Don M. Tellock, Petitioner

Jul 20, 2026

10402-23

Don M. Tellock, pro se.

Sharmila J. Porter and Mimi M. Wong, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FUNG, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 121.¹ In this collection due process (CDP) case petitioner seeks review pursuant to section 6330(d)(1) of a Supplemental Notice of Determination Concerning IRS Collection Actions under Internal Revenue Code Sections 6320 or 6330 (Supplemental Notice of Determination) issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) Independent Office of Appeals (Appeals Office). The Appeals Office upheld a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Rights to a Hearing (Levy Notice) relating to petitioner’s tax liabilities for tax years 2016 and 2017. Respondent has since conceded petitioner’s 2017 tax liability in full, so the proposed levy action for 2017 is moot, and we will dismiss the case as it relates to 2017.

See Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1, 8 (2006) (“Inasmuch as the proposed levy is moot, [the taxpayer] has no independent basis to challenge the existence or amount of her underlying tax liability in this proceeding.”). As for tax year 2016, respondent contends that no material facts are in dispute and that the Appeals settlement officer (AO) did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the Levy Notice. We agree and will grant respondent’s Motion.

Background

We derive the following facts from the parties’ pleadings, the parties’ Motion papers, and the certified Administrative Record of the CDP proceedings. See Rules 93, 121(j). We state these facts solely to decide respondent’s Motion and not as findings of fact in this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). When he timely filed his Petition, petitioner listed a mailing address in Louisiana and his state of legal residence as Florida.²

I. Petitioner’s Unpaid Tax Liabilities

Petitioner did not file income tax returns for tax years 2016 and 2017. For each tax year, respondent prepared a Substitute for Return (SFR),³ later assessing tax due, additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a), and statutory interest. On November 2, 2020, respondent issued petitioner a Notice of Deficiency for tax year 2017. On October 12, 2021, respondent issued petitioner a Notice of Deficiency for tax year 2016. Petitioner did not petition the Tax Court for redetermination in response to either Notice of Deficiency.

II. The Initial CDP Proceeding

On December 15, 2022, respondent issued petitioner the Levy Notice, informing petitioner of his right to request a CDP hearing with the Appeals Office. On January 13, 2023, petitioner submitted Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, for tax years 2016 and 2017. On Form 12153 petitioner stated that he was “not liable for the amount of the taxes assessed” and did not propose or select any collection alternatives.

On February 22, 2023, the AO acknowledged petitioner’s request for a CDP hearing and scheduled the hearing for March 23, 2023, explaining that the hearing was petitioner’s opportunity to state his reasons for disagreeing with the Levy Notice. The AO provided petitioner 21 days to file returns for tax years 2016 through 2021 to establish compliance with his income tax filing obligations. Petitioner did not submit any returns by that deadline.

On March 23, 2023, petitioner did not participate in the CDP hearing. That same day, the AO sent petitioner a letter allowing an additional 14 days to provide the requested information and requesting that petitioner contact him by April 6, 2023. On April 7, 2023, petitioner contacted the AO, confirmed receipt of the AO’s letter, and rescheduled the hearing for April 27, 2023. Petitioner still did not submit any requested information by the extended deadline.

On April 27, 2023, petitioner participated in the initial CDP hearing and stated that he disagreed with the Levy Notice. Petitioner told the AO that he had prepared returns for tax years 2016 and 2017 and intended to mail them. The AO advised petitioner that he would forward any returns received for reconsideration. Petitioner also requested an offer-in-compromise (OIC) or an installment agreement (IA). The AO explained that he could not consider any collection alternatives because petitioner was not in compliance with his filing obligations for tax years 2018 through 2021. The AO reminded petitioner that he had several prior opportunities to submit the requested information. But petitioner did not submit any information.

On May 12, 2023, petitioner faxed his 2016 and 2017 returns to the AO, who forwarded them to respondent immediately. Respondent, however, did not receive the returns until after the AO had already issued a Notice of Determination. On May 23, 2023, the AO issued petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Actions under IRS Sections 6320 or 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code (Initial Notice of Determination), sustaining the Levy Notice for tax years 2016 and 2017.

III. The Post-CDP Proceeding Adjustment

On June 2, 2023, respondent accepted petitioner’s filed 2016 and 2017 returns showing his reported tax liabilities. Respondent accordingly abated petitioner’s prior tax assessments, as reported on respondent’s SFRs, to the tax liabilities reported on petitioner’s filed returns and made corresponding abatements to additions to tax and statutory interest for tax years 2016 and 2017.

