Donald O'CONNOR, et al., Plaintiffs, and
Benjamin M. Aban, Donald N. Adaniya, Rolando R. Alvarado, Joseph A. Alvitre, Larry Andrews, Jeannett Armstrong, Robert G. Ashmore, Lee E. Austin, David K. Bahl, Lawrence R. Barron, Kenneth R. Battle, Jeanette Binion, Royce Binion, Eleanor M. Bishop, Gaetane M. Boutin, Thomas R. Boyden, Deena J. Bradshaw, Shadrach Breaux, Stephen G. Broich, Michael C. Brown, Yulanda S. Brown, David S. Buchanan, Maria L. Buenrostro, Gail Burnett, William D. Byrd, Richard F. Camacho, Elaine L. Carr, Larry Carr, Ruby L. Carter, Daniel Castellano, Raymond Cervantes, Alyce Chacon, Joyce M. Chalenor, William Q. Chavira, Mary R. Clarett, Jacqueline V. Clayter, Janice L. Cobb, Paula Sue Conklin, Sandra G. Contreras, Lori A. Cook, Patricia A. Cormier, Osvaldo R. Cosme, John D. Cota, Jr., Scott A. Craddolph, Ronnie F. Crews, Joselito S. Cristobal, Sherron S. Cryer, Marjorie E. Cunningham, Elmito A. Danggoec, Gibson Nancy Darley, Valynda D. Davis, Claudia L. Dawkins,
Mark W. Day, David Martin De LosReyes, Firmo C. De Mesa, Carolyn De Ruso, Mary E. Dean, Daniel J. Devoy, Rita P. Dietrich, John A. Dimercurio, Marianito G. Domingo, Viola E. Eaton, John T. Elliott, June E. Erwin, Sharon Espinoza, Joan E. Farber, Richard G. Ferguson, Craig E. Finch, Olivia Flores, Anna J. Fontana, Carl R. Fontana, David Russell Ford, Kevin Foreman, Salvador Franco, Donald R. Freeman, Richard C. Fromm, Charles E. Fuller, Donato F. Garcia, Lydia Garcia-Espinoza, Jerry A. Gasbarra, Andrea S. Gilbert, Frank C. Giovenco, Gabriel Giraco, Carmen Y. Glass Lang, Alan J. Glassman, Ralph J. Gomez, Gay Gorski, Russell L. Gosselin, Lelаnd A. Gotwals, Regina Goudeau, Timothy N. Graham, Melody A. Grant, Kathryn I. Gregor, Gordon C. Gregory, Victor A. Guerra, Eduardo Guirado, Mary L. Gunn, Victor Guzman, Douglas A. Hackett, Clara N. Hansen, Joan C. Harkins, Sharon Chaney Harris, Ingrid A. Harrison Meyerhofer, Luella L. Hartman, Edmore Hatcher, Dennis W. Hattan, Clifford L. Hawk, Barbara A. Hayes, Alice L. Heftye, Robert L. Henson, Sr., George Hernandez, Eric D. Hibbler, Talbert L. Hignight, Dwight E. Hill, Vivian Hill, Karen L. Hillblom, Ernest L. Hines, Barbara A. Holland, Antonius A. Holst, Mark J. Hopkins, Richard J. Huerta, Edward E. Huizar, Michael F. Humphrey, Eileen Hutchings, Pamela M. Iseri, Carole A. Jackson, Pamela A. Jarrett, Ronald D. Jensen, Odalie K. Johannessen, Judith A. John, Fred C. Johnson, David L. Johnson, Brian L. Jones, Altheria v. Jones, Ethelyn J. Jones, Charles L. King, John L. King, Edward S. Kirol, Stacey A. Koide, Jean K. Konnoff, Geza C. Koszty, Michael J. Kunza, Kenneth R. Kyle, Philip L. Lamontagne, Timothy D. Lane, Larry A. Latine, Phillip E. Lawson, Deirdre Anne Leary, James F. Lindekugel, Nelson Lugo, Teofilo M. Lugo, Laisene Malauulu, Gregory D. Marinas, Patrice A. Markham, Val S. Marquez, Richard D. McCaffery, Lance E. McNeil, Johnny McQueen, Jr., Anthony C. Metoyer, Jr., Troy J. Montgomery, Jong-Boon Moon, Don A. Morales, Donald F. Morgan, Barbara R. Murtagh, Albert W. Myers, Joyce C. Naeyaert, Mark D. Neumeister, Robert D. Nickens, Roque Nieto, Michael C. Nimtz, Sandra Lee Nunally, Yolanda Ontiveros-Duncan, Ronald L. Orr, Michael A. Paez, Kenneth F. Paffrath, Evelyn P. Palencia, Hugo A. Palomo, Roy H. Parker, III, Gary A. Patterson, Henry P. Perez, Robert A. Perez, Arthur R. Pimentel, Stanley H. Polinsky, Thomas H. Potter, Valerie B. Prather, John L. Quaderer, Lance D. Queen, Sandra A. Quintard, Timothy John Ramirez, Veda R. Ramsey, Linda Rau, Natividad Reyes, Jr., Frances A. Riedel, Edgar B. Roa, Angela K. Robbins, Roxie A. Roddy, Sharon L. Rodriguez, Joseph V. Rodriguez, Robert G. Rollings, Frank Romero, Richard M. Rosenthal, John G. Rossi, Ann Rubin, Vito Ruggiero, Ronald S. Sadora, Carlos E. Salazar, Priscilla B. Samson, Debra D. Sanchez, Robert Sanchez, Mark A. Sands, Jessie G. Santos, Ymelda Sasseen, William P. Shea, James E. Sheldon, Raymond J. Shipley, James N. Shows, Frank R. Silkwood, Deborah L. Sitlington, William H. Slaton, Charlotte C. Sluder, Gladys L. Snowden, Thomas I. Sorrels, Dennis E. Spain, Vivienne Steele, William H. Stephens, John W. Strandberg, Barry R. Stratton, Cathy D. Stratton, Belinda A. Sturz, Mick Suarez, Cindy J. Sulistio, Arturо L. Tabios, Jaime E. Tagle, George V. Taylor, John S. Telles, Dominic A.
