use of Charter vehicles, including safety requirements, authorized and unauthorized uses of the vehicles, procedures for reporting accidents, and procedures for securing and maintaining the vehicles. See Doc. 58, Ex. 7, 2010 Vehicle Policy at 1-4. Generally, Charter vehicles are to be used for job-related duties and assignments and commuting. See Doc. 58, Ex. 7, 2010 Vehicle Policy at 2. Employees generally may not transport family members or other non-Charter personnel without prior supervisor approval. Id. However, technicians who commute in Charter vehicles are permitted to make
The Timekeeping Memoranda specify, in detail, the time-recording procedures for both technicians who commute in Charter vehicles and those who do not, as well as the specific tasks required of technicians who commute in Charter vehicles in order to safeguard the vehicle and the equipment in it. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 1-5. These memoranda reflect the general Charter policies that technicians are to be paid for all work done during their shifts, and that they are not to work during their commutes, or prior to or following their shifts, without authorization. Id. However, to the extent technicians perform work during such periods, other than activities incidental to commuting in Charter vehicles, they are to be compensated for such time. Id.; see also Doc. 58, Ex. 12, 2010 Timekeeping Policy at 1; Ex. 16, 2011 Handbook at 15. For example, the Timekeeping Memoranda provide that in the morning, before leaving their homes, all technicians who commute in Charter vehicles are required to secure in their company vehicle the following items: (i) a small hand-held signal level meter used to perform services at customer locations, (ii) a small hand-held company-issued communications device, often referred to as a “PDA” (personal digital assistant), (iii) a laptop computer, if one has been assigned to them by Charter,
Charter policy instructs technicians to walk around their vehicle once in the morning before driving to work to check for obvious safety hazards (such as a child playing near the vehicle, or a large piece of debris near the vehicle). See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 1-2; Doc. 52, Burton Aff., ¶ 18. They are also required to pick up the two orange traffic cones, if placed at the front and back of the vehicle for safety purposes at the time the vehicle was parked. (Doc. 52, Burton Aff., ¶ 19; Doc. 42, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 92:25-93:8.) Under Charter policy, technicians are not compensated for these tasks. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 1-2.
In the morning, before their scheduled shift begins, technicians must briefly turn on their PDA to receive their first job assignment and to determine the assignment’s location. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 2; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 91:13-21. It takes less than a minute to log onto the PDA. (Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 92:15-17.) Some technicians log on to their PDA at home, prior to getting into their Charter vehicle; in that case, the technician will then log off the PDA after receiving his first assignment. Id. at 91:19-21. When the technician gets into his vehicle to drive to his first job assignment, he must then turn the PDA back on and enter his status as “en route.” See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 2; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 113:5-114:2, 121:15-20. Other technicians do not log onto their PDA in their homes, but instead check their first job assignment once in their vehicle immediately before their commute. (Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 122:12-25.) Technicians are not compensated for the brief time spent turning on their PDA’s and receiving their first assignment, or for entering their “en route” status. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 2; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 91:22-24.
The Timekeeping Memoranda instruct technicians not to conduct any work or communicate about work with anyone during their commute to the first job assignment, unless there is an emergency, a service outage for which the technicians’ assistance is needed, or a change in the first job assignment. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 2. Technicians are also instructed not to conduct work or communicate about wоrk during the commute home. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 3. Although commuting time is generally not compensable under Charter policy, if a technician is called by a dispatcher or supervisor regarding one of these events, the technician is required to pull over to safely answer the call, and the technician’s workday, and thus pay, will commence at that time. Id.
Each technician is assigned to a limited geographical territory (typically consisting of a cable system), and the job sites where the technician performs services, and thus the commuting area, are all located within the geographical boundaries of that territory. (Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 102:25-103:8.) Although a technician’s commute within his assigned work area is generally not compensable, to the extent he must drive outside the assigned work area, Charter policies require that the technician be compensated for the extra travel time. See Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶ 20; Doc. 58, Ex. 29, 2009 Technician Timekeeping Memo Questions and Answers at 1, Questions 4 and 5. Charter’s policy also provides that anyone who is required to commute more than 60 minutes on a regu
When a technician arrives home, he may be required to set two safety cones outside the vehicle (this requirement differs by Charter location, and not all technicians need to set out safety cones) and lock the vehicle. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 4; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 100:11-24. He must also take the signal level meter, PDA, any paper work orders, payments, or laptop he may have into his home; all other equipment remains in the vehicle. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 4; Ex. 16, 2011 Handbook at 70; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 93:13-16. Technicians are not compensated for these limited, incidental activities. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 4.
