Dominic Johnson v. the State of TexasDominic Johnson v. the State of Texas
A jury convicted appellant Dominic Johnson of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, rejected his affirmative defense of insanity, and assessed his punishment at fourteen years’ confinement. In a single issue, appellant argues that he presented factually sufficient evidence at trial to support his insanity defense. We disagree and affirm.
On February 17, 2023, Johnathan Bottoms was awoken by someone knocking loudly and ringing his doorbell. When he answered the door, he observed a vehicle parked in the middle of his yard. Bottoms saw a young man standing by the vehicle and asked him why he was parked in the yard. The man responded, “Do you think I‘m playing?” and then pulled out a gun. When Bottoms retreated inside and closed the door, the man began shooting. A bullet grazed Bottoms‘s head. Bleeding, he ran to his vehicle, drove to a nearby Starbucks, and called 9-1-1.1 From there, Bottoms was taken to the hospital, where he was treated for a gunshot wound and minor injuries from flying glass. A short time later, police apprehended the shooter in a neighbor‘s yard and identified him as appellant.
A. Scene Investigation
The jury heard testimony from several law enforcement officers who responded to the scene. Deputy Cantu testified that he was one of the first officers to arrive. His body-worn camera footage from the scene was admitted into evidence, and the State played portions of the video for the jury. He acknowledged that appellant did not try to flee when the officers approached him. Cantu described appellant‘s behavior as “aggressive” at one point and admitted that he used his stun gun on appellant because he “was not obeying orders.” Otherwise, he did not have much interaction with appellant at the scene.
Deputy Cantu‘s partner, Deputy Calvo, arrested appellant at the scene and placed him in her patrol car. She testified that he was compliant with their instructions during his arrest and did not attempt to flee or escape. Footage from the camera inside Deputy Calvo‘s patrol car was also admitted into evidence and played
Detective Pope was the lead investigator on the case. When he arrived at the scene, appellant was already detained in the patrol vehicle. Pope attempted to but did not speak with appellant. Pope acknowledged that his report stated that appellant appeared to be in an altered state of mind and admitted that the placement of appellant‘s vehicle in Bottoms‘s front yard was unusual. Through his investigation, he learned that appellant‘s family members had called 9-1-1 about appellant‘s mental health twice before the incident. He did not review those 9-1-1 calls or speak with appellant‘s family.
Pope spoke with the deputies at the scene, supervised the evidence collection, and interviewed Bottoms, his wife, and some neighbors. One neighbor saw appellant come up to her door on her Ring camera. The State played the Ring camera footage for the jury, and Pope testified that in the video, appellant can be heard saying,
Deputy Ward took photographs at the scene and described them for the jury. In particular, he documented an unopened wine bottle in the floorboard of appellant‘s vehicle, as well as prescription bottles for trazodone and Adderall containing pills and bearing appellant‘s name. He also located an open packet of clenbuterol tablets and a vial of testosterone in the center console.
B. Defense Witnesses
Members of appellant‘s family testified that in the weeks and days leading up to the February 17 shooting, appellant exhibited bizarre behavior. For example, appellant‘s mother heard him cursing one night around midnight, saying “F the dog” repeatedly. She snapped in his face but could not get his attention. The next morning, appellant could not recall the incident. Later, approximately two weeks before the shooting, appellant totaled his car in an accident but could not explain to his mother what happened. Then, while driving his sister to school on February 14, appellant claimed he was God and told her he could create a religion.
The next day, while his mother and stepfather were out, appellant yelled at his grandmother and accused her of killing members of her family. According to the grandmother, appellant also told her if she went to her childhood home and looked in the closet, she would die. Appellant‘s sister called police after he yelled at their mother. Appellant‘s stepfather described him as a “[v]ery mild mannered young man” up to this point and testified that he had never heard appellant yell at anyone in anger. Similarly, his mother testified that appellant had never screamed at her before and that he was previously always respectful. She described his behavior that evening as “high to low, like there was some sort of impulse control issue.” He told
Appellant‘s sister told the dispatcher that appellant was suffering a mental health crisis and needed to be placed on a psychiatric hold. When police arrived, appellant‘s family asked them to take him somewhere he could be “psychologically observed” overnight, but appellant resisted the idea. Otherwise, appellant‘s sister described him as cooperative with police. The officers advised the family that nothing was wrong with appellant, suggested that he was spoiled, upset, or acting out, and recommended that his parents evict him. The police left the home after determining that appellant did not meet the criteria to be involuntarily committed. This upset appellant‘s sister, so she and their mother went to stay in a nearby hotel. Appellant, his stepfather, and his grandmother stayed in the home and had “a fairly peaceful night.”