Thomas, Mia P. Thompson, Betty A. Todd, Rebecca M. Upton, Maria Suzette Vaccaro, James T. Vanhorn, Dana P. Vanorman, Joan C. Vincent, Warren E. Voss, Lula M. Wall, Vincent K. Warren, Bobby Lee Washington, Stephanie Renee Washington, James A. Wathen, II, Irma Weaver, Francis E. Whalen, Jr., Elvira A. White, Mary A. Wicker, Walter Gene Wilkerson, Merle A. Wilkison, Brenda G. Williams, Ervin Williams, Jr., Greg F. Wolfslau, Robert C. Woolfork, Rodney A. Wright, and Stanley E. Zubas, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-5016.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
DECIDED: October 17, 2002.
Steven R. Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, of Tulsa Oklahoma, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.
Kevin W. McArdle, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-aрpellee. With him on the brief were Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; and Todd M. Hughes, Assistant Director.
Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Donald O'Connor, et al., (collectively "appellants") appeal from the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. O'Connor v. United States,
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Appellants are employees of the Defense Contract Management District of the West ("DCMDW" or "the agency"),1 id. at 286, who seek compensation, liquidated damages, interest, attorney fees, and costs for overtime allegedly worked in violation of § 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1994). Appellants are represented exclusively by the American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE" or "the union"), local bargaining unit 2433 ("local 2433"), and certain terms of their employment are therefore governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") executed between the agency and the DCMDW Council of AFGE Locals, including local 2433. Id. at 287. Under § 7121(a)(1) of the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2000), all such CBAs are required to include procedures "for the settlement of grievances." Id. § 7121(a)(1). With certain exceptions that do not apply here, the CSRA provides that these negotiated grievance procedures are to "be the exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances which fall within its coverage." Id. (emphasis added). The statute further states that "any grievance not satisfactorily settled under the negotiated grievance procedure shall be subject to binding arbitration." Id. § 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii). The CSRA explicitly defines "grievance" to include complaints "by any employee, labor organization, or agency concerning ... any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law ... affecting conditions of employment." Id. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii). Although § 7121(c) of the statute excludes certain matters from the application of the grievance procedures, overtime claims under the FLSA are not among them. See id. § 7121(c).
As required by the CSRA, the CBA at issue here contains grievance procedures for the "prompt and equitable settlement of grievances between the parties" to the agreement. Consistent with the CSRA, the CBA defines "grievance" broadly to include complaints based upon "the interpretation or application of any law ... with respect to ... matters affecting conditions of employment." The CBA further provides that unless a matter is explicitly excluded from the application of the negotiated grievance procedures, these procedures are to be "the exclusive procedure available to bargaining unit employee(s) for the resolution of grievances." (emphasis added). Although the CSRA specifically permits a CBA to exclude any matter from the application of the grievance procedures that the negotiating parties see fit, see id. § 7121(a)(2), appellants' CBA does not list FLSA overtime claims in Article 36, Section 4, "Matters Excluded." Finally, appellants' CBA states that if the local bargaining unit representative is not satisfied with the results of the grievance procedures, it may request that the matter be taken to arbitration. As required by the CSRA, the arbitrator's decision is to be binding upon the parties.