Charter policies require that certain tasks be performed by technicians exclusively during the workday, when technicians are “on the clоck.” For example, all technicians are instructed to do the following during their paid shifts: (i) stock their vehicle; (ii) fuel and clean their vehicle; and (iii) conduct routine maintenance. If technicians are assigned a laptop, they are not to use it when they are not on the clock. See Doc. 58, Ex. 5, 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 5; Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 105:14-106:21. As a result, all of these activities performed during the workday are compensated under Charter policy. Id.
Charter’s Vehicle Policy is available to all employees via Charter’s intranet, and Charter employees are notified of this fact when they begin their employment with Charter. (Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶ 21.) Although the Vehicle Policy is a free-standing policy, like the Timekeeping Memoranda, it is also incorporated into the Employee Handbook via a hyperlink. Id. The Vehicle Policy is periodically revised and reissued, and updated versions are published to employees online. Id. The Vehicle Policies applicable during the Class Period were issued on January 1, 2008, and September 1, 2010. Id. Employees are instructed to adhere to the policies or be subject to corrective action. See Doc. 58, Ex. 7, 2010 Vehicle Policy at 1, 5.
Charter’s Timekeeping Memoranda, like the Employee Handbooks and Timekeeping and Vehicle Policies, are issued periodically. (Doc. 57, Judson Aff., ¶ 6.) Technicians receive a copy of the then applicable Timekeeping Memorandum at the start of their employment. Id. Each time a Timekeeping Memorandum is revised and reissued, it is distributed to all technicians. Id. With nearly every distribution of a revised Timekeeping Memorandum, technicians are instructed to read the memorandum and sign a form acknowledging that they have received the memorandum and agree to comply with its policies and expectations. Id.; 2011 Timekeeping Memo at 6. The Timekeeping Memoranda in effect during the relevant Class Period were issued by Charter on September 12, 2008, November 2, 2009, September 24, 2010, and March 27, 2011.
Discussion
Plaintiffs claim the policies of Charter violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Portal-to-Portal Act and its 1997 amendment, and the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act (ECFA). Defendants claim their policies do not violate the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act or the ECFA.
The purpose of the FLSA is to ensure that employees are paid for all hours worked in a given workweek, including overtime hours. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207; see Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,
The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, narrowed the coverage of the FLSA by excepting two activities that had been treated as compensable under prior case law: (1) walking, riding or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principle activity of the employee; and (2) activities which are “preliminary to or postliminary to” that principal activity. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The statute does not define “principle activity.” In Steiner v. Mitchell,
The Employee Commuting Flexibility Act (ECFA)
The stated purpose of the ECFA was “to amend the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relating to the payment of wages to employees who use employer-provided vehicles” for commuting. See H.R.Rep. No.
Congress responded to the DOL’s inconsistency by passing the EFCA in 1996. This Act added language to section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act in order to clarify the exclusions of the Act. The EFCA amendment to the Portal-to-Portal Act clarified the Act’s exclusion as related to commuting by an employee in an employer-provided vehicle. The Act clarified that the Portal-to-Portal Act excluded compensation for an employee’s commute in an employer-provided vehicle and for incidental activities related to the use of the vehicle for commuting. Specifically, the Act states that:
the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of the vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
The effect of the ECFA was to carve out, from the realm of compensable time, two types of employee activities pertaining to commuting in a company vehicle: (1) travel, and (2) incidental activities. Although travel was already a part of the original Portal-to-Portal Act, the category of “incidental activities” is new. Previously, the Act only referred to activities “preliminary to or postliminary to” principal activities. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).
Here, the dispute is a question of statutory interpretation: Does the Portal-to-Portal Act, as amended by the EFCA, except the preliminary and postliminary activities and commute of broadband technicians for Charter, specifically plaintiffs Donatti and Cowan, thus making these activities noncompensable under the FLSA.
