Dominguez v. StateDominguez v. State
Antonio Dоminguez, Jr., appeals a judgment and sentence for trafficking in cocaine. Dominguez argues that the trial court failed to аdequately instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime. We agree and reverse.
Dominguez was charged with trafficking in cocaine, a violation of
Any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or cоnstructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine as described in
s.893.03(2)(a)4 , or of any mixture containing cocaine is guilty оf a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as `trafficking in cocaine.’
The State must prove beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt that at the time of the transaction that the defendant knew the substance was cocaine.
(R 277).
This request was denied and instead the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Now, Antonio Dominguez, the defendant in this case, has been accused of the crime of trafficking in cocaine. Before you can find the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Element number one, Antonio Dominguez knowingly sold, delivered or possessed a certain substance.
Element number two, the substance was cocaine or a mixturе containing cocaine. And Element number three, the quantity of cocaine involved was 28 grams or more.
In Way v. State, 475 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court held that the knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed is an essential element of the crime of traffiсking in cocaine under
Before you can find the Defendаnt guilty of trafficking in cocaine, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Element number one, the Defendant knowingly sold, delivered or possessed a certain substance.
Element number two, the Defendant knew the substance was cocaine or a mixture containing cocaine. And element number three, the quantity of the cocaine involved was twenty-eight grams or more. (emphasis added)
The instructions in the present case followed the Florida Standard Jury Instructiоns in Criminal Cases at page 230. The standard jury instructions and hence the instructions given in this case, however, failed to completеly and adequately inform the jury of the state‘s burden of proof. As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, the initial determination of the applicable substantive law in every case should be made by the trial judge and no approval of the standard jury instructiоns by the supreme court can relieve the trial judge of his responsibility to properly and correctly charge the jury in each case. State v. Byran, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974). Since knowledge of the substance possessed is an essential element of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court should have instructed the jury on this element. The court did not do so and thus Dominguez must be given a new trial.
The state, however, argues that Dominguez has failed to establish “meaningful prejudice” from the failure to give his requested instruction. See Lacy v. State, 387 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (where standard jury instructions аre involved, appellate court is reluctant to find grounds for reversal absent a clear showing that rights of the accusеd have been meaningfully prejudiced by the instruction). Here the only real issue was Dominguez’ knowledge of the substance possеssed. The absence of the instruction on the state‘s burden of proof on this issue was therefore clearly prejudicial.
The cases cited by the state, Pratt v. State, 429 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and Williams v. State, 400 So.2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), are distinguishable. In Pratt, the court held that the failure of the judge to instruct the jury that knowledge of possession was an essential element of the crimе of introducing contraband into a correctional institution was not fundamental
In sum, we reverse the judgment and sentеnce and remand for a new trial because the court below failed to adequately instruct the jury. However, because the standard jury instructions do not contain an instruction on knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed, we deem this tо be a matter of great public importance and certify to the supreme court the following question:
DOES THE CURRENT STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION ON TRAFFICKING IN COCAINE SUFFICIENTLY INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT TO CONVICT A DEFENDANT UNDER THE STATUTE ONE OF THE ELEMENTS THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE IS THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW THAT THE SUBSTANCE IN WHICH HE TRAFFICKED WAS COCAINE?
REVERSED and REMANDED for new trial.
SHARP, J., concurs.
ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion.
ORFINGER, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In Way v. State, 475 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1985) the supreme court did not disapprove the standard jury instruction used here. What was at issue in Way was whether or not the State was required to provе that the defendant had actual knowledge of the weight of the cocaine he possessed. In answering that question in the negative, the court held that the trafficking statute,