The next morning, appellant‘s mother and sister returned from the hotel. Appellant‘s mother tried to talk to him about his behavior the day before, but he kept asking, “What are you talking about?” After appellant‘s mother asked him to take a drug test, appellant became angry. His mother informed him that if he would not take the drug test, he would have to leave. Appellant kept screaming, “I didn‘t take anything.” Appellant‘s mother testified that he had a “glazed over, piercing look” in his eyes. She left and brought his sister back to the hotel.
Later that day, appellant‘s stepfather was working from home when he heard the family dog “screaming” in pain. He went upstairs and found appellant half inside the dog‘s cage. When he pulled appellant out, his hand was bleeding, and the stepfather thought the dog had bitten appellant in self-defense. Appellant‘s grandmother testified that she heard him say, “You‘re making me do this” to the dog. Appellant‘s grandmother found it “shocking” that appellant did not react to
When appellant‘s mother returned home, appellant showed her his bloody hands and told her he was going to kill the dog. His mother called police again. According to appellant‘s stepfather, the police treated the situation more like a domestic disturbance and left after asking appellant some questions. Appellant‘s mother booked him a room at a nearby hotel, and he went without incident. She called a nearby hospital and two psychiatric facilities in the area, and each of them advised her that appellant would need to come in voluntarily to receive treatment. Appellant maintained that he did not need any help. The shooting occurred the next morning.
C. Competing Experts
Both sides presented expert testimony. Appellant‘s expert, Dr. Wendy Elliott, testified that she was asked to assess appellant‘s mental state at the time of the underlying incident. She met with appellant one time for approximately one hour and also spoke with his mother. Dr. Elliott reviewed the offense report, medical records, a prior competency evaluation, and a prior insanity evaluation, as well as the Ring camera footage and patrol car footage. Dr. Elliott diagnosed appellant with
Dr. Elliott noted that there was conflicting information concerning appellant‘s use of illegal substances at the time of the incident. She testified that appellant reported to jail staff following his arrest that he was using illicit substances, possibly heroin and alcohol. However, a drug screen taken at the hospital after his arrest was negative for any illicit substances.2 Likewise, though appellant reported misuse of some prescription medication, including Adderall, this was not reflected on the drug screen taken at the hospital. Dr. Elliott also testified about the prescriptions found in appellant‘s car at the time of his arrest: testosterone, clenbuterol, Adderall, and trazodone.
In reaching her conclusion regarding appellant‘s mental state, Dr. Elliott noted his behavior in the days prior to the incident, his mother‘s calls to police and desire to have him hospitalized, and his “odd” behavior during the incident. Particularly, Dr. Elliott testified that his “behavior post the arrest and the videos is him rambling and speaking, jumping between ideas, which are all consistent with mental illness.”
In rebuttal, the State presented testimony from Dr. Tyesha Alexander, who also spent about an hour with appellant. She described him as very polite, cooperative, and talkative. In evaluating appellant, Dr. Alexander reviewed various court filings, his medical records from the jail, other psychiatric records, crime scene photos, the Ring doorbell footage, footage from two police body cameras, and the patrol car footage. In the jail records, Dr. Alexander noted a diagnosis of psychotic disorder and substance abuse, or psychosis due to substance abuse. She testified that those records also indicated that “unspecified schizophrenia disorder” had also been eliminated from his diagnosis. The jail records stated that appellant was treated medically for substance abuse, though Dr. Alexander acknowledged that appellant told her he did not use drugs. She testified that appellant reported hallucinations and delusions, but she found his reports to be unreliable because there was no history of those issues prior to the incident, at least according to the records she reviewed. Dr. Alexander acknowledged that appellant reported things to Dr. Elliott that he did not mention to her.
