20881 | Ga. Ct. App. | May 16, 1931
1. A railroad company is liable for any injury proximately caused by the negligent running of its locomotives or cars (Civil Code, § 2780); and in all actions based thereon, proof of injury thus inflicted is prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the servants of the company in reference to such injury, with respect to the negligence charged in the petition (Ga. L. 1929, p. 316,. sec. 1); but no recovery can be had against a railroad company for injuries done by the consent of the complaining party, or where it appears that a failure on his part to exercise ordinary care for his own safety constituted the proximate cause of the injury. Civil Code, § 2781. If the complainant and the defendant company are both at fault, in that the negligence of each proximately contributes to the injury, but the negligence of the complainant does not equal or exceed that of tlie defendant, there may still be a recovery of partial damages reduced in proportion to the amount of default attributable to the complainant, except that in all cases, save where the defendant is guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct, the rule is further qualified so that the complainant is precluded from recovery if, by the exercise of ordinary care on his own part after the negligence of the defendant was apparent or should reasonably have been apprehended, he could have avoided the consequences to himself occasioned by the negligence of the defendant company. Thus the defense stated in section 2781 of the Civil Code, to the effect that a plaintiff can not recover for injuries caused by his consent or due to his own negligence, is separate and distinct from the additional limitation or qualification of the right to recover as stated in section 4426, which provides that notwithstanding the perilous situation might have been brought about in whole or in the greater part by the negligent acts of the defendant, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the injured party to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person to ascertain the defendant’s negligence and thereafter to avoid its consequences. In the one case, the plaintiff is precluded by his own acts and condutít which cause or at least equally contribute to the injury; in the other case, the plaintiff
2. While a failure to charge the defense stated in section 4426 of the Civil Code may constitute reversible error as against the railroad company, a failure so to charge could not be accounted as harmful error as against the plaintiff against whom such defense in favor of the railroad is directed. Accordingly, in an action for damages arising from a collision between the defendant’s locomotive and the plaintiff’s automobile at a private crossing attended by a private watchman furnished by the plaintiff’s employer, where the judge instructed the jury as to the defense stated in section 2781 of the Civil Code, that if “the jury should believe that the plaintiff himself, by the exercise of ordinary care at the time and place of his injuries, could have avoided injury to himself,” there could be no recovery, without referring to the duty imposed upon the plaintiff by section 4426 of the Civil Code to exercise ordinary care to ascertain the defendant’s negligence and thereafter to avoid its consequences, the charge given was not erroneous in that it failed to limit and restrict the duty of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care to avoid the consequences.of the defendants negligence to a time when such negligence was existing and apparent, or the circumstances were such that an ordinarily prudent person would have reason to apprehend its'existence. Nor was it error to refuse a
3. In view of the verdict in favor of the defendant, any error in the charge of the court relative to the duty of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care in mitigating the damages, or which might necessarily have relieved the defendant from any damage resulting from the improper or unskilful treatment of the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff might have exercised ordinary care in the selection of his physician, would not authorize a reversal, since such charge related only to the measure of damages. Southwest Georgia Development Co. v. Griffin, 38 Ga. App. 276 (143 S.E. 784" court="Ga. Ct. App." date_filed="1928-06-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/standard-lumber-co-v-clifton-5619378?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5619378">143 S. E. 784), and cit. While it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff, who sued by next friend, had not reached his majority, and while the jury could possibly have found that the impaired earning capacity of the plaintiff might not have extended beyond his twenty-first year had the plaintiff received proper and skilful medical treatment, a finding in favor of the defendant generally could not have resulted from any such conclusion, since the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, was entitled to recover on account of the pain and suffering necessarily incident to the injury received, independently of whether any physical impairment would result in decreasing his earning capacity after he reached his majority. Nor can it be assumed that the jury, in passing upon the right of the plaintiff to recover, were wrongfully influenced by the fact that he had received
4. The evidence authorized the verdict in favor of the defendant, and it can not be here set aside for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed.