*2 GOLDBERG, Before GARWOOD and WIENER, Judges. Circuit PER CURIAM: uphold seaman’s this case we under the Jones Act. compels precedent Fifth also us to Circuit uphold damages for the an award of timely pay shipowner’s failure to mainte- nance and cure. brought negligence Guevara claim under
I. Act, U.S.CApp. § the Jones and an Proceedings Facts and Below unseaworthiness claim under mari- law, against sought time Maritime. He also (Gue- Domingo Plaintiff-appellee Guevara *3 punitive damages for Maritime’s failure to vara) 29, 1990, May injured while was pay timely maintenance and cure on basis. of the crew on the serving as a member jury The returned a verdict in Guevara’s PHILADELPHIA, vessel OVERSEAS favor, finding negligent, Maritime the operated employer, owned and Guevara’s OVERSEAS PHILADELPHIA unseawor- Cor- defendant-appellant Maritime Overseas thy, negligent. jury and Guevara The (Maritime). prepar- poration The crew was $131,000 in compensatory awarded Guevara Texas, Freeport, ing ship to sail from and the May injury, for his and gangway, helping to secure the Guevara was $60,000 for Maritime’s required that it lifted the size of which be arbitrary capricious pay and failure to main- being per- ship’s the crane. The task was appeals. tenance and cure. Maritime now in the midst of considerable wind and formed standing on a catwalk on rain. Guevara was II. pursuant vessel to the orders of the
the bosun, superior, who was vessel’s Guevara’s Discussion gangway As was operating the crane.
lifted,
swayed in
and
Guevara’s direction
A.
away
him
from
the bosun ordered
to move
standing. But
where he was
when Guevara
argues
Maritime
the district
move,
momentarily caught
to
he
tried
denying
judg
court erred
its motions for
grating.
of his
in the catwalk
notwithstanding
tread
boot
ment
the verdict on Gue
himself,
Freeing
jumped
negligence
from the
Guevara
vara’s
and
unseaworthiness
challenges
jury’s
being hit
claims. Maritime also
catwalk to the deck below to avoid
for Maritime’s
gangway.
failure to
maintenance and cure. We
fall. He
Guevara
his knee
first consider whether there is sufficient evi
injury
promptly reported his
to the third
jury’s
finding
dence to
that Mari
Despite
given
mate and was
assistance.
his
negligent.
regard,
time was
In this
Mari
injury, Guevara continued to work on the
obliged
upstream against a
time is
to swim
(apparently
qualify for
bene-
vessel
to
union
of review
fast current because the standard
fits)
period
Upon
for a
of four months.
jury
in a
Act
applied
to be
to a
verdict
Jones
port,
saw a doctor
vessel’s return
Guevara
highly
jury’s
case
deferential. The
verdict
is
diagnosed
having
him
medial
who
a torn
complete
stand
there is a
ab
must
unless
liga-
meniscus and a torn anterior cruciate
See,
probative
support it.
sence of
facts to
Although initially
reluc-
ment.
Guevara was
e.g.,
Zapata
Wilson
Off-Shore
undergo surgery,
oper-
his knee was
tant to
(5th Cir.1991).
260, 266 n. 9
February
ated on
1991.
enough
evidence in the rec
There
Guevara, through
attorney,
his
made
ord to meet this lenient standard. Guevara’s
a number of formal demands on Maritime for
theory
liability
that he had been stand
beginning
and cure
on Febru
ing on the catwalk at the direction
Maritime, however,
ary
1991.1
made no bosun,
gangway
without
who then lifted
(Guevara)
De
payment until at least June
making
that he
was
first
sure
demands,
spite subsequent
captain
did not
of the vessel testi
position.
Guevara
The
safe
performs
if
payment
his
and final
until
the bosun is to blame he
receive
second
fied that
ascertaining
operation without first
such an
December
(now
day)
shipown-
$8.00 a
and medi-
cure" refers to a
often at the rate of
1. "Maintenance and
obligation
provide compensation
er’s ancient
torney’s
Garijak,
way.2
fees.” Morales
men are
harm’s
that none of his
(5th Cir.1987).
jury could have concluded from
bosun,
testimony
and hence Mari-
that the
shipowner
hable for
dam-
A
becomes
employer,
negligent.- Be-
time as his
was
pay maintenance can
ages when its refusal to
jury’s finding that Mari-
uphold
cause we
recalcitrant,
as callous and
arbi-
be described
negligent and therefore liable
time was
willful, callous,
trary
capricious, or
and
Act, we need not decide whether
the Jones
case,
jury
In this
persistent. See id.
jury correctly
found Maritime’s vessel
yes
question
answered
to the
whether Mari-
general maritime
unseaworthy under the
“arbitrarily
capriciously
failed
time
law.3
plaintiff, Domin-
provide maintenance to the
*4
timely
go
on a
basis?” and awarded
Guevara
B.
$60,000
damages.4 A
reasonable
challenge to
We now turn to Maritime’s
jury
have so concluded.
could
jury’s
punitive damages to
Gue-
first,
argues,
that Miles v.
vara. Maritime
parties stipulated that
at
Guevara’s
Apex
Corp.,
Marine
torney
demands for mainte
made formal
(1990),
317,
L.Ed.2d
Furthermore,
though
even
the Jones Act
presented
this case.
may
closely analogous
and DOHSA
not be
view,
seriously
ques
points
analysis
reference
in the Miles
with
my
calls into
Miles
cure,
respect
Long-
to maintenance and
availability
tion
Compensation
cure.
If the
shore and Harbor Workers’
nonpayment of maintenance and
(LHWCA),
Circuits,
§§
Supreme Act
33 U.S.C.
the Texas
First and Sixth
Court,
It has been
and
of the courts that have be.
said
maintenance
and all the rest
matter,
cure “is to
almost what work-
are correct that Miles
the seaman
considered the
compensation
is to the land worker.”
a cause men’s
bars
Norris,
unseaworthiness,1
26:1,
§
as I believe M.
The Law Seamen
at 3
action for
1985).
LHWCA, meanwhile,
are,
en banc should
ed.
they
then this Court
panel
compensation
“creates a worker’s
scheme for
seriously
previous
its
decisions
rethink
damages in maintenance
certain maritime workers which is exclusive
allowing punitive
Texaco, Inc.,
provide
Gray
of other remedies and does not
cure eases. See
and
Miller,
1457;
punitive damages.”
(La.App.), cert.
989 F.2d
610 So.2d
(exclusiveness
(La.1993).
§
see
U.S.C.
addition to the claim for one which it most seems . however, Subsequent Merry Shipping Vaughan, decisions have established Like that, fees, Merry Shipping squarely support addition to such does not Johnson, Relying Sample on dicta in Al-Zawkari v. American 1347 n. *8 Cir.1985), Steamship F.2d 8 871 590 n. Cir. 12 rt. ce 1989), one district court in the Sixth Circuit has (1986), 89 319 the Ninth L.Ed.2d punitive damages held that "a claim for under "[p]unitive damages Circuit stated in dicta that recog the doctrine of maintenance and cure is awardable, are in some circumstances to a sea Hoeffling nizable in this circuit." v. United payment man where for maintenance and cure is Steel, (E.D.Mich. F.Supp. States 792 1030 wrongfully part Sample, Relying- denied." in on 1991). Another district court in that Circuit has two district courts in the Ninth Circuit have held said that a recover "an award seaman of punitive damages that our, Riden are available. See punitive damages attorney's limited to Ow fees." 911-13; supra, F.Supp. at Nelsen v. Terminals, Inc., ens v. Conticarriers & (D.Hawaii Corp., F.Supp. Research (W.D.Tenn.1984) F.Supp. (original em however, 1992) (dicta). court, Another district phasis). suggested they Still another has that Voie, opposite reached the conclusion. See La not at all. See recoverable Mardoc Asbestos Case Clusters, supra, F.Supp. supra, F.Supp. at 600 n. 1. As at 831-32. Ridenour and La noted, recently gener Voie, conclusions, the Sixth Circuit held that reaching while different puni al maritime law does not allow of agreed dispos- that there is no Ninth Circuit case damages in a cause of action for unseawor itive of the issue. Miller, Miller, however, supra. thiness. See did specifically not discuss maintenance and cure claims. Pocahontas, however, upheld Merry Shipping. suf- Merry Shipping rule. the Holmes wrongful upon it damages for the fers from the fact that relied punitive Pocahontas, Vaughan. in cause of action for dissent in a seaman a death of holding, pointed of its As F.2d at 1051. the Second Circuit unseaworthiness. approvingly cited the First Merry Shipping Kraljic opinion: out in its decision, which, in the Pocahontas Circuit’s justified pu “The [Pocahontas ] Merry Shipping, “upheld an award words of damage primarily by relying nitive damages shipowner’s willful punitive for a of dissenting opinion Mr. on Justice Stewart’s withholding main- of a seaman’s and callous which, [Vaughan in v.] Atkinson as we F.2d at 625. Yet and cure.” 650 tenance indicated, have have would awarded exem holding in Pocahon- this endorsement damages concepts plary under traditional Merry clearly Shipping since tas is dictum necessarily not limited to the amount of and cure. As not involve maintenance did difficulty counsel fees. The obvious with noted, “The Holmes commentator has one approach is that the court followed the authority allowing an award of Court’s of in views the dissenters Atkinson and not readily damages apparent, not majority.” Kraljic, at was not at maintenance and cure because Kraljic, no of Holmes made mention even Davis, Merry Shipping.” Punitive issue though years it was decided six earlier. Cure, Damages Maintenance Kraljic, held that the Second Circuit willful 103, 108 Mar.Law. nonpayment of maintenance and cure entitles Furthermore, when one looks back seaman recover limit- Miles, of Merry Shipping with the benefit ed to the amount fees. Shipping Merry is doubt- becomes clear Kraljic court stated: holding Merry authority at best. The ful court, believe, “The we cor- [Pocahontas ] Shipping are avail- —that majority rectly perceived that both general maritime law—rested able under minority opinions in Atkinson essence upon assumptions, both of which were two found that were awarda- First, Merry Shipping capsized by Miles. ble maintenance and cure eases. The nonpecuniary losses are recovera- stated is, however, inescapable fact that the ma- general maritime law. See 650 ble under jority opinion in limited that re- Atkinson course, was proposition, at 626. That covery despite explicit to counsel fees rejected at squarely Miles. See 498 U.S. view of the that no such curb be dissenters Second, Merry at 325. S.Ct. imposed.” Id. at 415-16. argued unavailability of Shipping Finally, in order about the a brief word is Act under the Jones does case, Circuit’s Hines which was Eleventh unavailability general compel their under years Recog- three after Holmes. decided at 626. That maritime law. See 650 F.2d availability question nizing that on the however, reasoning, flatly inconsistent with dispos- damages, “Vaughan is not uniformity in insistence Miles’ only a claim for itive because that ease availability mari- asserted,” Hines, attorney’s fees was such as the Jones Act. time law and statutes court choose to F.2d at the Hines 27-29, 30-32, 111 See 498 U.S. ”, Merry Shipping guidance “[f]ollow[] Miles, Thus, it would because id., punitive damages in mainte- and allow longer Merry Shipping is no appear that *9 however, Again, Mer- nance and cure cases. good law. authority at ry Shipping questionable by case cited Holmes is the First The last best.5 sure, To Pocahontas decision. Circuit’s that Holmes relied up, sum the cases squarely punitive hold that To that case did the result upon cannot now available in maintenance and fees, attorneys’ eases, Vaughan awarded favorably cited in Holmes. and it was cure ping, one of them. Hines judges panel which was authored the Hines were on 5. Two of the per pre-split panel Merry Ship- was a curiam. Fifth Circuit the id., damages; Merry Shipping suggest did that the fees were meant to be a compensatory out-of-pocket for ex- award maintenance and cure and has not