For tax year 2017, petitioner’s remaining balance was $299.45, consisting solely of collection fees and expenses of $275, incurred before he filed his 2017 return, plus statutory interest of $24.45 on that amount for collection fees and expenses. The table below reflects the resulting changes in petitioner’s tax liability:

Date	Assessment Per	Tax Deficiency	Additions to Tax			Statutory Interest	Collection Fees and Expenses
Date	Assessment Per	Tax Deficiency	Section 6651(a)(1) Failure to Timely File	Section 6651(a)(2) Failure to Timely Pay	Section 6654(a) Failure to Make Estimated Tax Payments	Statutory Interest	Collection Fees and Expenses
3/15/2021	Respondent’s 2017 SFR	$36,594	$8,233.65	$4,208.31	$876.14	$6,561.06	$275
2/12/2024	Petitioner’s 2017 Filed Tax Return	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	24.45	275

IV. The Initial Tax Court Proceeding

On June 26, 2023, petitioner timely petitioned this Court for review of the Initial Notice of Determination. On February 14, 2024, respondent filed a Motion to Remand because the AO had relied on certain transcripts during the CDP hearing but did not keep those transcripts in the administrative file. On February 21, 2024, the Court granted respondent’s Motion to Remand, ordering that the Appeals Office conduct a supplemental CDP hearing with petitioner by May 21, 2024.

V. The Supplemental CDP Hearing

On April 25, 2024, before the supplemental CDP hearing, the AO reviewed petitioner’s tax transcripts and confirmed that petitioner had filed returns for 2016 and 2017 and that the remaining tax liabilities reflected those filed returns. On May 20, 2024, petitioner participated in the supplemental CDP hearing and requested consideration of a collection alternative. The AO again advised petitioner that he could not consider any collection alternatives because petitioner was not in compliance with his filing obligations for years 2018 through 2023. Petitioner did not provide the AO with any of the compliance and financial information previously requested. The AO set a new deadline of June 13, 2024, for petitioner to submit returns for 2018 through 2023. The AO also advised petitioner that failure to comply would result in a determination based on the information in the administrative file. Petitioner did not submit the requested returns by the deadline. On July 18, 2024, respondent issued petitioner the Supplemental Notice of Determination, sustaining the Levy Notice for tax years 2016 and 2017.

VI. Further Tax Court Proceedings

On May 2, 2025, respondent filed the Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 30, 2025, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Opposition). In his Opposition petitioner argued that (1) the AO abused his discretion by refusing to review petitioner’s tax transcripts and petitioner’s request for an OIC or an IA as his settlement offer; (2) paragraphs 51 and 52 of respondent’s Motion, which describe conversations between the AO and petitioner about collection alternatives and filing requirements, are not true; (3) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether respondent may assess fees and interest accrued during the 16-month delay caused by respondent’s Motion for Remand; and (4) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether respondent may assess interest accrued on a tax assessment for 2017 when petitioner’s tax liability for that year is now zero.

On December 19, 2025, respondent filed a Notice of Concession, conceding that petitioner owes no tax, fees, expenses, interest, penalty, or additions to tax for 2017.⁴ On December 24, 2025, petitioner filed a Status Report (1) restating the arguments in his Opposition; (2) asking this Court to order respondent to withdraw the tax lien for 2017 and notify credit reporting bureaus of respondent’s error and the lien’s withdrawal to mitigate damage to petitioner’s credit; and (3) providing the Court a copy of his Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement.⁵

Discussion

I. General Principles

A. Summary Judgment

Under Rule 121(a)(1), either party can move for summary judgment on all or any part of the legal issues in controversy. FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001). Summary judgment is a tool that expedites litigation to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Id. This Court grants summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and they are entitled to a decision as a matter of law. Rule 121(a)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Roberts v. Commissioner, 329 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Rule 121), aff’g in part 118 T.C. 365 (2002); Sundstrand, 98 T.C. at 520.

To decide a summary judgment motion, we construe factual materials and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Roberts v. Commissioner, 329 F.3d at 1227; Sundstrand, 98 T.C. at 520. If the moving party makes and properly supports their summary judgment motion, then the nonmovant cannot rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings. Rule 121(d). Instead, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id.; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24; United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We apply the same summary judgment standard in tax cases as we do in other areas of law.”). Because no genuine dispute of material fact exists in this case, summary judgment is appropriate.

