*3 up steps, or walk more than forty fifty to TJOFLAT, Before WILSON and B. yards at a time. Pneumatic knew about FLETCHER*, Judges. Circuit Maynard’s condition, back and the limita- PER CURIAM: by tions caused his condition. sponte sua Upon reconsideration of this Pneumatic terminated em- appeal, prior opinion, pub- we vacate our ployment 22, on March 1996. Pneumatic (11th Cir.2000),
lished at
enclosed
706(e)
(Court
Civil
of Title VII
days.
Section
five
it within
return
should
2000e-5(e)
§
Act of
U.S.C.
2).
right
Rights
to sue
receiving
After
Exh.
12117(a);
(1994);
Love
for viola-
42 U.S.C.
letter,
Pneumatic
Maynard sued
Co.,
Florida Civil
404 U.S.
92 S.Ct.
ADA
Pullman
tions of
(1972) (“A
seq. 616,
person
et
Act,
ch. 760.01
Fla. Stat.
30 L.Ed.2d
Rights
(1997).
trial,
at vari-
a violation of
Pneumatic
claiming
aggrieved
Prior to
to be
and for
Rights
to dismiss
Act of 1964
motions
of the Civil
times' raised
Title VII
ous
all were denied.3
a suit for redress
summary judgment,
...
not maintain
first
court until he has
federal district
jury
proceeded
claim
*4
certain avenues of
unsuccessfully pursued
Pneu-
trial,
granted
court
arid
relief.”); Zillyette
potential administrative
verdict fol-
for a
matic’s motion
directed
Corp.,
Fin.
179 F.3d
Capital
One
case.
plaintiffs
of
lowing
presentation
the
(“It
(11th Cir.1999)
is
law
settled
1339
on the fact that
district court relied
ADA,
that,
plaintiffs must com-
under the
timely
charge was not
EEOC
Maynard’s
procedural requirements
ply
the
with
same
time barred.
filed,
claims were
hence his
Title
of
Civil
to sue as exist under
VII
the
May-
stated that
Alternatively, the court
1964.”).
plaintiff
An ADA
Rights Act of
that he had a dis-
to establish
nard failed
proving
of
all conditions
has the burden
ADA.
meaning of the
ability within the
suit,
filing
including
con-
precedent to
the
rulings.
Maynard appeals both
timely filed with the EEOC.
dition that he
II. DISCUSSION
R.R.
v. Seaboard Coast Line
See Jackson
(11th Cir.1982)
Co.,
992, 1011
678 F.2d
novo the
review de
We
(“[T]he
firing
complaint
of an EEOC
timely
as a matter of
grant
to a
precedent
is a condition
Title VII
law,
light
in the
most
and view all evidence
action”).
Maynard,
the non-movant.
favorable to
Stores, Inc.,
v. Wal-Mart
See Wideman
Ordinarily,
plaintiff
an ADA
(11th Cir.1998).
1453, 1454
an
charge complaining
file a
about
must
employment practice
allegedly unlawful
deciding, as
Assuming without
(the
180
“charge”) with the EEOC within
did,
May
that
initially
the district court
practice,
42
days
employment
see
case of dis
prima
out a
facie
nard made
2000e-5(e)(l) (1994),
peri
§
but
U.S.C.
the
de
an issue we
ability,
only
address
may
a
the
firing charge
od for
with
EEOC
opinion—
original
to reach in our
clined
if
days
complainant
to
the
be extended
charge
his
Maynard timely filed
charge in a
local
timely
first files a
state or
filing
charge
Timely
with
EEOC.
in a “deferral state.” Id. Deferral
bringing
agency
to
prerequisite
is a
discrimination
Maynard
that
failed
Pneumatic continu-
affirmative defense
3.
It should be noted that
ously
precedent
contested the
for
ADA
timeliness
meet
condition
an
filing. Maynard
initial com-
in his
asserted
part
at Based in
based action.
Id.
on
plaint
had
a claim
issue,
that he
filed
filed a
for
timeliness
motion
Pneumatic
Com-
1996. See
FCHR on November
summary judgment,
which was denied
Trial,
Jury
January
plaint and
Demand
Summary
Motion for
court. See Defendant's
1998, ¶
(Tab 1).
answer con-
Pneumatic's
1998, 6, ¶
(Tab
at
Judgment, October
2-3
knowledge
they were "without
cluded
10).
quite
After
a bit of back and
be-
forth
Maynard's assertion on
therefore denied”
parties to the case and some initial
tween the
and Affir-
point.
Answer
See Defendant's
this
dates,
documentation and
confusion about the
(Tab
Defenses,
2at
mative
March
the district court denied the motion.