From 1997 through early 1999, eleven AFGE locals, including local 2433, filed substantively identical grievances against the agency alleging that it had violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime to all bargaining unit members occupying positions at the GS-9 grade level and above. See O'Connor,
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any оf his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000). The FLSA further provides that an individual whose employer violates § 207 is entitled to the unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, attorney fees, and costs. Id. § 216(b). An employee may bring suit for a § 207 violation in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction. Id.
On July 14, 1999, the parties entered into a global settlement agreement ("settlement agreement") resolving the eleven locals' overtime grievances against the agency. O'Connor,
Almost a year later, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that the agency had violated § 207 of the FLSA. Id. The court dismissed appellant's complaint on the ground that § 7121(a)(1) of the CSRA deprived the court of jurisdiction. Id. at 293. As stated above, § 7121(a)(1) provides that the negotiated grievance procedures contained in a CBA shall be, with certain exceptions, "the exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances that fall within [the CBA's] coverage." 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). The word "administrative" was added to the statute by Congress in 1994, and it forms the heart of the jurisdictional debate in this case. Prior to the 1994 amendment, § 7121(a)(1) provides simply that a CBA's negotiated grievance procedures would be "the exclusive procedures for resolving grievances which fall within [a CBA's coverage]." 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). In Carter v. Gibbs,
In the instant case, the Court of Federal Claims held that Congress's addition of the word "administrative" to § 7121(a)(1) did not overrule Carter and thus does not allow federal employees to bring an action in court when their grievances are subject to the negotiated proсedures contained in a CBA. See O'Connor,
The court went on, assuming arguendo that it possessed jurisdiction, to determine that the settlement agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction of the appellants' FLSA claims. Id. at 239. The court found that appellants had not raised a genuine issue of material fact that any of the elements of common law accord and satisfaction had not been satisfied. Id. at 294. Appellants argued that local 2433 was not a competent party to represent them in the agreement, citing Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,
Appellants appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II. DISCUSSION
A.
The Court of Federal Claims' decision to grant the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is a matter of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Muniz v. United States,
Appellants submit that the Court of Federal Claims erred when it held that § 7121(a)(1) deprived it of jurisdiction of appellants' claims. According to appellants, both the plain language and the legislative history of the statute indicate that Congress intended to overrule Carter by adding the word "administrative" to § 7121(a)(1) and that the availability of administrative redress under their CBA's negotiated grievance procedures therefore does not restrict their right to pursue a judicial remedy in court. The government responds that the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed appellants' claims for lack of jurisdiction because the addition of the word "administrative" did not affect the continuing applicability of Carter to appellants' case. The government argues that the structure of the statute, the remedial scheme established by § 7121, and the central purposes of the CSRA all counsel against reading the 1994 amendment to § 7121(a)(1) as allowing federal employees to press their grievances in court when they could seek an administrative remedy under their CBA's negotiated procedures.
Our holding in Mudge v. United States,
B.
We review de novo the court's grant, in the alternative, of partial summаry judgment in the government's favor on the issue of accord and satisfaction. See Glass v. United States,
"A claim is discharged by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction when `some performance different from that which was claimed as due is rendered and such substituted performance is accepted by the claimant as full satisfaction of his claim.'" Case, Inc. v. United States,
On appeal, appellants concede that the settlement agreement between the agency and the eleven AFGE locals, including local 2433, satisfies the four requirements of an accord and satisfaction. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Brooklyn Savings Bank, however, they argue that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction does not apply to claims brought under the FLSA and that the Court of Federal Claims therefore erred in holding that the doctrine barred appellants' action. Appellants also cite the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lynn's Food Stores for the proposition that employees cannot settle back wage claims arising under the FLSA without the supervision of either the Department of Labor ("DOL") or a court in the context of a stipulated judgment. Because the instant settlement agreement lacked such oversight, appellants assert that the settlement cannot compromise their FLSA claims or their right to pursue those claims in court. Finally, appellants argue that even if the settlement agreement constitutes a valid accord and satisfaction, it is binding only upon the union and not upon the individual employees whom the union represents.