involve put it: penses. As one commentator Miles; and Po- probably been overruled clearly if Vaughan “Yet did not articulate upon Vaughan the dis- cahontas was based puni- compensatory such an award was or cite, that Holmes did not sent. Of the cases Initially, tive. the Court cited Cortes Kraljic to the limits employer’s an proposition that failure attorneys’ of fees and Hines relied amount timely payments to make of maintenance Merry Shipping. the now-dubious and cure entitle the seaman to the Holmes, arguable support of there is one necessary intimating expenses, remaining possibility that should be consid- compensatory. award was The ered, namely, Vaughan, only up- while stress, however, that the Court went on to fees, attorneys’ holding an award of an- payments defendant’s failure to make the principle than its result. nounced a broader callous, language was willful and that lends unquestionably Vaughan is the root of this puni- itself to the view that the award was hence, law; attempt area of we now entire Maslanka, Damages tive.” Punitive in the Vaughan determine how broad is. (1980); Admiralty, 5 Mar.Law. Davis, supra, at accord Vaughan, opinion by Doug- a brief Justice as to commentators are divided whether las, “ambiguous”6 has been described as and Vaughan award was intended to be com- “cryptic”7 rightly so. What is clear is —and pensatory8 punitive9 or in nature. Douglas upheld an that Justice Fortunately, deciphering Vaughan, we attorneys’ to a where his fees seaman em- enigmatic are not confined the text ployer deliberately payment had withheld opinion unexpressed or the intent of its au- maintenance and cure. The confusion sur- Vaughan thor. Since was decided in theory Doug- rounds the under which Justice Supreme Court has cited it seven attorneys’ fees. las awarded On the one cases. Each of these cases concerns the hand, adjectives Douglas that Justice fees; shifting attorneys’ none of them employer’s used to behavior— describe cases, concerns maritime law. In all seven “callous,” “recalcitran[t],” persis- “willful and Vaughan support- the Court has treated tent,” Vaughan, 369 ing exception to the so-called “American imply that the award was meant to litigants generally 999— Rule” that must bear their hand, be a sanction. On the other case, own costs. the first such Chief his statements that a seaman is entitled to Vaughan Justice Warren read as establish- “necessary expenses” recover and that ing compensatory fee-shifting: basis for lawyer go seaman “was forced to hire a exceptions “Limited to the American rule him,” get plainly to court to what was owed ... have been sanctioned this Court Raduazzo, Black, Flynn, Cooper 6. 1 BE. D. & G. Bene 9. See G. Gilmore & C. The Law of Admi Admiralty § (2d dict on at 4-80 rev. ed. 1975) ralty (Vaughan ed. “awarded what 1991). essentially punitive damages were under the Mallor, fees.”); name of counsel Punitive Attor Robertson, Judge Rubin’s Maritime Tort Deci- ney's System, Fees Abuse Judicial sions, 52 La.L.Rev. (1983) (“Although N.CX.Rev. the Su Moore, ¶ 8. See 6 J. Moore’s preme Federal Practice 54.- Court awarded the seaman fees 78[3], (2d 1986) ("The at 54-503 n. 29 ed. compensatory damages, under the rubric of [Vaughan expenses ] court found that ... emphasized the role that bad defendant's faith rightly part the suit could compensatory damage."); Norris, be treated as played causing damages.”). had those That 30; id. at 54-504 n. the award was was also the view of 26:41, (“The supra § at 111 allowance of Rowe, Judge Rubin. See Sanchez justified by counsel fees was virtue of the inclu- (5th Cir.1989) (“Fees were awarded [in 'necessary expenses' damage sion arising as items of Vaughan shipowners’ ] on basis of the bad- suffering physical out of the handi- response underlying to the faith seaman's cap give the failure which follows mainte- claim.”). Judge Rubin has been described as cure."); Reinschreiber, supra, nance and at 312 *10 (“the acknowledged “an [Vaughan] master of the maritime field.” majority attorney’s award[ed] Robertson, compensatory damages"). supra, fees as an item of at 1527.