5).
as its third
Pneumatic
asserted
further
prohibit
states are those that
the unlawful
charge
filed his
of dis
Florida,
crimination in
employment practice
state,
issue and have
a deferral
but
he
charge
never filed a
state or local authorities to
with Florida’s
established
state
agency, the Florida
practice.
or seek relief for such
Commission on Hu
706(c)
(“FCHR”);
man Relations
VII,
he instead al
Section
of Title
42 U.S.C.
leges that he filed
2000e-(e)(l).
charge directly
his
2000e-5(c);
§
§
42 U.S.C.
In.
EEOC,
days
after Pneumatic ter
states,
deferral
“no
be filed
minated him.
awkward filing
person ag-
[with the
EEOC]...
him
left
with two important hurdles to
grieved
expiration
sixty days
before the
jump before he could be deemed to have
after
have been commenced
first,
filed his
charge;
to be
law,
under the
or local
State
unless such
entitled to the 300-day filing period, as
proceedings have been earlier terminat-
opposed to
180-day
period
usual
2000e-5(c).
ed....”
42 U.S.C.
This
(which, importantly,
missed),
he
gives
agencies
the deferral state
notice of
prove
needed to
that he filed
alleged
opportu-
and an
discrimination
with the FCHR before the
day
300th
fol
nity
investigate
allegations
before
*5
lowing
Second,
his termination.
since he
agency gets
the federal
involved. See
filed more than
days after
240
his termi
Co.,
EEOC v. Commercial
Prod.
486
Office
nation, he
prove
needed to
that the FCHR
1666,
U.S.
108 S.Ct.
100 L.Ed.2d
proceedings
terminated its
filing
on his
(1988) (The sixty-day
96
period
deferral
day
before the 300th
following his termi
706(c)
§
give
included
“to
States
nation. To
determine whether
and
opportunity
localities an
to combat
filing
filing
EEOC
constituted a
premature
discrimination free from
federal
FCHR, and whether the FCHR terminat
”). Thus,
intervention
...
in deferral
proceedings
ed its
day,
before the 300th
states,
complainant
either a
must file with
would, ordinarily,
look to the EEOC
agency by
day
the state
the 240th
after the
worksharing
FCHR
agreement.
act,
discriminatory
agency
or the state
agreement’s
The
language would deter
proceedings by
must terminate
the 300th
mine whether
filing with the
day on a charge
day.
filed after the 240th
constituted a simultaneous
Silver,
807,
Corp.
See Mohasco
v.
447 U.S.
See,
e.g., Puryear
the FCHR.
v.
2486,
(1980).
100 S.Ct.
will
Thus,
worksharing agreement provides
receives....
FCHR
originally
charges
agent
the [workshar-
terms of
is the FCHR’s
that the EEOC
express
under
by filing
plaintiff,
a
agreement],
receiving complaints, and that
ing
purposes
EEOC,
thereby com-
charges with
constructively terminates its
the FCHR
the [state
with both
proceedings
mences
receives
when the EEOC
EEOC.”); Bolinsky, 69
and the
agency]
period.
deferral
during
filed
(“[B]ecause
plaintiffs
F.Supp.2d at 847
earlier,
plaintiff
ADA
bears
As stated
an
automatically com-
the EEOC
filing with
that he
filed
proving
the burden
proceed-
the state
menced and terminated
EEOC; Maynard did
charge with
fifing with the
charge, his
ings on his
proof, as he
this burden of
not sustain
of his
exhaustion
a sufficient
EEOC was
necessary
EEOC-
failed to enter
remedies.”).
state law
worksharing agreement
into the
FCHR
language also would
agreement’s
Therefore,
ap-
the district court
record.
construc
the FCHR
determine
granted judgment as matter
propriately
See,
Maynard’s fifing.
tively terminated
favor.