B. Standard of Review

Section 6330(d)(1) grants this Court jurisdiction to review an IRS administrative determination in a CDP case. See Redeker-Barry v. United States, 476 F.3d 1189, 1190 (11th Cir. 2007); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). However, the Court generally cannot consider issues that were not raised during a CDP hearing. See Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 114 (2007). When this Court remands a case to the Appeals Office, the resulting hearing supplements the taxpayer’s original CDP hearing, rather than replacing it. Kelby, 130 T.C. at 86 (“The resulting section 6330 hearing on remand provides the parties with the opportunity to complete the initial section 6330 hearing while preserving the taxpayer’s right to receive judicial review of the ultimate administrative determination.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Drake v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-151, 2006 WL 2052889, at *11, supplementing 125 T.C. 201 (2005), aff’d, 511 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2007))). We therefore review the administrative position reflected in the Supplemental Notice of Determination. Kelby, 130 T.C. at 86–87; Drake v. Commissioner, 2006 WL 2052889, at *11.

Section 6330(d)(1) does not prescribe a standard of review for this Court to apply. See Goza, 114 T.C. at 181–82. We instead look to our precedents for the general parameters of judicial review in a CDP case. See Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza, 114 T.C. at 181–82. Where the taxpayer properly challenges the underlying tax liability, we review the IRS’s determination de novo. Sego, 114 T.C. at 610; Goza, 114 T.C. at 181–82. Where the taxpayer does not properly dispute the underlying tax liability, we review for abuse of discretion, which we find only if the AO acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact or law. Goza, 114 T.C. at 182; Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999); see also Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006).

II. Underlying Tax Liabilities

In CDP proceedings a taxpayer may challenge the underlying tax liability only if (1) he did not receive a statutory Notice of Deficiency; or (2) he has not otherwise had an opportunity to do so. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 9 (2004). Neither situation occurred in this case.

Respondent issued petitioner a Notice of Deficiency for each of tax years 2016 and 2017. Each Notice of Deficiency afforded petitioner the opportunity to contest his underlying tax liability with the Court; however, petitioner did not file a petition in response to either Notice of Deficiency. Petitioner’s failure to do so precluded him from later raising such a liability challenge with the Appeals Office. See Estate of Duncan v. Commissioner, 890 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2018) (referencing section 6330(c)(2)(B)), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2016-204. For the same reason, he is precluded from contesting his tax liabilities before this Court now.

In his Opposition petitioner contends that fees and interest accrued during the intervening remand period should be abated for tax year 2016. Interest on an underpayment of tax begins to accrue when the tax is both due and unpaid, and the interest continues to accrue until paid. See I.R.C. § 6601(a); see also FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. United States, 483 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The Internal Revenue Code renders a taxpayer liable for underpayment interest on ‘any amount of tax . . . [that] is not paid’ until such time as the amount in question is paid.” (quoting I.R.C. § 6601(a))); Avon Prods., Inc. v. United States, 588 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[I]nterest shall begin running when a tax becomes both due and unpaid.”); Intel Corp. & Consol. Subs. v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 90, 92 (1998) (“Section 6601(a) provides that interest shall be paid on the amount of tax not paid on or before the last date prescribed for payment for the period from such last date to the date paid.”), supplementing 100 T.C. 616 (1993). Simply stated, petitioner owes interest because he did not pay his tax liability when due and as he reported it for 2016. After petitioner filed his 2016 tax return, seven years late, the IRS abated tax and interest per its SFR according to petitioner’s reported tax liability. The remand of petitioner’s case to the Appeals Office changed neither petitioner’s tax liability, nor his obligation to pay the resulting fees and interest.

Section 6404(e) authorizes the Secretary to abate interest attributable to unreasonable IRS errors or delays in performing a ministerial or managerial act. The record does not indicate that any IRS error or delay prevented petitioner from paying his tax liability. “[A] request for an abatement of interest and penalty pursuant to section 6404(e) and (f) [constitutes] a challenge to the existence of an underlying liability.” Salahuddin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-141, 2012 WL 1758628, at *5; see also Dick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-101, at *4–5 (“A request for abatement of additions to tax and interest constitutes a challenge to a taxpayer’s underlying liability.”). As discussed, petitioner cannot raise any underlying liability challenges in this proceeding, and his request for interest abatement at this stage does not change that conclusion.⁶

We therefore review the Supplemental Notice of Determination for abuse of discretion only.

III. Abuse of Discretion

In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we consider only whether the AO (1) properly verified that the requirements of applicable law or administrative procedure were met; (2) considered any relevant issues petitioner raised; and (3) weighed “whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of [petitioner] that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.” See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e), 301.6330-1(e). Matters raised after a hearing generally do not reflect whether the Commissioner’s determination was an abuse of discretion. Sego, 114 T.C. at 612. We agree that the AO satisfied all three requirements.