Regarding the offense, appellant told Dr. Alexander that “he drove his car on the lawn, opened the door, and started shooting.” Appellant reported that “he didn‘t know why he would do such a thing because he didn‘t know the people.” Dr. Alexander found appellant‘s version of events “questionable” because based on his history, there was no indication of psychosis or psychotic diagnosis prior to the shooting event. Appellant told Dr. Alexander that because the charge against him was not murder, “he wasn‘t too worried about it.” Dr. Alexander did not believe appellant‘s testimony that his prescriptions for Adderall, trazodone, and hydroxyzine
Ultimately, Dr. Alexander concluded that appellant did not meet the legal standard for insanity. She acknowledged but disagreed with Dr. Elliott‘s conclusions. In reaching her opinion, Dr. Alexander noted the Ring camera footage of appellant asking one of Bottoms‘s neighbors about their car, which could be seen parked outside. Dr. Alexander testified that in the video, appellant mentioned needing a ride and asked about taking the neighbor‘s vehicle (which she described as either a Hellcat or Demon model of the Dodge Challenger—“[a] very fast car“). Dr. Alexander testified that this indicated to her that appellant was trying to get away from the scene, and in her opinion, he had an appreciation that what he had done was wrong.
Dr. Alexander opined that appellant was malingering, or exaggerating his mental health symptoms. She noted that his self-reports to mental health professionals varied, and she opined that appellant reports mental health symptoms when he thinks he can “get something out of it or get out of something.” She noted the items found inside appellant‘s vehicle at the time of the shooting and testified that abusing testosterone could lead to psychological problems, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, aggression, and hallucinations. She testified that clenbuterol had similar side effects and that it is not approved for human consumption in the United States for those reasons.3 Dr. Alexander testified that according to research, mixing testosterone and clenbuterol was “even more dangerous.” She acknowledged that the post-offense drug screen did not test for testosterone or clenbuterol, so she did not know how much, if any, was in his system at the time.
Appellant testified in his own defense. He explained that he started not feeling like himself in 2022, and in October, he saw a psychiatrist about his concerns. He testified that at that time, he was hearing voices, seeing things, and having trouble focusing. The “constant” voices told appellant to “go do stuff,” but he “didn‘t really listen most of the time.” He testified that the instructions were mundane things, like “go pet the dog,” so he did not think much of them. Appellant told the jury that he heard two voices, one male and one female. Appellant admitted that he did not tell his psychiatrist about the voices because he worried they would “lock [him] up.” According to appellant, the psychiatrist prescribed Adderall, hydroxyzine, and trazodone and diagnosed him with ADHD and depression. He estimated that he saw the psychiatrist once a month for a few months before the incident and testified that the medications helped “slow[] down” the voices and helped him focus better.
Appellant testified that in 2023, things worsened. One day in early January, he blacked out for half an hour while driving to work. He arrived in downtown Houston but could not recall how he got there. He claimed he would walk upstairs at home but forget why he was going upstairs. However, he did not discuss his memory lapses with his physician because he changed insurance and was in the process of finding a new doctor. Regarding his hallucinations, appellant testified that he was seeing people and would “hear messages in songs, thinking they were directed at [him].” The hallucinations worsened, and appellant would see someone watching him, “standing there, menacing.” He testified that he began sleeping with his dog “because if she started tripping, then [he] knew what [he] was seeing was real.” He described the apparitions as “old men,” “bald, gray skin, black eyes, and wearing just regular clothes, shirt and tie.” These men scared him, and he thought people were out to get him. He testified that he wrecked his car but had no idea how
As for the events of February 15, appellant testified that he had no idea why he felt his sister was about to be attacked or why he said the things he did to his grandmother. He denied that the responding officers gave him any kind of mental health assessment. Regarding February 16, appellant testified that he heard his dog barking and thought she was going to kill his entire family. More specifically, he “thought she had evil powers or something like that and was going to use those powers on the family.” He recalled the second 9-1-1 call and visit from police, and he testified that he did not think he had done anything wrong at the time. Appellant testified that he overheard the police mention an address that day, and he thought his parents had gotten a house for him at that address because they were kicking him out. When he went to the address, it was an insurance office.
