302 Mass. 393 | Mass. | 1939
This is an action for the conversion of an automobile truck by the defendant, who held a note secured by a mortgage upon the truck. The parties agreed that the note and mortgage were executed and delivered upon November 12, 1931; that the mortgage was duly recorded; and that the plaintiff had possession of the truck until December 3, 1931, when it was taken from him by the defendant who, on the next day, gave the plaintiff written notice of a foreclosure sale of the truck for breach of conditions of the mortgage. The mortgage was conditioned upon the payment of the plaintiff’s note in monthly instalments, the first of which would become due on December 12, 1931; the maintenance by the plaintiff of insurance against fire in not less than a certain sum for the benefit of the mortgagee; the prevention of waste or
In order to maintain this action for conversion it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he had a complete property in the truck, either general or special, and that at the time of the taking by the defendant he had actual possession or the right to its immediate possession. Bacon v. George, 206 Mass. 566. Judkins v. Tuller, 277 Mass. 247. Handy v. C. I. T. Corp. 291 Mass. 157. Standard Plumbing Supply Co. v. Gulesian, 297 Mass. 214. He was entitled to the full use and possession of the truck even as against the mortgagee so long as he observed the terms of the mortgage. If the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of the mortgage when the truck was taken by the defendant, then such a taking constituted a conversion. Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179. Downey v. Bay State Street Railway, 225 Mass. 281. Glassman v. Ficksman, 238 Mass. 580.
The taking of the truck by the defendant was undisputed but the parties were at issue as to the legality of taking. The conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant’s attorney when a demand was made for the return of the truck could be considered by the jury as indicative of the reason why the truck was taken. The failure of the attorney to claim that there had been a breach of any condition of the mortgage was evidence that the truck was not taken because of any such breach and that no such breach existed. These were questions of fact, the decision of which depended upon the credibility of the witnesses, even if their evidence was uncontradicted. It can rarely be ruled that oral testimony is sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. Giles v. Giles, 204 Mass. 383. Coleman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 215 Mass. 45. McDonough v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 228 Mass. 450. Eddy v. Johnston, 250 Mass. 299.
Exceptions sustained.