of law in Pneumatic’s
Chems., Inc.,
Air Prod. &
e.g.,
Griffin
(examin
(11th Cir.1989)
F.2d
III. CONCLUSION
the EEOC-FCHR
version of
ing an earlier
in its
prior opinion is vacated
entire-
Our
determining
worksharing agreement,
ty
holding
limit
this case to
and we
our
worksharing
EEOC-FCHR
“the
Maynard failed
deciding that Donald
‘con
instantaneous
agreement created an
”
timely filed his EEOC
*6
pro
prove that he
of the FCHR
termination’
structive
n. 4
Unfortunately, neither trial, Maynard At made out his ration. peal made the crucial EEOC-FCHR reasons, I case. For these prima facie part of the rec- worksharing agreement reverse the only would Maynard, ord. could demonstrate fact, judgment as a matter law to Pneumatic cative the district court’s failure to Products and remand. judicial take notice of agreement an abuse of discretion. A. Timeliness Turning to the merits of ap- clear, majority As the makes peal, it agreement is clear from the that Maynard timely filed his discrimination receipt the EEOC’s of a complainant’s charge depends upon the terms of the charges automatically initiates proceedings Worksharing Agreement between the of both the EEOC and the FCHR. Para- and the majority up- FCHR. The graph agreement II.A. of the states that holds the district court’s aas agency each designates the other “as its matter of law Pneumatic Products be- agent purpose of receiving party cause neither agreement made the drafting charges.” FCHR-EEOC Works- part agreement of the record. The creates haring Agreement for Fiscal Year 1997 prescribe rules of law that the circum- ¶ added). II A. (emphasis That paragraph filing stances under which agency one also explicitly states that receipt “EEOC’s filing Thus, constitutes with the other. charges on the FEPA’s1 behalf will auto- fact agreement that the was not entered matically initiate the of both irrelevant; into the record is it is the ¶ EEOC and the FEPA.” (empha- Id. II.A. duty district court’s to identify and inter- added). sis agreement also conclu- pret necessary the sources of law for de- sively establishes that ciding the case before it. with the only EEOC not automatically ini- clear, however, It is if even tiated proceedings FCHR, but agreement adjudicative is an fact rather instantaneously also constructively termi- law, than thing is the sort of of which proceedings. nated the FCHR Paragraph judicial district court could have taken agreement III.A.I. of the states that “[f]or 201(b) (“A judi- notice. See Fed.R.Evid. charges originally received the EEOC cially subject noticed fact must be one not initially processed to be by the and/or (1) dispute to reasonable in that it is either EEOC, the FEPA right waives its of ex- generally jur- known within the territorial *7 jurisdiction clusive initially process such (2) isdiction of the trial court or capable of charges for a period days of 60 for the ready and accurate determination re- purpose allowing proceed the accuracy sort to sources whose cannot rea- immediately with the processing of such sonably questioned.”). Although judi- be charges day.” before the 61st Id. cial is not mandatory notice unless it is ¶ III.A.I. This Court has held that virtual- requested by party a supplies who the ly language previous identical in a Works- information, court necessary a haring Agreement between the EEOC and judicial court’s failure to take notice the FCHR “created an instantaneous ‘con- constitute an abuse of discretion even ” proceed- structive termination’ of FCHR party requests when no such notice. See Chems., ings. v. Air Prods. & Griffin (d). 201(c), case, id. In May- this whether Inc., (11th Cir.1989). charges timely nard’s were depends filed Here, the Maynard’s EEOC received entirely language on the of the agreement, charges day within the 300 limit. FCHR a readily document that is available either automatically were from the or from initiated FCHR the Florida divi- that, sions of I Maynard’s the EEOC. would hold terminated concurrent with assuming agreement that adjudi- filing. the is an properly The EEOC considered The FCHR agreement. refers to itself as "FEPA" in the sense and life jury’s good common juris- The timely; accepted ability to gave I them sufficient right-to-sue experiences letter. a and issued
diction impairment court’s conclu- that determine reverse would condition, to establish had failed Maynard the “[sjignificantly restrict[s]... sion that timely filing. can [he] or duration under which manner activity as particular major a life perform Facie Case B. Prima condition, manner, or du- to the compared affirmed the opinion, we prior In our in average person ration under which to Pneumatic court’s district population perform can general Maynard had ground that Products on the major activity.” life 29 C.F.R. same facie case of prima out a to make failed 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). the ADA. in violation of discrimination charges filed his Corp., 233 Pneumatic Prods.
Maynard v. trial, At he and the FCHR. the EEOC Cir.2000). so, doing In we F.3d 1344 of discrimi- prima out his facie case made erred. Therefore, ADA. in violation of the nation person determine whether In order to I would reverse ADA, meaning within is disabled Pneu- judgment as a matter of law to (1) three issues: whether must decide remand for retrial. matic Products and (2) impairment, physical has a person Accordingly, I dissent. person claims the activities whether impair substantially limited are activit[ies],” (3) “major life are
ment actually does sub impairment major any life activities.
stantially limit Abbott, 524 U.S.
Bragdon v. (1998). 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct. 1994, Maynard suffered a herniated In LAURIE, Lindsey, Jackie Barbara By at work. March disc in his back while Plaintiffs-Appellants, disk, 1996, as a result of the herniated not lift more than fourteen could well, sleep sit a chair for more pounds, AP- ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL time, twenty at a than fifteen to minutes PEALS, Taylor, official Sam at a for more than fifteen minutes stand capacity, Defendants- and individual waist, time, up steps, at the run or bend Appellees. forty fifty yards than or walk more *8 Previously, we held that time. 00-11333, Nos. 00-11639. prima facie case failed to establish his Appeals, States Court of United present he failed to evidence because Eleventh Circuit. average person popula- in the how far the Maynard, 233 F.3d at tion can walk. July simply That conclusion was 1347-48.. no
wrong. Although offered average person in the
proof of how far the walk, impair- can
general population obviously substantially limiting
ment is so present comparator no
that he needed part of his facie prima
evidence as case.