1289
may
now
be otherwise.
preme
view
justice
Court’s
overriding considerations
when
1943,
Cole,
1, 93
36
v.
412 U.S.
S.Ct.
In Hall
appro
a result.
In
such
compel
seemed
(1973),
Brennan stated:
702
Justice
L.Ed.2d
held,
circumstances,
an ad
we have
priate
“Thus,
unquestioned that a federal
it is
counsel
may be awarded
miralty plaintiff
to a success-
may
counsel
award
fees
compensatory
an
fees as
item of
opponent has acted in
his
party
ful
when
taxed).”
(not
cost to be
separate
as a
faith,
wantonly,
op-
vexatiously,
or for
bad
Corp. v. Maier
Distilling
Fleischmann
cases,
this class of
pressive reasons.
718,
714,
Co.,
87 S.Ct.
Brewing
U.S.
386
is,
shifting’
underlying rationale
the
of‘fee
(1967) (empha
1404, 1407,
475
18 L.Ed.2d
course,
essential ele-
punitive,
the
added).
sis
triggering the award of fees
ment in
of ‘bad faith’ on the
the existence
therefore
however, Vaughan has
Brewing,
Maier
Since
5,
litigant.” Id. at
part of
unsuccessful
proposition
for the
to stand
now come
added;
(emphasis
internal
at 1946
93 S.Ct.
may
be awarded
attorneys’
sometimes
fees
omitted).
marks
quotation
has
opponent
his
party when
prevailing
a
in the re-
reasoning was reaffirmed
Hall’s
litiga-
in the conduct
in
acted
bad faith
NASCO, Inc.,
v.
501
of Chambers
cent case
said,
commentator has
As one
32,
2123,
tion.10
L.Ed.2d 27
111 S.Ct.
115
U.S.
Hall,
(1991).
uniformly cited as a foun-
Court
the Chambers
Vaughan
Quoting
now “is
exception
“in
of the bad-faith
said:
the case
ex-
‘bad faith’
so-called
case
dational
Rule,
underlying ratio-
‘the
to the American
rule.” Reinschreib-
ception to the American
”
is,
course, punitive.’
“fee-shifting”
nale of
compensato-
purely
er,
supra, at 312.11
53,
Even three
111
at 2137.
at
S.Ct.
Id.
not
aired
Vaughan has
been
ry description of
Hall for the
in
cited
dissenters
Chambers
Brewing.12,
Maier
majority opinion since
in a
for the bad
that “the rationale
proposition
short,
view is
current
the Court’s
75,
at
punishment.”
Id.
exception
faith
is.
be understood
Vaughan
should
fee
J., dissenting).
(Kennedy,
at 2148
111 S.Ct.
litiga-
conduct in
for bad-faith
as a sanction
rejected
specifically
Court
The Chambers
tion.
petitioner that fee-
argument made
This
compensatory
character.
shifting is
Vaughan in-
However,
knowledge that
our
said,
utterly,” id.
“fails
argument, the Court
does
immedi-
a bad-faith fee-shift
volved
15,
54,
because even
at 2137 n.