Burden of Proof
Plaintiffs argue that the burden of proof lies with Charter in this case, relying on statements in case law such as Baker v. Barnard Construction Co.,
Application of the Portal-to-Portal Act and ECFA to Charter Policies
Plaintiffs argue that the Portal-to-Portal Act, as applied to the policies of Charter, should be narrowly construed and interpreted in favor of employees. However, as set forth above, the Portal-to-Portal Act and its amendment, the ECFA, are not an exemption to the FLSA requiring narrow construction. See Adams,
The Portal-to-Portal Act generally excludes home-to-work travel from compensable time. 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. Ordinary home-to-work travel is not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act in the absence of a contract or custom of compensation that exists between the employer and employees. Chambers v. Sears Roebuck and Co.,
Also excluded from the definition of compensable work is any other activity performed before or after an employee’s shift that is not integral and indispensible
Here, the undisputed evidence is that there is no contract or custom between Charter and its broadband technicians that establishes compensation for the technicians’ commute times, in Charter-provided vehicles, from their home to their first job site, or from their last job site to their home. Rather, the policies of Charter specifically state the contrary. Charter’s policies also preclude compensation for technicians’ pre-and post-commuting activities when technicians are using Charter vehicles. Plaintiffs argue these policies are not in compliance with the Portal-to-Portal Act/ECFA and, therefore, the FLSA requires Charter technicians to be compensated for their commute times and pre-and post-commute activities. Plaintiffs argue the following reasons why their commute times and pre-and post-commute activities should be compensable and why Charter’s policies, which preclude compensation, violate the Portal-to-Portal AcV ECFA: (1) technicians transport expensive equipment in the Charter vehicles during the commute for the benefit of Charter, thereby making the commute a principal activity; (2) commute in Charter vehicles is controlled by Charter in that restrictions are placed on technicians’ activities during the commute, making the commute a principal activity; (3) use of the Charter vehicles for commuting is mandatory when technicians are “on call,” thereby making the commute an integral and indispensable principle activity; (4) the activities performed by technicians pre-and post-commute are not incidental, but are principal activities; (5) the commuting area for technicians in the Sedalia, Missouri area includes traveling to job sites in the Warrensburg area, thereby making the commute a principal activity, and the ECFA exception for commuting within the normal commuting area and related incidental activities inapplicable; and (6) the activities performed by technicians pre-and post-commute are not incidental, but are principal activities performed before and after the commute, thus making the “continuous work day doctrine” applicable.
Charter’s cross-motion for summary judgment argues that the Portal-to-Portal Act and ECFA, as applied to the undisputed policies of Charter, show no violation of the Act; Charter argues that plaintiffs’ commute time and the activities required of technicians by Charter in conjunction therewith, do not violate the Portal-to-Portal Act, as amended by the ECFA.
In order to address the arguments of the parties and determine whether the policies of Charter are in violation of the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Court must specifically consider the ECFA amendment to the Portal-to-Portal Act which was specifically enacted to address when an employee uses an employer’s vehicle for commuting. Plaintiffs’ arguments in support of summary judgment which fail to consider the ECFA, misconstrue the application of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Court must apply the Portal-to-Portal Act in its entirety, including the relevant ECFA amendment, to the facts of this case.
Transport of Equipment
Plaintiffs allege that transporting expensive equipment in their Charter vehicles during their commute from their home to their worksites, and from their worksites to home, is a part of their principal activities as technicians, done for the benefit of Charter, and thus, is compensable work. In this context, however, courts have specifically held that the transport of tools
Restrictions on Use of Charter Vehicle for Commuting
Plaintiffs argue that the restrictions on technicians’ commute activities make their commute time compensable as a principle activity. However, the case law on this issue is clear. “[Commuting done for the employer’s benefit, under the еmployer’s rules, is noncompensable if the labor beyond the mere act of driving the vehicle is de minimis.” Adams,
In Bobo v. United States,
Here, Charter’s policies state that technicians should refrain from personal use of Charter vehicles, including transporting a family member, friend, or even a Charter customer, without prior supervisor approval. See Doc. 58, Ex. 7, Charter Vehicle Policy 2010. The restrictions on vehicle use by Charter technicians are no more restrictive than those in Bobo and Chambers. Accordingly, in applying the law, as set forth above, to the restrictions set forth in Charter policy for employees using Charter’s vehicles, there is no basis to support a conclusion that the restrictions set forth in Charter’s policies violate the Portal-to-Portal Aet/ECFA.
Use of the Charter Vehicles for Commuting Mandatory when Technicians are “On Call ”
Plaintiffs argue that because commuting in a Charter vehicle is mandatory when a technician is “on-call,” the commute in the Charter vehicle by technicians is a principal activity for which the technicians must be compensated. Charter argues that technicians enter into an “agreement” with Charter regarding their use of company vehicles, and that this policy complies with the Portal-to-Portal Act/ECFA.