Appellant denied ever using any drugs other than “Delta 8 weed, regular weed, and mushrooms.” He testified that the last time he did any drugs was about a month before the shooting. He denied any drug use on the day of the shooting. He testified that on the morning of February 17, he went to his hotel room and only left to get food. Appellant testified that he was hearing voices in the hotel room and had a conversation with his friend Omar, though Omar was not in the room. Around 5:00 a.m., appellant began thinking, “They‘re coming for me,” and he worried that his hotel room was “bugged.” He testified that he could not recall leaving the hotel room, and the first thing he remembered was waking up in a padded jail cell. According to appellant, he did not learn what had happened until a competency evaluation sometime in April. He testified that he did not know Bottoms and had
Appellant did not recall telling anyone he had used illegal drugs, and he denied ever abusing his prescriptions. Appellant admitted that he got clenbuterol “over the internet” and that it is not currently used on humans. He testified that he took half a pill one time for weight loss and denied that it had any psychological effects. Appellant testified that he was “stockpiling” Seroquel in jail and admitted that he bought the pills from another inmate. Appellant took nineteen or twenty pills in a suicide attempt. He was prescribed Risperdal in jail and testified that he continued taking the medication thereafter. According to appellant, he has been “great, hunky-dory” ever since. At the time of trial, he was no longer hearing voices or seeing hallucinations.
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he told his expert certain things that he did not disclose to Dr. Alexander. In particular, appellant never told Dr. Alexander that he was “being gang stalked” or that he heard messages in songs. He claimed that Dr. Alexander did not ask him about those things. Appellant acknowledged that he did not tell either expert about his car accident, his friend Omar, the clothes on the floor, or the insurance office. He claimed he did tell both experts about the specific hallucinations of old men, although this information did not appear in either of their reports. He denied making other statements attributed to him in Dr. Alexander‘s report. Appellant acknowledged that his post-accident drug screen actually showed a low amount of alcohol in his blood, although he was “not too sure where that alcohol came from.” He denied telling anyone at the jail about possible drug or heroin use, or mixing Adderall with other substances.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
In Texas, a defendant is excused from criminal responsibility if he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense of insanity. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The test is whether, at the time of the conduct charged, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was “wrong.” Id. Under Texas law, “wrong” in this context means “illegal.” Id. (citing
A defendant raising the affirmative defense of insanity bears the burdens of proof and persuasion. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence concerning an insanity defense, the standard is whether after considering all the relevant evidence, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
The question of insanity is generally one for the factfinder, not only for determinations of credibility and weight of the evidence but also for setting the limits of the defense itself. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). This is because the issue is not strictly medical but involves legal and ethical considerations as well. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 877–78 (discussing Graham).
Lastly, the insanity defense is not available if the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated or temporarily insane due to intoxication.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury‘s rejection of his insanity defense. First, appellant argues that the testimony from his family members about his concerning behavior in the days
Appellant also points to the video footage of him in the patrol car and disputes Dr. Alexander‘s characterization of his conduct as “normal.” But again, it is the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, not the reviewing court. See Fisher, 397 S.W.3d at 745. Likewise, when faced with competing expert opinions as to whether appellant was insane at the time of the offense, the jury was free to reject the defense expert‘s opinion and accept the State‘s expert‘s opinion that appellant did not meet the legal definition of insanity. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 950–51.
Even assuming appellant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, he must still demonstrate that he did not know that his conduct was wrong. See Nutter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.);
Lastly, the jury was also presented with evidence that appellant‘s conduct was caused by voluntary intoxication, negating his insanity defense. See Lopez, 544 S.W.3d at 503 (stating that insanity defense is not available when defendant was voluntarily intoxicated or insane due to intoxication). The evidence reflected that trazodone, Adderall, testosterone, and clenbuterol were found in appellant‘s vehicle. Dr. Alexander explained the possible side effects of abusing some of these medications, including psychological problems, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, aggression, and hallucinations. Further, the testimony reflected that although appellant was drug tested after the shooting, the test was not conducted for almost forty-eight hours after the offense, and the test did not screen for testosterone or clenbuterol.
The jury also heard testimony from appellant‘s mother regarding her concern that appellant was using drugs. She testified that shortly before the shooting, she asked him whether behavior was drug-induced, purchased a drug test, and advised appellant he would need to test negative in order to remain in the home. In speaking with the detective after the shooting, appellant‘s mother theorized that “maybe he was spending his money on drugs” and questioned whether his behavior was the result of “steroid rage.”
Additionally, Dr. Alexander testified that according to the jail records, appellant reported daily use of heroin and alcohol and admitted to mixing high doses
After reviewing the entire record, we cannot say that the jury‘s rejection of appellant‘s insanity defense was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 670 n.29, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury‘s determination.
We overrule appellant‘s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
/s/ Ken Wise
Justice