111 S.Ct.
at
type
of that
are
awards
ately tell us whether
compensatory
may
fees
have
though the
Although some
punitive.
compensatory or
purpose
punitive.
primary
effect, their
attorneys’
an award of
have asserted
con-
analogized to
for civil
fines
The Court
to the
exception
compensatory
conse-
the bad-faith
tempt,
fees under
which
design.
quence
but
compensatory,13 the Su-
rule is
American
have,
112,
retrospect,
Indus.,
characterized
tators
Valley
Inc. v. Local
10. See Summit
2112, 2114,
involving
faith'
719-721,
the ‘bad
717,
Vaughan
72
decision
102 S.Ct.
456 U.S.
rule.”). Professor
(1982);
exception
the American
Express,
Roadway
Inc. v.
L.Ed.2d 511
2455,
interpretation
765-67,
752,
the bad-faith
Moore calls
100 S.Ct.
Piper,
U.S.
447
Moore, supra, at
(1980);
view.”
2464,
Runyon
Vaughan "a revisionist
v.
65
488
L.Ed.2d
2586,
Supreme
183-85,
may,
Court is
160,
that as
54-506. Be
McCrary,
96
427
S.Ct.
U.S.
meaning of its
(1976);
obviously the final arbiter
Alyeska Pipeline
49 L.Ed.2d
precedents.
Society, 421 U.S.
Serv. Co. Wilderness
258-59,
44 L.Ed.2d
Marshall,
dissenting opinion, once
in a
12. Justice
States,
(1975);
Co. v. United
F.D. Rich
interpretation
compensatory
revived the
116, 128-30,
40 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
S.Ct.
Alyeska,
U.S. at
Vaughan.
See
1, 4-6,
Cole,
(1974);
412 U.S.
Hall
Vaughan
("the attorney’s
]
[in
fee award
at 1633
36 L.Ed.2d
pri-
part legitimately
as a
included
was
Lehman,
entitled,
Siegler,
plaintiff
Inc. v.
was
Accord Lear
mary
11.
to which
relief
(9th Cir.1988) ("Although Vaughan
litigation
adjustment
ancillary
an
rather than
However,
Supreme
opinion
admiralty,
previous
subse-
Court
expenses").
sounded in
Court,
example of bad
en-
quently
the case as an
had
construed
Justice Marshall
written for
justifying
Vaughan.
F.D.
faith conduct
view of
bad-faith
dorsed the
Green,
litigation generally.”);
From
S.Ct. at
fees in civil
Rich
Fees,
Attorney’s
69 Cornell L.Rev.
Here to
Reinschreiber, supra,
("Both
(1984)
13. See
the Court
commen-
232 n. 148
*11
above,
upon
might
said,
Based
it
seem that
quoting
As the Chambers Court
from
“
Kraljic got
right:
below,
Second Circuit
it
the Fifth Circuit decision
‘[f]ee-shift-
Vaughan
award was a form of
dam-
ing
a
here is not matter of substantive reme-
age,
but one limited to the
of attor-
dy,
vindicating judicial authority.’”
but of
neys’
Chambers,
reading
fees. A careful
55,
Nasco,
Id. at
(quoting
S.Ct. at 2138
however, belies
the view
awards made
Radio,
Inc.
Calcasieu Television and
exception
under the bad-faith
to the Ameri-
(5th Cir.1990)).
interpre-
This
essentially punitive
can rule are
damages.
comports
tation
Vaughan.
with the facts in
The Chambers Court drew a distinction be-
shipowner’s liability
Because the
for mainte-
pursuant
tween fees awarded
to the bad-faith
clear,
perfectly
nance and cure was
it was an
exception,
which are based
a federal
litigation process
require
abuse of the
him
power
parties
court’s inherent
to sanction
“go
get
plainly
to court to
what was
owed
behavior,
litigation
their
and other “fee-shift- him laws that are centuries old.”
ing
embody
rules that
policy,
a substantive
Vaughan,
which the example, was an
not in a true damages. sense Puni- are awarded on the basis of the case,
merits of a whereas bad-faith fee-shift-
ing sanctions litigation abuses of the process.