The language of the ECFA and its legislative history compel the conclusion that the requisite agreement concerning the use of an employer’s vehicle to commute may simply be a part or condition of the employee’s employment. Rutti,
Here, Charter has policies in place concerning the use of Charter vehicles by its broadband technicians. The evidence shows that all employees are made aware of these policies when they begin their employment with Charter. Charter’s Vehicle Policy is free-standing policy available to employees via several means, including Charter’s intranet, and via a hyperlink in the online Employee Handbook. When updates are made to the policy, employees are made aware of these policies (details set forth in Facts section of this order), and frequently must sign a form acknowledging receipt of the policies. This evidence supports that Charter’s employee vehicle policies are an agreement between Charter and its employees; they are a condition of employment with Charter. As a condition of employment, the use of Charter vehicles by it broadband technicians, need not necessarily be voluntary. Legislative history and case law support that the agreement on use of employer’s vehicle can be a required condition of employment and need not necessarily be “voluntary.” See Rutti
Thus here, where the evidence shows that Charter has very specific policies on use of Charter vehicles for commuting and such policies are made known to the technicians and are conditions of the technicians’ employment, the compelled use of Charter vehicles for commuting when a technician is “on call” does not make the technician’s commute time compensable.
As set forth in the facts, Charter’s policies require technicians to perform certain actions pre-and post-commute. Plaintiffs argue these activities are not incidental to their commute, but are principal activities and, therefore, are compensable. Charter argues that the activities are incidental to the broadband technicians’ commute in Charter-provided vehicles and, therefore, do not require compensation, consistent with the Portal-to-Portal Aci/ECFA.
Upon review, the evidence supports that these activities are incidental. First, technicians carrying their PDA, signal level meter, work orders and payments and/or laptops to and from their vehicles is related to their commute to and from their homes in Charter-provided vehicles. The very nature of commuting in a company vehicle provides some pre-and post-commute activities by employees. So long as these activities are de minimis/incidental, the Portal-to-Portal Act/ECFA excludes these activities from those considered principal; therefore, not requiring compensation from the employer to the employee for these activities. In Chambers,
Moreover, a technician carrying these items to and from his Charter vehicles does not lengthen the time otherwise required for a technician to walk to and from the vehicle. The evidence is that these items can be easily carried in a shoulder bag or in a technician’s hands or some other regular fashion, and that no additional trips from' technicians’ homes to their vehicles and back are necessary. Certainly, such activity is de minimis and is not a principal activity supporting compensation.
Second, the time technicians spend at the beginning of their day quickly inspecting around their Charter vehicle for obvious hazards only takes a few seconds and is also directly related to the use of Charter vehicles for commuting. This is also true with regard to the activity of removing cones from around the Chartér vehicles at the beginning of their day, and placing the cones out when arriving home at the end of the day. These activities are de minimis, taking only seconds, and are directly related to use by technicians of Charter vehicles for commuting.
The legislative history of the ECFA indicates that much more time-intensive inspections, such as “routine vehicle safety inspections ... have long been considered preliminary or postliminary activities and therefore are not compensable.” Buzek,
Third, the evidence shows that the time spent by technicians turning on their
The case law supports that these activities are not principal activities, but are de minimis and incidental to the Charter technicians’ commute. For instance, in Chambers,
Here, even considering the cumulative daily time required for completing the pre- and post-commuting activities set forth in Charter policies, such time is de minimis and incidental. Although there is no evidence showing exactly how long it takes technicians to complete the preliminary and postliminary activities each day, no reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that these activities require more than a de minimis amount of time. There is no evidence showing that these activities would even total ten minutes in any given day. See Rutti,
Other Alleged Pre- and Posh-Shift Activities
Plaintiffs also assert that Charter failed to compensate them for “gathering tools” and doing “paperwork” before and after their shift. However, plaintiffs have no evidence that they are required to perform these activities before or after their shifts and, in fact, Charter’s policies tell technicians to conduct these activities only while on the clock. Further, Charter policy states that if such activity would be required, that such activity is compensable.
The only tools technicians need to gather, as discussed in the previous section, are a signal level meter, a PDA and a laptop (if applicable), and activities relatеd to these tools are incidental to the commute by Charter technicians in a Charter-provided vehicle. All other equipment is kept in the
As to paperwork, Charter’s Timekeeping Memoranda plainly does not require technicians who commute in Charter vehicles to perform any paperwork prior to or after their commutes; to the contrary, the policy prohibits technicians from doing so.