A. Verification

We have authority to review satisfaction of the verification requirement regardless of whether the taxpayer raised that issue at the CDP hearing. See Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197, 200–03 (2008), supplemented by 136 T.C. 463 (2011). Petitioner did not allege that the AO failed to satisfy this requirement or set forth specific facts to support such a claim. See Rule 331(b)(4) (“Any issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed to be conceded.”); Rockafellor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-160, at *12–13.

Although petitioner did not challenge verification at the CDP hearing or at any point during the CDP proceedings, the record nonetheless shows that the AO conducted a thorough review of the materials relevant to petitioner’s CDP hearing requests and verified that the requirements of all applicable laws and administrative procedure were followed. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1). Specifically, the AO verified that (1) respondent made a proper assessment; (2) respondent sent a notice and demand to petitioner’s last known address; (3) respondent issued a proper Levy Notice; and (4) petitioner owed tax. For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion concerning verification.

B. Issues Raised

At both the initial and supplemental CDP hearings petitioner requested collection alternatives, as he was entitled to do. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2) and (3). Petitioner contends that the AO abused his discretion by refusing to consider petitioner’s eligibility for an OIC or an IA. However, because petitioner failed to provide the requested documentation at either hearing, the AO could not consider any collection alternatives. See McLaine v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 228, 243 (2012).

An AO does not abuse his discretion by declining to consider an OIC where the taxpayer fails to submit the completed forms that such consideration requires. See Gentile v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-175, at *9, aff’d, 592 F. App’x 824 (11th Cir. 2014); Coleman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-51, 2010 WL 98529, at *4, aff’d, 420 F. App’x 663 (8th Cir. 2011). Once a taxpayer raises a collection alternative issue, as petitioner did here, he is obligated to provide the requested financial information to the Appeals Office. Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(e)(1) (“Taxpayers will be expected to provide all relevant information requested by Appeals, including financial statements, for [the AO’s] consideration of the facts and issues involved in the hearing.”). We have consistently held an AO does not abuse his discretion by proceeding with a case after receiving no response from the taxpayer. See Scholz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-2, at *8 (“When [an AO] gives a taxpayer an adequate period of time in which to respond, it is not an abuse of discretion for the [AO] to move ahead after encountering radio silence from the taxpayer.”).

Petitioner did not provide the requested forms or verification information, other than his 2016 and 2017 returns. In particular, petitioner never submitted tax returns for 2018 through 2023. The AO requested those returns repeatedly over the course of the CDP proceedings and explained his reason for doing so each time, informing petitioner that without them the AO could not determine his eligibility for any collection alternatives or other relief. Petitioner never provided the returns or any additional information. Accordingly, the AO did not abuse his discretion in declining to consider collection alternatives.

We note that petitioner had two separate opportunities to provide the documents necessary for the AO’s consideration of collection alternatives. See Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 114, 142 (2010) (“The taxpayer is always free to submit to IRS collection personnel another proposal of an installment agreement or an OIC, and those personnel have authority to accept that new proposal notwithstanding the Office of Appeals’ rejection of the taxpayer’s prior proposal.”), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012). At the initial CDP hearing, the AO told petitioner what documentation he needed to provide. Given a second chance at the supplemental CDP hearing, petitioner again failed to provide it. The AO’s decision to offer no collection alternatives and sustain the Levy Notice in the Supplemental Notice of Determination should not have surprised petitioner. See Palli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-54, at *20 (“Given that [the taxpayer] chose to squander his opportunity for a fresh look at his case on remand and did not provide the requested financial information to the Second AO, [the AO] did not abuse her discretion in rejecting [the taxpayer’s] request for an OIC and sustaining the levy.”).

In his Opposition petitioner argues that the AO abused his discretion by declining to review petitioner’s tax transcripts and by declining to consider petitioner’s request for a collection alternative such as an OIC or an IA. Petitioner also contends that certain paragraphs of respondent’s Motion are untrue because the AO “arbitrarily determined that he would not review the tax transcripts for the prior years to determine if it was even necessary for Petitioner to file any additional returns,” and that this factual dispute precludes summary judgment. We disagree. The Administrative Record shows that the AO requested information from petitioner to consider him for collection alternatives, mailed petitioner his tax transcripts to help him determine his filing obligations, and reviewed petitioner’s tax transcripts himself. This case was remanded to the Appeals Office only because the transcripts that the AO had reviewed during the initial CDP hearing were not included in the Administrative Record. Thereafter, the transcripts were included in the Administrative Record filed with the Court.

