This case presents two key issues for resolution: (1) Can a driver be found negligent if an accident occurs when his truck crashes into a parked vehicle but the apparently healthy driver has no memory of the accident? and (2) Is a plaintiffs status as an undocumented immigrant
Appellants Rigoberto E. Domingos Ayala and Jose R. Rodas Santacruz were working for Ebb Tide Tents and Party Rentais (“Ebb Tide”) when they were involved in a motor vehicle accident. The truck driven by appellee Robert F. Lee, holder of a commercial driver’s license, on behalf of his employer Bay State Pool Supplies of Baltimore, Inc. (“Bay State”), collided with Ebb Tide’s parked truck, resulting in severe injuries to Ayala and Santacruz. Ayala, Santacruz, and Imelda Carolina Chavez Ventura, Ayala’s wife, sued Lee and Bay State for negligence. A six-day jury trial resulted in a jury verdict for Lee and Bay State, which appellants now ask us to reverse. We agree with appellants and therefore we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Ayala and Santacruz were working for William Edward Comegys, Jr., then the owner of Ebb Tide, on September 27, 2010. Comegys was driving the three of them from the company headquarters to a job site in Annapolis and was traveling westbound on Route 50. It was raining, and the truck’s windshield wipers stopped working at some point during the drive. After crossing the Bay Bridge, Comegys stopped the truck and pulled over to the right hand shoulder of Route 50. The vehicle was fully out of the travel lanes, with the two right wheels on the grass and the two left wheels on the paved part of the shoulder. The emergency flashers were also on. Comegys, Ayala, and Santacruz all exited the truck and went to work on the windshield wipers. They had just fixed the wipers and were standing in front of the vehicle when suddenly their truck was struck from behind by the truck owned by Bay State and operated by Lee. Comegys was killed as a result of the
Ayala, Santacruz, and Ventura filed a complaint against Lee and Bay State in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on November 3, 2010.
It became obvious even before trial that Ayala and Santacruz’s immigration status would be at issue. Ayala and Santacruz are originally from El Salvador. In 2006, they entered the United States through Texas without presenting themselves to federal immigration authorities. They eventually settled in Maryland. Each acquired a Social Security Number and used it to get a permanent resident card, seek employment, and pay taxes. However, each Social Security Number was acquired illegally. Ayala and Santacruz are therefore undocumented immigrants.
Appellants moved to exclude evidence of their immigration status at trial in a written motion filed on April 26, 2012. The circuit court considered this and other motions in limine at a hearing on May 29, and ruled that immigration status was relevant and admissible evidence. Because Ayala and Santacruz asked for income-based damages, the circuit court reasoned that they had opened the door to inquiries about their immigration status. In the court’s view, there was a valid question over whether or not a plaintiff could legally earn the income he was claiming in damages. The court also found that the fact that Ayala and Santacruz had misrepresented their immigration status on employment forms was relevant to their credibility. Accordingly, at the August 2012 trial, the jury heard extensive testimony from Ayala and Santacruz on their legal status and how they came to the United States. Indeed, the second question asked of Ayala during cross-examination was: ‘You do not have a Social Security Number issued to you by the United States Government?” Counsel for Bay State and Lee also asked almost every other witness questions related to appellants’ immigration status.
Lee and Bay State relied on testimony from their own medical expert, who testified that Ayala and Santacruz’s injuries were less severe than they claimed, and video evidence from an investigator who had recorded Ayala and Santacruz performing various day-to-day activities. They also presented, over objection, the de bene esse deposition of the woman who had been lawfully issued the Social Security Number Ayala was using. Absent from the trial, however, was Lee himself. Because Lee was hospitalized, his deposition was read to the jury and served as his testimony. Accordingly, the jury heard that Lee was driving about fifty miles per hour in the right travel lane of Route 50. He saw a vehicle in his left side mirror and thought “Buddy, you’re getting too close. You’re coming into my lane.” Lee’s next memory was of crashing through the brush on the right side of the highway. He did not remember striking the Ebb Tide truck, nor did he remember seeing the truck. When asked how his vehicle moved to the right shoulder, Lee stated that “I must have just turned the wheel to the right, slightly.” When asked if he was guessing, Lee said “I don’t remember turning the wheel, but I could have — but it could have been [a] reaction as I was looking, you know.”
Appellants moved for “judgment on the issue of liability” at the close of Lee and Bay State’s case, which the circuit court denied. The case was submitted to the jury, which found that Lee and Bay State were not negligent. Ayala and Santacruz timely appealed.
Additional facts will be discussed below.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Appellants ask us to review five questions,
II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied appellants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of appellants’ immigration status at trial?
III. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it permitted a de bene esse deposition of a witness who was legally issued the Social Security Number Ayala used?