Plaintiffs also allege that Charter’s Cash Management Policy requires them to turn in any funds collected on a daily basis to the Charter facility. Plaintiffs allege that policy requires them to turn in any collected funds no later than the next morning, thus requiring technicians to make a stop by the office to deposit monies either after thеir scheduled shift ended or prior to the beginning of their shift the next day. However, plaintiffs fail to identify the specific Charter policy requiring such activity, and the evidence does not support that no later than the next morning means turning the funds in off the clock. According to the deposition testimony of Charter’s technical operations supervisor, a technician who collects cash or money should turn it in the day it is received; however, it can be held overnight by the technician and turned in the “very next morning,” with an exception for weekends when it may be held overnight longer. See Doc. 43, Ex. 1, Moser Dep. at 68-69. Plaintiffs’ allegations that the “very next morning” requires a deposit off the clock prior to the beginning of their shift is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the undisputed evidence is that contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, Charter’s policies specifically require that technicians are to turn .in customer payments while on the clock.
With regard to all these allegations, to the extent a technician would need to work prior to or after their shift, Charter’s policies make it clear that technicians will be paid' for all time worked, regardless of when it occurs. In particular, they state that: (1) if employees begin their workdаy before the start of their scheduled shift, they will be paid from the time they begin their workday before the start of their scheduled shift; (2) if a technician is required to work past the end of their shift to return to the office or complete other tasks, they will be paid up until the time they complete all work, even if it is after the end of the shift; and (3) as a general rule, technicians will be paid for all time worked.
Normal Commuting Area
Plaintiffs allege the commuting area for Charter broadband technicians in the Sedalia, Missouri area includes traveling to job sites in the Warrensburg area, thereby making the commute a principal activity, and the ECFA exception for commuting within the normal commuting area and related incidental activities inapplicable. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that because the commuting area for the Sedalia, Missouri broadband technicians includes commuting to the Warrensburg area, such commute is longer than the normal commuting area for Charter broadband technicians and, therefore,..is not incidental as defined by the Portal-to-Portal Ad/ ECFA, and should be compensable as a principal activity.
Charter argues that the nature of their business makes the Sedalia technicians commute time to Sedalia and Wаrrensburg normal. Charter’s policies do not define normal commute time in geographical terms because the territory assigned to
Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations that travel by Sedalia technicians to the Warrensburg area is outside the normal commuting area for Charter technicians assigned to that area is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the evidence supports the contrary. There is no evidence to support plaintiffs’ assertion that Chаrter’s store front location in Warrensburg dictates that Charter should have broadband technicians who are assigned only to the Warrensburg geographical area. Charter’s policies do not define what is a normal geographical location or what is the normal commute; the policies provide that if a technician commutes outside his assigned limited geographical area he is compensated, and if his commute is in excess of an hour, he should notify his supervisor in order for a determination to be made as to whether such commute should be compensable. Here, clearly, the evidence is that the normal geographical location for Charter broadband technicians in the Sedalia area includes the Warrensburg area. The evidence does not support that Charter technicians in the Sedalia office are being required to commute outside the normal commuting area for that region of Charter’s business; the normal commuting area is Sedalia and Warrensburg.
To the extent plaintiffs allege the commute by Sedalia technicians to Warrens-burg precludes application of the ECFA because these technicians are using Charter’s vehicle for travel оutside the normal commuting area for Charter’s business or establishment, the evidence simply does not support this. Thus, for the reasons set forth herein, Charter’s policies in this regard do not violate the Portal-to-Portal Act/ECFA.
Continuous Workday Rule
Plaintiffs argue that because the activities they perform pre-and post-commute are principal activities and are directed by Charter policy, this extends their workday to include their pre-commute and post-commute activities, as well as their commute time to and from their homes that occurs in between. See Alvarez,
Conclusion
The motions for partial summary judgment specifically state the issue is whether Charter policies comply with the Portal-to-Portal Act/ECFA. However, plaintiffs’ motion also argues unique facts and circumstances of their employment which they allege violate the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Court finds that such allegations fail to support that Charter’s policies are not in compliance with the Portal-to-Portal Act or the ECFA.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendants Charter Communications, L.L.C., and Charter Communications, Inc., is granted. [49] It is further
ORDERED that the motion for partial summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Peter Donatti and Matthew Cowan is denied. [39]
Notes
. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
. Although subsequent citations refer only to the 2010 Timekeeping Policy, it is noted that previous Timekeeping Policies included similar language to that cited.
. Although subsequent citations refer only to the 2011 Handbook, it is noted that previous employee handbooks included similar language to that cited.
. The second issue pertaining to the effect of the settlement in Goodell v. Charter Communications, L.L.C., No. 08-512-bbc,
. Neither Donatti nor Cowan were issued laptops.
. Subsequent to the filing of Charter's motion, the Timekeeping Memorandum was revised again and distributed as of April 23, 2012.