As we mentioned earlier, to consider any collection alternative, the AO first needed to verify petitioner’s compliance with his filing obligations via petitioner’s filed returns. See I.R.C. § 6159(c)(2); Giamelli, 129 T.C. at 111–12 (“Internal Revenue Service guidelines require a taxpayer to be current with filing and payment requirements to qualify for an installment agreement. . . . Reliance on a failure to pay current taxes in rejecting a collection alternative does not constitute an abuse of discretion.”); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A-D8 (“[T]he IRS does not consider offers to compromise from taxpayers who have not filed required returns . . . .”). Petitioner did not submit the requested returns that would have allowed the AO to consider him for an OIC or an IA, despite multiple time extensions and a second opportunity to provide such returns in his supplemental CDP hearing. It was petitioner’s obligation to establish compliance, and he did not. See Hartmann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-46, at *15 (“A taxpayer’s failure to file all required returns, standing alone, is sufficient to justify an Appeals Officer’s rejection of an IA or an OIC.”), aff’d, No. 24-2289, 2025 WL 213765 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2025); see also Giamelli, 129 T.C. at 111–12; Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(1) (“Taxpayers will be expected to provide all relevant information requested by Appeals, including financial statements, for its consideration of the facts and issues involved in the hearing.”). No genuine dispute therefore exists on this issue, as the AO told petitioner on multiple occasions throughout the CDP proceedings that return compliance was a prerequisite to consideration of any collection alternatives.

C. Balancing Analysis

Petitioner did not allege that the AO failed to conduct a proper balancing analysis for the proposed collection actions. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C). Because he did not raise the issue in the assignments of error, petitioner conceded the issue—regardless of the issues raised in his Opposition. See Rule 331(b)(4); see also Rockafellor, T.C. Memo. 2019-160, at *12–14. In any case, the AO considered the balancing requirement in section 6330(c)(3)(C) and thus did not abuse his discretion.

The AO balanced the need for the efficient collection of taxes with petitioner’s concern that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary in deciding to sustain the proposed collection action. As part of his analysis, the AO noted in the Initial and Supplemental Notices of Determination that he could not consider alternative forms of relief because petitioner did not provide the requested information, despite having many opportunities to do so during both CDP proceedings. We are therefore satisfied that the AO conducted an appropriate balancing analysis.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, we find no abuse of discretion in the AO’s decisions. So much of the Petition as relates to tax year 2017 is dismissed, and we will grant respondent’s Motion and affirm the Appeals Office’s Supplemental Notice of Determination to the extent that it sustains the Levy Notice for tax year 2016. We have considered all of the arguments made by the parties, and to the extent not mentioned above, we conclude that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.

Served 07/20/26

Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Absent any stipulation to the contrary, appeal of this case would seem to lie to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(G), (2).

When a taxpayer fails to timely file a return, the IRS is authorized to prepare a return for the taxpayer under section 6020(b) on the basis of the information available to it at the time. Because petitioner had not yet filed returns for tax years 2016 and 2017, the IRS prepared SFRs for those years under section 6020(b).

Because no tax or balance remains due for 2017, this Opinion does not address the contentions regarding that tax year. See . Accordingly, we will dismiss the case for mootness as it relates to tax year 2017.

The record does not show that respondent filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien for tax year 2017, and petitioner’s Form 843 abatement request is not before us for decision. See infra note 6.

Even if we were to construe petitioner’s argument as an independent request for review under section 6404(h), petitioner’s situation does not warrant that review. Section 6404(h) permits this Court to review the Secretary’s decision not to abate interest, but only after the IRS issues a notice of a determination not to abate interest or after 180 days have passed after the filing of an administrative request for abatement. See (“[Section] 6404(h) . . . authorizes the Tax Court to review whether the IRS abused its discretion by failing to abate interest on a tax deficiency caused by its own ‘unreasonable error or delay.’”), vacating and remanding ; (holding that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 6404(h) when the IRS’s determination regarding interest abatement is memorialized in a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330), supplemented by ; . The record does not indicate that respondent issued a notice of determination not to abate interest, that the Initial or Supplemental Notices of Determination memorialized any decision regarding interest abatement, or that petitioner raised the issue of interest abatement during the initial or supplemental CDP hearings. See (“[A] petition ostensibly filed under [section 6330] can also be viewed as having been filed under section 6404(h)(1) if the taxpayer had raised the issue of interest abatement in his [CDP] hearing.” (quoting , aff’d, )). Further, petitioner’s Form 843, submitted to this Court after the CDP proceedings, is not properly before us such that petitioner can invoke our review under section 6404(h).