IV. Did circuit court err when it refused to give appellants’ requested jury instructions?
Because we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied appellants’ motion for judgment, we do not reach the third and fourth questions. We therefore reverse the denial of the motion for judgment and remand for trial on the issue of damages. Given that appellants’ immigration status may again appear relevant at that stage, however, we also consider appellants’ second question and address the propriety of evidence of immigration status.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment
A. Background
Appellants argue that the facts of the accident “create a presumption of negligence” because Lee failed to maintain control of his vehicle. They assert that Lee violated two Maryland state laws when he crashed into the Ebb Tide vehicle: (1) Md.Code (1977, 2012 RepLVol.), Transportation Article (“Trans.”), § 21-309(b), which states that a “vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane”; and (2) Trans. § 21-312(b), which states that a “person may not drive a vehicle from any controlled access highway except at the entrances and exits established by public authority.” They contend that these violations are prima facie evidence of negligence. They therefore ask us to reverse the circuit court’s denial of their motion for judgment. By contrast, appellees argue that Lee did not violate any state laws because restrictions on lane changes and access to and from a highway do not apply to travel to and from the shoulder of a highway. Appellees argue in the alternative that even if the laws apply, they create only an inference of negligence, not a presumption, making the court’s denial of the motion for judgment and submission of the case to the jury appropriate.
B. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment in a civil case, applying the same standard as the circuit court. See District of Columbia v. Singleton,
C. Negligence as a Matter of Law
Finding negligence as a matter of law requires finding “in the evidence some prominent and decisive act, or failure to act, which permits of but one interpretation and in regard to which there is no room for reasonable minds to differ.” Weishaar v. Canestrale,
1. Lane Changes
Trans. § 21-309(b) states that a “vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from that lane or moved from a shoulder or bikeway into a lane until the driver has determined that it is safe to do so.”
2. Duty to Keep a Lookout
Drivers of motor vehicles have a duty to both “observe carefully the road in
The duty to keep a lookout is most frequently implicated in cases where a driver says that he looked and did not see anything, but then crashed into something anyway. For example, in Dashiell v. Moore,
It is also a rational and a reasonable inference that had the defendant looked he could not have failed to see so large an object as a thirteen hundred pound mule which was there to be seen directly in front of his car and directly in front of his headlights at some distance before the collision. It was undoubtedly there, it was not invisible, and yet he said that he never saw it at all before the collision, at the time of the collision or afterwards. It is not an unreasonable inference, therefore, that he could not have been looking ahead when he was adjusting the radio, or if he was, that his bent position prevented him from seeing the road directly in front of him.... The duty to look implies the duty to see what is in plain sight unless some reasonable explanation is shown. Where there is nothing to obstruct the vision of a driver, it is negligence not to see what is clearly visible.
Id. at 666-67,
Here, we do not even have testimony from Lee that he looked but did not see anything. He never said he looked ahead or to the right; his attention was focused to his left, where he thought he saw another vehicle “getting too close” to his vehicle.
Lee would gain nothing by couching the events that led to the collision as an “unavoidable accident.” In Fry v. Carter,
We pause to address two other points Lee raises in arguing that he was not negligent as a matter of law. Lee characterizes the evidence as “merely establishing] that he was not speeding, was
To hold that this “I-didn’i>-see-it-and-I-don’t-remember” defense without any real proof of justification is enough to force a negligence question to the jury would only encourage irresponsible behavior and foster bad tort law. We therefore vacate the jury verdict and reverse the denial of appellants’ motion for judgment on the issue of liability.
II. Immigration Status
A. Background
Before the trial, appellants moved in limine to exclude evidence of their immigration status. They argued that their immigration status was irrelevant because “it neither serve[d] to bar [their] right to bring the actions nor as a defense for the Defendants’ illegal and negligent actions but merely [was] an attempt to prejudice the jury against [them] for their statuses.” In the alternative, appellants argued that their immigration status should be excluded as prejudicial because the evidence “would poison the jury against [them] and prejudice the jury with information utterly irrelevant to the harms committed against [them] or the injuries they suffered.” Appellants apparently filed this motion in response to correspondence they received from appellees’ attorney, which indicated that appellees planned to a call a witness who would testify that Ayala’s and Santacruz’s Social Security Number cards and permanent resident cards were not legitimate. Not surprisingly, appellees opposed the motion in limine, arguing that evidence pertaining to immigration status was relevant because appellants were undocumented immigrants who were “prohibited by federal immigration law from earning any wages in the United States.” They asserted that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
As discussed above, the circuit court ruled that immigration status was relevant and admissible evidence at a motions hearing prior to the trial. The court provided additional reasoning in a written opinion filed just prior to the August 2012 jury trial. It noted that appellants’ immigration status was not relevant to the duty of care or the injuries alleged and that “[its]
B. Standard of Review
An evidentiary ruling on a motion in limine “is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will only be reversed upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” Malik v. State,
C. Federal Law
Because the federal government has the “preeminent role ... with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders,” Toll v. Moreno,
We likewise conclude that neither the IRCA nor Hoffman mandates denying awards of lost wages or medical expenses to undocumented immigrant employees solely because of their immigration status. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the Court of Appeals’ narrow view of the IRCA and Hoffman in Design Kitchen & Baths,
D. Evidence
Having determined that federal law does not preclude outright the award of lost wages or medical expenses in a personal injury action, for the guidance of the circuit court on remand we address whether evidence of appellants’ immigration status would be relevant or prejudicial to the damages to which appellants may be entitled. Appellees argue that evidence of
1. Lost Wages
Immigration status is relevant to a claim for lost wages for the simple reason that the legal ability to work affects the likelihood of future earnings in the United States.