The government responds that the settlement agreement satisfied the four elements required for a valid accord and satisfaction and that the Court of Claims' grant of partial summary judgment was therefore correct. The government argues that appellants' reliance on Brooklyn Savings and Lynn's Food Stores is misplaced because those were private sector cases that consequently did not address the compromise of a federal employee's FLSA rights under the CSRA. According to the government, the CSRA authorized the local bargaining unit representatives to release their members' FLSA claims by first defining the term "grievance" sufficiently broadly to encompass those claims and then providing for the settlement of such grievances by the locals. The government therefore asserts that the agreement not to arbitrate contained in the settlement agreement between local 2433 and the agency precludеs appellants from pursuing their FLSA claims in court.
We conclude that the parties' settlement agreement constitutes a valid accord and satisfaction, and we therefore affirm the court's decision granting partial summary judgment in the government's favor on the issue. As a preliminary matter, appellants' argument that any accord and satisfaction is binding only upon the union and not upon the individual employees lacks merit. Appellants do not contest that local 2433 is their exclusive bargaining unit representative. See O'Connor,
We are similarly unconvinced by appellants' reliance on Brooklyn Savings. In Brooklyn Savings, the Supreme Court held that a private employee could not waive or release his FLSA rights to liquidated damages. See Brooklyn Sav.,
The [FLSA] was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce To accomplish this purрose standards of minimum wages and maximum hours were provided.... No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act. We are of the opinion that the same policy considerations which forbid waiver of basic minimum and overtime wages under the Act also prohibit waiver of the employee's right to liquidated damages.
Id. at 706-07,
Notably, Brooklyn Savings did not address the question of whether an employee's rights under § 216(b) of the FLSA could be the subject of a valid accord and satisfaction. Unlike the instant case, none of the three cases considered in Brooklyn Savings involvеd a settlement executed between an employer and employee as the result of a bona fide dispute as to the coverage of the FLSA.3 Instead, the Court specifically left open the question of the validity of such a settlement. See Brooklyn Sav.,
Brooklyn Savings and Schulte therefore stand for the principle that a private sector employee cannot waive or release his right to back wage compensation and liquidated damages under the FLSA. They are inapposite to the instant case, however, which presents the question of whether a federal employee who, pursuant to the CSRA, is represented exclusively by a union and subject to a CBA, may legitimately relinquish his or her FLSA rights as part of an accord and satisfaction. As the Supreme Court has held, private sector law is not controlling in the context of federal labor controversies. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263,
Nor does the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lynn's Food Stores lead us to conclude that appellants' settlement agreement did not constitute a valid accord and satisfaction. In that case, the DOL found that Lynn's Food, a private sector employer, had violated the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions and that it was therefore liable to its employees for back wages and liquidated damages. See Lynn's Food Stores,
Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon both the language of the FLSA and the policy considerations underlying the Suprеme Court's decision in Brooklyn Savings and Schulte in affirming the district court. "Recognizing that there are often great inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees, Congress made the FLSA's provisions mandatory; thus, the provisions are not subject to negotiation or bargaining between employers and employees." Id. at 1352 (citing Brooklyn Sav.,
As discussed above, private sector law is not dispositive of federal labor disputes. And as discussed above, the policy concerns driving the court's decision in Lynn's Food Stores are not present in the context of a settlement agreement negotiated pursuant to the CSRA and a CBA. To the contrary, the CSRA encourages federal employees to participate in labor unions in order to avoid exactly the sort of unjust arrangements experienced by Lynn's Food's employees by attaining an equal bargaining position vis-à-vis their employers. Moreover, appellants direct our attention to nothing in the case law or the relevant statutes suggesting that settlement agreements executed between federal employees and their employers pursuant to the CSRA and an applicable CBA are subject to the same supervisory requirements as are settlement agreements in the private sector.
In Carter, this court held that "[u]nder the CSRA ... the rights of a unionized federal employee are consolidated within the four corners of the collective agreement." Carter,
CONCLUSION
The court erred in dismissing the appellants' complaint for lack of jurisdiction; we therefore reverse the court's dismissal. However, we affirm the court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the government on the ground of accord and satisfaction. Accordingly, we REVERSE-IN-PART, AFFIRM-IN-PART, and REMAND.
No costs.
Notes:
Notes
The DCMDW is a district of the Defense Contract Management Agency ("DCMA"), which was formerly the Defense Contract Management Command ("DCMC")O'Connor,
Brooklyn Savings dealt with three cases, all of which raised similar questions relating to the interpretation of § 216(b) of the FLSA. See
We note that there is some ambiguity in the record as to whether the dispute between appellants and the agency concerns the legal question of FLSA coverage or the factual issue of the amount of compensation and damages allegedly owed. As this question is not essential to our disposition of the case, however, we do not address it further