Yet relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Md. Rule 5-403. Immigration status is prejudicial in that it “introduces a factor into the case that might encourage the jury to dislike or disapprove of [a party] independent of the merits.”
Accordingly, courts that have balanced the relevance and prejudice inquiries have frequently come down on the side of “prejudicial” because of the low probative value of evidence of immigration status. The risk of deportation of an undocumented immigrant is very small,
If the court determines that evidence of a party’s immigration status is not unfairly prejudicial, its relevance typically relates to whether a party is entitled to lost wages at a United States pay rate or at the home country rate.
2. Credibility
Immigration status alone does not reflect upon an individual’s character and is thus not admissible for impeachment purposes. See Figeroa v. U.S. I.N.S.,
However, we cannot ignore the fact that in this case, appellants clearly opened the door to questions about their immigration status when their answers to interrogatories differed substantively from documents they later submitted as evidence.
3. Considerations on Remand
In the event that questions are raised about appellants’ immigration status at a future jury trial on damages, we summarize the limitations on such inquiries. The out-of-state case law suggests a multi-part inquiry into the circumstances of a party’s immigration status. Facts for the jury to weigh include: whether there is an imminent risk of deportation; how long the party has been in the United States; his or her work history in the United States; whether he or she has a family in the United States; what the United States wage rate is; and what the comparable home country wage rate would be, among other considerations. See Part II.D.l, supra. There was some evidence of these questions before the circuit court. A future jury hearing the damages portion of the trial would benefit from a full exposition of these and other relevant facts, with the circuit judge serving as an alert monitor of any questioning or evidence that veers too far on the side of prejudice. For example, in our opinion the immigration-related questioning of certain witnesses, such as the medical experts and appellants’ expert economist, went too far. While it would be proper to establish that the figures those witnesses relied on were based on United States dollars, any further attempt to elicit their opinion on costs outside of the country would be irrelevant. Appellees would benefit from securing their own expert witness who could testify about the likely costs in appellants’ home country.
Further, it may be that appellants’ applications for asylum have made some progress, which would be relevant to the question of whether they would leave the United States (assuming that if the applications were approved, appellants would stay). Even if the applications have not been approved, the fact that they exist and that appellants are actively seeking asylum is certainly germane to the question of
For all these reasons we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED FOR DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.
Notes
. Like the General Assembly, we use the term “undocumented immigrant” instead of any reference to "illegal” status. See Md.Code (1978, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2013 Supp.), Education Article, § 15-106.8(a) (exempting undocumented immigrant individuals from paying the out-of-state tuition rate at state community colleges if residential requirements are met). This choice is also in line with recent convention. See, e.g., Audrey J.S. Carrión & Matthew M. Somers, A Case for the Undocumented Immigrant, Maryland Bar J., July/Aug.2011, at 30; Paul Col-ford, "Illegal Immigrant” No More, Assoc. Press (Apr. 2, 2013), http:// blog.ap.org/2013/04/02/illegal-immigrant-no-more/.
. Appellants filed several amended complaints throughout the course of the litigation, culminating in a third amended complaint filed on February 21, 2012. Comegys’ wife also filed a wrongful death action on June 7, 2011, in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of Comegys’ estate. Bay State and Lee settled with Comegys’ estate prior to trial.
. The circuit court granted appellants’ motion to dismiss the negligent entrustment and hiring counts on the fourth day of trial.
. Appellants applied for asylum in May 2012 and had not yet received a ruling on their applications by the time trial occurred in August. There is no evidence of progress on the applications in the record before the Court.
. For example, defense counsel asked one of appellants’ expert witnesses: "If it is not legal for [appellants] to hold a job in the United States in the future, then your analysis really doesn’t apply, does it?” Counsel later asked appellants’ expert economist: "So you didn’t know when you wrote your report back in November that neither of these gentlemen had entered the country legally, correct?” Even the circuit court independently raised some immigration-related issues. In discussing appellants' medical expert’s testimony on future medical needs, the court stated: "I guess he might testify that following procedure X might be needed in three years out. The Defendants might say, [‘]Well, wait a second. Do you have any knowledge as to whether that procedure is available [outside of the United States]?[’]”
. Appellants seek review of the following:
1. Appellants presented evidence demonstrating the collision was caused by Appellee’s vehicle leaving the highway and striking Appellants' vehicle on the shoulder. Appellee presented no evidence as to the cause of the collision. Did the trial court commit error when it denied Appellants’ Motions for Judgment as to Negligence?
2. Appellant moved in limine to prohibit any reference to the immigration status of Appellants. The trial court denied this request thus allowing Appellee’s counsel to transform the trial from a tort case to an immigration hearing. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion in limine and permitting Appellee to inject racial bias and immigration matters into a tort trial?
3. The trial court allowed appellants to be questioned about employment verification forms and further allowed these forms to be admitted into evidence. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in this regard?
4. The jury instructions read by the trial court were improper. The trial court refused to give multiple jury instructions, improperly modified pattern jury instructions and interjected racial bias into jury instructions. Do these actions constitute prejudicial error?
5. The trial court permitted a de bene esse deposition in the middle of trial of a witness whose testimony was greatly prejudicial, whose testimony had no probative value and who had not been identified in pre-trial orders. Was this an abuse of discretion?
. Lee argues that the definition of "roadway” expressly excludes the shoulder, meaning that § 21-309(b) does not apply to a vehicle's movement from a lane to the shoulder. We reject this argument because it leads to plainly absurd results. Lee’s proffered interpretation would apply the statute to all lane changes except those involving a movement from a lane to the shoulder. We see no reason why drivers should not be required to wait to move to the shoulder until "it is safe to do so,” Trans. § 21-309(b); nor do we find any suggestion that the General Assembly intended to exclude this category of driver behavior from an otherwise generally applicable rule whose purpose is to regulate the safety of the highways by directing drivers to wait to change course until it is safe to do so.
. Even without the statute, it would still be negligent for a driver to change lanes without first determining that it was safe to do so. Wallace v. Fowler,
. However, several statutes imply a driver’s duty to keep a lookout. For example, Trans. § 21-403 specifies when a driver is required to yield the right-of-way to an approaching vehicle, which necessarily requires looking for the approaching vehicle. Trans. § 21-603(a) prohibits a person from starting a "vehicle that is stopped, standing, or parked until the movement can be made with reasonable safety,” which also implies that a driver must look to see what is around him and whether it is safe to proceed. Finally, Trans. § 21-604(b) prohibits a driver from moving a vehicle left or right on a roadway, turning, or "otherwise turn[ing] a vehicle from a direct course ... unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety,” again implying a duty to look and see whether it is safe.
. Dashiell did not involve a motion for directed verdict, now known as a motion for judgment, and there is no indication that one was filed. However, it recognizes "settled law” on a duty to keep a lookout — one we believe that is not locked into only direct collisions in the "mule age,” but extends to modem day crashes involving a stopped vehicle on a shoulder within the driver's lateral lookout. See Keith C. Miller, Automobile Accident Law & Practice, § 15.03[1] n. 9. Although the granting of a motion for judgment because the defendant was negligent as a matter of law will be a relatively rare occurrence, every decision establishing "settled law” in the area of automobile torts increases, not diminishes, the likelihood of the granting of such a motion.
. The evidence was clear that this vehicle did not strike or damage Lee's truck.
. If choice were an issue, Lee possibly could have slowed down or sounded his horn to avoid any encroachment from the left and certainly could have slowed down or braked before colliding with the parked vehicle that he struck with full force. See Fry,
. Enforcement against employers is also relatively low:
In the ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, the number of investigations of employers of illegal aliens declined seventy percent, from 7053 to 2061, on-site job arrests of illegal aliens declined from 8027 to 451, and the fines imposed on employers declined from 1063 to thirteen — a staggering ninety-nine percent decrease.
Hugh Alexander Fuller, Immigration, Compensation and Preemption: The Proper Measure of Lost Future Earning Capacity Damages after Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 58 Baylor L.Rev. 985, 1003 (2006).
. See also Avila-Blum v. Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc.,
. Then codified at Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.VoL), Labor & Employment Article, Title 9.
. However, immigration status is irrelevant on the question of liability. Hagl v. Jacob Stern & Sons, Inc.,
. Similarly, the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee concluded that a judge may not ask a criminal defendant to divulge the defendant’s immigration status at sentencing because of the risk of the "appearance of impropriety,” in violation of the Canons of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct. Maryland Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 2008-43 (2009).
. See n. 13, supra.
. Some courts have concluded that an undocumented immigrant may only recover lost wages at the home country rate. See Wielgus v. Ryobi Technologies, Inc.,
. Appellants may not have known that they could have objected to the interrogatories and not answered them. See Galaviz-Zamora,